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I began teaching comparative genocide studies at Macquarie 
University in Sydney almost a quarter of a century ago. 
Exploring with students the scale and dimensions of a dozen 
cases of this ‘crime of crimes’, I found myself muttering about 
the need for markers or symbols to distinguish the immensity 
and proportions of the events, in short, their magnitude. I got 
no further than suggesting we borrow terminology from 
criminal justice systems which distinguish between murder 
and manslaughter, between degrees of intent in those crimes, 
between murder in the first and second degree, or as between 
a principal in the first degree and an accessory in the second.  
I left it at that until April 2012 when I addressed a 
conference on ‘The Holocaust and Legacies of Race in the 
Post-Colonial World, 1945 to the Present’, a joint enterprise 
between the Universities of Cape Town, Southampton and 
Sydney. My theme was that Holocaust and genocide studies 
need to develop a ‘Richter-Scale’, a set of criteria which 
measures, however broadly, the immensity of a genocide 
much in the way that seismologist Charles Richter’s 
magnitude scale denotes the level of energy produced by an 
earthquake. I am hardly suggesting a logarithmic 10-number 
formula, or anything as literal as that, but rather a generally 
recognisable order of magnitude—assuredly not for the sake of 
claiming in some quantitative way which event is the first, 
second or third, or which the ‘biggest’, ‘smallest’ or ‘worst’ 
explosion. There should be no room for a victimhood 
competition, but there is certainly place for a clear indication 
of the sometimes great variations from a single (or, rather, a 
multifactor) norm; a way to find similarities and differences 
between cases and within cases; and a way of distilling the 
core of the events so that we can do better than simple 





exceptional—the terms that are evoked by the Holocaust. 
Some genocides, like the Jewish and Armenian events, are 
those things, but we need to delve deeper, to take into account 
and then examine a variety of components, ingredients, 
causative factors and outcomes. Within the components there 
are further degrees or gradations to be examined, such as the 
hierarchies of perpetrators, the differences in bystander 
behaviour, the qualities and quantities of rescue efforts, 
variations in victim resistance, similarities and differences in 
long-term impacts on targeted victim groups, in post-
genocidal justice, in reparations mechanisms and their results.  
Briefly, for the sake of convenience, accessibility and 
coherence, I list six major clusters for the assessment of a case 
of genocide: (1) the prerequisites of, or pre-cedents or 
precursors to, the event; (2) the actual genocidal event; (3) the 
post-genocide analyses; (4) the immediate aftermath of the 
genocide; (5) the long-term legacies of the genocide; and (6) 
other significant contributing factors. At first blush this could 
appear to be an autopsy model—a quantitative inquest into 
events that have occurred. But when completed, this ‘Richter-
Scale’ will have to be both multi-dimensional—retrospective, 
reflective, prospective—and driven by a process or technique. 
The process needed can well be something like the thematic 
approaches to medicine: (a) ‘epidemiological’, that is, looking 
at the distribution of cases, their patterns, incidence, 
prevalence, influences, and their determinants; (b) 
‘preventive’, staving off rather than having to treat the 
behaviour; (c) ‘diagnostic’, identifying and confirming the 
‘disease’ from its signs and symptoms; (d) ‘prognostic’ in the 
sense of describing and forecasting the likely outcomes of the 
warning signs; (e) ‘curative’, that is, intervening by treatment 
and remedy of a particular ongoing situation (f) ‘post-
mortem’, in the autopsy sense; and (g) ‘rehabilitative’, the 
manner and nature of repair and recovery. Mixing metaphors 
from history, medicine, law and seismology may seem a 





Under (1) precursors, history is essential. I suggest 
examining material on the birth (and death) of nations, of 
failed states, as seedbeds for genocide, together with the 
chronicle of intolerance, dehumanisation of the victims, and 
violence towards them. The perpetrator’s intent, which often 
varies, is crucial: criminal acts rest on both intent and action 
(sometimes inaction). Separate is the matter of motive, which 
often varies from one genocide to another. There is a seeming 
omnipresence of a race factor in these events. Here race 
includes antipathy to any group’s physical characteristics, or 
ethnicity, religion, language or culture; race and racism are 
not confined, historically, to colour. Without these precursors 
we get what I call ‘X-Files’ history—where bad guys arrive 
suddenly from outer space, wreak their terrible evil, and are 
vanquished by the good guys in, at most, a decade.  
In (2), the physical action, we have to assess the scale and 
dimension of the crime, its actual duration as well as the 
immediate antecedent factors, the pace of the event, the 
methods employed (which, as we know, range from deliberate 
starvation to the building of death factories), the role and 
nature of several variations of bystanderism, rescue and 
resistance.  
The task of (3), the post-event analyses, involves looking at 
complicity and companionship in the genocide, responsibility and 
agency, the participation of the professions and the participation of 
the public. The two latter items are seriously under-researched. 
The period of aftermath (4) includes determining 
accountability, addressing the problems of punishment and 
justice, and the vexed matter of both apologies and reparations. 
The consequent denialism is a key issue and as with so many 
of genocide’s other ingredients, there are at least ten varieties 
of this phenomenon, one of which is the appropriation of 
victim history.  
As to (5), the legacies, we need to look at the long-term 
outcome of the event and at the victimhood of the entire targeted 





scar victim peoples for generations, they sometimes tend to 
replace or displace the targeted group’s earlier history and 
achievements, leading to the genocide becoming the sole or 
major fulcrum of their ethnic identification.  
Finally, under (6), there are, inevitably, other significant 
factors, such as whether the events occurred in wartime or 
peacetime, the nature of the perpetrator’s form of governance, the 
limitations on the perpetrators of geography, and the entire 
(vexed) question of intervention. There may well be additional 
considerations. 
My recent monograph—Genocide in Australia: By Accident 
or Design?1 —portrays a history of both physical killing and 
forcible removal of children, both clearly acts of genocide but 
behaviours that spanned well over 100 years and occurred in 
‘dribs and drabs’. Not only the small coterie of professional 
denialists, but many colleagues and students insist that this 
history is so clearly different from that ‘other planet’, 
Auschwitz, or the ghastly streets of Kigali, that it can’t be 
considered in the same breath or in the same encyclopaedia of 
genocide. It can, and the ‘Richter’ proposal would locate that 
case in a wide canvas and show just how different but 
genocidal is Australia’s past.  
Each of these italicised aspects in the scale will need 
exposition, explanation and detailed critical analysis. For 
example, the issues of complicity, the professions, 
dehumanisation, responsibility, aftermath and apology can come 
together in two very different genocides. Australia began 
                                                 
1 An online and hard copy essay, published in 2011 by the Monash 
Indigenous Centre and the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, 
Monash University, Melbourne. The essay is accessible from either of 
their websites by clicking on the heading ‘Indigenous human rights 
and history’ in the Castan website, or under ‘MIC Research’ for the 





physical killing of Aborigines in the very early 1800s and 
ceased doing so in the late 1920s; the forcible removal of 
Aboriginal children began in the 1840s and ended in the late 
1980s. The national apology was only formalised in the 
Federal Parliament on 13 February 2008. The German doctors 
did what they did between 1933 and 1945 and the formal 
apology has only now come from the Bundesärtztekammer 
(German Medical Association) on 23 May 2012, exactly 67 
years after the last medical killings in the 'T4' euthanasia 
program. 'Contrary to popular beliefs’, the Physicians’ 
Conference said, 'doctors were not forced by political 
authorities to kill and experiment on prisoners, but rather 
engaged in the Holocaust as leaders and enthusiastic Nazi 
supporters'.2 In June 2012 the Annals of Anatomy (Anato-
mischer Anzeiger) published the results of a 2010 symposium 
on German anatomy in the Third Reich.3 The editors rightly 
ask why it took 65 years to acknowledge what was done. 
'Forgive and forget' is a common enough catchcry, but 
forgiveness and forgetting are not synonyms, and both issues 
still loom large for [all] victims and their descendants. 
The American philosopher Henry Theriault of Worcester 
State University in Massachusetts is joining me in researching, 
revising, expanding and arguing the case for this ‘Richter’ 
proposal as a taxonomic and diagnostic tool. Hopefully, the 
publication, possibly in short book form, will assist not only 
students but also some colleagues who constantly agitate, and 
sometimes bicker, about the nature of events in Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Libya, Syria, Darfur, the Nubian Hills, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, the treatment of Karen tribes 
in Burma, Indian communities in the Amazon, and San 
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Bushmen in Botswana. The H–Genocide list-serv is an acute 
indicator of these arguments and contentions. This scale could 
well be useful (and used) in the policy areas of governments.  
Coincidentally, the need for clearer differentiation 
emerged with the two most recent volumes of Genocide Studies 
and Prevention. In this official journal of the International 
Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS), the last two 
volumes4 were dedicated to critical reflections on the state 
and future of genocide studies. In one of the 18 essays, my 
friend and colleague Robert Melson made a significant 
comment: ‘(1) that there are significant differences between 
modern or contemporary genocides and the mass murders of 
the past; (2) that there is no single explanation for genocide 
since there are different types of genocide that require 
separate explanations; and (3) that the testimonies of victims 
and survivors must be taken into account in order to better 
understand the motives of the perpetrators and bystanders 
and give victims and survivors a voice in the narrative of 
destruction.’ This is not the place to analyse his analysis, but 
significant here is the (correct) assertion that there are 
different types of genocide that require different explanations.  
The contributions  
The essays in Genocide Perspectives IV were submitted before 
this ‘Richter’ proposal was articulated. Those accepted (after 
peer-review) were not included because of their illustration of 
such a scale, but in most instances they do illustrate and 
further define several of the components of that framework.  
Seven of the essays deal directly with one or other form of 
complicity, perhaps the most under-researched aspect of 
genocide as legally defined. Complicity, according to Article 
III of the 1948 Genocide Convention, is a crime, and 
                                                 





punishable. Complicity is not really that difficult to 
comprehend: among other things, it can mean collusion, 
connivance, collaboration, involvement, abetment or, in 
popular parlance, being in cahoots. It also means being a 
companion to events in the sense of ‘going along with’ a 
system—knowing, nodding, shrugging but still either aware, 
accepting or benefitting in some way. Two of the essays here 
analyse the specific involvement of the healing professions, 
and another the complicity of the silent churches during the 
events. Complicity is also a major factor in various forms of 
denialism, such as the appropriation of the victims' experience, 
in the open acceptance of perpetrators as desirable 
immigrants, in ‘closing chapters of history’ that are, in fact, 
not closed at all.  
Most contributions treat the issue of dehumanisation, the 
worthiness and unworthiness of targeted groups, including 
children. Two essays consider the quest for justice and the 
punishment of genocidaires; others deal with efforts at victim 
rescue and relief, rehabilitative therapies for victims, the 
prevention of genocide, and the search for some optimism in a 
world of utter darkness. Several contributions provide what 
Melson insists on—the voices of victims, even the mute ones 
exhumed from archives.  
Many still believe that genocide is the result of a 
megalomaniacal despot wreaking evil or vengeance, and if 
not one man, then a group of ‘true believers’ dedicated to the 
annihilation of a real or imagined enemy, or the acquisition of 
its land and assets. Yehuda Bauer and Raul Hilberg, two great 
Holocaust historians, have always insisted on the role of a 
‘compliant bureaucracy’, without which neither one man, nor 
his true-believing cohorts, nor his specially trained death 
squads, can achieve his or their purpose. Bureaucracy 
inevitably involves the professions, and apart from medical 
men, too little has focused on them. We know a great deal 
about the Nazi doctors, from their trial at Nuremberg to the 
books by, among others, A Mitscherlich and F Mielke (1949), 





(1997), Benno Müller-Hill (1998), Götz Aly (1994, 1999) and 
Paul Weindling (2005).5 More works by men like Max 
Weinreich and Konrad Jarausch are needed to address the 
other professionals who have engaged in genocidal ideology 
and implementation. Weinreich addressed the matter of 
‘Hitler’s professors’ way back in 1946, and Jarausch (1990) has 
dealt with lawyers, teachers and engineers.6 Among others, 
Susan Benedict7 has assessed the role of nurses during the 
'T4' euthanasia programs; and Edwin Black has truly audited 
the IBM corporation and its complicity in the Holocaust, 
providing the mechanical means of counting (victims) by 
Hollerith tabulating machines.8 But there is need to examine 
                                                 
5 Mitscherlich, A and Mielke, F (1949), The Death Doctors, London, 
Elek Books; Lifton, Robert J (1986), The Nazi Doctors: Medical killing 
and the psychology of genocide, London, Macmillan; Proctor, Robert 
(1988), Racial Hygiene: Medicine under the Nazis, Cambridge MA, 
Harvard University Press; Burleigh, Michael (1997), Ethics and 
Extermination: Reflections on Nazi genocide, Cambridge UK, Cambridge 
University Press; Müller-Hill, Benno (1998), Murderous Science: 
Elimination by scientific selection of Jews, Gypsies and Others, 1933–1945, 
Cold Spring, Harbor Laboratory Press; Aly, Götz, Chroust, Peter and 
Pross, Christian (1994), Cleansing the Fatherland: Nazi medicine and 
racial hygiene, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press; Aly, 
Götz (1999), ‘Final Solution’: Nazi population policy and the murder of the 
European Jews, New York, Oxford University Press; Weindling, Paul 
(2006), Nazi Medicine and the Nuremberg Trials: From medical war crimes 
to informed consent, New York, Palgrave Macmillan. 
6 Weinreich, Max (1946), Hitler’s Professors: The part of scholarship in 
Germany’s crimes against the Jewish people, 1999 edition, New Haven, 
Yale University Press; Jarausch, Konrad (1990), The Unfree Professions: 
German lawyers, teachers and engineers, 1900–1950, New York, Oxford 
University Press.  
7 Benedict, Susan (2003), ‘Killing while Caring: The nurses of 
Hadamar’, Issues in Mental Health Nursing, 24, 5, January, 59–79. 






the many others—the accountants, architects, chemists, 
dentists, economists, journalists, pharmacists, physicists, 
surveyors, writers—who were either complicit as accessories 
or companions.  
Michael Dudley and Fran Gale offer sharp insights into not 
only doctors but psychiatrists and other helping professions 
in a state bureaucracy. They have chosen the Judeocide as 
their framework—because it offers the starkest model yet of 
how the educated professions ought not to behave and 
because this case is so well documented and researched. 
Above all, they demonstrate the degrees of complicity in the 
collective abandonment of the ethics and codes of conduct 
both inherent and patent in their professions. They address 
the matter, however briefly, of professional associations and 
the manner in which they do not disassociate from members’ 
behaviour—and in that sense, condone it. They treat the 
phenomenon of evil, obedience, conformity, the significant 
issues of bystanderism, the matter of ‘knowing’ yet denying, 
and the possible reasons for ‘good’ behaviour in rescue 
efforts. Paul Bartrop’s examination of instances where ‘good 
breaks out during genocide’ is a significant companion to this 
discussion, particularly as he has chosen case studies outside 
of the Holocaust.  
A significant adjunct to the Dudley–Gale analysis is the 
Robert Kaplan and Garry Walter essay which explores the 
continuity of some appalling psychiatric notions and practices 
that have assailed genocide from the precursor era to the 
Nazis, through to the Nazi ideologies, and beyond to the 
more recent genocidal events in Bosnia. Importantly, the 
authors take us back to the forerunners of much of Nazi 
medicine, the Turkish doctors and their role in the genocide of 
Turkey’s three Christian minorities. The Serbian era is not 
closed, with Karadzic and Mladic on trial at The Hague (at 
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this time of writing). Hitler apart, we have little in the 
genocide literature on the socialisation, mindsets and 
personalities of perpetrators, and this essay ‘humanises’ these 
inhumane destroyers of people. While they touch on the 
Soviet era of psychiatry, we should remember that 
profession’s role in that despotic, erratic, brutal slice of the 
twentieth century’s genocidal history.  
Most scholars are interested in what the eminent historian 
Saul Friedländer called the ‘transmission belts’ of genocide. 
Obeying orders is generally considered significant, and in 
several essays here we have references to Stanley Milgram’s 
obedience experiments in the United States. Dehumanisation of 
the victims is considered essential if ‘ordinary people’ are 
expected to participate in the genocidal processes. And it is in 
bureaucracies that we find the essence of that de- or non-
humanising, the depersonalising and 'de-biologising' of those 
who are human. Bureaucracies are rarely places of innovation. 
Traditionally they are places of inertia. But once they develop 
a theme and a rhythm, they gather a momentum difficult to 
stop. They also develop a special language and lexicon for 
specific domains of administration. Rowan Savage sets the 
tone in his insightful analysis of what Philip Zimbardo has 
called ‘administrative evil'—of how the dehumanising 
processes of bureaucracies facilitates genocide. Savage cites 
George Orwell’s observation that special phraseology is 
needed if one wants to name things without calling up mental 
images of them. Thus genocide almost always involves a new 
vocabulary for victims, words needed to turn them into 
something other than one’s kindly general practitioner, 
lawyer or accountant, other than one’s friendly neighbour or 
old school mate. The Nazis were not alone in devising a new 
lexicon for their actions, executions and victims.9 
                                                 






Animalisation and insectification are the keys to 
dehumanisation (both in the language of bureaucracy and in 
the physical actions in the killing fields), and dehumanisation 
in turn is a ‘legitimation’ of bureaucratic behaviour before, 
during and often enough, after the genocide. The Savage, 
Kaplan and Walter, and the Woodcock essays provide keys to 
comprehending this dimension of genocide in the Jewish, 
Rwandan, Bosnian, Romani and other cases.  
Collusion and involvement don’t have to be by way of 
physical acts of commission. Complicit passivity, negativity 
and omission are nowhere better illustrated than in the case of 
the churches during the Holocaust. My essay deals with the 
simple mechanics of wanting and not wanting, that is, a state of 
mind—whether individual, collective, corporate, or 
national—that is unwilling to act, or that doesn’t want to act, 
even when it has the capacity to do so. Not wanting to act 
often involves what Yehuda Bauer calls ‘hostile 
indifference’—and such was the story of both Protestant and 
Catholic churches, certainly in Germany, during the Nazi era. 
My view is that there is a much richer field of research here 
than spending more time examining psychological 
experiments on obedience, or more pointedly, conformity. It 
is also a plea for looking at the simpler questions and the 
simpler answers about human behaviour. We don’t always 
have to resort to the concepts, high theories, new models and 
methodologic obsessions that now beset so much of the social 
sciences and humanities. Paul O’Shea, an internationally 
recognised authority on the Pius XII era, examines the Vatican 
archival records available to see some of the things that were 
wanted, not wanted, what was done and not done, in the case of 
Slovakia and its head, the priest Jozef Tiso, the willing and 
                                                                                             
Examples of Nazi Idiom‘, Yad Vashem Studies, 5, 133–67; Friedlander, 
Henry (1980), ‘The Manipulation of Language’, in Friedlander, 
Henry and Milton, Sybil (eds), The Holocaust: Ideology, bureaucracy, 





compliant assistant of Berlin. As terse as is some of his 
archival material, it is extraordinarily revealing. In one short 
column, and in the same breath so to speak, we have a 
Vatican lament about the death of two Vincentian priests in 
Auschwitz, the deportation of 70,000 Slovakian Jews, and a 
letter from the Chief Rabbi of the British Empire, Joseph 
Herman Hertz, begging the Pope for help—the terse reply to 
which was that ‘the Holy Father is doing all he can’.  
All genocide analyses look hard, and often unavailingly, 
for accountability and adequate punishment for the very few 
who are believed responsible for a genocide. The matter of 
justice, reparations and apologies for the many individual 
victims and for the targeted group as a whole are matters akin 
to quicksilver—visible but difficult to grasp, to apply, to 
appease or assuage the legacies of anguish. Winton Higgins 
examines the whole question of historical justice following the 
Nuremberg trials, and the way in which those innovative 
trials helped develop a new and invigorated sense of the rule 
of law and its implementation. His account of the context of 
the Nuremberg trial is fascinating and alive, yet ends in 
pessimism because of the way the United States, the driving 
force in this new post-war jurisprudence, has turned its back 
on the Nuremberg achievements by abjuring the new 
International Criminal Court. Where indeed is the saga of 
punity for genocide heading, even as we watch the tedious 
and tendentious trials of Slobodan Milosevic, deceased 
midstream, and now Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, 
both ailing at The Hague? A particularly fitting companion 
piece is Ruth Balint’s tale of Károly Zantai, accused of a 
Jewish murder in Hungary, who is still, at this moment of 
writing in June 2012, contesting his extradition to Hungary. 
She demonstrates what tenacious field and library research 
can produce even on one ‘nice old man’, unblemished in his 
Australian life, whose days are ending in ignominy thousands 
of kilometres from the scene of his actions. As Michael Dudley 





closed episode’.  
One of the major puzzles about the Genocide Convention 
of 1948 is how the fifth act of genocide in Article II, ‘forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group’, came to 
be included. The first three acts defined in Article II clearly 
derive from the immediate vortices of the Armenian, Pontian 
Greek and Assyrian genocides and the Holocaust, and are 
indicative of a recent, short, sharp physical attack on the 
victims. But the fourth act, sterilisation, and the fifth on child 
removals, are suggestive of a much longer-term aim, a much 
longer time frame, than the acutely physical. Panayiotis 
Diamadis illuminates the appalling dynamic of children as 
victims of genocide in Canada, Australia, Turkey, Nazi 
Germany and Greece. Scholars tend to mention only one case 
of ‘auto-genocide’, the destruction of a genocidaire’s very own 
people, namely, Cambodia. But Greeks forcibly removed their 
own children during an ideological and political battle after 
World War II—and that tale is both illuminating and frightful.  
Shannon Woodcock takes us into the world of the ‘Tigani’, 
the Romani people of Romania—the ultimate victims of social 
pariahdom and unworthiness. ‘The Tigan is not a man’ is the 
title of her (2005) doctoral thesis and here she shows how 
these Romani people—stereotyped as uneducable, lazy, 
convicted, ‘morally dangerous’ and nomadic—were deported 
to Transnistria [an artificial geographic term created in World 
War II] and often to death. Her account includes first-hand 
testimony of people wrongly ‘categorised’ and here we find 
something of what Robert Melson insists is essential—the 
voice of the surviving victims in the chronicle of their 
negation as citizens and their destruction as humans. She also 
admonishes Western scholars for persisting with the use of 
the word ‘Gypsy/Gypsies’ in their writing. The Balint essay 
allows us to hear some of the voices of victims, perpetrators 
and witnesses then—rather than the post-event analyses by 
those who were not there. The voices of those involved are 
audible, even as they reside in archive drawers. David 





narrative therapy for victims of the Rwandan, Jewish and 
Aboriginal genocides. Their essay gives us a remarkable 
connection between these three victim groups. In reality, 
narrative therapy embodies the direct voices of survivors, 
evocative, poignant, yet optimistic about having to live each 
day in the shadow of their disaster, each day with tears and 
memory, each day having to live next door to the perpetrators 
who wanted to kill them. [Woodcock appeals for just such a 
post-genocidal narrative therapy for the Tigani in Romania.] 
The voices here are mostly communal, dramatically showing 
both the pain endured during the genocide as well as the 
short- and longer-term legacies and outcomes of that 
catastrophe.  
Genocide intervention and prevention have become (only 
relatively recently) major topics in contemporary scholarship. 
Isabelle Macgregor and Devin Bowles analyse some of the key 
issues and make a strong and eloquent plea for looking at 
what my ‘Richter-Scale’ proposes at the outset, namely, the 
‘upstream’ factors that underlie an incipient genocide, with 
the obvious premise that addressing some of the pre-cedent 
features of an at-risk community can prevent an actual 
genocide, and if not prevent entirely, then at least mitigate it 
in some way. In today’s technological age, there is no shortage 
of instruments to detect these early warning factors. The 
prevention aspect of genocide is now, somewhat belatedly, 
coming more fully into focus.  
Paul Bartrop’s account of ‘good’ amid the ‘evil’ is not, and 
doesn’t pretend to be, a definitive analysis or a finite 
understanding of altruism, a topic of some weight in the 
literature but one which has produced no definite answers as 
to why people, sometimes ‘unlikely’ people, behave the way 
they did. His short cameos give us a glimpse into the kind of 
people who were prepared to take inordinate risks to rescue 
those destined for death. Amid the gloom that is genocide, we 





darkness, as in Jerzy Kosinski’s nihilistic novel, The Painted 
Bird.10 Vicken Babkenian explores the dimensions of both 
awareness of the Turkish onslaughts on Christian minorities 
from 1915, and the rescue and relief attempts in places as far 
away as Australia. From him we learn two things. First, that 
in genocide there can be a good sense of wanting, a 
willingness to act when you have the capacity to do so. 
Second, how to engage in ‘double-think’, the term George 
Orwell used to describe the capacity to hold two 
contradictory ideas in one’s head simultaneously and not see 
the dissonance—in this case, Australian help, including 
official help, for victims of the Turks while engaging in a ‘love 
affair’ with the perpetrators, the arch-enemy Turks.  
In the Genocide Perspectives series to date, some 
contributions have been commissioned and some volun-
teered. Some of the authors have been internationally 
recognised authorities;11 others have been Australian scholars, 
many of them of the ‘young brigade’. The growth of genocide 
scholarship here has been quite spectacular since the mid- to 
late-1980s. University courses are not ‘thick on the ground’ 
but several universities have specific courses or teach aspects 
of genocide. The secondary school curricula offer some case 
studies and a new national curriculum in the offing will allow 
teachers more room for the subject. While Australian 
insularity is evident in political and judicial comments that it 
was ‘all a long time ago and far away’, genocide is pretty 
much in the daily lexicon, and the dreaded ‘G’ word is now 
much more commonly discussed in relation to Aboriginal 
                                                 
10 A novel published in 1965. It is the story of either a Romani or a 
Jewish boy wandering alone and helpless around Europe during 
World War II. There is no rescue, no salvation or redemption.  
11 Including Kurt Jonassohn, Zdzislaw Jan Ryn, Jürgen Matthäus, 
Richard Breitman, Vahakn Dadrian, Eric Markusen, Damir Mirkovic, 
Rubina Peroomian, Steven Jacobs, Christopher Saunders, Alan 






For me, the most significant emergence has been the way 
scholars have moved to a broader approach in their thinking 
and writing, comparing and contrasting, moving away from 
micro-analyses of one case and looking at a broader spectrum 
of concepts and cases. And while the 20th century was, indeed, 
the century of genocide, giving rise to literally thousands of 
works on the events of that time, there is still a need for more 
study of the ‘cold cases’ of genocide in antiquity, the Middle 





‘WITH SCORN AND BIAS’: GENOCIDAL 




The quantification of nature, which led to its explication in 
terms of mathematical structures, separated reality from all 
inherent ends and, consequently, separated the true from the 
good, science from ethics. —Herbert Marcuse1  
…political language has to consist largely of euphemism, 
question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenceless 
villages are bombarded from the air, the inhabitants driven 
out into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts 
set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called pacification. 
Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and sent 
trudging along the roads with no more than they can carry: 
this is called transfer of population or rectification of frontiers. 
People are imprisoned for years without trial, or shot in the 
back of the neck or sent to die of scurvy in Arctic lumber 
camps: this is called elimination of unreliable elements. Such 
phraseology is needed if one wants to name things without 
calling up mental pictures of them. —George Orwell2 
Orwell is, of course, the dean of investigators into the political 
use of bureaucratic and euphemistic language to conceal the 
reality to which it refers, and which it constructs. This essay 
examines this set of utterances in episodes of genocide and 
mass killing: it is an analysis of the ‘regimes of practices’—to 
use Michel Foucault’s term—contingent upon the emergence 
of modernity. These regimes spawned a discursive strategy of 
bureaucratic dehumanisation that legitimised the mass killing 
of collectivities categorised according to demography, and 
                                                 
1 Marcuse, H (1972), One Dimensional Man, London, Abacus, 121.  
2 Orwell, G (1961), ‘Politics and the English Language’ in George 





dealt with these collectivities—that is, oppressed and killed 
them—in rational-instrumental fashion.  
My intent is both simple and specific: to examine the role of 
bureaucratic discourse and structure as a form of dehumanisation in 
genocide and genocidal killing. I do not intend to mount a 
general critique of bureaucratic centralisation as a system of 
power, though I draw upon such critiques to inform my 
argument. Nor will I present a more general case concerning 
bureaucracy as a functional aspect of state governance which 
makes genocide possible, though many aspects of such an 
argument have points of relevance to my subject matter. Both 
of these arguments—that is, general critiques of bureaucracy 
as a system of domination, and a claim concerning the 
centrality of bureaucracy in toto as an aspect of modernity 
which is deeply implicated in the practice of genocide—have 
been well outlined in the literature. My purpose, and the 
originality of my contribution, is not to recover this ground, 
but rather to use it as a point of departure to examine 
bureaucratic dehumanisation as a discursive strategy.3 I look 
at the way in which this strategy came to be constituted, how 
it is internalised and enacted by perpetrators within bureau-
cratic systems, and how it may discursively construct its 
objects in ways which legitimise genocidal action to-ward 
them. 
‘Bureaucracy’ 
How are we to define ‘bureaucracy’? While both bureaucratic 
practice and modern society have changed a great deal since 
the time of his writing, Max Weber’s definition of bureaucracy 
                                                 
3 For full discussion of the conceptualisation of genocidal 
dehumanisation as a discursive strategy, see Rowan Savage (2009), 
‘Genocidal Dehumanisation as a Discursive Strategy in the Modern 





is still a good ‘shorthand’ to identify what is meant. Weber’s 
bureaucracy is an ‘ideal type’, one which is not fully manifest 
in any (or every) given situation.4 In principle, bureaucracy is 
understood as a system of domination which is centralised, 
hierarchical, governed by a set of general, rational(ised) rules 
and based upon written documents, in which authority is 
graded in levels, particular bodies have fixed jurisdiction, and 
the (appointed) office of the individual is separate from her or 
his person (in terms of private life and domicile).5 In 
analysing bureaucracy, it is important to distinguish between 
its aspect as a delegated structure of responsibility, and as a 
record-keeping exercise. Both of these aspects have roles to 
play in dehumanisation, roles which will become clear. The 
critiques of bureaucracy which we encounter here will show, 
first, how contra Weber, the necessity, neutrality, and 
rationality of modern bureaucracy as a system have been 
challenged; and second, the way in which this system, as a 
system, is deeply implicated in the enactment of death and 
destruction, what Philip Zimbardo terms ‘administrative 
evil’.6 
Bureaucratic management can be considered both a 
technique and a technology. Kathy Ferguson writes that ‘[t]he 
term “bureaucratization” refers to the invasion of disciplinary 
technique into both the discursive and the institutional 
                                                 
4 For a problematisation of Weber via Bauman’s argument on 
bureaucracy and genocide, see Bloxham, D (2008), ‘Organized Mass 
Murder: Structure, Participation, and Motivation in Comparative 
Perspective’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol 22, no 2.  
5 Weber, M (1948), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (ed and trans 
H H Gerth and C Wright Mills), London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
196–200. 
6 Zimbardo, P (2007), The Lucifer Effect: Understanding how good people 
turn evil, New York, Random House, 381; Zimbardo’s analysis is 






practices of a particular realm of human relations…reshaping 
both the roles and the events available to people, and the 
language commonly used to describe those events, along 
bureaucratic lines.’7 With regard to the human, it has been 
argued—most notably by Weber—that bureaucracy’s ‘specific 
nature…develops the more perfectly the more [it] is 
“dehumanised”’, that is (according to this logic), the more it 
operates under the principle of sine ira ac studio, ‘without 
scorn or bias’.8 The material presented here will not analyse 
this claim regarding the function of bureaucracies in 
completing tasks, but it will be shown to be utterly false in the 
relationship it posits between dehumanisation and equal or 
respectful treatment.  
I deal here with the ‘realm of human relations’ which 
pertains to bureaucratic mass killing. I examine, first, the 
inherently dehumanising tendencies of bureaucracy as a 
system and their specific implication in mass killing; and 
second, bureaucratic and euphemistic language which names 
victims as non-sentient objects. This most often occurs in 
bureaucratic utterances in which individuals are referred to as 
‘pieces’, ‘units’ and so forth, but it may also occur in more 
direct metaphors in which victims are thought of or referred 
to as, for example, ‘logs’. The salient feature here is that 
victims are ‘de-biologised’; they are entirely denied agency 
and individuality; they are removed from the question of the 
moral order in regard to their status as objects of action; and 
they are turned into units of production (though ‘destruction’ 
might be the more appropriate term9). It will become apparent 
                                                 
7 Ferguson, K E (1984), The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy, 
Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 37. 
8 Weber, From Max Weber, 215–16. 
9 On the efficiency of organisational processes of destruction in the 






that even non-bureaucratic de-biologising utterances tend to 
follow and emerge from the patterns created by modern 
bureaucratic discourse, and that such utterances are 
intimately connected with overtly bureaucratic dehuman-
isation.  
Structure and subject 
I outline the historical developments which created the 
system and the discourse of bureaucratic management, and 
the inherent ideological tendencies which were ‘built in’ to 
this system from its inception. I trace the ways in which 
bureaucratic-genocidal dehumanisation emerges, first, from 
the centralising project of modernity and the (nation-)state; 
second, from the mass scale on which ideology thus became 
able to be realistically conceived and action logistically 
executed; and third, from the tendency, not to ignore the 
existence of the individual as such, but to perceive, categorise 
and act upon the individual as an idealised type, and only as 
a representative of that idealised type. I show the way in 
which bureaucratic and euphemistic construction creates 
social, moral, physical and psychological distance which 
makes invisible the victims’ humanity and the meaning or 
reality of involvement in action taken against them. I analyse 
the way in which the logic of bureaucratic discourse and 
practice is weighted against the humanisation of victims, 
before turning to the differences between the nature and use 
of bureaucratic and euphemistic discourse on the part of 
bureaucratic ‘middlemen’ in the killing process, and on the 
part of direct killers.  
The purported nature of the ideal bureaucratic-rational 
system is that it is free from affect, and that its very purpose is 
to deal with, and to make comprehensible, processes 
concerning concrete physical reality. In contrast to this aspect 
                                                                                             






of its own ideological self-representation, the bureaucratic 
style tends to be heavily euphemistic in its reduction of every 
item to a unit which is interchangeable with other units in the 
same category, the specific nature of which is not important to 
the process. Bureaucratic discourse therefore produces 
euphemistic language including (as we will see) the 
classification of humans as ‘units’. Bureaucratic management 
also produces non-verbal dehumanisation—for instance, the 
tattooing of numbers onto some of the Nazi camp prisoners at 
Auschwitz. I also deal with non-bureaucratic euphemistic 
language which names victims as inanimate objects—but may 
nonetheless relate to production, the better to associate killing 
with activities which do not produce equal psychic or 
cognitive dissonance. The connections between these forms, 
which at times seem unrelated, should become clear later. At 
this point, it suffices to say that bureaucratic and non-
bureaucratic euphemism often work hand-in-hand, as in the 
Nazi case, where euphemisms which were not strictly 
bureaucratic, such as Endlösung (final solution), were used 
within official circles (indeed, euphemistic language, or lying, 
was itself specifically known as the ‘language rule’) along 
with strictly bureaucratic euphemisms relating to units, 
numbers, and so forth. These two related types of utterance, 
while not always present in the same situation, are mutually 
reinforcing.  
Modernity, bureaucracy and the State: the creation of 
distance 
‘I am not a number, I am a free man!’ ran the memorable 
catchphrase from the 1960s television series The Prisoner. 
While most people accept, grudgingly or otherwise, that 
modern mass society must be run on centralised bureaucratic 
principles in which statistics are the method by which policy 
decisions affecting individuals are made, this does not mean 
that being treated as a statistic does not cause fear and 





given that this discursive strategy objectifies the individual 
and denies her/him agency in the construction of the nature 
of his/her own identity. The conceptualisation of the 
individual as one ‘unit’ among other identical units of the 
same kind (whatever the category chosen) allows the making 
of decisions which impact on individuals, without reference 
to their humanity—as Weber puts it, ‘[t]he “objective” 
discharge of business primarily means a discharge of 
business…“without regard for persons”’10 —and therefore 
without reference to the human impact of such decisions. In 
modern bureaucratic society, emotional distance is created 
between the decision-maker or facilitator in a centralised 
position of power, and the object of her or his decision. In the 
words of James Waller, ‘[r]educed to data, dehumanised 
victims lose their moral standing and become objects 
requiring disposal’.11 The most famous example of the 
murderous bureaucrat who manages to disavow connection 
with the consequence of his or her actions is, of course, Adolf 
Eichmann; but as we will see, Schreibtischtäter (‘desk 
murderers’) are not confined to the Nazi genocide.  
According to Zygmunt Bauman (to whom, with Weber 
and Herbert Marcuse, this essay is indebted), ‘the essence of 
bureaucratic structure and process’ is the sole focus on 
instrumental-rational criteria for means, and the consequent 
dissociation of ends from moral evaluation.12 This occurs 
through ‘the meticulous functional division of labour’, and 
                                                 
10 Weber, From Max Weber, 215. 
11 Waller, J (2007), Becoming Evil: How ordinary people commit genocide 
and mass killing (2nd revised edn), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
208. On bureaucratic distance and psychological impact, see also 
Bloxham, ‘Organized Mass Murder’, 218. 
12 Bauman, Z (1989), Modernity and the Holocaust, New York, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 98. See also Opotow, S (1990), ‘Deterring 





‘the substitution of technical for a moral responsibility’.13 
How has this discursive formation emerged? We can begin to 
answer through the examination of a number of 
characteristics of the modern bureaucratic society—namely, 
the physical size and internal distances of units of 
governance, along with new technologies of communication; 
the psychological distance which accompanied its physical 
counterpart; the assumption of ethical authority by the state; 
and discourse emerging from Enlightenment ideology 
valorising ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’ as ends and as moral good 
in themselves. 
In the modern era the (nation-) state model, along with the 
rise of mass society, involved, as the standard method of 
governance, the centralisation of power and the 
implementation of demographic techniques of population 
conceived and enacted from the centre14 (made possible by 
modern technologies of speedy communication over long 
distances, technologies Weber calls ‘the pacemakers of 
bureaucratization’15). The physically-distanced nature of 
modern society in itself has repercussions; as Bauman 
observes, ‘responsibility is silenced once proximity is eroded; 
it may eventually be replaced with resentment once the fellow 
                                                 
13 See also Betton, J and Hench, T J (2000), ‘“Any color as long as it’s 
black”: Henry Ford and the ethics of business’, Journal of Genocide 
Research, vol 4, no 4, 539, on technical responsibility. See also 
Huggins, M K, Haritos-Fatouros, M and Zimbardo, P G (2002), 
Violence Workers: Police torturers and murderers reconstruct Brazilian 
atrocities, Los Angeles and London, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 170–72. 
14 On the techniques of population in the context of mass killing, see 
Semelin, J (2007), Purify and Destroy: The political uses of massacre and 
genocide, New York, Columbia University Press, 338–39. 





human subject is transformed into an Other’, a process which 
may be all the easier considering the lack of intimate 
knowledge of the other occasioned by physical distance.16 In 
this society, ‘the distance at which human action may be 
effective and consequential…grow[s] rapidly’; but the 
capacity of the moral drive remains limited to the proximity 
of the individual.17  
The distance created by modern bureaucratic systems is 
both physical and psychological.18 Bureaucratic organisation 
creates a class of ‘middlemen’ (bureaucrats) who are vital to 
the enacting of power, but who do not feel a connection with 
these actions inasmuch as they neither order action (in the 
sense of deciding what action will be taken), nor physically 
carry it out.19 Bauman writes that, as opposed to the 
conditions inhering in the pre-modern order, in the 
bureaucratic division of labour ‘most functionaries of the 
bureaucratic hierarchy may give commands without full 
knowledge of their effects’.20 It thus becomes possible for 
action to be disavowed by every party involved: ‘[f]or the 
person on whose behalf they are done, they exist verbally or 
in the imagination …The man who has actually done them, on 
the other hand, will always view them as someone else’s and 
                                                 
16 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 193. This is not to say that 
familiar proximity always inhibits violence, as we see in episodes 
like the Rwandan genocide. 
17 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 193. 
18 For a discussion from a psychoanalytic perspective of the 
satisfactions and fulfilments for the individual of involvement in 
bureaucratic destructiveness, see Alford, C F (1990), ‘The 
Organization of Evil’, Political Psychology, vol 11, no 1, 18–20. 
19 Bandura, A (1999), ‘Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of 
Inhumanities’, Personality and Social Psychology Review, vol 3, no 3, 
199. 





himself as but the blameless instrument of an alien will’.21 The 
division of any action into minute, functional, separate tasks 
spreads responsibility so thinly that no individual need feel it 
in regard to the final action:22 ‘the organization as a whole is 
an instrument to obliterate responsibility’.23 As Waller notes, 
the larger the group is, the less responsibility is felt by any 
individual.24 The acceptance of personal responsibility is also 
inhibited by the fact that ‘[t]he bureaucratic division of 
labor…creates an ethos in which refusing to kill would only 
alienate—in a condemnatory fashion—one’s friends and 
colleagues and, in the end, not deter in the least bit the killing 
operations’ (a subject to which we will return).25 Ultimately, 
responsibility is both displaced onto the agency of others, and 
diffused to the point of non-existence.26  
Furthermore, bureaucratic language (similar to that often 
used by perpetrators reporting their own participation in 
                                                 
21 In Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 25; see also Milgram, S 
(2005), Obedience To Authority: An experimental view, London, Pinter 
and Martin, (1st edn 1974), 9–10; Bandura, A (2002), ‘Selective Moral 
Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency’, Journal of Moral 
Education, vol 31, no 2, 106–08. 
22 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 100; see also Waller, Becoming 
Evil, 247–50; Milgram, 12–13; Bandura, A, Barbaranelli, C, Caprara, G 
V, and Pastorelli, C (1996), ‘Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in 
the Exercise of Moral Agency’, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, vol 71, no 2, 365. 
23 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 163. 
24 Waller, Becoming Evil, 248. 
25 Waller, Becoming Evil, 250. 
26 Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara and Pastorelli, 365; Bandura, 
‘Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities’, 196–98; 
Bandura (1990), ‘Selective Activation and Disengagement of Moral 





brutality) can be characterised as an ‘agentless, passive style’ 
which serves as a linguistic tool to create the appearance that 
action (in this case, action which might on other 
interpretations appear immoral) is ‘the work of nameless 
forces rather than people’:27 Stanley Milgram calls this 
‘counteranthropomorphism’, the attribution of an impersonal 
quality to forces which are human in origin and 
maintenance.28 Bureaucratic processes thereby not only allow 
the evasion of responsibility, but create their own momentum, 
both actual and psychological, and, as we will see, ultimately 
become their own end.  
Another aspect of the rational, centralised and 
bureaucratic nation-state (and nationalist) model of 
governance is the usurpation of supreme ethical authority by 
state powers on behalf of the societies which they rule.29 ‘The 
good of the nation-state’ (or, as Weber put it, ‘reasons of 
state’) becomes the ultimate ethical authority, and technical 
experts are in turn employed to advise on action which in 
itself becomes a foregone, unquestionable conclusion.30 
Following from this, Milgram notes that a specific 
characteristic of modern society is the way in which it teaches 
individuals to respond to impersonal authorities.31 In Rwanda, 
according to Alison Des Forges, the claim by perpetrators that 
                                                 
27 Waller, Becoming Evil, 12; see also Bandura, ‘Selective Moral 
Disengagement’, 105; Bandura, ‘Moral Disengagement in the 
Perpetration of Inhumanities’, 195; Bandura, ‘Selective Activation 
and Disengagement’, 32. 
28 Milgram, 10. 
29 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 199. See Bloxham, ‘Organized 
Mass Murder’, 203. 
30 For a case study from Nazi Germany, see Mierzejewski, A C (2001), 
‘A Public Enterprise in the Service of Mass Murder: The Deutsche 
Reichsbahn and the Holocaust’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol 15, 
no 1, 33–46. 





they killed because authorities told them to kill, reflects not a 
predisposition to obey orders but a recognition that the moral 
authority of ‘the state’ made ‘the unthinkable’ both thinkable 
and do-able.32  
The rise of the distance society, operating in the 
framework of the model of the state, was necessarily 
accompanied by a massive expansion both of the techniques 
and discourse of bureaucracy, and of the bureaucratic classes. 
Bureaucratic demography was intimately informed by 
Enlightenment ideals which made ‘rationality’, placed in 
opposition to a devalued ‘emotionality’, a guiding principle 
and ideology of management and governance—the ideal, as 
Weber puts it, is ‘[t]he “objective” discharge of business 
…according to calculable rules and “without regard for 
persons”’.33 Ideology that depicts bureaucracy as a rational 
and pragmatic system dealing with concrete reality also 
conceals the value-laden metaphorical nature of the language 
which it employs. Marcuse, following Weber, calls this 
ideology ‘technical rationality’ and views it, at least in the 
Nazi case, as the ‘legalized terror of bureaucratisation’, an all-
embracing instrument and apparatus of mass domination.34 
Logic, in Marcuse’s view, emerges from and must pay tribute 
to systems of domination; rationality, expressed as an 
hypothetical system of forms and functions, is dependent on a 
pre-established universe of ends (ends which, as part of this 
process, conceal their pre-established nature); and rationality 
                                                 
32 Des Forges, A (1999), ‘Leave None To Tell The Story’: Genocide in 
Rwanda, New York, Human Rights Watch, 12. 
33 Weber, From Max Weber, 215 (original italics). 
34 Marcuse, H (1998), Technology, War and Fascism: Collected papers of 






develops not only in, but for this system of ends.35 Within this 
discursive-ideational system, the individual is literally 
reified—turned into a res, a thing, whose only pertinent 
qualities are those which are quantifiable.36 Ultimately, in 
modern society the ‘rational’ is inherently political, and—
rather than the irrational, as in some commonly held theories 
about oppressive social domination—it becomes the most 
effective vehicle of mystification.37 In this process, ‘the object 
world (including the subjects) is experienced as a world of 
instrumentalities’ in which ‘[t]he technological context 
predefines the form in which objects appear’.38 ‘Rationality’ (a 
means) comes to be seen as an end in itself, and as such 
conceals the actual purpose, or end, for which action is taken 
(as, for example, genocide and genocidal killing). 
We have examined the characteristics of modern 
bureaucracy and their relationship to dehumanisation; what, 
we now ask, is the relationship between the system itself, and 
the individual within this system?  
The individual within the bureaucratic system 
How are individuals subsumed into a bureaucratic system? 
                                                 
35 Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, 137. 
36 Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, 138. 
37 Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, 153. 
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be reminded here of the way in which ‘rationality’ or ‘reason’ has 
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The characteristics of bureaucracy outlined in the introduction 
tell us something about the way in which this process occurs. 
As Marcuse contends:  
bureaucracy…emerges on an apparently objective and 
impersonal ground, provided by the rational specialization of 
functions, and this rationality in turn serves to increase the 
rationality of submission. For, the more the individual 
functions are divided, fixated and synchronized according to 
objective and impersonal patterns, the less reasonable it is for 
the individual to withdraw or withstand…The rationality 
embodied in the giant enterprises makes it appear as if men, 
in obeying them, obey the dictum of an objective ration-
ality…Private power relationships appear not only as 
relationships between objective things but also as the rule of 
rationality itself.39  
This ideological representation of harmony between the 
special and the common interest is delusive.40 Marcuse also 
suggests that the creation or expansion of an ideologised 
bureaucracy (as in Nazi Germany) offers numerous novel 
opportunities and creates a new elite, factors which in 
themselves bind individuals to bureaucracies and to the 
organisations which created them.41 As we have seen, the end 
to which the apparatus of bureaucracy works is its own 
maintenance on an increasingly efficient scale;42 therefore, 
                                                 
39 Marcuse, Technology, War and Fascism, 57–58. Marcuse draws a 
value-distinction between private bureaucracy, and effectively 
democratic public bureaucracy which the argument of this essay 
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bureaucracy may be generalised. 
40 Marcuse, Technology, War and Fascism, 57. 
41 Marcuse, Technology, War and Fascism, 75–76. 
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every individual within the apparatus has an incentive to 
work toward this end. In Marcuse’s words, ‘morale has 
become a part of technology’.43  
As well as this, bureaucracies are mass groups which are 
large enough that the individual is not personalised or known 
to all other members, but small enough to maintain the 
characteristic of being a group. Thus the moral obligation of 
individuals comes to be owed to the organisation to which 
they belong, and to individuals within that organisation, not 
to the objects on which they act.44 In sum, moral concerns do 
not relate to the action one performs, but rather to how well 
one lives up to the expectations of authority and/or to those 
of one’s (organisational) peers.45 This, furthermore, is a self-
reinforcing process: individual bureaucrats, observes Weber, 
have ‘a common interest in seeing that the mechanism 
continues its functions and that the societally exercised 
authority carries on’.46 In the bureaucratic situation, that is, a 
group identification occurs on the part of the individual 
                                                                                             
over efficiency within bureaucracies contributed to the Holocaust, 
see Mixon, F G Jr, Sawyer, C and Trevino, L J (2004), ‘The 
bureaucracy of murder: empirical evidence’, International Journal of 
Social Economics, vol 31, no 9, 855–67.  
43 Marcuse, Technology, War and Fascism, 161. 
44 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 99, 195; Bandura, ‘Moral 
Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities’, 196. 
45 Milgram, 10, 147–48; this phenomenon has also been documented 
in detail by Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 159–66, 
by Hannah Arendt in her study of Adolf Eichmann (1983), Eichmann 
in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil [revised and enlarged 
edition], New York, Penguin, 22, 92, and, in regard to the 
expectations and judgements of one’s equals rather than one’s 
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which ‘carries with it a repression of conscience where “outside 
values” are excluded and locally generated values 
dominate’.47  
Bureaucracy and individual morality 
What exactly are these ‘locally generated values’? Bureaucratic 
language charts the progress of labour, best expressed in 
statistics, which ‘say nothing about the nature of the operation 
or its objects’.48 In other words, bureaucratic discourse diverts 
any question of morality from the object, while concealing its 
human nature. What occurs as a result of these processes is, in 
Bauman’s words, a state in which every action is multifinal: it 
‘can be combined and integrated into more than one meaning-
determining totality. By itself, the function is devoid of 
meaning, and the meaning which will be eventually bestowed 
on it is in no way pre-empted by the actions of its 
perpetrators’.49 In short, ‘technical responsibility…forgets that 
the action is a means to something other than itself’.50 It is 
only the performance of the act which is in question: Milgram 
calls this process a ‘narrowing of moral concern’.51 Further-
more, the euphemistic terminology of modern bureaucracy, 
which over time seeps increasingly into everyday language, in 
itself distorts meaning regarding action. Marcuse identifies 
this as ‘functional language’, ‘the language of one-
dimensional thought’, which identifies things and their 
functions. We may more specifically state here that, in terms of 
people, the individual is identified, firstly, with the collective, 
and secondly, with the effect that collective is said to have on 
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‘society’. Not only the non-human world considered as such, 
but also human beings and actions themselves, become 
Heideggerian ‘standing-reserve’. Such language, by its 
internally constructed terms of reference, validates itself and 
grants itself immunity against contradiction, and denies 
possibilities of distinction and complexity.52 This charac-
terisation holds even (or perhaps particularly) when language 
‘does not transmit orders but information’.53  
In itself, this aspect of bureaucracy may not seem directly 
related to dehumanisation. It is the dehumanising discursive 
strategy which constructs humans as objects that allows 
calculation to take place with the least possibility of ‘moral 
calculus’ regarding ends intruding: ‘the language in which 
things that happen to [humans] (or are done to them) are 
narrated, safeguards its referents from ethical evaluation’.54 
This discourse of technical expertise assures the psychological 
distance of both ‘desk-murderers’ and ‘hands-on’ perpetrators 
from their victims.55 Bauman offers the example of Willy Just, 
a German technical expert who gave advice on improvements 
to Nazi gas vans so that ‘fluids’ would flow to the middle, 
allowing ‘thin fluids’ to exit the van and ‘thicker fluids’ to be 
hosed out afterwards.56 The ‘personality type of the technical 
expert’, writes Weber, is strongly furthered by the 
bureaucratisation of all domination.57 The fact that feelings of 
moral responsibility continue to exist—but oriented toward 
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fulfilling a technical role, rather than toward the ends or 
consequences of action—means that, in perpetrators’ own 
eyes, their essential goodness is endorsed, allowing them to 
feel more ‘human’ and to return to society after the 
commission of their deeds.58 Indeed, this situation, in which a 
perpetrator has entered into the realm of authority of their 
own free will, and recognises the justifying ideology of the 
actions demanded, secures not only obedience, but willing 
obedience, ‘accompanied by a strong sense of doing the right 
thing’.59 Finally, a bureaucratic structure which rewards 
loyalty and performance creates a situation in which 
professional self-interest can play a role in perpetrator 
attitudes to the task to which they have been assigned;60 this 
includes their understanding of the meaning of victims’ 
existence and of their actions toward victims.  
Many examples can be found of the way in which the 
system outlined above binds willing perpetrators to systems 
of mass killing. Hannah Arendt argued that the ‘horribly 
painstaking thoroughness’ of Nazi genocide could be traced 
to the notion (very common in Germany, she added) that to 
be law-abiding is not only to obey laws, but to identify one’s 
own will with the principle behind the laws.61 In pre-colonial 
Rwanda, there was a well-developed system of hierarchical 
organisation and structure of authority, a fact that the Belgian 
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colonisers considered ‘a major factor for progress’.62 Also 
well-developed were institutions of labour mobilisation and 
requisition, a practice which would continue in colonial, and 
post-colonial, systems such as the umuganda (obligatory 
communal work).63 It is worth noting here that Rwandan 
genocide was often characterised as ‘communal work’—that 
is, both as familiar and morally unambiguous ‘work’ rather 
than ‘killing’ as such, and as an activity authorised by, 
ordered by, and for the good of the community—meaning 
that to reject such work was to betray the community.64 
Indeed, Philip Verwimp proposes as a representative example 
of this narrative the similarity between a 1979 exhortation of 
President Juvénal Habyarimana’s to communal work in order 
to ‘attack’ the problem and ‘destroy the forces of evil’, and the 
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language used in 1994 to refer to the killing of Tutsi.65 
Furthermore, the agricultural nature of much umuganda 
worked in tandem with the euphemistic framing of killing as 
‘chopping down the tall trees’ (a theme to which we will 
return). After the genocide, many perpetrators explained their 
actions by reference to the importance of obeying ‘the law’ 
(igeteko) or ‘the authorities’.66 
We can conclude with Marcuse that in the modern society, 
domination and administration have ceased to be separate 
and independent functions.67 The system is designed such 
that the individual comes to self-identify with that system; if 
not on all levels, certainly to the extent that the incentive to 
perform binds him/her to the system and seriously obstructs 
not only possibilities, but also the conceivability, of 
meaningful resistance.  
In speaking of tendencies which support oppressive 
domination, two other properties of modern bureaucracy 
must also be noted. First, Weber argues that the chief 
influence on ‘the bureaucratic tendency’ was the need created 
by standing armies and by the connection of public finance 
with the military establishment, developments of the modern 
era; 68 this itself should tell us something about the nature of 
bureaucracy. Indeed, the military metaphor is frequently seen 
in genocide, and all the more so given that genocide is often 
carried out in periods of warfare. In Rwanda, for example, 
Tutsi were often depicted in an essentialised fashion as 
‘accomplices’ of the rebel RPF, or as the generalised ‘Tutsi 
enemy’ or Inkotanyi: Scott Straus concludes that ‘killing Tutsi 
                                                 
65 Verwimp, 350. 
66 Straus, The Order of Genocide, 137, 159–60, 173, 219–21. 
67 Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, 92. 





was inseparable from the language of war’.69 Second, 
bureaucracy innately lends itself to concealment and (public) 
euphemism.70 As Weber notes, for those within the system 
superiority is enhanced by keeping secret their knowledge 
and intentions, meaning that this tendency is built into the 
system: ‘[t]he concept of the “official secret” is the specific 
invention of bureaucracy, and nothing is so fanatically 
defended by the bureaucracy as this attitude, which cannot be 
substantially justified beyond these specifically qualified 
areas’.71 
Some of the psychological states mentioned above are not 
innovations of the modern age—for example, the 
displacement of moral responsibility of those ‘acting on 
orders’. This should not blind us to the fact that in the modern 
system as it was created in the West and then imposed, more 
or less thoroughly, on a global scale, these common 
psychological processes were employed in the creation of a 
new model of governance, and a new society. Physical, 
psychological, emotional and moral distance was created 
between those who enacted or supported power, and the 
objects of such action. Modern bureaucratic management was 
not and is not a neutral tool which can be put to any ends; it 
contains various propensities and tendencies, outlined above, 
which in some circumstances may be considered to be offset 
by other benefits, but in other contexts contribute 
immeasurably to the existence and operation of systems of 
destruction.72 
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Genocidal and non-genocidal bureaucracy 
We have seen the way in which the rise of the modern 
bureaucratic state allowed the removal of ‘moral calculus’ 
from the enactment of violence, and the way in which this 
process takes place both on the level of executive or collective 
decision-making, and at the individual level. From this 
premise, it may be objected that there is nothing uncommon 
about the fact that genocidal states use this kind of language 
about their subjects; that this fact has nothing specific to tell 
us about genocide, and that bureaucratic centralisation and its 
impact on society has already been exhaustively explored. 
Bauman acknowledges this objection when he writes that ‘the 
adverse impact of dehumanisation is much more common 
than the habit to identify it almost totally with its genocidal 
effects would suggest’.73 Taking this train of thought a step 
further, Donald Bloxham criticises Bauman’s reading thus: 
To some degree genocidal structures inevitably will resemble 
the political systems in which they are embedded, and so 
Zygmunt Bauman, who locates the character of the Holocaust 
within the bureaucratic mindset that he sees as central to its 
perpetration, may be saying only that Nazi Germany was a 
modern state, which is self-evident.74  
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Bauman has indeed located the murderous social 
reorganisation of the Holocaust, and, by extension, other 
genocides, within the realm of the massive, rational, ordering 
process of modernity in which ‘everyone will be transported 
from their present, contingent site to the place where reason 
orders them to be’ (including nowhere).75 And it is true that a 
bureaucratic system is the practice of the modern capitalist 
state or institution, no matter what substance it is dealing in 
(oil, sugar or people) and, furthermore, that it always deals 
with people in this way. An example can be found in the fact 
that every modern, Western, human society already, on a 
massive scale, treats biological beings (namely, animals and 
plants) in exactly this fashion: as interchangeable items 
representing a class, and as units of production. Far from 
being a counter-example, this demonstrates, first, that the fact 
that this is the standard system of organisation in such 
societies is intimately involved in the expression of 
dominance over particular groups; and second, that an 
enabling aspect of the enactment of such dominance upon 
humans is that it is discursively related to other forms of the 
enactment of dominance which are conceived as less morally 
problematic. As Bauman writes, ‘the civilizing process is, 
among other things, a process of divesting the use and 
deployment of violence from moral calculus, and of 
emancipating the desiderata of rationality from interference of 
ethical norms or moral inhibitions’.76 The infliction of 
genocide involves prejudice, in the sense of an emotional 
feeling of the lesser worth of or the danger posed by another 
                                                                                             
rather than a specific aspect of the Holocaust, can be read as 
supporting the argument that I present here.  
75 Bauman, Z (2000), ‘The Duty To Remember—But What?’, in Kaye, 
James and Stråth, Bo (eds) Enlightenment and Genocide, Contradictions 
of Modernity (Series philosophy and politics; no 5), Brussels, P I E–
Peter Lang, 50. 





collective, but also ‘the routine and unemotional function of 
modern society’.77 And both of these practices involve 
dehumanisation. 
Given that genocide and mass killing are the extremes of 
the expression of violent dominance, the following becomes 
clear. Such discourse functions constantly at a lower-key 
register on an everyday level (to allow one not to think about 
the rise in levels of domestic violence or homelessness, the 
treatment of refugees and minority groups, or the fate of the 
dead animal on one’s plate). But this means that it can be used 
as a model to create similar psychological-emotional states 
toward other circumstances, ones to which there has been less 
time to become habituated, which have not yet become 
socialised as norms, or which are periodical or circumstantial 
rather than ongoing. The very fact that decisions regarding 
action in mass society are, at least in principle, always made 
on the basis of statistical research and demography (whether 
they involve cuts in tax or cuts in welfare) means that the use 
of such language can normalise genocide. It makes genocidal 
action into just another task among many in the running of a 
well-ordered society, rather than leaving the possibility that it 
will be seen by the perpetrator as an unprecedented, 
extraordinary or qualitatively different event within her or his 
universe of meaning and morality.78 As Bauman puts it, ‘[t]his 
mode can be put to the service of a genocidal objective 
without major revision of its structure, mechanisms and 
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behavioural norms’.79 In Rwanda, according to Des Forges: 
[a]dministrators broke the genocide down into a series of 
discrete tasks which they executed without consideration of 
the ultimate objective of the work. Cultivators turned out for 
the long-standing practice of communal labor although they 
knew that they were to cut down people as well as the brush 
in which they found them. Priests announced public meetings 
without consideration of the message to be delivered there. 
Businessmen contributed money to the ‘self-defense’ fund 
established by the government as they had contributed to 
similar collections in the past, even though the money was to 
buy ‘refreshments’ for the militia and fuel to transport them 
to their places of ‘work’.80  
Such a process is self-sustaining, and contains its own 
momentum. Once individuals have been transformed into 
units, their very humanity ‘slows down the smooth flow of 
bureaucratic routine’, creating a ‘nuisance factor’ which 
means that individuals are considered not only with 
indifference, but with disapprobation and censure.81 To return 
to an earlier point, Bauman maintains that bureaucracy is not 
merely a tool, which can be used for good or bad ends; rather, 
‘the dice are loaded’, inasmuch as bureaucracy ‘has a logic 
and momentum of its own’; it is ‘programmed to seek the 
optimal solution’, and to measure that solution in a way 
which does ‘not distinguish between one human object and 
another, or between human and inhuman objects’.82 In 
genocide and genocidal killing, the rational sequence of the 
destruct-ion of victims (as outlined by Raul Hilberg), 
beginning with definition and ending with annihilation, is 
arranged, according to the logic of bureaucratic discourse, 
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precisely to evict the ‘object’ from the realm of moral 
obligation, with each step putting further distance between 
the victim, and perpetrators and bystanders.83 We may also 
consider Wolfgang Sofsky’s comment on categorisation in the 
Nazi camps: in itself, this system ‘created distances, intensified 
antagonisms and drew lines of social demarcation that none 
could cross…[it] guided social judgement by intensifying the 
perception of differences’.84 In the following section, I outline 
the way in which such categorisation dehumanises its objects 
and legitimises mistreatment and killing.  
Bureaucracy, categorisation and dominance 
In the introduction, I mentioned the way in which, in the 
modern age, individuals are categorised as representative of 
an ideal type. This type is chosen from among a pre-
constructed taxonomy of types which is itself in turn chosen 
from other taxonomies as relevant to the situation at hand:85 
that is, a situational ideological framework is created through 
which circumstance is comprehended and action taken. Paul 
Chilton, drawing on research in the cognitive sciences, argues 
that language which categorises in this way blends the 
cognitive domains or ‘modes’ of social intelligence with those 
of intuitive essentialism and technicality (tool-making). A 
naturalisation of the categories which are used takes place 
(categories which, though they may belong only to humans, 
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do not in themselves remind one of the humanity of their 
objects), and humans thus come to be classified as non-human 
things which can be instrumentally manipulated.86 In the 
discursive terms of modern technologies of population, in any 
given situation, one property is taken to be the defining 
characteristic of the individual (as a woman, Jew, Communist, 
et cetera), and that individual as such is synecdochal, is only a 
representative of the group of people who have that property, 
and who are a group only because they have that property.87 
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Bauman suggests that this kind of categorical abstraction ‘is 
one of modernity’s principal powers…genocide differs from 
other murders in having a category for its object’.88 In a 
possible endgame, the individual becomes representative only 
of that property itself: Jews come to be understood not just as 
likely to bear or spread disease, not just as a metaphorical 
disease which makes up part of a figure of speech, but as 
‘disease incarnate’89 (the Nazis also depicted them, and 
justified much of their treatment, as ‘criminals incarnate’). In 
Rwanda, Straus notes the way in which ‘over and over again’ 
Tutsi were spoken of by perpetrators as a unit, ‘a single entity 
with identical—and permanent—intentions’: the category ‘the 
Tutsi’ came to substitute for the individual.90 For many 
perpetrators, the central phrase of the genocide was recalled 
as ‘Umwanzi ni umwe ni umututsi’ (the enemy is one; it is the 
Tutsi).91 
Many scholars have shown the paradoxical nature of 
modernity, the way in which it contains its own 
contradictions. Thus, often-claimed dehumanising char-
acteristics of modern society have been associated both with 
the group (mass culture, bureaucracy, centralisation, 
standardisation, homogenisation) and with the individual (in 
the claim that social groups and the moral and social benefits 
they create, whatever they may be argued to be, are being 
destroyed due to capitalist-consumerist individualism). But 
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these positions are not necessarily as contradictory as they 
might seem, and the contradiction may be resolved by asking 
to what use a process is put: what is this process of 
production in fact producing, and at whose behest? The 
(identity of) the human individual must be conceptualised in 
the ‘gaze’ of the bureaucratic institution both as a 
demographic, and as a (single) unit of production—this 
concept can be seen as similar to Foucault’s definition of the 
two poles of development of modern bio-power: the anatomo-
politics of the human body, and that of the ‘species body’.92 
The fact of the individual’s existence as an individual is the 
locus of a process which, in conception, execution and aim, 
determines that the individual remain within the relevant 
category, and represent that category through his/her actions. 
This applies to all modern citizens, not only to victims but to 
their persecutors—though it should be affirmed that these 
categories are highly malleable according to time and 
circumstance: they are determined and produced by the 
question which is asked.93 In Bauman’s words, ‘[d]ehu-
manisation starts at the point when, thanks to the 
distantiation, the objects at which the bureaucratic action is 
aimed can, and are, reduced to a set of quantitative 
measures’.94 The definition of victims in this way ‘sets them 
apart as a different category, so that whatever applies to it does 
not apply to all the rest’—individuals become exemplars of a 
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type, and that type ‘seep[s] into their individualized image’.95  
Groups of people may often be divided, on paper, into 
various categories; but this is not usually done in order to 
physically destroy one group. In bureaucratic genocide, 
language already exists in which is inherent a certain 
categorisation of the object (to be dealt with as inanimate), 
accompanied by a certain moral-emotional state (apathy) with 
regard to that object; the use of such language is standard 
practice in mass situations. This allows the employer of such 
language to deny the fact of the victims as living individual 
humans who, under previous normativities, would have been 
owed at least a minimal amount of consideration and/or 
obligation as to the way in which they were treated. This 
language, then, is a self-fulfilling prophecy of genocide, one in 
which victims are named as inanimate matter before they are 
transformed into that state. 
The example of the genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda in the 
mid-1990s casts some light on these processes. At first glance, 
discussion of this case in terms of modernity and the state 
may seem counter-intuitive. The genocide took place during a 
period of civil war and administrative chaos, in which the 
official Rwandan government had collapsed after the 
assassinations of the President, Juvénal Habyarimana, and the 
Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana.96 Rwandan society 
was anything but highly modernised or industrialised; 
Rwanda was chiefly a subsistence agriculture economy, and 
the genocide itself can be characterised as ‘low-tech’ (in 
comparison to, for example, Nazi genocide). Given this, what 
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role can bureaucracy and bureaucratic discourse have played? 
In the first instance, Rwanda is a prime example of the way in 
which bureaucratic techniques of demography and 
population management generate a precondition for genocide 
by creating and shaping identity categories. While ‘Hutu’ and 
‘Tutsi’ were certainly identity categories in pre-colonial 
Rwandan society, they were categories which were both 
flexible and permeable. Between 1927 and 1936, the colonising 
Belgians—employing a divide-and-rule strategy typical of 
colonialism—(re)organised administration in the areas of 
education, state administration, taxation, and Church around 
these identities, took a census classifying every Rwandan as 
Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa, and issued identity cards bearing this 
information.97 Identity cards continued to be used in the post-
colonial period, and were employed during the genocide as a 
marker of identity, and hence as one method of identifying 
victims.  
As Mahmood Mamdani observes, colonial rule (and the 
transition from direct to indirect colonial rule) came to be 
premised upon the necessity for hierarchical structures of 
domination, not only between colonisers and colonised, but 
also between different colonised collectivities. Legally- and 
politically-constructed hierarchies were organised by 
essentialised identity categorisation.98 The centralised and 
hierarchical system of domination which the Belgians 
instituted in Rwanda was premised upon rule through the 
Tutsi, who, according to racial-religious ‘Hamitic’ theories 
current at the time, were racially superior, considered to be 
taller, lighter-skinned, and more fine-featured than the 
Hutu.99 Indeed, in 1902 the Church described Tutsi as 
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‘supreme humans’ (leaving an obvious inference to be drawn 
as to the ‘human nature’ of the Hutu).100 In the post-colonial 
period the power dynamic was reversed, leaving the Tutsi a 
minority subject to institutionalised oppression, massacre, 
and ultimately genocide in the context of civil war. This 
demography played itself out in the periodic massacres of 
Tutsi which took place in the period between independence 
and the genocide. In the 1973 violence, which began with 
purges of Tutsi, ‘officials and government supporters called 
the actions [purges] “ethnic rebalancing”, “clearing off” 
(déguerpir) and removing a Tutsi “surplus”. The issue to 
which they referred was “ethnic proportionality”’.101 ‘Ethnic 
balancing’ was carried out by ‘Public Safety Committees’.102 
The role of bureaucratic discourse in genocide, mass killing 
and mass violence in Rwanda is evident both in general 
terms, and in the specific use of language by perpetrators.  
I do not claim that we can draw a straight line between 
bureaucratic colonial governance in Rwanda, and genocide. 
But we may say that this governance, and in particular the 
characteristically bureaucratic features which it imposed on 
Rwandan society in terms of hierarchy and the categorisation 
of essentialised identity, were necessary conditions for the 
genocide which occurred there. Mamdani argues that the 
origin of violence in Rwanda is found not in the realms of 
biology and culture, but rather, in state constructions of 
political identity.103 It was not only the creation of a race-
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mythology regarding Rwandan peoples which led to violent 
ongoing conflict; similar mythologies were applied elsewhere 
without this consequence. Rather, in Rwanda this notion 
became a rationale for a set of institutions inspired by, 
embedded in, and reproduced by this ideology.104 The 
ideology was incorporated into a system organised along 
bureaucratic lines: an institutional construct.105 Ultimately, the 
bureaucratic dehumanisation of Hutu (under the colonial 
regime) and Tutsi (in the post-colonial period) was a vital 
factor in the Rwandan genocide. The role of bureaucracy and 
bureaucratic discourse in this and other genocides goes 
beyond the fact that bureaucratic organisation is necessary in 
order to attempt genocide in the age of the mass society. 
Although present in varying degrees in different cases, this 
discursive strategy is intimately involved with 
dehumanisation in general, and specifically, genocidal 
dehumanisation.  
In bureaucracies, however, it is not only victims but also 
perpetrators who undergo a process of de-individuation. In a 
group situation, there is a decreased focus on personal 
identity, which becomes submerged in the nature of the 
group, and general social norms have their place taken by 
situation-specific group norms.106 This process also takes 
place in ‘hands-on’ situations, in which a perpetrator group 
who identify as such are more likely to behave cruelly and 
aggress-ively.107 A common example would be a particular 
military unit or militia group, who generally share some kind 
of visual signifier, such as a uniform. This brings us to the 
question of the different psychological states of those 
indirectly and directly involved in killing, and the different 
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psychological desires and needs which euphemistic and 
bureaucratic language fulfils in each case.  
Schreibtischtäter and direct perpetrators: distinctions and 
similarities 
While some have spoken of ‘primeval moral drives’ against 
killing, I have argued elsewhere that this is an overstatement 
of the case.108 It should not be assumed that individuals have 
an innate propensity not to act violently, which must be 
overcome by external influences. Milgram writes that 
‘[t]hough such prescriptions as “Thou shalt not kill” occupy a 
pre-eminent place in the moral order, they do not occupy a 
correspondingly intractable position in the human psychic 
structure’.109 Milgram’s experiments have demonstrated that 
the commonsense understanding that it is more difficult to 
harm someone directly, than to order harm done—that the 
closer the victim, the harder it is to act against them—is borne 
out in fact.110  
The literal distance between bureaucratic perpetrators and 
victims plays a part in legitimising their actions; but how does 
bureaucratic discourse relate to direct or ‘hands-on’ 
perpetrators, the men and women ‘on the ground’, who 
cannot ignore the physical consequences of their actions? For 
the direct perpetrator, killing, when constructed as the 
processing of objects, can be understood as an unpleasant 
task, but one identical in kind to other tasks which must be 
carried out for the functioning (or even the survival) of 
society. Their actions, just like those of the ‘desk-murderer’, 
are ‘nothing personal’, and hence may be disconnected or 
                                                 
108 Savage, ‘Genocidal Dehumanisation’, 126–33; Bauman, Modernity 
and the Holocaust, 188. 
109 Milgram, 8. 





compartmentalised from their self-conception.111 
Furthermore, the language, discourses and practice of 
industrialisation, or, in less modernised societies, of everyday 
work, can be applied to the killing process.112 In each case, 
euphemistic language provides a discursive strategy in which, 
despite the fact that terminology is not literally believed to be 
factual, the mean-ing of acts can be altered to produce less 
cognitive dissonance: ‘as they live within their euphemistic 
labels, and use them with each other, perpetrators become 
bound to a psychologically safe realm of dissociation, 
disavowal, and emotional distance’.113 Albert Bandura, whose 
work has consistently provided empirical demonstrations of 
the disinhibitory power of euphemistic language, comments 
that: 
[e]uphemistic language…provides a convenient tool for 
masking reprehensible activities or even conferring a 
respectable status upon them (Bolinger, 1982; Lutz, 1987). 
Through sanitized and convoluted verbiage, destructive 
conduct is made benign and those who engage in it are 
relieved of a sense of personal agency.114  
The bureaucratic routinisation of actions, their division 
into separate tasks which are performed identically each time 
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they occur, desensitises the direct perpetrator to her or his 
own actions, and, ‘[o]nce habituated, the prevailing mindset 
becomes how to do it better, not whether to do it at all’.115 It 
may seem on the surface that an important difference is that 
strictly bureaucratic euphemism does not deal directly with 
motivatory questions of morality, with the issue of ‘should’, 
while non-bureaucratic euphemistic language often does so in 
regard to the terms with which it creates meaning, inasmuch 
as the terms used themselves imply and thus call for the 
‘correct’ action in response. This difference may be considered 
superficial, as, in each case, action is premised on similar 
discursive thinking. In bureaucratic discourse, action is 
premised on (moral) responsibility to the bureaucracy and 
one’s fellows, while in the case of non-bureaucratic discourse 
action is determined both by the previous factors, by direct 
exhortation, and by the way in which ‘reality’ is thus 
constructed. According to Bandura, euphemistic language, 
either as ‘sanitisation’ or as the ‘agentless passive voice’, both 
of which are in evidence in documentary material presented 
in this essay, can be seen as an ‘injurious weapon’.116 The 
following examples provide elucidating evidence of the 
existence and function of euphemism at bureaucratic and 
non-bureaucratic registers.  
The paradigmatic case of bureaucratic euphemistic 
language is, of course, the Nazi destruction of the Jews 
(though their record-keeping practices were rivalled by the 
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia). To take a few examples from a 
list which could be multiplied virtually ad infinitum: in terms 
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of euphemistic language, we see such phrases as the prefix 
Sonder-, that is, ‘special’, which was widely used to indicate 
physical destruction, as, for example, in Sonderbehandlung 
(‘special treatment’, that is, killing), or Sonderkommando (the 
Jewish units which disposed of corpses); strictly-maintained 
linguistic reference to camp inmates as Häftlinge (prisoners);117 
the listing by statisticians and public health authorities of 
corpses as Figuren (figures or pieces); and memo references to 
victims as ‘the load’, ‘number of pieces’, and ‘merchandise’.118 
Trains carrying Jews to camps were referred to by Ostbahn 
bureaucrats as Seifenzuteilung (‘soap allotment’), while the 
people being transported were termed Umsiedler 
(‘resettlers’).119 Another notorious example is found in the 
tattooing of numbers on camp prisoners. This highly 
bureaucratic and centralised genocide provides perhaps the 
most extensive use of such discourse, and the clearest 
demonstration of its purposes; in the fact, for example, that 
victims in the camps, if they had not been selected for 
immediate killing, were identified both by a number, and by a 
coloured symbol indicating to which group they belonged. 
These indicated and constructed a place in a hierarchy of 
power and value defined by the perpetrators, a place which 
defined the way in which the individual would be treated 
within the camps. A similar process obtained in Khmer Rouge 
Cambodia, where, upon reaching co-operative farms, people 
were grouped into three classifications, with the blue scarves 
given to city dwellers used to identify and target them as 
bannheu, or ‘deposed’.120 As Sofsky puts it,  
absolute power is the absolute power to label…defining a 
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taxonomy of categories into which every prisoner was 
pigeonholed…the use of the class hierarchy was a strategy of 
graded discrimination, persecution, and annihilation. The 
ultimate value in this pecking order was the worth a person’s 
life was accorded. This value sign was sewn to an individual’s 
clothing, visible for all to see, a stigmatic patch…[w]ith the 
aid of categories, power implemented its model of society.121  
As well as the German case, euphemistic utterance, and 
language which transforms victims into objects without 
subjectivity can be found in many other episodes of genocide 
and genocidal killing; the resemblance to the better-known 
Nazi language is often striking. In planning the Srebrenica 
massacre, ‘Bosnian Serb political and military leaders used a 
code to communicate among themselves, referring to the 
groups of men to be executed as “parcels”’ to be ‘delivered’.122 
In occupied China, Japanese army personnel conducting cruel 
and lethal medical experiments referred to the civilian 
Chinese who were their victims as maruta (‘logs’).123 These 
prisoners were identified by a number and a card describing 
their biomedical particulars:124 as one perpetrator recalled, 
‘[a]lthough, when [prisoners] arrived, they each had cards 
with their name, birthplace, reason for arrest and age, we 
simply gave them a number. A maruta was just a number, a 
piece of experimental material.’125 Biomedical records gave a 
prisoner’s case number only, along with textbook-style, 
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identical full-body illustrations.126 People to be shipped to 
Pingfan, headquarters of the notorious Japanese Biological 
Warfare Unit 731, were called Tokui-Atsukai (‘special con-
signments’), while Japanese forces responsible for rounding 
up Chinese victims were known as the ‘Special Handling 
Forces’, and the activity of spreading disease among the 
populace in person, generally through the distribution of 
contaminated food, was called ‘field strategy’.127 Even in the 
Australian colonial era, Aboriginal victims of special Native 
Police Forces were labelled as ‘kangaroos’ who had to be ‘dis-
persed’.128  
As we see from these examples, euphemistic utterances 
employing the language of officialdom and production, and 
carrying the moral and ideological imperatives of these 
domains, are available for use by both direct and indirect 
perpetrators of mass killing. The non-bureaucratic naming of 
victims as inanimate objects is not as common as either 
bureaucratic discourse which de-biologises victims, or 
utterances which name them as threatening animals and 
disease organisms;129 however, it should not be ignored. Non-
bureaucratic objectifying language could be seen as a kind of 
halfway point between these two, or more strictly, three types 
(that is, de-biologisation and binarised biologisation). In this 
case, while victims are named as metaphors for other things, 
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rather than completely written out of existence except as 
units, they nonetheless continue to be placed within the 
framework of units of production, as in the case of maruta, or 
of the Hutu Power call to ‘cut down the tall trees’, that is, to 
kill Tutsi.130 Such a discursive strategy is not intimately 
related to modernity in itself in the same way that 
bureaucratic discourse is, though the systematic logic of 
production is undoubtedly a modern innovation. But it is 
related to episodes which could only have taken place under 
the auspices of modernity.  
In Rwanda, a highly agriculturalised economy where the 
machete was a near-ubiquitous tool, the naming of Tutsi as 
‘tall trees’ to be ‘chopped down’ performed a number of 
functions. Firstly, as with all dehumanisation, it functioned 
strategically to remove the sanctions otherwise attaching to 
the killing of fellow human beings, and to remove empathy 
which might otherwise be felt, by naming victims as non-
human. Secondly, this language equated the killing of Tutsi 
with communal agricultural work, thereby framing genocide 
both as a familiar and morally impeccable activity and as a 
duty to the community. Thirdly, it made physical reference to 
the supposed height of Tutsi in comparison to Hutu, pointing 
out and stigmatising their difference from the ingroup and, in 
a metaphor within a metaphor, referring to the ‘high’ roles of 
power and prestige they were alleged to unfairly occupy 
within Rwandan society. Fourthly and finally, it referred to 
the manner in which they could or should be killed, that is, 
with machetes.  
Euphemistic language which names victims as inanimate 
objects and units of production is not solely the confine of 
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bureaucrats who do not ‘get their hands dirty’ in the actual 
business of torture, theft and killing; it is also used by those 
who are personally involved with such actions on a day-to-
day basis, and is not limited to killing in highly modernised, 
bureaucratised and industrialised societies such as Nazi 
Germany. While a distinction should be drawn between, for 
example, Nazi paperwork in which Jews are considered 
‘units’, and Hutu Power radio announcers calling for Hutu to 
‘chop down the tall trees’, in each case this language 
objectifies victims, categorises them in a way which denies 
them individuality, defines their inclusion in the victim group 
as their only salient characteristic, and allows the ‘invisible-
ising’ of the human consequences of action taken toward 
them. This permits in turn the full or attempted suppression 
of any moral or emotional response on the part of 
perpetrators—that is, in Arendt’s (perhaps over-universal) 
phrase, the overcoming of ‘the animal pity by which all 
normal men are affected in the presence of physical 
suffering’.131 
In his analysis of National Socialism, Marcuse provides a 
further insight into the connection between bureaucratic and 
non-bureaucratic discourse in violent oppression. It may seem 
from outward appearances that the ‘irrational’ or ‘idealistic’ 
language embodied in philosophy, ideology and propaganda 
is opposed to technical-rational discourse ‘pertaining to the 
realm of administration organization and daily communi-
cation’; but Marcuse argues that each type is technical, that is, 
‘its concepts aim at a definite pragmatic goal, and fixate all 
things, relations and institutions in their operational function 
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within the National Socialist system’.132 In genocide, the value 
of supra-technical mythological and metaphysical language 
becomes exclusively operational, as they are made parts of 
particular techniques of domination.133 
Having demonstrated both the role played by 
bureaucratic, and euphemistic, language in genocide, and the 
intimate connection between these two forms, in concluding 
we must return to a final question relating to the individual 
psyche and the role of this discourse within a broader 
examination of the work done by dehumanisation—
determining whether the role played by this discourse is 
legitimatory, motivatory, or both.134  
Conclusion 
While the biological determinism of modern racism is rooted 
in Enlightenment rationalism, the logistics of modern 
genocide and mass killing are no less the fruit of the huge 
modern projects of population, reliant on centralised, 
bureaucratic technologies of surveillance and action; and both 
legitimise the mass killing of individual human beings. Unlike 
other forms of dehumanisation, the bureaucratic-euphemistic 
strategic discursive type is purely legitimatory. It does not 
provide a motivation for killing, except inasmuch as the 
bureaucratic process creates its own objects and is self-
perpetuating, as every individual is motivated to excel at their 
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assigned task;135 in overall terms, we may consider this a 
secondary motivation. But this language functions to conceal 
the human nature of the objects of power, and the human 
consequences of action, as well as displacing responsibility 
from the individual perpetrator—whether a bureaucratic 
functionary or a ‘hands-on’ killer. Thus, as a discursive 
strategy, it helps to achieve what Bauman argues was 
necessary for the perpetration of the Holocaust (and, we might 
add, most if not all other genocides): not the mobilisation of 
attitudes toward victim peoples, but merely their 
neutralisation.136 Language itself enacts ‘a transformation of 
personal relations into impersonal things and events’.137 
Further, the more such language depersonalises victims, the 
more possible it becomes to construct motivatory 
characterisations around violence toward the victim.138 
The language of bureaucratic euphemism and production 
is intimately related to other types of genocidal 
dehumanisation, in that it allows the depersonalisation of 
victims, the distancing of the victim from perpetrators and 
bystanders, and an erasure of individuality which makes of 
the victim a ‘blank slate’ onto which can be written 
motivatory characterisations. In itself, however, it 
dehumanises victims by presenting them as non-human 
objects in a process of production—or rather, destruction—in 
which moral responsibility is defined by the process (the 
means), rather than the ends. As the examples presented in 
this essay demonstrate, this set of utterances appears in 
extremely diverse episodes, from those in which more 
motivatory types of dehumanisation are present (Nazi 
genocide of the Jews), to cases of genocidal killing in which 
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there is no intent for the complete disappearance of the entire 
victim people (Japanese mass killing in China); as well as 
episodes in which more extreme and nakedly hostile 
biomedical forms of dehumanisation are not in evidence 
(genocide in Rwanda).  
In terms of the work of dehumanisation, bureaucratic and 
euphemistic discourse may be considered to be chiefly 
legitimatory. It is applied permeably to both non-genocidal 
and genocidal situations, and it seems universally to appear 
in concert with other, more overt and overtly hostile forms of 
dehumanisation: it may thus be considered a ‘constant’ which 
is necessary for the legitimisation of modern genocide and 
mass killing, but is not sufficient, either as a motivation, or as 
a form of dehumanisation in itself.139 Both in its relationship 
to non-genocidal practice, and in the lack of any motivatory 
aspect, it can be considered a relatively less extreme type of 
genocidal dehumanisation. Given that legitimisation is a 
universal function of genocidal dehumanisation, despite these 
qualifiers this type has a vitally important role to play in the 
commission and enactment of genocide in the modern era.
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GENOCIDE AND THE HEALING PROFESSIONS 
 
MICHAEL DUDLEY AND FRAN GALE1 
 
Nazism is not a closed episode. Like nuclear war and 
environmental destruction, it warrants universal concern. The 
professions in general, and the mental health and helping 
professionals in particular, have played key roles in waging 
the ‘war on terror’. In 2007, a British doctor attempted to 
bomb Glasgow airport. Dr Che Guevara, Dr Radovan 
Karadzic, and those supporting Hamas provide examples of 
doctors or psychiatrists allied to state violence, as shown 
below and by Kaplan and Walter in this volume. Though it is 
imperative that helping professionals ponder professional 
abuses and their origins, contemporary bioethics generally 
neglects this record.2 Individual professionals may exploit 
patients in a manner universally regarded as criminal or in 
breach of codes, but may also follow political-institutional or 
state-based rules without necessarily knowing (or perhaps 
‘knowing’—that is, they are denying at some level) that their 
behaviours are abusive. Such systemic abuses frequently 
involve loyalties divided between patients and third parties—
in this case, the state.  
In this contemporary setting, we examine the actions of 
Nazi doctors and psychiatrists, the lasting outcomes of the 
Nuremberg medical and other trials for both human rights 
and mental health, and most significantly, the motives and 
reasons for three kinds of behaviour: harming, standing by, 
                                                 
1 This is a revised version of the chapter ‘Through a Glass, Darkly: 
Nazi era illuminations of psychiatry, human rights and rights 
violations’ that appears in their book, Dudley, Michael, Silove, 
Derrick and Gale, Fran (eds) (2012), Mental Health and Human Rights: 
Vision, praxis and courage, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 





and rescuing.  
We chose the Holocaust because of its historical 
significance for human rights, and because it is a ‘pure case’ of 
genocide that has been researched in immense detail. The 
Holocaust is instructive about the causes and remediation of 
human rights abuses. Two motivating questions arise: first, 
what prevents today’s doctors, psychiatrists and helping 
professionals falling from grace in comparable ways?; second, 
given the Holocaust’s interplay of individual, situational and 
social factors, where should the emphasis in prevention lie? 
The answers matter greatly for states, institutions, and 
professional and other communities that must safeguard 
against recurrence.  
The contemporary setting: human rights abuses specific to 
mental health  
The ‘war on terror’ has damaged the human rights 
achievements that followed World War II. America’s Bush 
administration ‘achieved’ this through ‘rendition’ of suspects 
to places of torture, by undermining the International 
Criminal Court, and by using notorious centres like 
Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib prison, the former site of 
Saddam Hussein’s tortures, murders and experiments.3  
Many investigations into Abu Ghraib demonstrate that it 
was overcrowded and unsewered, and its staff and prisoners 
frequently killed or traumatised by constant shelling. Sweeps 
and checkpoints collected blameless civilians and families, 
and fear of their joining the insurgency and absence of 
administrative authority foiled their release. Missing was 
leadership by its new, inexperienced commander and other 
principals; staff training, supervision, accountability and co-
ordination; and any capacity to care for prisoner children and 
                                                 





inmates with contagious diseases or mental illness (Zimbardo 
2007).  
Frustrated higher commanders determined to extract 
‘actionable intelligence’ from suspected insurgents. Major 
General Geoffrey Miller, visiting from Guantanamo Bay, 
stated he wanted Abu Ghraib’s prisoners ‘treated like dogs’ 
(Karpinski 2004; Karpinski 2005). Post-Korean war programs, 
developed to enable military personnel to survive 
interrogations, were modified. They included long-term 
isolation, threats, exploitation of phobias, inducement of fear 
(among others, through the use of dogs), severe humiliation, 
including demeaning and sometimes sexual assault, 
degrading ‘trophy photography’ and sleep deprivation4 
(Sontag, 2003; Bloche and Marks, 2005). Both military and 
civilian suspects were held indefinitely, and their Geneva 
Convention rights to fair trial and freedom from ‘cruel, 
inhuman and degrading’ treatment were brushed aside. Abu 
Ghraib’s civilian interrogators were anonymous and lawless, 
sometimes killing with impunity.  
Philip Zimbardo rejects the emphasis on individual 
character, inevitably the official explanations which blame the 
‘bad apples’, a minority of low-ranking individuals. Instead, 
he highlights situational and wider social contexts—the ‘bad 
barrel’ and ‘bad barrel-makers’ respectively. His interviews 
with Sergeant Chip Frederick, a key operations manager 
whom he was asked to help defend, reveal that untrained 
army reservists, despised by fellow soldiers, committed the 
abuses. Lack of actionable intelligence led to further pressure 
to break prisoners. Frederick, who previously acted as a 
guard in a low security prison, had no record of violence or 
antisocial behaviour, and his personality testing was 
unremarkable. Yet he was responsible for attaching electrodes 
to a hooded prisoner who was forced to stand on a box and 
                                                 





told that if he moved he would be electrocuted. While 
Frederick received a severe sentence, heads of state and senior 
‘architects’—politicians, lawyers, security chiefs, military 
leaders, and medical personnel—escaped prosecution.5 US 
Department of Defense documents show that health pro-
fessionals worked in behavioural science consultation teams 
to facilitate coercive interrogations. They formulated general 
and individual interrogation approaches, allowed 
interrogators to exploit detainees’ medical records, certified 
detainees’ fitness, monitored interrogations, falsified medical 
records and death certificates, failed to report abuses and to 
provide basic medical care (Miles 2004). Abu Ghraib’s 
psychiatrist was employed not to meet the needs of staff or 
mentally ill detainees, but to help make interrogations more 
effective.6  
Not only did the higher command not authorise and check 
tactics, but directives for health professionals diverged 
markedly from recognised human rights standards. Some 
argued that as they were not operating as clinicians, patient 
ethical codes did not apply. Ethical guidelines from the US 
Presidential Task Force on Psychological Ethics and National 
Security did not prohibit psychologists’ participation, nor 
require their adherence to international human rights law 
regardless of interpretation by military authorities (Bloche 
and Marks 2005). The American Psychological Association 
initially endorsed interrogation up to a ‘sub-torture 
threshold’, and was accused of dispensing with traditional 
ethical standards outside the strictly therapeutic context by 
separating clinical from non-clinical duties. But such coercive, 
deceptive procedures depart from the doctor–patient 
relationship with its precondition of voluntary, informed 
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consent. Even if physicians did not participate directly, their 
presence legitimated and sanitised it. The American 
Psychiatric Association stated that not only should 
psychiatrists not participate in torture, but should not be part 
of interrogations; and that they have a responsibility to report 
situations of torture. Moreover, there is no indication that 
doctors have the kind of skills that are useful in interrogation.  
Enduring legacies of the Holocaust 
The Nazi era is the nadir of modern Western history. At its 
heart are six million Jewish victims, and 23 million others,7 
actions so enormous, cruel and intricate as to defy credulity. 
Surviving and remembering such unalloyed evil forever 
changes feeling, thinking, imagination and memory (see Levi 
1987; Higgins 2003, 2006). The death camps were another 
universe, defying speech (Adorno 1955) and commanding, at 
least initially, only silence in the face of it all. SS militiamen 
taunted their prisoners with the prospect of denial and 
disbelief as they worked to destroy all traces of evidence. In 
Terrence Des Pres’ book The Survivor: An anatomy of life in the 
death camps (1976), a guard says to an inmate that even if he 
survives to tell the tale, no one will believe him. Fortunately, 
if that be the word, the Holocaust is a thoroughly documented 
historical event, as well as a universal symbol for radical evil, 
and a yardstick for crimes against humanity (Alexander et al 
2009). US Prosecutor Robert Jackson stated in his opening 
address at the first Nuremberg trial: ‘The wrongs which we 
seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so 
malignant and so devastating that civilisation cannot tolerate 
their being ignored because it cannot survive their being 
repeated.’  
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Mirroring and harnessing Western modernity, Nazism 
used technology and bureaucracy to pursue its ideologically-
driven, murderous racism (Bauman 1989; Bauer 2001). Its 
economic, environmental and public health emphases are 
familiar, captivating and confronting (Dudley and Gale 2002). 
Holocaust analysts divide populations by their responses: 
perpetrators (numbering around two million), bystanders 
(numbering hundreds of millions), and rescuers, maybe a few 
tens of thousands (Bauer 2001). These categories, while 
heuristically useful, are not watertight. Bavarian peasants, for 
example, traded with Jewish cattle dealers despite Nazi 
attempts to prevent this, yet often approved antisemitic laws.8 
In the camps’ ‘grey zone’, victims sometimes were 
accomplices (kapos, for example) to perpetrators, though 
perpetrators were not victims (Levi 1987). Despite the Nazi 
state’s genocide and criminality, the actors were neither 
angels nor demons, but ordinary people (Bauer 2001; 
Browning 1998). Holocaust remembrance continues for 
victims and survivors, and for nations, communities and 
professions to prevent amnesia and protect against 
recurrence.  
Nazi doctors and psychiatrists: activities  
A particular breach of trust occurs when physicians abandon 
their special responsibilities (Grodin and Annas 2007; Annas 
and Grodin 1992). That doctors act as architects, leaders, 
instruments and auxiliaries of mass murder, conducting lethal 
experiments on behalf of a transgressor state, may beggar 
belief: yet after World War II, prosecution investigators at the 
Nuremberg and other medical trials exposed and thoroughly 
documented such activities on a large scale (Alexander 1948, 
1949). The transgressions of doctors, psychiatrists and other 
professionals under Nazism have been extensively examined 
                                                 





(see Grodin and Annas 2007, Schmidt 2007, Weindling 2006, 
Baum 2008, Dudley and Gale 2002 and Markusen 1997 for 
examples of recent bibliographies). Such a debacle was 
unprecedented. Education and professional status, rather than 
conferring immunity, generally facilitated the Nazi agenda. 
Medicine in particular was united to the Nazi state, with 
psychiatry the chief medical specialty represented in the 
killing programs, without whom the Holocaust may well 
have failed (Dudley and Gale 2002; Markusen 1997).  
As the Nazis removed moral restraints, they quickly 
ceased to ratify advanced Weimar republic legislation on 
human experimentation (Hanauski-Abel 1996). Clinicians and 
scientists decisively abandoned medical and psychiatric ethics 
when they promoted and participated in compulsory 
sterilisation. Doctors, psychiatrists, welfare, church and 
community groups supported the 1933 law which required 
mandatory and widely-enforced reporting. Lawyers, doctors 
and psychiatrists manned courts which heard cases in secret 
and allowed few successful appeals. The law encompassed 
those suffering from schizophrenia, manic depressive 
insanity, hereditary epilepsy, alcoholism, and Huntingdon’s 
chorea, as well as hereditary blindness, hereditary deafness, 
severe deformity (including talipes, club feet), and congenital 
feeble-mindedness. The last, a vague, flexible category, 
captured social deviance (such as prostitution under ‘moral 
feeble-mindedness’), and accounted for three-quarters of 
cases, including many in poverty. Sterilisation also allowed 
asylum directors to discharge patients and cut costs. Many 
patients died of surgical complications.9  
From 1939 in occupied Poland, adults with mental 
disabilities were killed by poison gas, the first trial of this 
method. In Germany, doctors, psychiatrists, nurses and other 
helping professionals and staff joined with administrators in 
                                                 





the Tiergartenstrasse (T4) ‘euthanasia’ program for children. 
Gassing was extended to adults with mental disabilities. 
Hitler’s signature appears on the T4 program on his private 
letterhead.10 The criteria for killing were both ‘eugenic’ 
(including ‘non-Aryan’) and economic, related to potential 
productivity, but in practice the victims were sacrificed for 
quotas and administrative efficiency. As an open secret, 
which claimed 200,000 victims, ‘euthanasia’ had many accom-
plices: the myth of a small group of fanatical perpetrators 
hoodwinking a public who knew nothing is untenable11 
(Friedlander 1995; Bauer 2001). That these institutions of 
intentional killing bore the insignia of the Red Cross on their 
rooftops is an indictment of both the German Red Cross and 
the International Commission of the Red Cross—which never 
disavowed or disaffiliated its German colleagues.  
This dress rehearsal provided senior expertise to killing 
centres in the occupied territories, for the so-called ‘14f13’ 
program that claimed approximately 50,000 concentration 
camp victims (Lifton 1986).12 From mid-1941, doctors and 
psychiatrists oversaw the ‘Final Solution’, manning camps, 
performing executions and selections and providing 
ideological justifications13 (Lifton 1986). In all phases, they 
exploited the murdered and the living for medical research. 
Coerced inmates underwent at least 26 types of experiments, 
including ice-water immersion, high altitude decompression, 
high-dose radiation, and making seawater drinkable, and 
often died in the search for better killing methods or through 
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callous disregard.14 While most experiments were 
scientifically useless,15 the possible exceptions (hypothermia 
and decompression) raised sharp ethical questions about 
using knowledge obtained by such means (Moreno 2007; 
Müller-Hill 1988). Professor Louis Waller, an esteemed 
Australian legal authority, raised this question in 1985 under 
the illuminating title of ‘The Fruit of the Poisoned Tree’.16 
The motives of perpetrators—among which peer pressure, 
duress, authoritarianism, careerism and ideology featured 
prominently—are explored below. Specifically, Nazi pseudo-
science (‘race hygiene’, ‘scientific racism’ and eugenics) and 
its biomedical engineering project for a judenrein utopia, 
dovetailed perfectly with the experimental ambitions of 
scientists, doctors and psychiatrists, whose careers prospered. 
Few psychiatrists resisted and no letters survive from 
psychiatrists on behalf of their patients to the authorities 
(Dudley and Gale 2002). As noted, nurses (McFarland-Icke 
1999) participated in killings, while psychologists (Mandler 
2002) were also implicated in the Nazi debacle. 
When the war ended, the ensuing trials and plethora of 
psychiatrist and physician suicides sullied the reputation of 
German medicine. An American denazification report 
estimated that about half of German physicians were ‘proven 
Nazis’—about 24,000, against the profession’s later view of 
only 350 criminal doctors.17 What had gone wrong, and how, 
was too complex for a trial which piloted new international 
law.18  
Doctors and medical scientists denied complicity by 
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representing themselves as victims of Nazism. Unrepentant 
Nazis, conservatives, and leading physicians disparaged the 
trials as ‘victors’ justice’, and suppressed publications by the 
trial’s medical observers.19 German medical associations 
avoided examining their Nazi past (Pross 1992; Kater 1997) 
and exonerated individuals by blaming socialised medicine 
and excessive state powers, while insisting on professional 
autonomy.20 Cold War priorities (strategic research and 
intelligence) also protected those who were implicated. 
(Contemporaneously, the United States gave Japanese Unit 
731—which also conducted biological warfare experiments 
accounting for 270,000 victims—immunity from 
prosecution).21 In the 1980s, a research-granting agency which 
funded Robert Ritter’s project (see below), refused to 
acknowledge that its precursor financed the genocide.22 
Medical institutes and researchers used materials from 
murdered victims before this was outlawed and the remains 
reburied in 198923 (Hanauski-Abel 1996). Nazi influence also 
affected the World Medical Association, which virtually 
ignored the Nuremberg Code (Kater 1997).24  
Human rights outcomes of the Nuremberg trials  
The post-war Nuremberg trials of the Nazi leadership (1945–
1949) were landmark events, defining new standards of 
international justice with far-reaching significance for human 
rights. An International Military Tribunal defined crimes such 
as conspiring against peace, waging aggressive war, and a 
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new category, crimes against humanity, and tried the former 
Nazi military leaders for these and for war crimes. The trials 
of Nazi doctors, the Einsatzgruppen (the four mobile killing 
squads), jurists and industrialists, the war crimes trials in the 
separate zones of occupation, and national prosecutions in 
various German-occupied countries followed (Ehrenfreund, 
2007). All four occupying powers exercised sovereignty and 
tried the Germans accused for crimes against pre-Nazi 
German law.  
The trials overthrew, at least partially, the principle of 
national sovereignty—established by the Treaty of Westphalia 
in 1648—which bestowed immunity on state functionaries 
within state borders. States and other authorities could not 
wilfully disregard individuals’ rights. The trials also 
demolished the defence of superior orders, and the tu quoque 
(‘you did it too’) defence, thus re-asserting the principle of 
individual moral responsibility that had been eroded by 
authoritarian leadership.25 These trials affected the rules of 
war and treatment of prisoners, and in bridging gulfs of 
language, nationality, custom and procedure, they proved 
feasible. The principle of universal jurisdiction held that any 
country where grave crimes are committed, such actions 
could be judged and individuals punished. The trials of Nazi 
industrialists foreshadowed lawsuits against businesses 
accused of human rights abuses.26  
Furthermore, the extensive, authoritative documentation 
of Nazi atrocities ‘[established] these perceived “incredible” 
events by clear and public proof, so that no one can ever 
doubt that they were fact not fable’.27 These trials in effect 
inaugurated Holocaust history, belied future Holocaust 
denial, and shaped German democracy. 
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Raphael Lemkin coined the word ‘genocide’ to describe 
the German authorities’ systematic murder of ethnic and 
religious groups defined as degenerate. Arguing that 
genocide should denote the motivation to commit such 
crimes, he criticised the new category ‘crimes against 
humanity’ for neglecting this motivation. How much the 
medical trials applied this reasoning is a moot point.28 Telford 
Taylor regarded the experiments as pilot studies for 
genocide.29  
The Nuremberg trials—and for medicine, the Nuremberg 
Code—were three great contemporaneous reforms, together 
with the formation of the United Nations (1945) and the 
publication of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948). Collectively, they helped to launch the international 
human rights movement and frameworks, including the 
Genocide Convention; to revise the Geneva Conventions on 
laws and customs of war; and to establish the European Court 
of Human Rights, the Bill of Rights and subsequent rights 
treaties and institutions. They are relevant not just for 
medicine and mental health, but civil society and planetary 
survival (Robertson 2006; Ehrenfreund 2007).  
Notwithstanding, enforcement has been piecemeal. During 
and after the Cold War, no international machinery 
underwrote human rights protections. Genocide continued: 
today, perpetrators in East Timor, the Congo, and Darfur 
remain free. The United States circumvented international 
standards in its ‘war on terror’. The charge of ‘victors’ justice’ 
(made by Hermann Göring at Nuremberg) endures: the Allies 
were not tried for dropping the atom bomb, for example. 
Nevertheless, the Nuremberg legacy endures in the Pinochet, 
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Milosevic, Tadic and Karadzic trials, the advent of the 
International Criminal Court in 2002, and recent international 
actions to address genocide—the Kosovo bombings, and the 
tribunals or special courts for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone and Cambodia30 (Robertson 2006).  
Positive outcomes from the doctors’ trials: the Nuremberg 
Code and its successors 
While the patient’s health and protection from harm date 
from Hippocrates, informed consent and non-therapeutic 
experimentation only emerged in 19th century codes of ethics 
and pre-Nazi (1900 and 1931) German documents that 
thoroughly discussed these issues (Grodin 1992; Winau 2007).  
The Nuremberg doctors’ trial ended with a declaration 
about permissible medical experiments. In Europe and the 
United States, however, frequent dangerous medical 
experiments continued. The Tuskegee (Alabama) syphilis 
experiment which ‘examined’ the natural progression of the 
untreated disease on poor, rural, Black men began in 1932 but 
only ended in 1972 (Reverby 2009). Rediscovery of the 
‘Nuremberg Code’ in the 1960s as the first global, 
comprehensive reflection on the nature, purpose and limits of 
human experimentation was vital to identifying and 
addressing this area31 (Perley et al 1992; Grodin 1992).  
Pre-eminently, the Code32 requires voluntary informed 
consent. It mandates qualified researchers, socially beneficial 
intent, scientific design and results unobtainable by other 
methods. Benefits must outweigh risks, harm must be 
minimised, and risk to life prevented (except when 
researchers experiment on themselves). Subjects must be 
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allowed to withdraw at any time. Researcher responsibility 
for participants’ well-being is paramount.  
The Code’s successors, not comprehensively discussed 
here, assert the rights of health research participants. They 
include the World Medical Association’s Declaration of 
Helsinki (DoH)33 which has formed the cornerstone of human 
research ethics. For vulnerable populations like children, 
prisoners and military personnel, the DoH emphasised 
physician responsibility34 and softened the Code’s absolute 
requirement of voluntary informed consent, instead requiring 
consent by legal guardians (‘responsible relatives’ for 
children; minors should consent where possible). Never-
theless, the first DoH revision (1975) confirmed that the 
interests of science and society should never take precedence 
over the well-being of the subject (para III 4), and decreed that 
research ethics committees (or their equivalent) must oversee 
research, initiating what is now widespread practice 
(Williams 2008).  
The Council for the International Organisation of Medical 
Sciences (CIOMS), formed by World Health Organisation 
(WHO) and UNESCO, also developed the International 
Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human 
Subjects (1982; CIOMS–WHO 1993), which despite some 
inconsistencies with DoH (Macklin 1999), were also informed 
by the Code. In communal and non-Western research settings, 
they noted difficulties with informed consent, research 
knowledge, funding and governance (Perley et al 1992). 
Successive DoH revisions have fired controversies about 
principled versus pragmatic approaches to research ethics in 
the developing world (Lurie and Wolfe 1997; Lie et al 2004; 
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Social Medicine Portal 2008; Rennie 2008; Sharma 2004).  
Harming by individuals and groups: social, situational and 
individual contributions 
Like other great evils, the Holocaust was inhuman, yet 
humans were responsible for systematic attacks on humans. 
The social science lexicon rarely discusses evil, and 
behavioural scientists and clinicians reluctantly examine it, 
thus magnifying its apparent incomprehensibility. Some 
consign evil to the province of philosophers and theologians, 
or alternatively (and positivistically) reduce it to behaviour, 
biology or mental illness. This dishonours those with a 
genuine mental illness and relieves culprits of responsibility 
(Rosen 2011). The political and military elite of the Third 
Reich rarely suffered overt mental illness, though the fact that 
these were ‘ordinary men’ does not mean they were mentally 
healthy. Clinical science cannot exclude (im)moral acts from 
its purview, nor reduce them to judgements about 
(ab)normality. Like morality, it assays not just events and 
causes, but who we are, should be, and take ourselves to be 
(Glas 2006). Patients may interpret professional neutrality on 
such matters as indifference. 
Evil encompasses moral wrongness as an end (the intent to 
harm) or a means to an end, and extreme harm, through acts 
disproportionate to any instigation or provocation. Bandura 
(1975) refers to ‘moral disengagement’, which involves 
suspending proactive humane behaviour and abandoning 
restraints on harmful behaviour. Some note the persistence of 
such acts, victims’ helplessness, levels of perpetrator 
responsibility, and sometimes the ‘magnitude gap’ between 
damage to victims and benefits accruing to perpetrators 
(Berkowitz 1999; Hamilton and Sanders 1999).35 Omission 
may also be evil (as discussed in Colin Tatz’s essay in this 
volume on the churches during the Holocaust). Card’s 
                                                 





definition36 of evils as ‘foreseeable intolerable harms 
produced by culpable wrongdoing’ leaves open the question 
of intent, which may be complex, even impenetrable.37 Noting 
humanity’s potential for good and evil, this perspective 
bypasses essentialist dichotomies. 
Motives and reasons for harming, with particular reference 
to the Nazi example  
As suggested above, recurring individual, socio-cultural and 
situational factors contribute to mass human rights violations. 
Holocaust history, other genocides (not considered in detail 
here), and experimental psychology reveal this. Theories 
about Nazi doctors and psychiatrists’ actions must not only 
consider these levels of action, but the wider German national 
situation. In the following sections, the Nazi example and 
experimental evidence are reviewed to shed light on motives 
and reasons for harming, bystanding and helping. To direct 
prevention, it is also important to decide where the ‘engine-
room’ is located. 
Personality 
Early researchers considered innate characteristics. In 1955, 
Adorno and colleagues described the ‘authoritarian 
personality’—characterised by conventionalism, authority 
submission, aggression, projection and anti-introspection—
self-selecting for the Party and the SS. Rather than one 
(authoritarian) Nazi personality, unsurprisingly a wide range 
exists. For example, Robert Lifton describes SS doctor Josef 
Mengele’s scientific detachment, flamboyance and fanatical 
cruelty; chief Auschwitz doctor Eduard Wirths’ 
meticulousness and obedience; gynaecologist and mass 
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steriliser Carl Clauberg’s arrogant ambition. A frequent 
theme, noted with Lifton’s [anonymous] doctor Ernst B, and 
Gitta Sereny’s 1974 study of Franz Stangl (the commandant of 
Treblinka) and her 1995 biography of Albert Speer (Hitler’s 
architect and from 1942 munitions/armaments minister), is of 
people emotionally starved or abused as children, struggling 
to make human connections and seeking liveliness in 
movements of national regeneration. Stangl feared resistance 
and was intimidated. Despite Speer’s burden of guilt, his wish 
for transformation and to make amends, his narcissism 
prevented him empathising with the humanity of his slave 
labourers or the Jews whom he saw deported from Berlin, and 
even reciprocating the love of those close to him (Sereny 1998; 
Kubarych 2005). Speer’s problem with denial is treated below.  
Adorno and colleagues, however, postulated a relationship 
between authoritarian personality and the group and/or 
social environment.38 Studies of mass human rights violations 
highlight how cultures of obedience—whether populist, 
authoritarian, collectivist or fundamentalist—reject social 
diversity and dissent. Frequently male-dominated, they avoid 
critical thinking, prize loyalty, honour and death for the 
group, and identify and punish their enemies. Institutional 
and informational control, indoctrination, creating fear and 
agonising uncertainty, destruction of family and social bonds, 
and brainwashing children (for example, as soldiers) all 
enable radical, utopian actions: violence against family, 
intimates, and moral codes (Glover 1999; Cohen 2001; Pina e 
Cunha et al 2010). Women are often particularly vulnerable.39 
Adorno and colleagues’ observations about the dynamic 
interaction between individuals and German culture are 
highly pertinent. While individual doctors and scientists were 
centrally responsible, sponsored by the Nazi state, the failure 
of German society and institutions and the force of situations 
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and social roles must also be understood. 
Interplay between personality, group, situational and social 
determinants 
In Nazism, personality and situational determinants both 
contributed to the outcome of racist ideology. Hitler is the 
most striking example in point. In the ‘historians’ debate’ in 
the 1980s (Mason, 1989), intentionalists like Lucy Dawidowicz 
(1975) emphasised the importance of Hitler’s master plan as 
expressed in Mein Kampf, while functionalists minimised 
Hitler’s role. They stressed anarchic forces, such as 
opportunism from Nazism’s lower ranks, and bureaucratic 
chaos and infighting which drove improvisation and 
increasingly radical agendas (for example, Browning 1998, 
2004). A more nuanced synthesis of intentionalism and 
functionalism now prevails (Bauer, 2001). Thus, Hitler’s 
charismatic authority, according to Kershaw (2008), backed 
actions, however radical or inhumane, which furthered his 
ideological obsessions. His non-intervention style permitted 
party bosses, bureaucrats and professionals full scope for 
initiative. Since opportunities abounded for expansion, 
power, status and enrichment, there was never any shortage 
of chaotic rival schemes or willing participants. One might 
denounce neighbours to the Gestapo, slur a business 
competitor’s ‘Aryan’ credentials, or nominate patients for the 
euthanasia program: this was all ‘working towards the 
Fuhrer’ (Kershaw 2008; Bankier 1988; Michman 2010). 
Competitors for Hitler’s favour were often not told of rivals’ 
plans, many of which were deleterious to a ‘united’ purpose. 
Adolf Eichmann’s rise from obscurity to managing the 
‘Final Solution’ follows this trajectory (Kershaw 2008). In 1963, 
Hannah Arendt diagnosed Eichmann’s ‘banality of evil’; his 
incapacity to introspect and lack of inner language inclined 
him to unquestioning obedience to his assigned task, like a 
cog in a machine. Eichmann was also not devoid of 





young man, he joined the Party late as a bourgeois careerist 
and swiftly took on its program (Berkowitz 1999; Cesarani 
2006).  
Yet the influence of individuals like Hitler on groups and 
wider society was also inevitably mutual. As we will see, to 
further pursue their program, the Nazis depended on public 
adulation or inertia and lack of resistance.  
Socio-cultural and national-historical factors 
Socio-cultural and national-historical factors contribute 
significantly to mass human rights violations.40 At a personal 
or cultural level, tribalism and ethnic nationalism can nurse 
old narratives that maintain enmity. Past victimisation, 
enduring wounds, even early childrearing may trigger 
reactive withdrawal or compensatory anger. Severe, 
persistent life conditions and struggle for resources may 
frustrate basic needs like security, attachment, positive 
identity and role, effective control, justice and meaning 
(Maslow 1987, Silove 2000). When an individual or group’s 
self-concept is vulnerable, setbacks overwhelm collective and 
personal self-worth. Defensive superiority then forms a 
compensatory identity that diminishes and scapegoats others. 
Leaders who share the group’s culture, life situations and 
often unhealed wounds,41 may then propagate destructive 
ideologies to gain followers or consolidate a following 
(Allport 1954).  
From its foundation in 1871, Germany was a weak (and 
ultimately a failed) state (Moore 1966; Steinmetz 1997; 
Kershaw 2008; Higgins 2006), and a non-existent state in the 
Third Reich period, as Franz Neumann (1967) pointed out 
contemporaneously. Its ideologies of ‘race hygiene’ and 
‘scientific racism’, and the Great War’s bitter legacies, were 
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primers for eventual genocide. Defeat, revolution and the 
Versailles Treaty’s war guilt clauses fed the myth that Jews, 
socialists, Communists and war profiteers stabbed Germany 
in the back. Colossal reparations, foreign occupation of the 
Ruhr and hyper-inflation fuelled economic depression and 
social chaos. Hitler promised to redeem Germany by 
modernisation, racial purification and imperial conquest.42 In 
the earlier Nazi years, many Germans experienced mystical, 
exalted states associated with nationalism (Soelle 2001), 
expressed in the resurgent economy, the spectacle of the 
Nuremberg rallies, the victories of German athletes at the 
Berlin Olympics, and Hitler’s achievements in foreign affairs 
(Friedländer 2007). Psychiatrist Carl Jung, who loved pagan 
symbolism and myth, valorised the German peoples’ 
revitalisation under National Socialism.43 With the coming of 
the Third Reich, however, state deliberative decision-making 
also completely disappeared, civilised standards collapsed, 
and barriers to state-sanctioned inhumanity were rapidly 
removed (Mommsen 1997; Kershaw 2008). Race hygiene 
replaced social and sexual health clinics. Waves of repression 
and violence descended on Jews and other minorities. 
Political opponents held in the new Dachau concentration 
camp were murdered (Evans 2004; and Lifton).44 Most 
Germans were insulated from the experience of these groups. 
The role of antisemitism is disputed. Earlier historians 
traced a lineage from Luther through Christian antisemitism 
to the Third Reich (for example, McGovern 1973). Several 
authorities suggest that antisemitism was weaker in Germany 
than in other western countries, like France, and certainly 
weaker than in eastern Europe. For instance, from 
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emancipation in 1848 till the Weimar Republic, German Jews 
did not die of antisemitic violence. During the Weimar period, 
polarisation occurred between Jewish integration and 
intensifying antisemitism among various organisations and 
political parties, especially just after World War I and the 
years immediately preceding the Third Reich, but not the 
period in between. From 30 January 1933, a cascade of 
disastrous policy, legal and social developments overtook 
Jews (Abrahams-Sprod 2006). Hitler’s antisemitism, 
‘calculation and fanaticism’ inspired these developments, and 
institutions, bureaucracies and professions willingly 
implemented them. Daniel Goldhagen’s controversial 1996 
thesis that antisemitism among ordinary Germans was always 
‘eliminationist’ and enabled Holocaust killing has been 
strongly contested. Some thought it massively simplified and 
demonised German popular motivations, while others noted 
the lack of comparison with Nazi-occupied countries,45 and as 
the sole cause of popular participation in genocide it was 
widely discounted. While antisemitism permeated German 
national culture, some view Nazi propaganda (at least to 
1941) as apparently failing to bolster public support for anti-
Jewish policy and provoking concerns about the illegality of 
these measures and possible repercussions. Others, like 
Robert Ericksen (2012), have shown just how complicit the 
churches and universities were in bolstering the Nazi regime. 
Ultimately, there was a distancing, an alienation and (from 
1941) a buffer between the regime and a war-weary populace, 
who wanted to know little and who because of their pre-
existent antisemitic attitudes, did not protest. Thus popular 
antisemitism may have directly motivated murder but also 
indirectly and probably more frequently contributed to the 
radical Nazi program’s success by promoting non-
intervention, that is standing by in all matters related to Jews 
(Bankier 1988; Michman 2010; Kershaw 2008). The literature 
                                                 





on who knew what and when, on who was complicit or 
merely companions to this genocide, has been sparse, but is 
coming into sharp focus with the research of Eric Johnston 
(2006) and Robert Ericksen (2012).  
Bauman (1989) also highlights the Holocaust’s origins in 
modernity, and particularly its trademark: instrumental 
rationality, which is characterised by segmentation of labour, 
categorisation and procedures. Although modernity does not 
explain all genocides, for example Rwanda,46 instrumental 
rationality plays a vital role.  
Instrumental rationality, group dynamics and ‘othering’ 
Thus Bauman notes that administrative or organisational evil 
depends on deficient ethical frameworks, with efficiency 
paramount, conscience captive to authority, information 
diffused, and responsibility fragmented. Attention to task, 
technique, rules and limited morality separates actions from 
emotion.47 Harms are even easier to commit when one is an 
intermediary, neither giving orders nor carrying them out 
(Kilham and Mann 1974), when one is anonymous or 
disguised48 (Staub 2003), and when one is removed from the 
consequences of one’s actions, as modern technological 
warfare and the Milgram experiments (see below) 
demonstrate. Eichmann and other ‘desk murderers’, using the 
railway tourist fare schedule, could therefore organise 
‘removal transports’ to effect a ‘change of residence’ of Jews—
to Auschwitz.49 Bureaucratisation and progressively 
sophisticated means of killing such as Zyklon-B gas chambers 
rather than shooting, maximised efficiency and psychological 
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insulation: perpetrators did not face their victims, who 
became non-human legitimate targets (Browning 1998; 
Glover;50 Russell and Gregory 2005; Bauman 1989, and Rowan 
Savage in this volume). Each agent’s task is plausibly 
deniable. As a good manager or employee, effective, efficient 
and legal, one can still (un)wittingly commit evil acts (Adams 
and Balfour 2004; Pina e Cunha et al 2010). Contemporary 
examples include international corporations that deal in 
destruction and death: international small arms traders, the 
tobacco lobby (Bandura 1999), multinational polluters, and 
the Hardie asbestos scandal in Australia (Peacock 2009).  
Similarly, in overt war, terrorism and genocide, group 
allegiance and absolution facilitate killing; and situational and 
group roles, and cultural and organisational arrangements 
channel the emotions and proclivities of perpetrators. 
Fundamental needs to survive and belong mean accepting 
group norms and co-operation (Staub 2003; Zimbardo 2007). 
Promoting soldiers’ connections with comrades also enhances 
their willingness to act for them and their operational 
effectiveness against enemies (Grossman 1996).  
Interviewing Nazi killers, Lifton and psychiatrist Henry 
Dicks (1972) underscored their normality rather than 
pathology.51 Collective, diffused or displaced responsibility 
allows people to behave more cruelly than if acting alone, to 
relinquish responsibility for victims’ life and welfare, and 
makes bystander helping less probable.52 Christopher 
Browning, studying the trial documents of Reserve Police 
Battalion 101, comprising ‘ordinary’ middle-aged working 
class men from the social democratic city of Hamburg, 
emphasised such variables: group and tribal loyalty, peer 
pressure, assigned roles and obedience to authority. Ordered 
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to murder Jews in a Polish village (Josefow), the group leader 
gave his men the choice to opt out, but less than 15 of 500 did 
so. Not initially heartless, they became progressively de-
sensitised, eventually murdering 70,000–80,000 people 
(Browning 1998) sometimes bringing their wives and 
girlfriends to watch their weeks’ ‘work’, and they became the 
most efficient killers in the Lublin district. 
Dehumanisation involves stripping people of human 
qualities, thus denying likeness, empathy and obligation. 
Social group research demonstrates that in-groups rate 
themselves as more human than out-groups and strangers 
(Haslam et al 2005). Thus moral principles apply to ‘us’, but 
not ‘them’.53 ‘Just-world’ thinking assumes the world is just, 
therefore suffering people invited their fate by their actions or 
character: hence perpetrators devalue people they have 
harmed (Lerner 1980; Staub 2003). In wars and actions against 
‘undesirable’ minorities, state propaganda portrays enemies 
as greedy, cruel, godless, raping, murdering, criminal, 
mindless savages or barbarians or ‘gooks’, demonic, or 
dangerous animals (Keen 2004; Glover, 1999; Zimbardo54).  
As Primo Levi’s Nazi camp commandant explained, rather 
than being pointlessly cruel to those who would die, 
dehumanising victims enabled perpetrators to kill (Levi, 
1987). Nazism sought to influence public perception through 
propaganda films that portrayed Jews, Roma, homosexuals, 
and people with mental disabilities as vermin or as vicious, 
lascivious, sinister, grotesque or otherwise subhuman. Such 
films popularised ‘natural selection’, and promoted voluntary 
and involuntary ‘euthanasia’.55 Blaming victims by staging 
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incidents where they stand accused as provocateurs (as the 
Nazis did to Jews on ‘Kristallnacht’ or Hitler did to Poland at 
the outbreak of World War II) absolves the perpetrator and 
justifies further aggression and marginalisation. Zimbardo 
(2007) shows how institutional power without safeguards 
leads to abuse. Contagion of emotions may spread with mobs. 
For some, psychological mechanisms such as sadism, 
sensational thrill-seeking and threatened egotism may play 
into this (Baumeister and Campbell 1999). In short, 
dehumanising people enables torture and murder (see Rowan 
Savage in this volume).  
Language, and the problem with and function of denial 
Denial (specifically knowing yet not-knowing), which 
operates at personal, cultural and official levels (Cohen 2001), 
is the sine qua non of mass human rights violations. Denial is 
literal (‘nothing is happening’), interpretative (‘what is 
happening is not what it seems’), volitional (‘it’s got nothing 
to do with me’), ‘relativist’ (‘yes, but look at what the Russians 
did to German civilians’), and so on.56  
Exculpatory or neutralised language is intrinsic to rights 
violations. Harms are often justified by invoking higher moral 
principles (just war theories and rhetoric rationalise making 
war to resist oppression, save humanity, or secure peace), or 
by using euphemistic or non-agentic phrases (for example, 
‘collateral damage’, ‘surgical strikes’, ‘friendly fire’) (Bandura 
1999). Nazi deceptive or distancing language (for example, 
‘selection’, ‘special operation’, ‘resettlement’, ‘Final Solution’) 
facilitated denial for observers and victims, enabling 
perpetrators to split off and disown personal acts (Arendt 
1963; Cohen57). The term ‘Final Solution’ stood for mass 
murder without sounding like it, keeping the focus on 
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For Hitler, compartmentalisation was vital. Personally, he 
avoided physical and visual contact with the consequences of 
his murderous orders, and actively prevented others telling 
him the truth. Collectively, Hitler strictly separated his life 
with Himmler, Goebbels, his generals and staff from his 
intimate personal circle. He also required compart-
mentalisation by others. A notice on every wall read: ‘Every 
man need only know what is going on in his own domain’. 
Compartmentalisation involved not only activities but also 
thinking. Speer observed that linked with his secrecy order, 
this meant much more than Hitler’s wanting people to 
concentrate their minds—it meant it was dangerous not to59 
(Kubarych 2005).  
Albert Speer exemplifies individual denial. While denying 
lifelong that he knew the Jews were being exterminated, Speer 
affirmed that he was blind by choice, not ignorant. Noticing 
the obvious destruction of ‘Kristallnacht’ and Jewish evictions, 
he avoided knowing the reasons. He eluded recognising the 
barbarous conditions of his slave labourers. A friend advised 
him never to visit Auschwitz: what he saw there he was not 
permitted to describe and could not describe. Speer avoided 
querying him or anyone, evading evidence that would 
confirm his suspicions that crimes had been committed. He 
admitted he was ‘inescapably contaminated morally; from 
discovering something which might have made me turn from 
my course, I had closed my eyes’ (Sereny 1996; Kubarych 
2005). On tough questions, he generalised about specifics and 
admitted a little to deny a lot. It was not that Speer did not 
want to know, but (more strongly) that he wanted not to 
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know (Kubarych 2005).  
German collective denial was expressed and examined 
after April 1945, when the widely publicised liberation of the 
Bergen–Belsen concentration camp shocked the world. As 
events unfolded, many Germans claimed ‘We knew nothing 
about this’ (Davon haben wir nichts gewusst). Though Germans 
knew of Nazi murderousness towards Jews through 
propaganda (Johnson 2005), awareness of genocide (which 
began after the invasion of Russia) had come gradually for the 
Allies and Germans. Except for civilians and soldiers in close 
proximity to the Einsatzgruppen, the concentration camps in 
German-occupied lands or extermination camps in Poland, 
there were rumours and guesses (Sereny 2000). German 
historian Peter Longerich comments that Davon, meaning 
‘about this’, implies knowledge and unwillingness to openly 
address the subject further. The verb gewusst, implying 
knowledge, is carefully chosen, not excluding rumours and 
partial information that was uncertain. People accordingly 
employed this strategy to distance themselves from 
responsibility (Richards, 2006). The Holocaust therefore was 
an open secret in real time (Cohen 2001). The question of 
knowledge and accountability has been central to recent 
German history (see below). After the war, many asserted that 
Germans had been misled60 or were uninformed. Defendants 
concealed, distorted or justified their roles, for example citing 
obedience and community loyalty during war61 or were self-
righteously indignant.62 Neurologist Julius Hallervorden, who 
removed brains from murdered children with cerebral palsy, 
told Leo Alexander that ‘there was wonderful material among 
those brains, beautiful mental defectives…[but] how they 
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came to me was none of my business’.63  
Gradualism 
People and societies change for worse (or better) through 
stepwise actions (Zimbardo 2007; Staub64). Prefacing big 
requests with related smaller requests (the ‘foot-in-the-door’ 
tactic) is effective (Staub;65 Milgram 1963; Zimbardo 2007). 
Learning through participation is critical—for harming, 
gradually inducting and capturing people in practices they 
normally find morally abhorrent. Thus exposure and step-
wise change overcomes resistance, altering values, self-
concept and behaviours. ‘Teachers’ who shock errant 
‘learners’ increase shock intensity as learner performance 
declines (Bandura et al 1975). Some observe the role of 
learned perversity or unleashed sadism, based on an 
emerging culture of freedom from constraints that is 
associated with absolute power, or the removal or 
suppression of negative consequences for undertaking 
increasingly cruel acts upon others (Rosen 2011).  
Under the Nazis, Jewish assimilation and the German–
Jewish symbiosis was destroyed through progressive 
exclusion (dismissal from jobs, expropriation, disenfranchise-
ment, prohibition of marriage and sexual relations), 
terrorisation (the ‘Kristallnacht’ pogrom), stigmatisation 
(wearing yellow stars), and finally removal and extermination 
(Staub;66 Abrahams-Sprod 2006). The ‘euthanasia’ programs 
pioneered Holocaust technologies, and effected psychological 
and institutional changes that facilitated it (Dudley and Gale 
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2002; Staub67). Eichmann acclimatised to genocide through 
ethnic cleansing of Poles in 1939. When first exposed to bodies 
of massacred Jews, he reacted with revulsion: however, Nazi 
ideology, Führer loyalty, his need to belong and careerism, 
made him continue and ignore his distress, which gradually 
extinguished (Arendt 1963). Stangl was also drawn into 
genocide in a stepwise fashion (Sereny 1974). For members of 
Police Battalion 101, police force career choice and training 
and increasing Jewish persecution may possibly have aided 
their desensitisation.68 Greek torturers were not selected for 
sadism but non-deviancy, identification with the political 
regime, and obedience. Training bound them together 
through initiation rites, isolation, new values, and elitist 
language; de-individuation and prevention of thinking; and 
exposure to frequent, group controlled violence (Gibson and 
Haritos-Fatouros 1986). Forms of contractual obligation are 
created, meaningful roles are played, and apparently 
reasonable rules become binding. Preventing exit, and 
offering an (ideological) end to justify the means (Staub 2003) 
are also important. The induction of executioners (Haney et al 
1997; Robertson 2006), the ‘normalisation’ of executions in 
various countries, and the evolution of terrorists (Bandura 
1999) exemplify the same gradualism. In war, indoctrination, 
humiliation and distancing and the killing or wounding of 
comrades may provoke explosive retaliation and excitement, 
a wish to go on killing.69 Glover (1999) convincingly 
documents a stepwise progression in the shift to killing at 
distance, from the British naval blockade in World War I to 
the use of the atomic bomb, and details the institutional 
momentum, moral inertia, diffused responsibility and moral 
sliding that made it possible. The role of miscommunication, 
Hobbesian fear and military drift should also not be 
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Nazi doctors and psychiatrists: motivations and reasons 
Illich and Foucault chart the dangers inherent in medical 
power and biological knowledge.70 (Technical knowledge can 
facilitate both healing and killing (Lafleur et al 2007)). 
Unsurprisingly, similar motives and reasons emerge in 
medical and helping contexts: as noted above, the criteria for 
‘euthanasia’, for example, were ideological (‘eugenic’, 
antisemitic, and economic), practical (related to 
administrative efficiency), and achieved through bureaucratic 
routine, peer pressure, propaganda and inducements.71  
At Nuremberg, Nazi doctors and psychiatrists multiplied 
excuses. These included: following orders, tu quoque, acting 
for public health or national security, total war demands 
extreme measures (Proctor 1992), the captives would be killed 
anyway, prisoners who volunteered for experiments were 
offered freedom (there was no evidence of this) or might 
expiate their ‘crimes’ (that is, minority group status or 
political beliefs), scientists lacked moral or ‘values’ expertise, 
or that the few could be sacrificed for the many (Caplan,72 
Schmidt 2007, Weindling 2006). The post-war medical trials 
admitted none of these justifications. Moreover, the claim that 
the Nazis enforced psychiatric co-operation is a half-truth at 
best. Despite pressure from peers and superiors, higher 
ranking and direct perpetrators were seldom simply coerced 
into transgression. Doctors were not coerced, insane, 
psychopathic, demonic or incompetent, but frequently pillars 
of the establishment.73 German medicine affiliated to the Nazi 
                                                 
70 Weindling (2006), 5. 
71 Evans (2009), 101. 
72 Caplan (2007), 66–70. 





party early74 and enthusiastically—it actively welcomed the 
Nazis (Dudley and Gale 2002) —and in greater numbers than 
any other professional group (Proctor 1988). The SS was the 
chief perpetrator organisation, which recruited a high number 
of professional culprits, especially doctors. Antisemitic 
ideology, obedience and more authoritarian personality 
orientation distinguished SS members (Dicks 1972; Merkl 
1980; Elms and Milgram 1966; Staub75). Scientists were not 
bystanders or pawns: many helped construct Nazi racial 
policies76 which progressively subverted discussions of 
human experimentation in ethics journals.77  
German psychiatry, which was somatically focused, state-
dominated and objectified patients,78) had aided the pursuit of 
compulsory sterilisation and ‘euthanasia’. Eugenics and ‘race 
hygiene’ resulted in compulsory sterilisations in several 
countries. German authorities argued the war sacrificed the 
best genes, while medicine supported the weak, leaving the 
worst to proliferate. Purging such ‘epidemics’ would redeem 
and regenerate Germany. Many Nazis therefore endorsed 
medical ‘counter-selection’ of ‘degenerate’ individuals and 
‘useless eaters’ (those with various physical, mental and 
intellectual disabilities, or belonging to certain cultural 
groups) for euthanasia (Zimbardo;79 Weindling;80 Gallagher 
1990; Lifton 1986, Friedlander 1995; Dudley and Gale 2002). 
Hitler conceived the German nation as a body to which every 
true German was indissolubly joined but from which the 
Jewish ‘bacillus’, ‘virus’, ‘gangrenous excrescence’ were to be 
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extirpated. Thus genocide was an immune response to illness 
in the body politic (Koenigsburg 2009). Robert Ritter, 
psychiatrist with the German National Institute of Health, 
also viewed 90 per cent of Romani as descendants of the 
lowest European criminal sub-proletariat, dispatching many 
for killing.81 The supposed subhuman status of live subjects 
also facilitated coerced experiments. Commitment to public 
health and alternative medicine contrasted with denial of the 
social causes of poverty.82  
Interviewing Nuremberg medical defendants and others, 
Alexander (1948, 1949) concluded that indoctrination, group 
seduction and sanctioning led to denial of individual 
responsibility and reality. He speculated that the Nazi 
regime’s enforcement of Blutkitt (‘blood putty’), the collective 
commission of crimes contrary to one’s personal values, 
confirmed extraordinary service in the ‘greater cause’ or 
‘sacred mission’, proving and reinforcing party allegiance and 
loyalty. Thus Himmler, famously addressing the SS 
perpetrators, pardoned them in discharging their ‘heroic 
duty’. Doctors and psychiatrists were often committed Nazis, 
who ‘selected’ for national health. For doctors and 
psychiatrists, the language of eugenics, and the metaphor of 
surgical extirpation of the ulcer or gangrene of Jewry and 
other ‘degenerates’ from the body of German humanity, 
represented murder as a public service.83 Ferocity and 
hardness replaced Judeo–Christian compassion (Gallagher;84 
Glover 1999). Among camp doctors, Lifton noted ‘doubling’, 
whereby a portion of the self becomes the whole (or 
‘Auschwitz self’), enabling self-deception and adaptation to 
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evil environments. Irrespective of this construct’s validity 
(Burleigh 1994; Cohen 2001; Gaita85), the separation of roles 
characterised T4 psychiatrists.  
In contrast to the notion of a ‘duty to kill’, embodied in 
medical writings of the time (Dudley and Gale 2002) is the 
motive of venality. As noted above, opportunism and 
careerism were rampant as the Nazis offered non-Jewish 
doctors, who did not demur, improved earnings, assets, 
research opportunities and status as Jewish colleagues were 
ousted (Proctor 1992). Self-interest—such as financial 
incentive, career advancement or expropriation—is a common 
motive in genocide and mass murder.86 Zealots also 
participated eagerly in exterminations, others performed 
required duties more or less methodically, others again 
participated reluctantly.87  
Holocaust bystanders  
Standing by rarely receives sufficient attention, compared 
with perpetrators, victims and rescuers. Standing by 
encompasses a number of heterogeneous responses. Some 
bystanders may be guilt-ridden. Others may fear 
consequences, be in denial, suppressing uncomfortable 
knowledge (Speer fits this description), be morally indifferent, 
or tacitly approve or be complicit in what is occurring.88  
In the Third Reich, many were passive bystanders or even 
active participants, boycotting Jewish businesses, benefiting 
from expropriations of Jewish property or firing Jewish 
employees, breaking off friendships (Abrahams-Sprod 2006). 
Deception and obfuscation determined the ‘language rules’ 
(Goldhagen 1996, Arendt 1963, Cohen 2001). As noted, Jewish 
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and non-Jewish doctors were pitted against each other. The 
Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute, renamed after Göring, 
accommodated psychoanalytic concepts to Nazi ideology.89 
Psychiatrists enhanced their lowly status by accepting the task 
of identifying and excluding inferior Germans.90 German 
psychiatrist Oswald Bumke asserted in 1945 that though 
killing people with mental illness was meant to be top secret, 
‘the sparrows were whistling it from the rooftops’.91 
Research on bystanders and rescuers, compared with 
perpetrators, is scant. Underpinning bystanding are 
situational risks that are judged insuperable, and the wish for 
normality, predictability and social acceptance. Numbing and 
avoidance of critical thinking are common. Depending on 
social conditions, bystanders may become temporary 
perpetrators or rescuers.92  
Bystanders have power to influence events. To act against 
Jews, the Nazi leadership needed a reliable substrata of 
antisemitism. They were apprehensive about popular 
reactions, but surprised and emboldened by the lack of 
response, and also popular action against Jews (Hilberg 1961; 
Dawidowicz 1975; Staub93). Arendt (1994) spoke of ‘the empty 
space’ forming around friends and loved ones when the Nazis 
came to power, in the wave of co-ordination, not yet the 
pressure of terror. Thus bystanders—nice enough men and 
women whose moral sense was blunted—made the Holocaust 
possible (Gryn 1996).  
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As bystanders, many nations facilitated the Holocaust. 
Antisemitism existed in western nations. They supported the 
1936 Berlin Olympics. American corporations traded with 
Germany throughout the 1930s (Wyman 1984). In May 1939, 
the SS St Louis carried 937 Jewish refugees from Hamburg to 
Cuba, which denied them entry. So, despite appeals, did the 
United States. Britain, France, Belgium and Holland finally 
admitted them but subsequently many died in Nazi gas 
chambers, a consequence of collective international indecision 
and policy failure regarding Jewish refugees (Thomas and 
Morgan-Witts, 1974). The Rwandan genocide,94 and events in 
Darfur (among others) also exemplify the effects of standing 
by. 
Motives and reasons for harming: experimental models 
A number of experimental paradigms have modelled 
elements of perpetrator behaviour, shedding light on 
Holocaust events as well as later genocides. Stanley Milgram’s 
famous experiments (1963, 1974) examined how obedience to 
authority and conformity might violate people’s basic moral 
beliefs. Milgram was inspired by Asch’s conformity 
experiments. These demonstrated that individual 
participants’ visual comparisons of different line lengths with 
a reference line could be influenced by peers’ false responses. 
Dissenting peer responses reduced the likelihood of 
conformity (Asch 1956), but collectivist cultures increased it 
(Bond and Smith 1996). The Holocaust and contemporaneous 
Eichmann trial primed Milgram’s work.  
In New Haven, Connecticut, 1,000 adults aged 20 to 50 
years from numerous occupations and educational 
backgrounds, became unwitting subjects for Milgram’s 
purported study of memory and learning. A white-coated, 
impassive experimenter ordered them to teach a pleasant 
volunteer stranger a series of word pairs, using a generator 
                                                 





that supposedly administered increasingly painful and 
hazardous shocks when errors were made. The learner, out of 
sight in another room, was the experimenter’s confederate, 
and though increasingly distressed sounds were pre-recorded 
and played for each shock level, no shocks were actually 
given. The experimenter met participants’ distress, 
questioning and wish to discontinue with reassurances that he 
would assume all responsibility and there was no permanent 
damage, but increasingly assertive demands that they 
continue.  
Beforehand, Milgram polled professionals’ predicted 
outcomes. All 14 Yale University senior psychology majors 
believed that very few (average 1.2 per cent) would inflict 
maximum voltage. Thirty-nine psychiatrists predicted that 0.1 
per cent (the ‘pathological fringe’) would administer 
maximum voltage, only 4 per cent would reach 300 volts, and 
most would not exceed 150 volts. The actual results starkly 
discredited these predictions. Despite personal distress, when 
pressed, almost two-thirds of participants obeyed to the end 
(three administered 450 volts). Women and men were equally 
obedient. The experiment delivered similar results in 
Princeton, Rome, South Africa, Australia and Munich (where 
85 per cent of subjects obeyed until the end) (Milgram 1974). 
High compliance (6 per cent) occurred when peers complied, 
the experimenter was adjacent, the learner was in another 
room, distress sounds were absent, and the warning was only 
written on the shock generator. Thus avoiding personal 
sensory awareness of the impact of harmful acts was crucial. 
Conversely, the experimenter’s reduced physical proximity 
(for example, instructing via phone), the learner’s distress 
sounds or increased proximity (for example, having to hold 
the learner’s arm on a shock plate), conflicting authority 
(incompatible orders of equal status experimenters), and peer 
rebellion (observed disobedience of other teachers (actually 
actors)), reduced obedience. Perhaps non-strangers (family, 





decreased obedience, while the procedural impersonality of 
the shock generator facilitated it (Russell and Gregory 2005). 
Choosing to please rather than confront the experimenter, 
most participants relinquished personal responsibility and 
delegated: administering word-pair tests while another 
participant administered shocks ensured high (93 per cent) 
compliance. Milgram95 associated this with modern 
bureaucracy, which absolves most from directly destructive 
actions, employing small numbers of ‘the most callous and 
obtuse’ for ‘dirty work’. For those who resisted, personalities, 
feelings of competence, values and (sometimes) group 
cultures were important (Milgram 1974; Staub 2003).  
Albert Bandura et al (1975), purporting to study the effects 
of punishment on decision-making, derived similar findings. 
‘Supervisors’ who were told to administer electric shocks to 
unseen subjects who made faulty decisions, increased the 
intensity of ‘shocking’ behaviour if responsibility was 
collective rather than individual, and if recipients were 
negatively labelled. (No electric shocks were actually given). 
As performance declined, shock intensities increased, creating 
further failures that were taken as further evidence of 
culpability. Self-exonerating justifications prevailed. 
The also famous Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE) 
(Zimbardo 2007; Haney et al 1973) explored the effects of 
situational variables (including duress and peer pressure) on 
individual behaviour. Role-playing life in a simulated prison, 
24 white middle class young males selected for apparently 
normal psychological adjustment were randomly assigned to 
the parts of warders or prisoners. The experiment 
intentionally reproduced the worst features of prisons, 
including de-individuation (warders) and dehumanisation 
(prisoners). Warders received military uniforms, wooden 
batons and reflective glasses (minimising eye contact), and 
                                                 





worked in shifts, returning home off hours. Prisoners donned 
smocks without underpants, thongs and ankle chains, were 
assigned identifying numbers, and booked in by actual police 
co-operating with the experiment at its inception. Loss of 
personal identity facilitated learned helplessness, with 
prisoners suffering and accepting sadistic and humiliating 
treatment from guards. Physical punishments and arbitrary 
controls included deprivation of privacy, food and sleep, and 
degrading practices, for example, enforced nudity, and 
cleaning toilets with bare hands. Some resisted, others became 
zealous models, many developed uncontrollable crying or 
disorganised thinking. As with the Nazi doctors (Lifton 1986), 
guards were zealous, methodical or reluctant, though even 
the latter failed to challenge the situation.96 Inadequate 
supervision abetted prisoner abuse. The experiment had to be 
abandoned after six days of the projected fortnight.  
Contrary to expectation that individuals facing moral 
dilemmas would follow their conscience, Milgram’s 
experiment showed that directives from authorities 
overwhelmed the morality of most individuals who are in no 
way evil (Milgram 1974; Blass 2002). Zimbardo et al’s 
experiment (and also that by Bandura et al) similarly revealed 
the importance of individual, situational and systemic factors, 
including de-individuation and dehumanisation, in 
understanding institutional abuses (Zimbardo,97 Staub 2003).  
Taken together, these experiments illustrate the influence 
of experimentally induced authority, peers, institutional 
ideology (‘the slogan that legitimises the means to attain the 
goal’98) and onlookers, on individual behaviours. Ordinary 
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people, performing tasks without particular hostility, can act 
destructively even without physical coercion. Obedience to 
authority can lead to verbal abuse, sexual assault (strip-search 
scams provoked by anonymous ‘police officers’ in American 
fast-food restaurant chains) or death (for example, doctors’ 
power over nurses in drug ordering, airline pilots’ authority 
over first officers) (Zimbardo 2007, 278ff). Schoolteachers 
favouring students with blue eyes or brown eyes can 
transform classrooms into totalitarian, abusive and exclusive 
environments (Peters 1985). Ron Jones, a teacher in Palo Alto, 
produced his film ‘The Third Wave’ in 1967: it showed high 
school students just how easily fascist behaviour could be 
‘created’ when hierarchies, dressed in appropriate uniforms 
and insignia, are introduced. This ‘situational’ paradigm, 
rather than formal mental illness, repeatedly supports torture 
and mass murder, as exemplified by the Third Reich’s camp 
guards, Rwandan and former Yugoslavian genocides, 
terrorists and suicide bombers,99 and destructive cults (Jim 
Jones' People’s Temple, Aum Shinrikyo). Role identification 
and compartmentalisation can produce dire results, as the 
camp guards who played Bach while they murdered Jews 
illustrates.100  
Milgram101 believed his results confirmed Arendt’s 
conception of ‘the banality of evil’. However, direct authority 
does not fully explain the sanctioning of harms in everyday 
situations, where authority is often deliberately diffused, and 
where ideology is vital (Bandura 1999).  
This is not to excuse individuals’ reprehensible actions, or 
to minimise their accountability. But investigators differ in 
interpreting individual vulnerability to antisocial behaviours 
and ‘moral disengagement’. Bandura (1999) cites parenting 
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failures, abuse and neglect, early aggression, failure to 
recognise and cultivate pro-social behaviour, lack of guilt, 
rumination over personal injustices and retaliation, and lack 
of perceived efficacy to withstand peer pressure. Zimbardo 
(2007) argues that these experiments show the potential 
corruptibility of anyone (including our kin and ourselves) 
given the right situational and/or systemic (socio-cultural) 
forces, and difficulty predicting behaviours under stress even 
with prior knowledge of people’s innate, apparently ‘normal’, 
dispositions. Baum102 responds that this does not account for 
individual rescuing, and emphasises the predictive 
importance of personal emotional development.  
Motives and reasons for helping  
Social psychology emphasises the power of social situations: 
under conducive conditions, ordinary decent people can do 
appalling things. However, the situational paradigm begs the 
question about why some people behave well, heroically and 
sometimes repeatedly, in dire situations (Bernstein 2002; 
Baum 2008). Milgram found a sizeable minority resisted 
pressure, displaying moral courage and imagination (Bandura 
1999). Against self-interest, without expectation of gain, and 
often in prolonged peril, rescuers of Jews in the Holocaust 
frequently acted for acquaintances or strangers. Such active 
behaviour (those honoured by Yad Vashem under-represent 
those who rescued) was often crucial to outcome in Nazi-
occupied Europe. Typically, they minimised their 
contribution, rather than seeing it as heroic. Their actions and 
motives have been frequently described (for example, Tec 
1986; Oliner and Oliner 1988; Paldiel 1988; Fogelman 1994; 
Gilbert 2002). 
Helping can be situationally influenced. For example, the 
                                                 





more people who witness an emergency, the less likely they 
will help (Darley and Latane 1968). Diffusion of responsibility 
may explain this,103 because helping is more likely when 
needs are clear, great, impactful and focused, costs are 
affordable and the behaviour required is socially acceptable.104 
Time pressure (Darley and Batson 1973) and the prior 
relationship are also relevant. In Milgram’s experiments, as 
noted, situational determinants, like being personally 
responsible for and witnessing harms one causes (Milgram 
1974; Bandura et al 1975), affected obedience. 
But this is notwithstanding the importance of character, 
competencies in crises, and the capacity of situations to shape 
character. Crime interveners have a sense of capability 
founded on training and subjective personal strength 
(Hudson et al 1981). Steps in help include noticing, 
understanding the urgency, assuming responsibility, deciding 
how to help, and implementing one’s decision. Like 
perpetrators and bystanders, rescuers evolve. Contact leads to 
identification, becoming aware of the human characteristics of 
those being killed or harmed converts bystanders from 
passivity to action, and gradual incremental involvement 
becomes an obsession to rescue. The stories of famous 
rescuers Oskar Schindler (Keneally 1983) and Raoul 
Wallenberg show this (Bandura 1999, Staub 2003).  
Many Holocaust rescuers and Milgram experiment defiers 
were deeply connected to and identified with moral parents 
and families holding strong humanitarian values. Notably, 
they received less punitive rearing, with closer fathers and 
more reasoning and explanation (London 1970; Oliner and 
Oliner 1988; Blass 1991; Blass 1993,105 Tec 1986; Staub,106 
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Baum107). While perpetrators have over-developed social 
identities, rescuers were far more often emotionally mature: 
independent-minded, emotionally intelligent, having higher 
self-esteem, subscribing to universal ideals and principles 
(Baum 2008), and socially responsible. Rescuers differed from 
bystanders on locus of control, autonomy, risk-taking, social 
responsibility, tolerance and authoritarianism, empathy, and 
altruistic moral reasoning (Midlarsky et al 2005). While trait 
adventurousness characterised some, all rescuers showed 
courage when confronted with daunting risks. Some belonged 
to resistance groups, church groups or nations that shaped 
their responses, though religion did not notably associate with 
rescuing. Such ‘pro-social orientation’ (Staub 1995) may be 
grounded in respect and moral standing, moral principles and 
identity, and in affective connections and sympathy (Staub 
1995; Glover 1999).  
The psychology of altruism is relevant here. Altruism is 
the motivation to help others or for others’ welfare without 
regard to reward or the benefits of recognition. While the 
payoffs of altruism are hotly debated, helping has its own 
momentum: the great majority of helpers describe the 
experience as positive, while conversely people whose lives 
are more satisfying feel they have more to give others. 
Research shows that materialistic-competitive goals (wealth, 
career success, power) are inimical to helping, though not 
other personal goals (for example, support and security, 
personal growth, competence, control).108  
Whole cultures of rescue confronted Nazism, as in 
Denmark and Bulgaria, and Italy and Hungary before 
German takeovers in 1943 and 1944 respectively. National 
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leadership [and internal political struggles] prevented 
Bulgarian Jews being deported. Some members of the German 
Confessing Church, Holland’s Antirevolutionary Church, and 
various Italian and French villages exemplify resistance (as 
discussed in Colin Tatz’s chapter in this volume). In Le 
Chambon-sur-Lignon, descendants of persecuted Protestant 
Huguenots led by their pastor and his wife, hid thousands of 
Jews from the Nazis (Sauvage 1989; Baum109). Relatives and 
institutions that protested killing of people with mental, 
physical and intellectual disabilities acted similarly. Against 
German efficiency, incorruptibility and obedience, divergent 
civic traditions (of freedom and equal rights in Denmark, and 
unpunctuality and inefficiency in Italy) may also have 
contributed to this outcome (Glover, 1999). At a macro-
political level, realpolitik may determine whether people or 
nations intervene in oppression or aggression (for example, 
European nations deciding whether to stop Hitler before 
World War II). However, membership and memory of 
minority group status, pro-social orientation, and leadership 
all contribute to outcomes in national and whole-cultural 
situations.  
Preventing mass human rights violations: where is the 
engine-room?  
The Holocaust contains individual, situational and social 
determinants, and (in)humanity arises from ordinary 
psychological, situational and socio-cultural processes and 
their evolution into extreme forms. Yet should preventive 
approaches to mass human rights violations target the level of 
individual frailty and transgression, or institutional, 
communal, socio-cultural and national influences? How to 
address situational factors in facilitating such abuses?  
It is a paradox that individuals rather than groups are 
generally held legally accountable for mass human rights 
                                                 





violations, yet locating the prime cause of such violations in 
individual frailty and pathology seems misconceived. Moral 
actions while remaining the actor’s personal responsibility 
presuppose wider influences (Bandura, 1999; Zimbardo, 2007; 
Staub, 2003). Research meta-analyses reveal the power of 
social situations on behaviour is robust, yet criminal justice 
systems rarely address this.110 While individual perpetrators 
played key roles, the role of German society and nation was 
absolutely crucial, for example, in accepting Hitler and not 
resisting antisemitic policies. Virtually every German 
institution, occupational group or profession contributed 
voluntarily (usually enthusiastically) to the ‘Final Solution’, 
turning their own traditional ethical protocols upside down 
(Higgins 2006). The effect of this inertia on further Nazi 
programming has been noted.  
Because humans are herd animals, most will do what the 
herd is doing. Most will manifest as ‘saints’ or ‘sinners’ 
according to the health or breakdown of those communal, 
societal and political forms of association with which they 
identify. This suggests there may be value intervening at a 
number of levels. Educational programs that seek to influence 
the moral awareness and development of individual children 
and adults about racism and social inclusion are of potentially 
great significance, as is the preservation of the moral 
resources—respect, sympathy and friendship—and cultiva-
tion of a moral identity and imagination, in promoting 
helping and resistance. Pre-eminently, paying attention to 
these wider determinants and preventing the decline of social 
and national institutions that preserve civility constitutes a 
crucial arena for genocide prevention (Higgins 2003; Higgins 
2006).  
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FROM KRAEPELIN TO KARADZIC: PSYCHIATRY’S 
LONG ROAD TO GENOCIDE 
 
ROBERT M KAPLAN AND GARRY WALTER 
 
…it is always a simple matter to drag people along whether it 
is a democracy, or a fascist dictatorship, or a parliament, or a 
communist dictatorship. Voice or no voice, the people can 
always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. All you have 
to do it tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the 
pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to 
danger. It works the same for every country.—Herman Göring, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, at Nuremberg1  
The twentieth was the century of mass murder, as Niall 
Ferguson,2 Eric Hobsbawm,3 4 and others have pointed out. 
The rate of civilian deaths rose from less than 5 per cent 
before World War I to over 80 per cent by 1980, with women 
and children a significant majority. The death toll from 
genocide, mass murder, forced starvation, ethnic cleansing 
and expulsion exceeded 170 million. In 1990, Michael Burleigh 
could say that the chance of events such as the Holocaust 
occurring again were remote; after 11 September 2001, he 
stated that humankind faced an existential threat to its 
future.5  
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In a Europe that had been [relatively] peaceful since 1945, 
the wars that followed the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1990 
caused dismay at the rapid rise of extreme nationalism.6 
Images of gaunt prisoners in Serbian concentration camps 
between 1992 and 1995 raised the spectre of genocide. 
Between 150,000 and 250,000 people were killed and a million 
made homeless. By 1995, when hostilities came to an end 
following the Dayton Agreement, there were reports of 
atrocities on all sides—Serbian, Croatian and Muslim 
Bosnians—but the chief perpetrators were the Serbian 
Bosnians. Led by Dr Radovan Karadzic, and under the 
military command of General Ratko Mladic, the Serbs 
committed genocide to render 70 per cent of the territory of 
Bosnia free of non-Serbian inhabitants.7  
Many aspects of the Bosnian genocide were deeply 
disturbing. But one startling feature emerged—the role of 
psychiatrists. They were leading figures in the Bosnian Serb 
political party, the Serb Democratic Reform (SDF). Serbian 
psychiatrists adopted a public role to promote their 
nationalist aims, justify the behaviour of the military forces, 
and denigrate the opposition in psychological terms. The 
unique spectacle was that of a practising psychiatrist, Dr 
Radovan Karadzic8—in his role as President of Republika 
Srpska—actively directing the military activities, notably the 
siege of his home town of Sarajevo. 
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At this time of writing, Karadzic is on trial before the 
International Criminal Court in The Hague. His case should 
shed light on how he used his psychiatric training to devise 
terror tactics for dealing with the enemy. It may also answer a 
key question: how does the profession of psychiatry lend itself 
to such extraordinary state abuse? Decades earlier, in the 
Nuremberg Doctors’ Trial,9 it became apparent that the 
medical profession contained within itself the necessary 
ingredients for much of its own ruin. And in this regard the 
psychiatric profession, so often regarded as marginal to the 
medical mainstream, set the agenda for the rest of the 
profession [see the Dudley and Gale chapter in this volume].  
The path from marginalisation to acceptance in 
mainstream medicine and the use of modern technology in 
psychiatry goes back to the early years of the nineteenth 
century. Psychiatry unerringly allied itself with the dominant 
social agendas of the day. That the model arose in Germany 
meant that eugenics, racism and nationalism were allied to an 
academic approach in which the individual was readily 
submerged by the doctrine of the greater good of the nation. 
From Sigmund Freud and Emil Kraepelin, reductionist or 
vulgarised psychological concepts were used as a tool for 
ideological pursuits. These tendencies surface recurrently 
whenever psychiatry becomes involved in abuse of human 
rights by the nation-state. The terminus of this path, the 
Bosnian genocide, illustrates this theme. 
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The rise of psychiatry 
Insanity…provides us with the proper scale for 
comprehending the numerous intellectual, moral, religious, 
and artistic currents and phenomena of our social life. —Emil 
Kraepelin10 
Psychiatric illness has been recognised since antiquity. There 
are credible descriptions of schizophrenia in the 
Mesopotamian Assyrian Codex.11 Until the nineteenth 
century, psychiatry—its practitioners often referred to as 
‘mad-doctors’ or ‘alienists’—was mostly a custodial business, 
looked down upon by the medical profession and feared by 
the public. The Enlightenment led to new attitudes. Phillipe 
Pinel (1745–1826), a fervid revolutionary, believed in an 
illness model of symptoms and treatment.12 The belief that the 
root cause of mental illness lay in the environment led to 
more humane psycho-social methods of management in what 
was known as 'moral treatment'. Pinel’s work led to the 
removal of chains and shackles for the ill, liberation from 
dungeons, and to the rise of the asylum. Thus began 
institutionalised psychiatry and the process of organising its 
practitioners into a professional discipline.  
By the second half of the nineteenth century one condition 
came to dominate and define psychiatry: neurosyphilis, 
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known as Generalised Paresis of the Insane, or GPI. 
Psychiatry had found its grand cause, its defining illness, and 
it was not until the middle of the twentieth century that GPI 
ceased to play a part in the daily life of doctors in psychiatric 
wards. GPI was a uniformly fatal disease that affected men 
more than women. A middle-class illness, it struck at the 
heart of the class interests—property. The patient would have 
a change in personality, a sense of self-importance and an 
expansive tendency leading to wild spending, investing and 
drinking. This wrecked the family business and distressed 
relatives. The victim could ruin the family fortunes, making it 
‘a disease that had everything to do with property and little to 
do with sex’.13 Patients became demented and unable to care 
for themselves, often dying in lunatic asylums.  
As the twentieth century loomed, the syphilis organism 
showed its adaptability. Neurosyphilis became, as it were, 
more egalitarian. Previously an illness of predominantly 
upper-class men, it went ‘down market’, affecting women as 
commonly as men.14 Syphilis occupied such a dominating role 
in the pantheon of diseases that it was accorded 113 pages in 
the 1893 Index Catalogue of the Surgeon General; tuberculosis, a 
much more prevalent condition and one with a greater 
morbidity, was given a mere 55 pages.15 
Prevalent in all this was an especially malignant idea, 
namely, hereditary syphilis. First raised in 1595, this was to 
become a leitmotif of the times. How could a third generation 
                                                 
13 Shorter, Edward (1997), A History of Psychiatry: From the era of the 
asylum to the age of Prozac, New York, John Wiley and Sons.  
14 Hare, E H (1959), ‘The origin and spread of dementia paralytica’, 
Journal of Mental Sciences, 105, 594–626. 
15 Silverstein, Arthur M and Ruggere, Christine (2006), ‘Dr Arthur 
Conan Doyle and the case of congenital syphilis’, Perspectives in 





of a family be so afflicted unless the disease was inherited? 
Arthur Conan Doyle, creator of the fictional Sherlock Holmes, 
graduated as a doctor in 1881, a period when the Lamarckian 
theory of acquired characteristics featured prominently in 
medical education. Doyle chose the topic of complications of 
tertiary syphilis for his MD thesis. In 1894, his short story ‘The 
Third Generation’, illustrated how syphilis could affect 
several generations of a family, leaving havoc in its wake.16  
The idea of hereditary syphilis had remarkable persistence. 
Despite the discoveries of Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch, it 
endured, fitting perfectly into the theory of degeneration. It 
coursed through psychiatry like a septic stream into the 
twentieth century. It attracted an obscure youth living in 
Vienna. Coming from a rural background rife with 
intermarriage, mental handicap and ancestor confusion, Adolf 
Hitler was convinced that hereditary syphilis, ‘spread by the 
Jews’, would destroy the German race, his obsession fuelled 
by persistent rumours that he had a Jewish grandfather. Hitler 
did not understand the difference between congenital syphilis 
(the organism can cross the placental barrier, which 
distinguishes it from other sexually transmitted diseases) and 
hereditary syphilis. Years later, it was to surface in Mein 
Kampf where 13 pages were devoted to explaining how the 
syphilitic taint, (allegedly) spread by Jews, passed down the 
generations.17 
In a Europe that was growing in wealth and creating a 
large bourgeoisie, nationalists seized on middle-class fears of 
being outbred and losing their privileged status to a surging 
proletariat. In response, an alliance arose between two 
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unlikely forces: nationalism (with the Catholic church in close 
association) and ‘respectability’. Nationalism represented an 
unrepentant swing back to the past, but with significant 
differences. The cities, hotbeds of liberalism and modernism, 
encompassed everything that was wrong with the nation. 
Marginal groups like Jews, Romani and Slavs were perceived 
as a threat to the social order through their birth rates and 
their values. They were said to propagate anti-clerical 
philosophies like abortion, sexual perversion and breakdown 
of the traditional family unit. The countryside, including 
regions of appalling backwardness, poverty, ignorance, and 
devotion to the irrational, was idealised as the völkisch culture 
which represented a glorious and unsullied past. 
The nation was divided along faultlines of race and an 
extraordinary dichotomy in the private and public life of the 
individual. State policy ensured a ‘polite’ society in which 
sexual activities were directed to childbirth within marriage. 
Sex began to be regulated for the wellbeing of the greater 
society. The medical profession duly stepped forward, 
providing a forensic basis for state regulation. The 
'classification' of sex was initiated by psychiatrist Baron 
Richard von Krafft-Ebing. A believer in the theory of 
degeneration, he wrote Psychopathia Sexualis, probably the 
only medical book to have pornographic status. In the 
process, he gave the world the term ‘sado-masochism’, but he 
focused mainly on homosexuality. The state now had the 
legal basis to prosecute aberrant individuals. ‘Perversions’ 
such as masturbation, homosexuality and trans-sexualism 
were deemed precursors to moral insanity. Krafft-Ebing's 
book was published in 1886 and by 1871 the German Criminal 
Code (in its notorious Paragraph 175) had made 
homosexuality a criminal offence. These outlooks created a 
breach into which not only Freud but many others surged. 
The medical profession, including psychiatry through its 
desire to explain, classify and 'own' many different forms of 





society, a role that was deeply antipathetic to the ancient and 
sacred role of treating the individual without fear or favour. 
To pass from healing the person to the role of healer of society 
was an opportunity that some could not resist.  
Kraepelin and the German eugenics movement 
There are two sorts of psychiatrists, those by inclination, and 
those by chance; those entering psychiatry by chance are 
sometimes reasonable. —Emil Kraepelin18 
An indication of the age is that the three of the most 
important figures in twentieth century psychiatry were born 
almost simultaneously—Emil Kraepelin and Sigmund Freud 
in 1856 and Eugen Bleuler a year later. Compared to the rest 
of Europe, German psychiatry had a significant advantage. It 
was practised by academicians who perceived themselves as 
scientists and saw their patients as research material.19  
Emil Kraepelin (1856–1926)20 qualified in medicine at the 
University of Leipzig in 1878 and, unusually, wanted to study 
psychiatry from the start.21 His intention was to establish a 
discipline based on findings that could be proved, 
abandoning speculative theories from romanticism. Like all 
psychiatrists of the day, Kraepelin learnt his craft through 
clinical encounters with syphilis, writing what is probably still 
the best book on its psychopathology and predicting 
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(correctly) that GPI arose from Treponema pallidum infection.  
Kraepelin was the organising principal in modern 
psychiatry. His findings became the paradigm for twentieth 
century psychiatry. He had deeply bureaucratic instincts, he 
developed training programs, and constantly lobbied the 
government for mandatory syphilis testing and alcohol 
control.22 In 1917, he founded the German Institute for 
Psychiatric Research, a centre that came to dominate 
psychiatric research. 
The eminent psychoanalyst and historian Gregory 
Zilboorg23 described Kraepelin as an ‘academic man’ who 
lacked human interest in the individual. He was unreservedly 
antisemitic, describing Jews as ‘a very great danger’ to the 
German ‘race’ through a tendency to forge ahead. Among the 
races and classes, he believed that Romani, swindlers, poets 
and ‘psychopathic Jews’ were prone to hysteria.24 25 
Kraepelin’s psychiatry was dominated by a somatic or 
biological perspective in which biographical, social, cultural 
and psychological dimensions were marginalised. He was the 
first to apply these terms not solely to individuals but to social 
groups and institutions. Behaviour that did not correspond 
with his outlook was attributed to the theory of degeneration.26 
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Preoccupied with the ‘will’, Kraepelin appeared indifferent to 
the problems of shell-shocked soldiers or hysterics.27  
In 1915, psychiatrist Professor Albert Hoche described the 
end of individualism and the transformation of the nation into 
a higher organism, the Volk.28 Eugenics, arising from the 
practice of pedigree in veterinary science, became a dominant 
theme in German medicine and science. Prominent eugenicist 
Ludwig Woltmann, who drew on Charles Darwin and Comte 
Arthur de Gobineau for inspiration (with some Karl Marx 
thrown in for good measure), made race a central concern.29 
German eugenics was a vulgarised form of Social Darwinism, 
portraying the struggle for survival in simplistic racial terms, 
constantly raising the threat to the German people from 
‘other’ groups. Preaching Germanic supremacy, he regarded 
the struggle for existence as a racial conflict in which 
Germany would eventually predominate. Three prominent 
disciples were anthropologists Otto Ammon and Eugen 
Fischer, the latter then based at the University of Freiburg, 
and Professor Ludwig Schemann.30 Schemann translated and 
introduced into Germany the Frenchman Comte de 
Gobineau's four-volume essay on The Inequality of the Human 
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Races, the doctrine of degeneration and decline and, above all 
to eager German ears, the 'science' of racial purity. 
The trail from the gas chambers and ovens of Auschwitz 
can be followed back to the hitherto forgotten but first 
genocide of the century—the Herero and Nama slaughter in 
German South West Africa (now Namibia) between 1904 and 
1906. The first demonstration of the malign consequences of 
biological racism resulted in the annihilation of over 80 per 
cent of the Herero nation, the effects of which are still being 
felt today.31 32 This event was largely assisted by the efforts of 
Eugen Fischer. In 1908 he studied (or rather, he did a series of 
pseudo-scientific measurements) of 310 children of a mixed 
race group arising from cohabitation of the settlers and native 
women in German South West Africa, a people known as the 
Rehoboth Bastards or Basters. He argued that the physically 
strong and healthy Basters should initially be allowed to 
increase in numbers to provide labour to the settlers; 
thereafter, one should only grant them the minimum 
protection they needed ‘as a race inferior to us’ and for as long 
as these physically strong but mentally inferior mongrelised 
people were useful. Then nature should take its course 
through 'free competition, which in [Fischer’s] opinion, means 
[their] demise'.  
The Herero genocide was driven by the racial theories of 
such physical anthropologists. The influence of these men on 
German medicine, especially psychiatry, was considerable 
and set the tone for what was to follow. After Germany was 
defeated and excluded from the colony, the Herero genocide 
subsided into obscurity [until a decade ago], but its lessons 
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were well learned. The terms Lebensraum [need for living 
room] and Konzentrationslager [concentration camp] 
established the pattern of state organisation of genocide by 
biological means, largely run by doctors.33 It is no coincidence 
that a number of leading Nazis had close connections with 
German South West Africa and acted as ‘conduit’ for these 
concepts. Of these, Herman Göring was the most notorious.34  
Fisher’s study, published in Germany in 1913, must be 
regarded as one of the precursors of the Holocaust. In 1919, 
Entente troops, mostly French, occupied the Rhineland. 
Children born out of wedlock (known as Rhineland Bastards) 
arose from relations between local women and the soldiers. 
After 1937, Fisher created a medical unit, Commission 
Number 3, to secretly sterilise 400 children of ‘Rhineland 
Bastards’. In 1927, Fischer became Director of the new Kaiser 
Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human Heredity, and 
Eugenics in Berlin, supervising academics who became 
leading figures in providing justification for Nazi 
antisemitism and developing laws which then excluded Jews, 
Rom people and other ‘non-Aryans’ from German citizen-
ship. By training SS doctors and medical students in eugenics 
and racial hygiene, he supported physicians directly involved 
in mass murder and crimes against humanity. Fischer used 
his scientific authority to justify colonial exploitation and 
racial extermination. His disciples were equally influential in 
anthropology, sociology, medicine and eugenics. Fritz Lenz 
became the first professor of ‘Race Hygiene’ at the University 
of Munich in 1923. Setting the tone for the medical 
involvement in genocide, in a 1917 article Lenz, Fischer's close 
colleague, proposed putting the interests of one’s race above 
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all ethical considerations. 
To what extent psychiatrists were the driving force in 
devising biological solutions to racial ‘problems’, or were 
easily encouraged to do so,35 may be debatable, but there can 
be little doubt about their enthusiasm to become involved. In 
the lead-up to World War I, eugenics as the dominant 
paradigm flourished in Germany, America, Great Britain, 
Sweden and elsewhere, with Fischer at one point hailed as 
heading an international eugenics organisation. Eugenics had 
a considerable influence on research, planning and the quest 
for effective treatments. Other influences were also beginning 
to establish themselves, notably the rise of psychoanalysis. 
Initially concerned with establishing his movement, Freud’s 
testimony to the commission of inquiry on war neurosis led to 
growing interest. In the decades before his death, Freud began 
to stray from strictly technical issues, writing instead about 
the application of psychoanalysis to the condition of 
humanity as a whole. Reacting to the rise of fascism, Freud 
came to hold a pessimistic view of human nature as 
dominated by the death instinct. Religion was merely an 
illusion. He was not alone in this: Kraepelin wrote about 
Bismarck, describing Weimar republican society as hysterical 
and the socialist leaders as psychopathic. Yet soon the medical 
profession itself came to be caught up in horrific abuse and 
widespread death in the Armenian genocide. That genocide 
and its biological thrusts set the stage for what was to be the 
precursor to the Holocaust.  
Doctors and the Armenian Genocide 
If a physician presumes to take into consideration in his work 
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whether a life has value or not, the consequences are 
boundless and the physician becomes the most dangerous 
man in the state. —Christopher Willhelm Hufeland36 
The 1914–1923 Armenian, Pontian Greek and Assyrian 
genocide was in so many ways the template for the 
Holocaust: forced emigration, expulsions, property 
confiscations, forced labour, public torture and executions, 
medical experiments, elementary gassings, starvation, and 
death marches. It was largely directed and carried out by 
doctors, leading members of the Ittihadist Party who came to 
power in a coup in 1908.37 Dr Behaeddin Sakir and Dr 
Mehmett Nazim, held responsible in part for the deaths of at 
least 1.5 million Armenians, 350,000 Pontian Greeks and 
perhaps 250,000 Assyrian Christians, played a pivotal role in 
the establishment and deployment of the Special Organ-
isation units, extermination squads staffed by violent 
criminals released from prisons to undertake killings. Sakir 
had worked as chief physician of Soloniki Municipal Hospital 
and Nazim, described as ‘a doctor by profession and not 
without promise’, in what must be regarded as one of the 
most misguided appointments in the history of medicine, was 
designated Professor of Legal (Ethical) Medicine at Istanbul 
Medical School.  
Many of their collaborators, mostly governors of the 
Anatolian provinces where the Armenians lived, were 
graduates of the Imperial Medical School. Medical personnel 
did not merely supervise proceedings but were directly 
involved in the killings, often participating in torture. Dr 
Mehmed Reşid, known as the ‘Executioner Governor’, was 
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extraordinarily brutal, smashing skulls, nailing red-hot 
horseshoes to victims' chests, and crucifying people on 
makeshift crosses. Sadistic cruelty was demonstrated by 
ophthalmologists who gave eye drops to children that made 
them blind and who performed unnecessary, deliberately 
disfiguring ophthalmological procedures, especially on young 
girls.38 Other doctors, describing their victims as subhuman, 
used them as guinea pigs to infect a range of diseases. 
Hundreds of victims were injected with blood from typhus 
cases.  
Dr Ali Said was accused of killing thousands of infants, 
adults and pregnant women by administering poison as 
liquid medicine. He ordered the drowning at sea of patients 
who refused the ‘medicine’ and directed the disposal of their 
corpses. Infant victims of Dr Tevfik Rusdü were taken to a 
purported steam bath and killed with a toxic gas, an ominous 
precursor to the later Judeocide. 
The later Kemalist government turned its back on the issue 
and the collective (and aggressive) Turkish denial that the 
genocide had ever occurred took hold. In the years 
afterwards, looking at the issue from radically different moral 
standpoints, both Hitler and Churchill noted that everyone 
[wilfully] forgot the matter before long and Armenia was 
destined to slip into the West's historical amnesia [at least 
until the 1980s]. 
Dr Mehmed Reşid’s suicide note summed up the attitude 
of these medical genocidaires:  
Even though I am a physician, I cannot ignore my 
nationhood. Armenian traitors…were dangerous microbes. 
Isn’t it the duty of a doctor to destroy these microbes? My 
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Turkishness prevailed over my medical calling. Of course my 
conscience is bothering me, but I couldn’t see my country 
disappearing. As to historical responsibility, I couldn’t care 
less what historians of other nations write about me.39  
The Armenian genocide set the groundwork for the most 
notorious examples of medical complicity in state abuses: the 
Nazi doctors who participated in euthanasia and genocide, 
and the Japanese doctors who practiced biological warfare. 
Included among the former were psychiatrists, who, in 
carrying out Hitler’s euthanasia program on their patients, 
appear to have been in a state of complete moral disarray.  
Racial psychiatry, sterilisation and the Holocaust 
[Hitler] could, if need be, do without lawyers, engineers, and 
builders, but not without medical professionals, suggesting in 
an early speech before the National Socialists Physicians’ 
League…’you, you Nationalist Socialist doctors, I cannot do 
without you for a single day, not a single hour. If …you fail 
me, then all is lost. For what good are our struggles, if the 
health of our people is in danger?’ ––Adolf Hitler40 
Many members of the German medical profession needed no 
pushing to accept Nazi ideology after Hitler came to power in 
1933. Doctors were the first profession to join and embrace the 
Nazi party and had the largest representation of all 
occupational groups;41 of 15,000 Nazi Party medical members, 
3,000 were psychiatrists. Nazi racial theories were accepted 
without question. The profession acquiesced in the drive to 
expel all Jewish doctors. The Nazi physician was designated a 
‘selector’ to improve the health of the nation by removing 
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‘inferiors’.42 Eugenics and racial hygiene were compulsory 
subjects in medical schools. This enthusiasm was not 
restricted to Germany. Following the Anschluss, Austrian 
physicians forced Jewish doctors out of the Vienna Faculty of 
Medicine, which more than any other European university 
had a huge Jewish presence—78 per cent of the staff, 
including some Nobel Prize winners. 
The role of psychiatrists in mass murder began in 1938 
with their prominent involvement in the sterilisation of 
patients said to have incurable physical or mental disease. The 
process soon accelerated with the move to exterminate 
psychiatric patients. In 1928, jurisprudence professor Karl 
Binding and psychiatrist Albert Hoche enunciated their 
concept of ‘life unworthy of life’, which quickly became the 
raison d’etre of the Nazi biological vision. The ‘Aktion T4 
program’ to kill ‘unworthy’ adults on eugenic grounds was 
based at six centres in Germany and Austria. Under the sign 
of the Red Cross, gas chambers were introduced to dispose of 
‘incurables’ from the mental hospitals of the Reich. 
Psychiatrists experimented with killing by phenol injections 
and carbon monoxide gassing. Tiergartenstrasse 4 was the 
address at which the Auschwitz, Belzec, Treblinka, Majdanek 
and Sobibor gas chambers had their first trial run.  
No coercion was involved. Resistance to participation in 
these activities was very limited. Opposition to the T4 
philosophy came from men like Bishop Clemens von Galen, 
Karl Bonhoeffer, Oswald Bumke and Gottfried Ewald. John 
Rittmeister, a Swiss-trained psychoanalyst and Communist 
had been involved in underground activities to oppose the 
Nazis, ostensibly spying for America; he was the only 
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psychiatrist to be executed—by beheading in May 1943.43 
Ernst Kretzmer made the observation that whereas in the past 
they had treated psychopaths, they were now ruled by 
them—and was lucky to get away with his life. Paul-Gerhard 
Braune, who was arrested, wrote to Hitler condemning the 
very concept of 'life unworthy of life', warning that the moral 
foundations of the nation would be undermined.  
There was no shortage of supporters of the euthanasia 
program. The leading figure, Ernest Rüdin, was followed by 
professors Heyde, Carl Schneider, de Crinis and Nitsche. Carl 
Jung’s enthusiasm for Nazism went well beyond mere 
flirtation but he managed to cover his tracks after the war. 
There were at least 275,000 victims of this ‘cleansing’ 
program. Schneider’s eagerness included grandiose plans for 
a vast research institute to study genetic aspects of idiocy and, 
while it never materialised, he did experimental work on 
brains from euthanased patients.44  
German doctors unquestioningly shared the values of 
Wilhelmine Germany. The loss of World War I came as a 
shattering blow, followed by the Weimar Republic, a regime 
they rejected. There was also a practical issue: loss of income. 
Following the Depression, health funding was significantly 
reduced and medical schools were producing far more 
graduates than the system could absorb, a situation only 
remedied by Hitler’s ascent to power in 1933. That the mass 
clearing of all Jewish doctors from practice would inevitably 
lead to an improvement also featured in the doctors' 
thinking.45 From 1927 to 1932, the average annual income of 
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doctors fell by 27 per cent; by 1935 it had increased by 25 per 
cent.46 
The central concept in Nazi ideology was the 
‘symbolisation of immortality’. Fritz Lenz (and later Rudolf 
Hess) would suggest that National Socialism was nothing but 
applied biology.47 The German medical profession was 
designated the ‘central intellectual resource’ of the New 
Order.48 In this grotesquely thaumaturgic vision, the doctor 
was the final agent in the Nazi myth of therapy by mass 
murder. Seduced by the power of utilitarian thought and 
arguments, German doctors allied their professional skills 
with the annihilating process of a despotic government. 
Echoing Turkey's Dr Mehmed Resid, Fritz Klein, a Nazi 
doctor, explained to author Robert Jay Lifton that he 'killed in 
order to cure'49, and that made him a good doctor. Their 
statements at Nuremberg indicated how they lost their moral 
bearings in this grotesque Nazi political culture.50  
During World War II, doctors made ‘selections’ at the 
death camps, dividing victims into those destined for 
immediate extermination in the gas chambers and those who 
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could do some useful work or could be used in experiments. 
The operation of the crematoria, determination of when the 
victims were dead and choice of means of killing were done 
under medical supervision.  
Psychiatric euthanasia centres served as training 
institutions for SS doctors who went on to construct the death 
camps. These doctors had seven times the membership of the 
SS compared to other sectors of the German population.51 No 
coercion was required to get doctors to work in experimental 
institutes or concentration camps and there was no shortage 
of volunteers. Large-scale experimental programs were 
conducted by leading medical research institutes using 
untermenschen, ‘sub-human’ subjects, from concentration 
camps. The only physician to command a death camp 
(Treblinka) was psychiatrist Dr Imfried Eberl.52 
The Nuremberg Doctors Trials in 1946 proved every-
thing—and nothing.53 They revealed the role of doctors in 
experimenting on human subjects and in running death 
camps. The doctors, to a man, lacked any contrition, stating 
that they were doing no more than following state policy and 
their experiments were all done for ‘the greater good'. It is 
perhaps problematic that the trial focus was arguably on 
details of warped experimentation rather than the doctors’ 
role in industrialised mass murder.  
The Nuremberg Code established criteria to ensure that 
the abuse of human beings for experimentation would not 
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occur again.54 Alone of German institutions, the medical 
profession escaped denazification. No attempt was made to 
acknowledge the abuses—let alone even atone for them—and 
this continued until well into the 1970s when intense (and 
foreign) exposure forced some concessions.  
Medical abuse after 1945—a growth industry 
There is nothing in the human being that which cannot be 
verbalised…What a person hides from himself, he hides from 
society. There is nothing in Soviet society that is not 
expressed in words. There are no naked thoughts. The 
unconscious does not exist because it is not available for the 
conscious control. —Joseph Stalin55  
By the time of Hitler, the distinction between civilian and 
military combatants was blurred beyond recognition; 
atrocities against the civilian population were regarded as an 
essential means of waging war. Murder of civilians was a 
feature of World War II; in Yugoslavia, for example, more 
civilians had been killed by Chetnik and Ustasa resistance 
forces than by the Nazi invaders. 
What happened in mid-Europe mid-century gave birth to 
the shibboleth 'Never Again!'. The Holocaust, the Nuremberg 
and 110,000 other trials that ensued, and the 1948 Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide led to this 
universal cry. But it wasn't long before we had to witness 
genocide yet again in most continents and in diverse domains: 
the Soviet deportations of whole nations, the Indonesian 
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massacres, genocide in East Timor, Burundi, Rwanda, the 
Chittagong Hill Tribes, the massive death tolls in establishing 
first Pakistan, then Bangladesh. Amidst such carnage, there 
was the spectre of Soviet psychiatry distorting every ethical 
precept of the profession in its role as a slavish agent of the 
Soviet regime. If people began to think that postwar genocide 
was by now essentially the province of Africa and Asia, they 
were wrong. A nightmare in the Hitlerian mould was 
awaiting in what was Yugoslavia.  
The origins of Yugoslavian medicine and psychiatry 
At a time when Germany can expel tens of thousands of Jews 
and Russia can shift millions of people from one part of the 
continent to another, the shifting of a few hundred thousand 
Albanians will not lead to the outbreak of a world war. —
Vaso Cubrilovic, predicting ethnic cleansing56 
Information on the origin and development of Yugoslavian 
psychiatry and psychology is almost nonexistent in the 
English literature, and scarce enough in Serbo–Croatian 
journals,57 58 but certain conclusions can be drawn. Following 
the Enlightenment, Croatian and Latinist writers made 
contributions to psychology— Croatian philosopher Marko 
Marulic (1450–1542) is credited with first using the term 
‘psychology’,59 but it took until 1920 before psychology had 
an academic place in universities.  
Yugoslavian psychiatry, like the rest of Europe, drew 
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heavily on the German School, with its emphasis on 
Kraepelinian dualism, biological factors and eugenics. 
Psychoanalysis had a natural attraction to some individuals 
when Vienna, where Freud was based, and the regions that 
became Yugoslavia, were still in the Austro –Hungarian Dual 
Monarchy. Following World War II, at least in the first few 
years, the Communist federated state that appeared under 
Marshall Tito was determined to be more ideologically pure 
than Stalinist Russia. Yugoslavian psychiatry changed when 
psychological testing and psychoanalysis were seen as 
politically unacceptable bourgeois indulgences. The emphasis 
was on Pavlovian behaviourism, with the addition of 
biological treatment. Within a decade, ideological restrictions 
were relaxed.  
Despite rigid centralisation of control, psychiatric services 
varied between the component states and this tended to 
influence the approaches taken. The influence of Communism 
was regarded as stronger and lasted longer in Serbia than in 
Croatia and Slovenia. The result was a greater emphasis on a 
clinical and more ‘person-orientated’ psychology in Belgrade, 
while there was greater production of academic research-
based work in Zagreb. Possibly because of its long-standing 
ties to the Germanic world, Zagreb was the most well-
endowed centre, while Belgrade tended to attract those who 
were psychoanalytically orientated.60 There was nothing 
unusual about this: even in Nazi Germany, where Freud was 
considered anathema, a form of analytic psychotherapy 
continued at the Göring Institute for the duration World War 
II. After 1970, Yugoslavian psychiatrists would regularly 
attend international conferences and train at other centres, 
such as the Tavistock Institute or the Maudsley Hospital in 
London.  
                                                 





Psychiatrists and the Bosnian genocide  
These are truly scenes from hell, written on the darkest pages 
of human history. —Judge Fouad Riad (1995), reviewing the 
Srebrenica killings61 
The 1992–1995 Bosnian war arose from the break-up of the 
nation state called Yugoslavia. Following the death of Tito 
and the fall of Communism, multi-ethnic Yugoslavia was 
doomed. Slovenia, after a brief clash with Croatia, was the 
first to secede. Transforming seamlessly from their role as 
Communist apparatchiks to nationalist leaders, Franjo 
Tudjman (Croatia) and Slobodan Milosevic (Serbia) were 
determined to expand their territories by expelling other 
ethnic groups. Playing on ancient scores, the two states went 
to war in 1991, with atrocities on both sides. While both made 
gains, the outcome was less than satisfactory for Milosevic, 
who then set his sights on the multi-ethnic state of Bosnia–
Herzegovina as his prime goal.62 Milosevic used the Serbian 
Democratic Party of Bosnia–Herzegovina (SDS) as a proxy for 
his goal of creating a Greater Serbia.  
An ominous phrase entered the lexicon: ‘ethnic cleansing’, 
the use of brutal force to remove Muslims from territories 
claimed by the Serbs. Harking back to the atrocities of the 
Croatian Ustasa during World War II, it has the same meaning 
and intent as clearing Europe of its Jews, Judenrein. Ethnic 
cleansing involved individual and mass killing, arbitrary 
extrajudicial killings, mass rape, starvation, destruction of 
residences, property and religious institutions, and 
population expulsion.63 It was first used by Slobodan 
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Milosevic in April 1987 to describe Albanian violence towards 
the Kosovar Serbs. The term was then used by the media from 
July 1991 and by the United Nations in 1993; recent examples 
of the practice and its underpinnings have been thoroughly 
examined in Norman Naimark's book, Fires of Hatred.64  
Serbian psychiatrists were prominent in nationalist 
politics. The SDS, including many of its medical members, 
was established in 1990 by Zagreb-based psychiatrist Dr 
Jovan Raskovic.65 He was born in Knin in 1929. With the onset 
of war, his family moved to Zagreb. He studied medicine at 
the University of Zagreb, qualifying in 1956. He obtained his 
psychiatric degree in 1962 and worked in the neuropsychiatric 
ward at Sibenik Hospital. A well-known psychiatric figure in 
Yugoslavia, he published widely in international psychiatric 
journals. His early papers on social and cultural topics give 
little indication of his political views. Later books (Narcissism 
and Depersonalisation, 1990) were more explicit, and the most 
notorious was Luda Zemlja (The Mad Country, 1990).66 Raskovic 
wrote that Catholics (Croats), Orthodox (Serbs) and Muslims 
experienced different neuroses: Serbs were strongly oedipal, 
Croats fearful of castration and Muslims anally fixated.67 On 
this premise, Croats were psychologically driven to challenge 
the power of Serbs, the ‘nation of tragic destiny’. The 
connection between heaven and national destiny created 
‘conditions for the religious destiny of an ethnical being’. As a 
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result of ‘laws regarding the hygiene of the anal channel’, 
Muslims were disposed to gather property and behave 
aggressively. In this fashion, Raskovic used psychoanalytic 
jargon to justify Serbian aggression, while simultaneously 
dehumanising the Muslim opposition. He claimed68 that his 
conclusions were derived from decades of psychiatric work at 
the borders of the three republics. 
Raskovic addressed public meetings. He refused to join 
Tudjman’s government because the latter would not 
acknowledge Serbian rights. Tudjman made public a tape-
recording in which Raskovic derided Serbians, forcing 
Raskovic to stand down. He retired to Belgrade and from any 
further involvement in politics.  
In 1989, an obscure Sarajevo-based psychiatrist, Dr 
Radovan Karadzic, became head of the Serbian Green Party (a 
grim irony in view of his later despoiling of large tracts of 
Bosnia). The following year he surprised many by replacing 
Raskovic as head of the SDS. He immediately adopted a 
posture of aggressive nationalism and vicious anti-Muslim 
rhetoric, confusing many who had regarded him as 
unscrupulous but apolitical until then. The SDS proclaimed a 
network of ‘Serb Autonomous Regions’ which69 from 1992 
orchestrated the removal of all Muslims and Croats in the 
Serbs’ path. After a strong vote in the November 1990 
elections, the SDS participated in a tri-national Bosnian 
government under President Alija Izetbegovic. As Yugoslavia 
moved toward dissolution in the following year, Karadzic 
warned that if Bosnia and Herzegovina declared 
independence, Bosnian Serbs would secede and seek union 
with Serbia. After the republic’s electorate voted for 
independence, war erupted in April 1992.  
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Karadzic became president of the Bosnian Serb Republic 
(Republika Srpska) based in the self-proclaimed capital of Palé. 
By December 1992, Bosnian Serbs had seized about 70 per 
cent of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the course of the conflict, 
Serb forces committed many atrocities, chiefly against 
Muslims. Tactics included mass execution, the establishment 
of rape centres, torture, and forcible removal of people. 
Concentration camps, not seen in Europe since the Nazi era, 
were re-established. Karadzic authorised the siege of Sarajevo, 
shelling the homes of his colleagues and killing patients in 
their beds at the hospital where he had worked until 
recently70.  
Sydney psychiatrist Dusan Kecmanovic, who had direct 
experience of the events that led to the post-Yugoslavia wars, 
described the behaviour of psychiatrists at the time as ‘ethno-
nationalism’—defined as the absolute precedence of loyalty to 
one’s own ethno-national group.71 This was characterised by 
preferential treatment of patients of the same ethnicity, the 
disproportionately high numbers of psychiatrists among the 
political leadership, and the involvement in ethno-nationalist 
studies or statements beyond usual professional interests. 
These criteria applied to the ethno-psychological writings of 
both the Croatian and Serbian psychiatrists of the period. 
Each side used psychoanalytic vocabulary to rationalise the 
defects of their enemies.  
In 1993, Serbian psychiatrists published The Stresses of 
War—in collaboration with government departments— 
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documenting the effects of the war on the Serbian people.72 
The book alleged that the international media ‘satanised’ the 
Serbian people, preparing the way for genocide against them. 
While condemning war crimes and genocide, the authors’ bias 
was evident in their discussion of the rape of non-Serb 
women. First, they claimed that the number of victims was 
greatly understated; second, the tendentious allegation was 
posited that rapes could not have been ordered by officers 
because soldiers cannot get erections on command. In an 
ironic reversal of Dr Raskovic’s writings, the psychiatrists 
alleged that psychiatry was being misused to ‘spread hatred 
against the Serbian people’, and in their subsequent book, 
Sanctions (1994),73 it was suggested that growing international 
sanctions acted as a prelude to Serbian genocide.  
Professor E Klein of Zagreb University wrote that Serbs 
were militant, had a warrior culture and tended to form 
groups around warrior-leaders. They often had an inferiority 
complex because of their ‘lower level of civilisation and 
culture’.74 Professor M Jakovljevic, at the same institution, 
said Serbs had a paranoid political culture manifesting in an 
‘almost erotic attitude’ towards weapons, producing a 
nihilistic destructiveness. This compared adversely with the 
Croatian political culture of peaceful co-existence.75 
Professor J Maric, at Belgrade University, took a different 
tack. Serbs, he stated, were well-intended, peaceful and did 
not ‘denigrate other peoples’.76 Maric contends that while 
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they did not have high level of material wellbeing, they did 
not subscribe to the superficial politeness found in the West. 
Serbian psychiatrists, while ostensibly presenting their case in 
a balanced and objective fashion, were both publicising the 
Serbian case and seeking to justify ethnic cleansing practices 
in the Bosnian war. By ignoring the aggressive role of the 
Serbian government, these psychiatrists acted, in effect, as 
genocide apologists.  
Milosevic signed the Dayton peace accord on December 
1995, effectively shutting the door on the Bosnian Serb 
leadership. The accord partitioned Bosnia and Herzegovina 
into Serb and Muslim–Croat areas and ended the war. The 
political tide turned and many Bosnian Serbs held Karadzic 
responsible for their isolation.77 In 1995, Karadzic was 
indicted by an international War Crimes Tribunal for the 
massacre of Muslim and Croatian civilians. He resigned in 
July 1996, swearing he would never stand trial. After the fall 
of Milosevic, he went underground in Serbia. There he 
remained, protected by a network of Serbian loyalists until his 
arrest in 2008. 
Radovan Karadzic—a psychiatrist’s own story78  
Why not? It’s all strange here, nothing is normal. —
Psychiatrist Dr Ferhid Mujanovic, after Kosovo Hospital was 
shelled by the Serbians. 
At 15, Radovan Karadzic moved to student quarters in the 
city of Sarajevo, living in a multi-ethnic neighbourhood and 
mixing comfortably with Serbian, Croatian and Muslim 
neighbours. The young Karadzic was described as naïve, but 









endearing. Neighbours recalled a shy farm boy wearing a 
grimy white pullover knitted with wool from his village.79 
Later, his striking looks—he was over six foot tall with a 
Byronic shock of hair—attracted attention, and he became a 
serial seducer of women. In 1965, Karadzic, with a high school 
diploma from the medical vocational school,80 studied at the 
University of Sarajevo. He received his medical degree on 19 
July 1971 and then qualified in psychiatry. 
During this time, Karadzic had joined and left the 
Communist Party, became involved in student politics and 
dabbled in literary circles. He wrote four volumes of poetry 
which he recited in public, accompanied by the gusle (a one-
stringed Serbian instrument), to indifferent response. 
Karadzic had no doubt about his talent as a poet, but the 
literary circles with whom he associated were dubious, 
regarding him as little more than a dabbling amateur. This 
did not deter him. He published several volumes of his work, 
receiving state-funded prizes for his efforts. He also wrote 
children’s stories and composed Serbian folk music, which he 
performed on radio.81 
Analysis of his early poetry reveals prophetic, if not 
apocalyptic, visions of the future.82 In 1971, 21 years before the 
war, he wrote a poem called ‘Let’s go down to the town and 
kill some scum’. Another poem of that time, ‘Sarajevo’, speaks 
of the city burning in a ‘blood-soaked tide'. His fourth 
volume, published in 1990, reveals an obsession with 
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violence, notably in ‘The Morning Hand-Grenade’.83 
According to Marko Vesovic,84 a writer who knew him from 
university days, ‘we had considered his case hopeless as far as 
literature is concerned’. 
Karadzic married Ljiljana Zelen—a Serbian psychiatrist-in-
training from an upper-class Sarajevo family—who later 
practised as a psychoanalyst. They had two children. With 
suspicious amounts of money at his disposal, he was thought 
to be a police informer for KOS (the Counterintelligence 
Agency of the former Yugoslavia) 85 and was shunned by 
many.  
Karadzic worked at the Djuro Djakovic Adult Education 
Centre. To further his skills, he had Tavistock Group Therapy 
training [the Tavistock in London is a highly regarded centre 
for education and training in different therapies.] He moved 
to the psychiatric clinic in Kosevo hospital, Sarajevo until 
1983, spending 1980 training in psychotherapy at the Zagreb 
Centre for Mental Health. From 1983 till 1984 he was at the 
Vozdovac Health Centre in Belgrade. Karadzic continued to 
engage in activities that would fulfil his grandiose self-image, 
becoming the psychiatrist for the Sarajevo soccer team, one of 
the leading teams in Bosnia, and later for the Belgrade Red 
Star team. Despite subjecting the players to mass hypnosis, 
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the teams fared no better.86  
Ever enterprising and needing money for investments and 
gambling, Karadzic sold fraudulent medical certificates and 
prescriptions to those who wanted to avoid military service or 
retire early. On 26 September 1985, he was sentenced to three 
years in prison and fined for fraud and embezzlement of 
public funds. He was charged with using a $100,000 grant 
meant for farmers to build his own chicken farm in nearby 
Palé. Karadzic spent only 11 months in prison. He later 
claimed that he had been a political prisoner and the 
experience had hardened him, but it is likely the offences 
were criminal, not political, and his government contacts 
ensured he did not serve a long sentence.87  
He returned to psychiatric practice when political pressure 
to take him back was asserted on the hospital. He worked at 
the Vozdovac Health Centre in Belgrade in 1987 and that year 
he presented a paper to a psychotherapy conference analysing 
a poem about bizarre bodily mutilation. A much-touted book 
on depression never eventuated. The last record of him 
working in psychiatry is from February to March 1992 at the 
Nedjo Zec psychiatric clinic in Kosevo Hospital, Sarajevo. In 
his last year at the clinic, Karadzic was always accompanied 
by bodyguards, who caused staff and patients distress by 
insisting on body searches. Karadzic’s availability became 
increasingly limited, and there were always lines of unhappy 
patients outside his office. His supervisor, Dr Ismet Ceric, 
eventually requested he take leave. After he went to Palé in 
1992, he did not practise psychiatry again. 
Karadzic’s possible motivations and mental state  
You want to take Bosnia and Herzegovina down the same 
highway to hell and suffering that Slovenia and Croatia are 
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travelling. Do not think that you will not lead Bosnia and 
Herzegovina into hell, and do not think that you will not 
perhaps lead the Muslim people into annihilation, because the 
Muslims cannot defend themselves if there is war—How will 
you prevent everyone from being killed in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina? —Dr Radovan Karadzic (October 1991), 
demonstrating the skills acquired from years of psychotherapy 
training88 
Little is known about Karadzic’s upbringing. His father 
would undoubtedly have stoked his nationalism, but died 
when Karadzic was young; his reaction to the death is 
unknown. His mother spoke glowingly of her son and 
supported his political goals once he became President.89 We 
know little more of Karadzic the doctor, or why he chose 
psychiatry. At best he was regarded as marginally competent, 
indifferent to the concerns of his patients, and corrupt. Dr 
Ceric described his work as ‘ordinary’.90 His colleagues, 
regaled with assertions that he would become a famous 
psychiatrist or poet, said that he diagnosed everybody with 
masked depression, provoked psychotic patients, was always 
late and never completed reports.91 When a psychopathic 
patient with a knife went roaming in the ward, Karadzic 
retreated to his room, leaving a nurse to disarm and calm him.  
Inevitably questions will be raised about Karadzic’s mental 
state. He was reported to drink to excess, spend money and 
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gamble heavily at casinos.92 Dr Ceric said he had 
psychosomatic symptoms. In springtime and autumn he was 
depressed and ‘a little bit, sometimes euphoric’ during 
summer and winter. Selling medical certificates, gambling 
and indiscriminate spending are indicative of a grandiose and 
reckless nature, with strong elements of opportunism.93 
Vesovic described Karadzic as a psychopath, ‘a man without a 
core’. We cannot exonerate his actions, yet some writers, 
noting his extreme pronouncements, would consider 
diagnoses like psychopathy, manic-depression or paranoia.94  
Dr Ceric wrote that ‘at the time there was a joke among 
our colleagues and our nurses that one day in the future, it’s 
possible that Radovan would come to the clinic early in the 
morning and say, “Okay I’m back and I’m not guilty of 
nothing—or everything, everyone else is guilty...the 
Americans or something...so how about some tea or coffee.”’95 
Warren Zimmerman, the last American ambassador to 
Yugoslavia, regarded him as barking mad, obsessed with 
violence and in need of psychiatric treatment96.  
What cannot be denied is Karadzic’s capacity for gross 
denial, at times reaching delusional proportions. He alleged 
that Muslims destroyed the famous National Library, with its 
irreplaceable cultural treasures, because it was a Christian 
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building.97 Far from Sarajevo being under siege by his forces 
for two years, he blustered that Muslim guns were there to 
prevent citizens from breaking out of the city. In the face of 
overwhelming evidence of murderous atrocities by Bosnian 
Serb forces, he continued to state that there was not one shred 
of evidence to support these claims and, once again, the 
atrocities had been carried out by Muslims against their own 
people.98 
He never renounced his role as a psychiatrist, even after he 
assumed the Presidency of the Republika Srpska. One analyst 
stated that the level of violence of combatants was fanned by 
Dr Karadzic’s ‘psychobabble’.99 Karadzic’s group therapy 
training influenced his leadership style and choice of terror 
tactics. Allegations have been made that he witnessed and 
participated in torture at Bosnian Serb concentration camps.100  
Karadzic’s short reign as President of the Bosnian Serb 
Republic left an appalling legacy. The full extent of killing and 
destruction wrought by his forces during the war will never 
be fully known. The casualties and survivors, many now 
dispersed around the world as refugees, will suffer for the rest 
of their lives. Although many aspects of Karadzic’s 
personality remain deeply enigmatic, he displayed an 
extraordinary degree of reckless opportunism in which the 
instincts of an extreme gambler were unchallenged by any 
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restraint or fear of the consequences. His most enduring 
characteristics are his grandiose self-image, reckless and 
profligate nature, boundless opportunism and grotesque 
capacity for self-deception. If nothing else, they disqualify 
him as a candidate for Hannah Arendt’s ‘banality of evil’. 
Conclusion  
…of all the professions, medicine is one most likely to attract 
people with high personal anxieties about dying. We become 
doctors because our ability to cure gives us power over the 
death of which we are so afraid… —Sherwin Nuland101 
The three facets of the medical role are sapiential, 
authoritarian and charismatic. Sapience, of course, comes 
from training and experience, while authority is not just 
implicit but constantly reiterated by the title ‘Doctor’. The 
charismatic role accounts for the fact that doctors are dealing 
with powerful and mysterious forces. The basis for medical 
involvement in political abuse goes deep into the psychology 
of medicine and the personality of the practitioner. At its 
heart is an extreme grandiosity, a belief that ‘treating’ (in 
reality, extirpating) the illness affecting the nation is merely 
an extension of the ancient and honoured role of treating the 
sick patient. During the nineteenth century, the belief arose 
that it was only a question of degree in moving from healing 
the individual to healing the nation. The murder of other 
human beings (the emphasis being on those defined as ‘the 
other’) was, to some, merely a mental leap from the 
adjustment required of the doctors to detach themselves from 
the patients in order to treat them.  
In 1937, the Serb philosopher and nationalist Vaso 
Cubrilovic, who had taken part in the plot to kill the 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, anticipated ethnic cleansing in 
psychological terms. He proposed to remove Albanians from 
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Serbian lands by ‘the creation of a suitable psychosis’, that is, 
to drive them away by intolerable terror. It is significant that 
the language used to justify racial genocide was derived from 
medicine in portraying the enemy in pathological terms. The 
concept of cleansing or disinfection, particularly since the 
early 1900s, was intended to facilitate the illusion that the 
mass murders were intended to promote ‘hygiene’. This 
designation of the victim of eugenic or ethnic genocide as 
some sort of pathology infecting the society as a whole was a 
regular part of the process of legitimising massacre as a public 
health measure by using ‘reverse jargon’.102  
Turkey's Dr Nazim referred to his Armenian victims as 
dangerous microbes or abscesses; Hitler and his medical 
acolytes described Jews, inter alia, as parasites, a plague, lice, 
vermin, cancer, tumours, racial tuberculosis and gangrenous 
excrescences that had to be eliminated.103 Stalin and Beria 
promoted the term purge to denote the deportation of millions 
of ethnic Soviet minorities to Siberia, regardless of the 
mortality. Japanese germ warfare referred to the population in 
Manchuria as 'logs', whom they used for horrifying 
experiments; in Rwanda, the Hutu term for Tutsis was 
‘cockroaches’; Albanian commanders called the Roma 
‘majutsis’, meaning, lower than garbage.104 Animalisation and 
insectification of people, as Rowan Savage shows in his essay 
here, is the 'simplest' form of dehumanisation, and it is that 
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sense of designated enemies as other than human that allows 
the ideological perpetrators and their minions to justify their 
actions.  
Why do some elements of the psychiatric profession ally 
themselves with genocide in this way, a way that stridently 
contradicts every principle of care and healing to which its 
practitioners are dedicated? Of all the medical sub-disciplines, 
psychiatry has the most direct link with shamanism, the first 
specialised role in hunter-gatherer society. The role of the 
shaman was not just healing the individual but ensuring the 
harmony of the tribal group by placating the gods, coping 
with drought or scarcity and predicting the future. In doing 
so, it became an elite and hereditary priestly group. This 
tendency continued in the post-Enlightenment decline in 
religion and its substitution by psychiatry and psychology.  
Of all the sub-disciplines, psychiatry was the youngest and 
the last to achieve professional recognition. By virtue of the 
terrain in which it operates—the mind—psychiatry is 
predisposed to overdetermination, making it especially 
susceptible to utopian ideology or irenic fantasies. The first 
organiser of the profession, Pinel, driven by the spirit of the 
French Revolution, sought to change the environment of the 
patient through 'moral therapy'. Full recognition of the 
discipline came at the start of the twentieth century from Emil 
Kraepelin. There is no denying his organisational genius; this, 
coupled with the development of a rational system of 
classifying diagnoses, set the profession on track to become a 
medical speciality.  
German psychiatry’s greatest asset proved its undoing: 
academicians perceived themselves as scientists and saw 
patients as research material.105 This was a Faustian pact of 
the most ominous nature—it laid the seeds of the total moral 
                                                 





collapse of German psychiatry under the Nazis.106 Kraepelin 
has to take credit for the catastrophic effect of the theory of 
degeneration on German psychiatry—and ultimately the 
lowest point in the history of medicine. More than any of his 
colleagues, Kraepelin had the intelligence and vision to see 
that degeneration was an ultimately doomed and immoral 
proposition. By articulating social facts into an implied threat 
to the collective wellbeing of the nation,107 Kraepelin was the 
chief architect of the psychiatric debauchment that followed. 
It was no coincidence that Ernst Rüdin, his successor at 
Heidelberg, was the driving force behind the Nazi euthanasia 
program.108 Another follower, Robert Gaupp, stated in 1938 
that Kraepelin’s work comprised nothing less than ‘the 
foundation of all Nazi racial hygiene laws’.109 English 
psychiatrist Michael Shepherd described Kraepelin’s ideas as 
proto-fascistic.110 When Kraepelin died in 1926, Hitler would 
have been mostly unknown to him.  
Whitely states that psychiatry ‘now constitutes an 
amorphous system of beliefs, behaviours and attitudes whose 
functions and doctrines are unsettlingly to those held by 
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conventional religions’.111 Its practitioners undergo years of 
special training to gain access to knowledge inaccessible to the 
public (increasingly less so in this age of the internet) allowing 
them special powers (enforcing treatment). Their terrain, 
despite constant reiteration that they are now brain-based, is 
‘the mind’, a territory with as little definition as ‘the soul’ is to 
the public. 
Canonical texts are regarded as being of unshakeable 
authority but lead to intense (and to the public, largely 
incomprehensible) disputes. Its ultimate expression, personal 
psychotherapy, models itself on sacramental involvement and 
sin confession, establishing a ritual practice akin to regular 
attendance at Catholic mass. Like any church, psychiatry can 
be broken down into diverse parts, with different competing 
schools squabbling over ideology but sharing the same goals 
and distinguishing itself from opposition, that is, non-
professional or lay competitors. Like other institutions in the 
public relations-driven jargon-rich discourse, psychiatric 
colleges all have ‘mission statements’.  
Consider, as an example, the Royal Australian and New 
Zealand College of Psychiatry.112 It takes a stand on selected 
and appropriate public issues, such as child abuse or 
detention of refugees; yet it shies away from matters that 
would be seen as falling directly into its bailiwick. At times it 
appears to take a distinctly moral or censorious approach, 
sometimes quite legitimately in relation to issues around 
stigma, for example complaining that the Jim Carey movie 
Me, Myself and Irene was offensive to mental patients. It is 
preoccupied with sexual misconduct by doctors (most 
                                                 
111 Whitley, Rob (2008), ‘Is psychiatry a religion?’, Journal of the Royal 
Society of Medicine, December, 101, 12, 579–82. 
112 It should be stated that in this regard, the RANZCP is little 






recently, banning delisted psychiatrists from applying to 
rejoin the College), but has never issued any response to the 
roles of men like Karadzic and his Serbian colleagues in the 
Bosnian genocide. 
Are psychiatrists as individuals inherently prone to human 
rights abuse? There is nothing to indicate that most 
psychiatrists involved in such activities are anything but law-
abiding and exemplary citizens. In the former USSR, it would 
appear that the majority of Soviet psychiatrists were reluctant 
to participate in state-sanctioned abuse of psychiatric 
diagnosis and treatment, and 'wriggled out' of such roles as 
soon as it was politically possible. 113 114 The German 
psychiatrists who led the genocide were not marginal 
characters, misfits or psychopaths, but some of the most 
prominent academics. Rüdin and Gaupp, for example, were 
leaders in the field. Other academics involved in wide-
ranging abuses included Julius Hallervorden, director of the 
prestigious Kaiser–Wilhelm Institute, who collected brains of 
euthanasia victims for his neuro-pathological collection, and 
Carl Schneider, who studied victims before they were 
murdered and then dissected their brains. Colonel Aubrey 
Levin, who ran the anti-homosexual Aversion Project in the 
South African Defence Force, had extreme right-wing views, 
yet was an otherwise unremarkable personality.  
Karadzic, in contrast, was an extremely dubious, if not 
marginal, character. His work was at best ‘ordinary’, his 
attempts to establish himself as an artist (or sporting coach) 
close to pathetic and he constantly cast around for a role in 
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which he could fulfil his grandiose fantasies. Yet Karadzic the 
genocidaire cannot be separated from Karadzic the psychiatrist. 
He had no hesitation in shelling his workplace, suggesting 
that he had internalised the slights of his colleagues and 
wanted revenge. He thrived on the fighting, was a constant 
presence at the siege of Sarajevo and used group psychology 
to plan tactics of terror and ethnic cleansing. That he worked 
as an alternative therapist when he was in hiding indicates 
that the genocide was perhaps just another expression, albeit 
one with the most terrible consequences, of the quest to 
become the comprehensive 'healer', feasibly an aspiration of 
genocidal doctors.  
In its capacity for overdetermination, does psychiatry have 
a fatal flaw? This may well be the case. The involvement with 
eugenics only had consequences in Germany, but led to 
sterilisation of the mentally ill in countries such as Sweden (as 
late as 1965) and the United States particularly between the 
two world wars. At the highwater mark of psychoanalysis in 
mid-century, American psychiatrists confidently issued 
nostrums about disturbed youth requiring counselling to 
solve a range of social problems. For decades, there was 
suppression of acknowledging child sexual abuse on the basis 
of Freud’s oedipal theory (it was all a fantasy), that swung 
round to the opposite extreme after 1980 and imprisoned 
innocent parents on the basis of repressed memories 
‘discovered’ in therapy. Now we see another manifestation of 
this tendency towards over-zealous social activism, the 
removal of children from mothers (if not their imprisonment) 
on the basis of a pseudo-scientific and unproven theory 
known as Munchausen’s Syndrome by Proxy.  
It has to be accepted that, with the best intentions in the 
world, the practise of psychiatry can lend itself at intervals to 
a view of society that can be described, variously, as 
patronising, paternalistic, Manichean and all-encompassing. 
In this scenario, the outcome is inevitable. From the 
individual to the profession, there arise those who ally 





destroy, other groups of people, driven by an inexorable sense 
of rectitude that may, in some cases at least, overlie a surging 
torrent of rage that led them to the profession in the first case. 
As a result of atrocities committed during the Bosnian 
Civil War of 1992–1995, Karadzic stands indicted as a 
suspected war criminal for crimes against humanity and 
genocide, the first doctor so indicted since the Nuremberg 
Doctors’ Trial in 1946. These crimes include killing 68 civilians 
in the shelling of the Markale marketplace on 5 February 1994, 
the use of 248 United Nations peacekeepers as human shields, 
and the murder of up to 7,500 people under UN protection at 
Srebrenica.  
In 1993, the American Psychiatric Association passed a 
motion condemning Karadzic for ‘brutal and inhumane 
actions’. The condemnation was issued with ‘particular 
offence, urgency and horror because, by membership and 
training, Dr Karadzic claims membership in our 
profession’.115  
Psychiatrists, alongside other medical and mental health 
professionals, have wide reaching moral responsibility. 
Prominent psychiatrist Thomas Szasz made the point quite 
bluntly: 'It is the moral duty of psychologists and 
psychiatrists to safeguard the dignity and liberty of people 
generally, and, in particular those with whom they work. If 
instead they take professional advantage of the imprisoned 
status of incarcerated individuals or populations, they are, in 
my opinion, criminals.'116 
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Regrettably, the evidence thus far suggests that doctors, 
regardless of prestige, ability, qualification or training, are 
amongst the most willing accomplices of state abuse. They 
will play a leading role in perpetuating the system, support 
and participate in state abuse and, where circumstances 
permit, willingly accede to leadership of repressive regimes. 
What cannot be doubted is that this phenomenon is a 
beginning, not an end, and will undoubtedly recur in future.  
We kill everybody, my dear. Some with bullets, some with 
words, and everybody with our deeds. We drive people into 
their graves, and neither see it nor feel it. —Maxim Gorky in 
Enemies117  
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This essay is about the indifference, even the hostile 
indifference, of Christian churches to the Jewish experience in 
the 1930s and 1940s. Even a brief review of the attitudes and 
actions of the German Catholic and Protestant churches, of 
two Popes, of the highly-regarded theologian Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer and of the German Jews’ responses leads to this 
conclusion: that there are much simpler explanations of their 
silences and their moral abdications than can be found in the 
grand theorising so often required by the humanities and 
social sciences. 
Two factors make this is a difficult assignment. First, 
identifying let alone pinpointing emotions and attitudes, 
which is so much harder than assembling chronology and 
narrative. Second, finding the appropriate words to capture 
and comprehend church conduct during the Holocaust era. 
(And then beyond the Shoah to church silence during Burundi, 
Rwanda, Somalia, Guatemala, North Korea, Bangladesh, 
Kosovo, Bosnia, Iraq, Darfur, among other such events.)  
One tries to find and understand the mechanisms, the 
transmission belts that 'drove' their behaviour. Greed, 
revenge, hate and contempt explain many acts of evil; 
Samaritanism, generosity, charitableness, even altruism 
underlie acts of goodness. A word that doesn’t seem to belong 
in the vocabularies of good and evil is want. It seems 
innocuous enough. But want can mislead. To want something 
is to wish or hope for it, to yearn or pine or even crave for it; 
the verb implies action towards something positive and 
definable. Not to want is a much more passive notion, even a 
negative one. Wanting has the common meaning of lacking, 





often, being unacceptable. These are not merely normal 
emotions and behaviours or psychological states of being; 
they are also political terms and attitudes and it is in these 
latter senses that I look briefly at what Christians and Jews 
wanted, didn’t want, and the nature of their wanting in 
relation to Jews in the Europe of the 1930s and 1940s.  
Indifference is another relevant word, one that on the face of 
it indicates neither want nor not want. Written or spoken, it 
conveys a sense of neutrality, of not caring one way or the 
other, a shrug signifying lack of concern, lack of interest, 
coolness or even coldness, or simply disdain, disregard or 
dismissiveness. It doesn’t connote strength of feeling, 
certainly not passion. In his lectures, Yehuda Bauer, the doyen 
of Holocaust historians, always talks about hostile indifference 
towards Jews in that era—a notion that embodies intense 
feelings of either antagonism, bitterness, unkindness, malice, 
callousness or spite, or all of those feelings. Joining ‘hostile’ to 
‘indifference’ may well be a contradiction but that in itself is 
appropriate for a period of history replete with contradiction, 
including the inconsistency of the celebrated German 
Protestant theologian Bonhoeffer.  
Two more terms need consideration: worthy and its 
opposite, unworthy. Genocide scholars sometimes, but not 
often, talk about worthy and unworthy victims, those who do 
and those who don’t warrant rescue or any of the several 
forms of intervention. Worthy here means deserving of, 
meriting, justifying, warranting attention or action. The 
Catholic and Protestant teaching that Judaism was 
superseded by Christianity and was therefore obsolete is but 
one form of unworthiness. Centuries of Christian teaching of 
contempt for Jews is another.1 In World War II, several Polish 
underground movements wouldn’t give arms to Jewish 
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partisans and some local right-wing resistance movements 
hunted down Jews in order to kill them. That was another 
litmus of unworthiness.2 In 1985, when he was Mayor of 
Darmstadt, Günther Metzger told the German Council of Sinti 
and Roma people that their request to be included in 
remembrance ceremonies to mark the liberation of the 
Bergen–Belsen camp ‘insulted the honour’ of the Holocaust by 
wishing to be associated with it.3 That is as good an exemplar 
of unworthiness as we will find. [Woodcock's essay here shows 
just how unworthy are the Romani in Romanian society.] 
The Catholic Church and the Jews 
The Catholic church isn’t a monolithic structure now and it 
wasn’t so in the Holocaust years. There were hundreds of 
Catholic churches and thousands of church men and women: 
some saved Jews, others defended Jews, some betrayed Jews 
and some killed Jews. Father Jozef Tiso, a priest, headed a 
Nazi puppet state in Slovakia from where Jews were deported 
to Auschwitz: ‘It is a Christian action to expel the Jews, 
because it is for the good of the people, which is thus getting 
rid of the pests.’4 [See Paul O'Shea's essay in this volume.] Yet 
Dominican nuns, led by Sister Bertranda (Anna Borkowska), 
assisted and even ran guns for the famous partisan Abba 
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Kovner and his men in the Vilna (Vilnius) ghetto 
underground.5  
The noticeably short Vatican document, We Remember: A 
reflection on the Holocaust (The Shoah)—released on 16 March 
1998, more than 50 years after the events—was presented by 
Edward Idris Cardinal Cassidy to a large Sydney audience a 
year later.6 Cassidy talked of ‘the sons and daughters of the 
Church…who fostered longstanding sentiments of mistrust 
and hostility that the Vatican documents refer to as anti-
Judaism’.7 If only it had been merely mistrust and hostility. 
That Jews could have lived with, as they have done for two 
millennia—and longer. But they had to live with and die from 
things infinitely greater than mere mistrust and hostility. 
They, and the Catholic church, have also had to live with the 
reality, expressed by Christian philosopher Marcel Dubois, 
that ‘the centuries-old Christian anti-Judaism prepared the 
soil for modern antisemitism and the Holocaust’.8 
Why did people behave the way they did? The Cardinal 
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conceded that ‘many Christians did in fact fail to give every 
possible assistance to those being persecuted’; he talked of 
people who ‘failed to give the witness that might have been 
expected of them as Christ’s followers’. The tenor of this is 
that, at worst, the Catholic church was merely one third of the 
Holocaust triangle9 that comprises the perpetrators and 
victims as well as the bystanders, those who by their 
indifference—or even their hostile indifference—allowed it to 
happen. Many churches and churchmen were more than 
bystanders: they were accessories, accomplices, collaborators, 
certainly companions to both ideas and actions—and 
murderers. The Vatican document has several references to 
the church or its adherents as co-equal victims. But there is a 
blasphemy in equating the fate of the Jews of Europe with the 
fate of the Catholic church or even several hundred of its 
servants. (There are also curious omissions of the dead in We 
Remember: the forgetting of, among others, 220,000 Roma, as 
many as 5.7 million Russians prisoners of war, at least 3.5 
million non-Jewish Poles, nearly 6 million Ukrainian civilians, 
8.2 million Russian civilians, and tens of thousands of anti-
fascists, Serbian patriots, Jehovah's Witnesses and gay men.) 
There are, literally, innumerable examples of Catholic 
clergy, whether in Germany or among her satellite allies, who 
strongly supported Nazism and were, in many ways, 
perpetrators. Among others, Ernst Helmreich has written a 
major work on The German Churches Under Hitler;10 Klaus 
Scholder has published a two-volume analysis of The Churches 
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and the Third Reich11 and Kevin Spicer has provided much 
detail in several works, especially in his more recent portrait 
of Hitler’s Priests.12 This latter book devotes some 60 pages to 
biographies of 138 leading ‘brown priests’.  
Some aspects of church involvement need brief discussion. 
The essential thrust of We Remember is that there was a ‘them’ 
and ‘us’ dichotomy: ‘us’ or ‘we’ were the anti-Jewish church 
leaders and ideology-makers who taught and preached a 
doctrine of contempt, now regarded as morally and ethically 
wrong; ‘them’ were an aberrant group of pagan Nazis whose 
roots lay outside of Catholic Christianity and who murdered 
in the name of blood and race. This kind of rationalisation 
does not become the Vatican. It echoes the German historian, 
Ernst Nolte, who talked about ‘us’ or ‘we’ Germans, the good 
people, the anti-Nazis, and the ‘them’ Germans, Nazis who 
seemingly descended from some alien spaceship in 1933 and 
who were vanquished by the forces of good in 1945.13  
Some 43 per cent of Germans were Catholics, and a 
significant 22.7 per cent of the Schutzstaffeln (SS) were 
adherents, attendees at mass, seekers of rites and rituals. 
Hitler was undoubtedly a radical figure, the one who put the 
extermination engine into operation. But the engine, and most 
of the vehicle’s parts, was assembled well before he came to 
power. His radicalism was in removing the brakes that had 
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always held back the Church, namely, the injunction of St 
Augustine in the fourth century that Jews could be and even 
should be demeaned, brought low, expelled, harassed, 
deported, reviled—but not killed.14  
In the Weimar period in the 1920s, bishops spoke out 
against the glorification of race and blood, but said nothing 
about anti-Jewish propaganda. They did, however, talk 
strongly about the destructive influence of the Jews. The main 
proponents were men like Fathers Josef Roth, Lorenz Pieper, 
Magnus Gött, the Franciscan Erhard Schlund, the Jesuit 
Gustav Gundlach and Bishop Michael Buchberger of 
Regensburg.  
In the post-Weimar period, Hitler had strong dialogue 
with the Catholic leadership, who in turn began an 
appreciation of the values of racial purity. Archbishop Conrad 
Gröber (‘Conrad the Brown’), while heavily involved in 
winning over the German bishops to the Vatican’s signing a 
concordat with the Reich, stated: 
Every people bears itself the responsibility for its successful 
existence, and the intake of entirely foreign blood will always 
represent a risk for a nationality that has proven its historical 
worth. Hence, no people may be denied the right to maintain 
undisturbed their previous racial stock and to enact 
safeguards for this purpose. The Christian religion merely 
demands that the means used do not offend against the moral 
law and natural justice.15 
Later, he protested against the euthanasia program but not 
against the treatment of Jews.  
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The famous Advent sermons of 1933 by Cardinal Michael 
von Faulhaber have been misinterpreted: he said that he 
didn’t object to the attempt to keep national characteristics 
‘pure and unadulterated’ but he objected to placing loyalty to 
race above loyalty to the church. This was misinterpreted as 
Catholic condemnation of Nazi ideology. It wasn’t. He was a 
willing defender of the Old Testament, but while the people 
of Israel before Christ were the vehicles of divine revelation, 
those who came after were but ‘restless wanderers over the 
earth’. He was therefore ‘not concerned with defending the 
Jews of our time’—because, he insisted, ‘the Jews can help 
themselves’.16 [This was said in the context of the ‘failed’ Nazi 
attempt at a Jewish economic boycott, promoted by Julius 
Streicher, on 1 April 1933. Beginning a few weeks earlier, in 
March 1933, Jews and non-Jews had met in rallies at New 
York’s Madison Square Garden to protest at German 
treatment of Jews. These meetings caused Nazis to fear an 
American boycott of their goods, leading to this notion that 
Jews were not only all-powerful but also capable of looking 
after themselves.] Cardinal-Archbishop Adolf Bertram used a 
similar turn of phrase when he and Faulhaber pointed out to 
the Pope that there were ‘immediate issues of greater 
importance in the long term: schools, the maintaining of 
Catholic associations, sterilization’.17 Although he condemned 
the euthanasia program, Faulhaber never once uttered a word 
about the persecution and extermination of the Jews. Hitler, 
he was happy to say, was ‘the first statesman, aside from the 
Holy Father, who raised his voice against bolshevism’.18 He 
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admired the Führer as ‘a man of peace’.  
The Catholic church agreed to the Nuremberg Laws which 
prohibited marriages between Jews and Aryans: in short, the 
church agreed to an inadmissible infringement of her spiritual 
jurisdiction to give sacraments to a baptised Jew. While many 
Catholic leaders abroad condemned these Laws, Bishop Alois 
Hudal, head of the German church in Rome, said the 
Nuremberg Laws were ‘essential as a measure of self-defence 
against the influx of foreign elements’. This ‘Semitic race’, he 
wrote, wanted to ‘become the financial masters of the Eternal 
City’.19 Much later, he was to assist in the escape of a dozen 
major war criminals, including Adolf Eichmann, three Nazi 
camp commandants, Franz Stangl, Gustav Wagner and Alois 
Brunner, and such men as Klaus Barbie, (Croatian) Ante 
Pavelic and Josef Mengele.20 
A pastoral letter from the German bishops, by Faulhaber, 
was read on the first Sunday in January 1937. It agreed with 
Hitler’s perception of the Bolshevik danger: 
The German Bishops consider it their duty to support the 
head of the German Reich by all those means which the 
Church has at its disposal. Co-operation in repelling this 
threat is a religious task.21  
In effect, the bishops were at one with Hitler in perceiving 
Jews as the chief engineers, carriers and exploiters of 
Bolshevism. Gröber characterised Bolshevism as ‘an Asiatic 
state despotism, in point of fact in the service of a group of 
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terrorists led by Jews’.22 
The Bishop of Limburg, Antonius Hilfrich, was an 
opponent of the euthanasia program. He admitted the 
Jewishness of Jesus ‘but the Christian religion has not grown 
out of the nature of this people’; rather, ‘it has had to make its 
way against this people’, those guilty of the murder of God.23 
Given these sentiments from senior clergymen, Lewy says it 
was no wonder that the lower-ranking churchmen felt free to 
express not just their contempt but their hatred of Jewry. 
‘Kristallnacht’, the Goebbels-orchestrated pogrom of 9 
November 1938, was in so many ways the trailer for the ‘Final 
Solution’. The late rabbi and philosopher Emil Fackenheim 
always said that following the destruction of the Temple in 70 
CE, this was the second-most climactic event in Jewish history 
to that point—because that action singled out Jews simply 
and merely because they were. Apart from Provost Bernhard 
Lichtenberg of St Hedwig’s Cathedral in Berlin, this event was 
not commented upon by German Catholic churchmen (in 
sharp contrast to the condemnation by cardinals in France, 
Portugal and Belgium). Lichtenberg—the blessed and 
beatified Catholic, the man who had been imprisoned by the 
Gestapo for, among several things, asking his congregants at 
the end of his services to pray for the Jews—lamented: ‘What 
took place yesterday, we know; what will be tomorrow, we 
do not know; but what happens today, that we have 
witnessed; outside this church the synagogue is burning, and 
that is also a house of God’.24 He was taken to Dachau, and 
died en route, of causes unknown.  
The church in parts of Germany rejected from service and 
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sacraments those ordered to wear yellow armbands. They 
were fellow Catholics but they were Jews. The church in 
Germany certainly protested against the euthanasia program 
and the Bishop of Münster, Clemens Galen, has rightly been 
honoured as an heroic figure for his opposition. But, like 
Gröber and von Faulhaber, he never protested against Jewish 
treatment.25 That was left to the lone Lichtenberg.  
By the end of 1942, the German episcopate was well 
informed of what was happening. Colonel Kurt Gerstein had 
joined the SS to ‘take a look into Hitler’s kitchen’, to see for 
himself what was happening to Jews: after witnessing a 
gassing at Belzec death camp, he tried to inform the Papal 
Nuncio, Cesare Orsenigo. The Monsignor refused to see him. 
Monsignor Wilhelm Berning, Bishop of Osnabrück, and a 
strong Nazi sympathiser, wrote in his notes of 5 February 
1942 that ‘the plan for a total elimination of the Jews clearly 
exists’.26 Monsignor Conrad Gröber, Archbishop of Freiberg, 
told the Pope on 14 June 1942 about the Einsatzgruppen 
massacres in Russia: ‘The Nazi conception of the world is 
characterised by the most radical anti-Semitism, going as far 
as the annihilation [Vernichtung] of Jewry, not only in its spirit 
but also in its members.’27  
The German bishops made no statements about the fate of 
Jews in Dachau or in other camps, but expressed concern 
solely at the possible intrusion into the indissolubility of 
Christian marriages. Archbishop-Cardinal Adolf Bertram, 
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President of the German Bishops’ Conference and the pre-
eminent Catholic cleric, and others expressed concern about 
Jewish converts in the camps but not about Jews in general. 
(Three days before the war ended, the same Bertram said a 
Mass in fond memory of Hitler a week after his suicide.) In all 
their pleas and pleadings about the right to life and liberty, 
none of these men, including the ‘heroic’ figures of von 
Faulhaber and von Galen, could actually utter the word ‘Jew’. 
Opposed to the euthanasia program to the extent that it least 
stopped, officially—though it continued secretly until beyond 
the last day of the war—they couldn’t find it within their 
Christianness to oppose the Jewish programs. Unlike the 
Belgian, French and Dutch bishops, the German bishops 
never spoke out when Jews were being transported from their 
country.28 These were the men who ordered denial of the 
sacraments to Catholics who engaged in duelling or who 
sought cremation rather than burial—but didn’t deny such 
rites to men who killed Jews.  
Two Popes and the Jews 
On 14 March 1937, Achille Ratti, Pope Pius XI, wrote the first 
ever encyclical in German, 12 pages addressed to the German 
bishops. A week later it was read from every pulpit. He 
declared that ‘whoever exalts race or nation or the State to the 
highest norm and worships them like idols perverts and 
distorts the divine order of things... True Christianity proves 
itself in the love of God and in the active love of one’s 
neighbour.’ He added that ‘human laws which run counter to 
natural laws are not obligatory in conscience’.29 The encyclical 
was entitled Mit brennender Sorge, with serious or burning 
concern.  
In 1938 he asked the renowned American Jesuit writer on 
Black–White relations, John LaFarge, to help him pen another 
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encyclical, Humani Generis Unitas, a document which some 
historians, including Conor Cruise O’Brien, have suggested 
(wrongly perhaps, but quite seriously) may have averted the 
Holocaust. LaFarge was assisted by Gustav Gundlach, who 
earlier had written an encyclopaedia article defending a 
‘permissible anti-Semitism’. Ethnic and racist antisemitism 
was ‘unchristian’, he wrote, but he condoned ‘anti-
Jewishness’ as a moral and legal means of com-bating 
‘dangerous influences of Jewish ethnicity in the ambit of 
economics, politics, press, theatre, cinema, science and the 
arts’.30 Unlike Mit brennender Sorge, it mentioned Jews and 
antisemitism. At paragraph 132, he wrote: ‘Even those who in 
time of war fought bravely for their country are treated as 
traitors, and the children of those who laid down their lives in 
their country’s behalf are branded as outlaws by the very fact 
of their of their parentage... This flagrant denial of human 
rights sends many thousands of helpless persons out over the 
face of the earth without any resources. Wandering from 
frontier to frontier, they are a burden to humanity and to 
themselves’.31  
Even so, there was no denunciation of Nazi policies and no 
condemnation of anti-Jewish programs. The draft, regrettably, 
was still very much in traditional Catholic mould. It repeated 
the theological casuistry about the historic curse on Jews for 
their rejection of Christ, and the right to continue with 
conversion goals. As to the circumstances in which Jews find 
themselves in various countries, this gives rise ‘to very 
different problems in the practical order’ and so the church 
‘leaves to the powers concerned the solution to these 
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problems’ in the ‘truly profane spheres’.32 The 100-page draft 
didn’t go any further or anywhere and it was left to 1965, to 
the most significant Nostra Aetate of the Second Vatican 
Council, to declare a total break with the centuries of 
contempt.33 
When Pius XI died in February 1939, Bernard Joseph, on 
behalf of the executive of the Jewish Agency, wrote to the 
Patriarch in Jerusalem:34 
In common with the whole civilised community, the Jewish 
people mourns the loss of one of the greatest exponents of the 
cause of international peace and goodwill... More than once 
did we have occasion to be deeply grateful for the attitude 
which he took up against the persecution of racial minorities 
and in particular for the deep concern which he expressed for 
the fate of the persecuted Jews of Central Europe. His noble 
efforts on their behalf will ensure for him for all time a warm 
place in the memories of Jewish people wherever they live. 
These are not the words that Jews will ever come to use of 
his successor, Eugenio Pacelli, Pope Pius XII. Not only Jews 
but many Catholic thinkers despaired then, and now, of this 
man’s failure to do certain things that were within his powers 
to do. He failed to promulgate an explicit and direct 
condemnation of the war of aggression, to speak out openly 
against the acts of violence against Jews and others under 
Nazi occupation. He had full knowledge of the facts from 
early on, and his sin, if I may use the term, was not to use the 
influence he had within him. He continued to remain silent 
                                                 
32 Passelecq and Suchesky, 256–57. 
33 There are several key works on Vatican Council II: see Cassidy, 
Edward Idriss Cardinal (2005), Ecumenism and Inter-Religious 
Dialogue: Unitatis Redintegratio, Nostra Aetate, New Jersey, Paulist 
Press.  
34 Lapide, Pinchas (1967), Three Popes and the Jews, New York, 





despite ceaseless appeals from his own adherents, from Jews 
and from governments, to speak out. On 6 March 1943, 
Bishop Konrad von Preysing asked the Pope to help save 
Jews, ‘the many unfortunate innocents’, still in Berlin and 
awaiting deportation. In April 1943, he wrote to Preysing 
saying he wouldn’t speak out, advising caution ‘to avoid the 
greater evil (ad maiora mala vitanda)’.35 What could possibly 
have been a greater evil? He condoned the Vichy 
Government’s ‘Jewish Statutes’. The French bishops 
protested, but Léon Bérard, the Vichy Ambassador to the 
Holy See, reported to Marshal Petain that the Vatican did not 
consider such laws to be in conflict with Catholic teaching.36 
The razzia against the Jews of Rome began early on 
Saturday morning, 16 October 1943: Jews were being 
deported from literally under the Vatican balcony. In his 
capacity as Bishop of Rome, Pius XII may have ordered nuns 
and priests to give them shelter and sanctuary, but Paul 
O’Shea and others37 have established that there is no evidence, 
anywhere, of such a written or spoken order. (That he didn’t 
stop such rescue efforts can hardly be used as evidence of his 
goodness, as a few faithful have asserted.) It was not 
uncommon for Catholics to use the Pope or his name as a 
moral justification for action and what is clear is that despite 
lack of public leadership from the Vatican, Italians (as Italians, 
not necessarily as Christians) rescued 7,000 Jews and hid 
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them. One thousand Rome Jews went to Auschwitz and only 
15 returned. In O’Shea’s view, of all Pacelli’s actions or 
inactions, his absent voice on the Jews of Rome was his most 
abject miscalculation, his worst misjudgement. Pius, 
according to Yehuda Bauer, raises a moral question: who is a 
saintly person? His answer: ‘Pius rejected possible martyrdom 
at German hands for defending Jews. Probst Lichtenberg in 
Berlin died for that reason. Who should be proclaimed a 
saint—Lichtenberg or Pacelli?’38 
There is a point to all of this: everyone should welcome the 
church’s admissions, regrets, the church’s remembering and 
the church’s call for Teshuvah, repentance in charity of word 
and deed, something Cardinal Cassidy rightly described as 
going well beyond apology. But there is something else that is 
needed following the Cardinal’s promise that this document 
is not the last Vatican word on the subject: that remembering 
has to be full memory, not partial memory, not selective 
memory, not just of the Jews but those millions of non-Jews 
persecuted and murdered by the Nazis, those whom Michael 
Berenbaum has called a ‘mosaic of victims’.39 There was, and 
is, the good, the bad, the ugly, and the wanting. We all need to 
look at all of these behaviours, face them, and come to terms 
with what they are.  
The Protestants and the Jews 
Looking at or into that landscape of death one understands 
the search for light and for some optimism. In 1953, Israel 
passed the Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance (Yad Vashem) 
Law, which enabled the official recognition of Righteous 
Gentiles, or the ‘Righteous Among the Nations’—those who 
risked their lives, positions or property to save Jews, for no 
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reward. To have found and honoured just on 24,333 such 
people to date [1 January 2012] is to have uncovered a small 
nugget of altruism amid a universe of unalloyed evil. When 
we highlight Martin Niemöller, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Helmut 
Gollwitzer, Elisabeth Schmitz, Marga Meusel, Hans 
Ehrenberg, Karl Immer and Julius von Jan, it makes us feel 
better about humanity. It may even offer a sense of 
redemption for those who feel guilt. But this predilection to 
always look on the bright side of things is a strange, even 
perverse, form of political synecdoche: looking at a part of 
something to represent the whole, usually with the intent of 
equating the whole with the part. These men and women 
were certainly a part of resistance to National Socialism but 
nowhere near representative of Protestant Germany. 
Wolfgang Gerlach, whose doctoral dissertation in 1970 began 
both the exhumation and autopsy of German Protestant anti-
semitism, has a better perspective. The title of his book on the 
Confessing Church—the Protestant schismatic church that 
opposed the attempts to Nazify the church —and the 
persecution of the Jews is apt enough: And the Witnesses Were 
Silent.40  
Scholder contends that the Protestant churches laid 
themselves ‘open to völkisch antisemitism in the 1920s 
…under its spell even the churches did not see and hear what 
was going on before their very eyes, on their doorsteps and 
within their walls’.41 His conclusion is fitting, except for the 
bizarre dates he attributes. That brand of popular 
antisemitism was alive and well centuries earlier. At times it 
was essentially racial antisemitism at work rather than simply 
traditional public sentiment, as shown in the letter written by 
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Lutheran Pastor Reichelmann to Der Stürmer in 1935: ‘We 
stand enthusiastically behind your struggle against the Jewish 
death watch beetles which are undermining our nation…the 
murderers of Our Saviour’.42 Or we can note the sentiments of 
Otto Dibelius, the church’s superintendent, who sermonised 
‘that one cannot ignore the fact that Judaism is taking a 
leading role in all of the destructive manifestations of modern 
civilisation’;43 in the wake of violence and measures against 
Jews in 1933, he wrote, these actions ‘will be for the best of the 
world’.44 
In both Catholic and Protestant responses to this 
tremendum of the twentieth century there is a curious 
consistency: that Nazi antisemitism was quintessentially racial 
(and evil) and therefore quite separate from the traditional, 
völkisch, religious (and permissible) variety of that 
phenomenon. The late doyen of historians of antisemitism, 
Jacob Katz, encapsulated the essential relationship:45 
The key to the understanding of what happened in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Jewish–Gentile 
relations, including its catastrophic climax in the Holocaust is 
not to be found in the immediate past, but in the course of 
Jewish history, at least since its entanglement with the history 
of Christianity.  
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After Napoleon’s defeat, and at least until 1876, all birth, 
death and marriage records were in the hands of the German 
churches, kept in parish registers. These details became 
crucial for the Nazi identification of Jews. The supply of such 
information by the churches was doubtless given as a civic 
duty and as an act of loyalty—but with the knowledge that 
there would be serious consequences (of some kind) for the 
individuals named.46 
We know much of the narrative history of the German 
Christians and the Confessing Church. In 1933, Hitler was 
opposed to the pluralism of the Protestants and so he 
attempted a unification of the 28 Evangelical churches 
(including Lutheran, Reformed and United) under one Reich 
Bishop. This was to be a counterpart to the concordat signed 
by Hitler and the Vatican in 1933. The scheme had popular 
support, with Nazism finding favour among the Deutsche 
Christen movement. That church group wanted to include in 
religion what had already been put in place elsewhere—the 
Aryan Paragraph. Just as Jews were excluded from 
organisations, federations, political parties and public life, so 
they were to be excluded from Christian teaching. There was, 
above all, to be a complete disassociation from the Old 
Testament (unlike some of the Catholic hierarchy who sought 
to preserve that document).  
The Paragraph meant that Jewish converts were outside 
the church, and it was this exclusion, not to the treatment of 
Jews in general, that motivated the Pastors’ Evangelical 
League to active opposition to National Socialism, at least in 
religious affairs. It focused around Martin Niemöller and 
centred on Karl Barth’s celebrated essay ‘Theological 
Existentialism Today’. The Aryan Paragraph was seen as a 
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violation of Christian teaching: evangelical churches wanted 
to spread the gospel, not be constrained from doing so.  
The Confessing Church resisted in several ways, including 
hiding some 2,000 Jews. Pastor Heinrich Grüber established 
an office, a Büro, in Berlin to give advice and assistance not to 
Jews in general but to ‘Christian Jews’ during the brief period 
of forced expulsion under Eichmann’s control—until he was 
arrested in December 1940.47 His efforts were rarely admired 
or applauded by most of the Protestant churches.  
Hitler lost patience with these men and women and 
allowed ideologues like Alfred Rosenberg and Martin 
Bormann to harass them. They did. Between 1937 and 1945, 18 
pastors were confined to camps; Helene Jacobs was jailed and 
the man she served and revered, the Jewish-born jurist, Franz 
Kaufmann, who ran a group that hid Jews, was shot. 
Niemöller was confined in Sachsenhausen and Dachau and 
Bonhoeffer was executed at Flossenbürg in April 1945.  
In 1935, a deaconess of the Berlin church, Marga Meusel, 
objected to the Confessing Church’s timidity. She wanted to 
know why the church was concerned only for itself and for its 
Jewish converts rather for those who were suffering most. In 
1938, one Protestant voice (among the very few) was heard 
about ‘Kristallnacht’— that of Julius von Jan, a Protestant 
minister in the town of Württemberg, who asked: ‘who would 
have thought that one single crime in Paris [the Polish–Jewish 
youth Herschel Grynszpan shooting German diplomat Ernst 
vom Rath] would have resulted in so many crimes being 
committed in Germany?’48 
It wasn’t merely a matter of timidity but rather of silence. 
There were no voices about the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 that 
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‘uncitizened’ the Jews of Germany. There was but von Jan’s 
reflection on the night of 9 November 1938. There was 
nothing to be heard about the Judeocide as such. There was 
only a secret memorandum to Hitler in 1936 protesting at the 
campaign against the Jews, the camps and the pervasiveness 
of the Gestapo.49 On 19 October 1945, the Council of the 
Evangelical Church admitted to the moral failure of their 
Christianity. The Stuttgart Declaration (or Confession) of 
Guilt said, in part: ‘For long years we have fought in the name 
of Jesus Christ against the spirit that found its terrible 
expression in the National Socialist rule of violence; yet we 
accuse ourselves for not speaking out more courageously, 
praying more faithfully, believing more gladly, and loving 
more ardently’. The word ‘Jew’ did not appear. The word 
‘more’ suggests that the churches did do things but could 
have said and done ‘more’. The significant Darmstadt 
declaration of 1947 called for the churches to reconsider and 
improve their attitudes towards and beliefs in the political 
structures that led to Germany’s disaster, but many branches 
refused to sign it.50 In 1950, the synod of the Evangelical 
Church in Germany resolved, inter alia, that ‘We ask all 
Christians to disassociate themselves from all anti-Semitism 
and earnestly resist it whenever it stirs again, and to 
encounter Jews and Jewish Christians in a brotherly 
spirit…’.51 
Bonhoeffer and the Jews 
This essay began as a presentation to the fourth annual 
Bonhoeffer Conference organised by Father Stephen Moore at 
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Kincumber, north of Sydney, in November 2008.52 A 
Christian–Jewish group met to reflect on the discipleship and 
legacy of Bonhoeffer, using as its title the phrase coined by 
biographer Stephen Haynes to assess the Bonhoeffer legacy—
‘A Cautious Embrace’. Historian John Moses insisted that 
Bonhoeffer be recognised as ‘a reluctant revolutionary’, a man 
who had the courage to shift from Lutheran notions of 
Christian supercessionism to seeing church and synagogue in 
a reciprocal relationship, a man who was moved from 
passivity to strong activism against Nazi tyranny.53 Rachel 
Kohn posed significant hypothetical questions about how the 
theologian would have or may have reacted to today’s jihadist 
terrorism.54 Christine Winter reminded us of the Lutheran 
context, pointing out that the two noted Lutheran leaders of 
Bayern and Württemberg, Hans Meiser and Theophil Wurm, 
in writing their memoirs after the war, could not bring 
themselves to mention Jews, even in passing.55 (In 1926, 
Meiser, who was to become Bishop of Bavaria from 1933 to 
1955, wrote that the ‘Jewish intellect’ was ‘excessive and even 
lascivious’ and was ‘destroying the moral fundaments of our 
people’.56 In 1938, Wurm accepted the need for the race laws 
but in 1943 he wrote of his distress at the fate of Jews in mixed 
marriages and interference ‘in the sanctity of marriage’.57) 
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Debate at the conference was sometimes heated, always 
considered and ended, politely, with a consensus about 
caution. 
There can be no doubt that Bonhoeffer would have signed 
the Stuttgarter Schulderklärung and supported the 1950 
resolution. Stephen Haynes has provided an insightful 
analysis of the contradictions and inconsistencies in 
Bonhoeffer as a ‘bystander, resister, victim’. And, he added, as 
a rescuer.58 Bonhoeffer criticised his church for what he 
considered its purely churchly opposition to the dictatorship; 
he considered Hitler the ‘AntiChrist’; he was forbidden to 
teach, preach and publish; he was an anti-Nazi counterspy; he 
helped 14 Jews (11 of them Christian converts) escape to 
Switzerland. But when he wrote his essay on ‘The Church and 
the Jewish Question’, he always used the highly-charged term 
Judenfrage. Most people reading that in the 1930s would have 
understood the text: the alien Jew who posed a problem, 
usually a threat, to Germany. His lifelong conviction was that 
the ‘Jewish Question’ would be solved by their conversion. 
John Moses has written about his ‘deep-seated anti-Judaistic 
theology’.59 But there was no voice from him on the 
euthanasia issue, or on the Laws of 1935, or on the 
extermination of Jews. Of the November 1938 pogrom, he did 
comment that ‘if today the synagogues burn, tomorrow the 
churches, too, will be set alight’.60 For the Kincumber 
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conference, I read his Letters and Papers from Prison.61 While 
this may well be but a fragment of his writings, and not 
‘representative’, the word ‘Jews’ appears only twice in 371 
pages, and then only en passant. In sum, while Bonhoeffer may 
have moved quickly along a spectrum that culminated in his 
anti-Hitler activities, he was, to the end, a product of a long-
held and deep-seated Lutheran tradition which saw Jews as a 
quite separate people, which demonised them and saw their 
conversion as their only salvation.  
In all such discussion, one has to recall the writings of the 
profound French historian, Jules Isaac. In his influential The 
Teaching of Contempt, he began the book with a quotation from 
his friend Pope John XXIII: ‘It is a fundamental rule of life 
never to distort the truth.’ The opening chapter has a short 
headnote: ‘All authorities are agreed that a true Christian 
cannot be an anti-Semite.’62 However terse, these aphorisms 
are really not that difficult to understand. There is another 
from Alexander Donat, a survivor of the Warsaw Ghetto: ‘A 
Christian who witnesses inactively a crime becomes its 
accomplice.’63  
The Jews and the Jews 
The Centralverein Deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens 
(The Central Organisation for German Citizens of the Jewish 
Faith) began life in 1893. This body, known as CV, spent 
decades fighting attacks, calumnies and libels on Jews. Most 
often it could only resort to Paragraph 130 of the Criminal 
Code, on incitement to racial violence, and then, in despair at 
                                                                                             
York, Continuum International Publishing Group, 109.  
61 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich (1971 edn), Letters and Papers from Prison, (ed) 
Bethge, Eberhard, London, The Folio Society. 
62 Isaac, 20–21.  
63 Donat, Alexander (1968), ‘Jewish Resistance’ in Out of the 






courts ever finding for the Jews, turned to paragraph 166 on 
crimes against religion. The CV had much to worry about: the 
closing of German borders to Jewish immigrants in 1906; the 
increasingly popular writings of such vigorous antisemites as 
Eugen Dühring, Heinrich von Treitschke, Arthur de Gobineau 
and Houston Stewart Chamberlain; the rise of well over 100 
institutes for the study of rassenhygiene; the hysteria and Jew-
hating crudities of Julius Streicher; court biases against Jewish 
plaintiffs or criminals; the German Youth Movement 
(Wandervögel) and its many branches that banned Jews; Jews 
having to form their own university fraternities and Turner-
schaften; the constant attacks on Jewish music, Jewish physics, 
Jewish everything. Yet by March 1933, the CV issued a 
statement condemning reports of Nazi atrocities against Jews 
as ‘pure invention’. Antisemitism, it said, existed and was of 
grave concern, ‘but it was a domestic affair’.64  
Nearly a year later, in May 1934, Rabbi Leo Baeck met 
Clarence Pickett, a prominent American Quaker who was 
visiting Germany to see what could be done for the Jews. 
Since before Christ, Baeck told him, Jews had been part of 
Germany and the Worms synagogue had recently celebrated 
its 900 years of continuous existence. ‘The Jews love Germany 
and they want to stay there’. It was a good time to be a rabbi, 
he said: his congregation used to number 50 or 60 but now he 
had to run four services every Saturday.65 
By September 1935, the newly formed Reichsvertretung der 
Juden in Deutschland (the National Representation of Jews in 
Germany) declared that the Nuremberg Laws ‘have come as 
the severest of blows for the Jews in Germany’. But ‘they must 
create a basis on which a tolerable relationship becomes 
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possible between the German and the Jewish people’.66 In 
effect, they were saying that if that was all they had to live 
with, they could cope with that.  
This is precisely what the Jewish historian and philosopher 
Gershom Scholem always railed against: this one-sided, 
unrequited love affair between Germans and Jews. In his well 
known essay on the myth of German–Jewish dialogue, 
Scholem excoriated these particular Jews for their delusions 
and their self-deception. They may have had a passionate love 
for their Vaterland but the Vaterland had never had such 
feelings for them. It took two to make a dialogue and the 
Jews, he said, ‘spoke only to themselves’. For 200 years, 
Scholem wrote, Jews could have heard the clumping of 
antisemitic boots behind them;67 Helmreich described that 
phenomenon as the ‘cannonball of anti-Semitism [that] had 
started rolling down the hill many years in the past’.68 They 
didn’t want to see or hear. 
In 1932, an esteemed American writer, Edgar Mowrer, 
visited Germany. After dinner with a Jewish banker who had 
donated money to the Nazi Party, Mowrer wondered aloud 
‘how the People of Israel have managed to survive so many 
thousands of years when they obviously have a strong 
suicidal urge’. The banker scoffed at Hitler’s rhetoric: ‘just 
talk’, he said.69 
Am I blaming Jews for their demise? Assuredly not. But it 
must have been clear to many, as it was to people like 
Scholem and political scientist Guenter Lewy, that German 
Jews had surrendered part of their souls, part of their 
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historical experience about tenure and tolerance in foreign 
lands, in order to devote themselves to Germanness; and in 
order to do that, they even dedicated themselves to 
disassociating themselves totally from the allegedly coarse, 
loud, uncouth, Yiddish-speaking Ostjuden, the East Europeans 
Jews from neighbouring Poland.70 But they failed to see that 
they had never been, nor ever would be, part of ‘us Germans’. 
This may seem a harsh conclusion, but Scholem was hardly 
alone in expressing it. Ursula Büttner contends that ‘for the 
majority of German Protestants, Jews were and always would 
be strangers no matter how assimilated they were’; this 
aversion, she concludes, extended to ‘Jewish Christians’, 
people who not only once adhered to a foreign religion but 
who still ‘belonged to a foreign people’.71 
Some colleagues who have heard me talk on this topic ask 
whether I am treading the path of Daniel Goldhagen,72 
asserting that Germany was and is somehow ‘genetically’ 
incapable of embracing cultural diversity and was always a 
repository or reservoir of an ‘eliminationist antisemitism’. No, 
is the answer, but I do subscribe to the view that German Jews 
had an unrequited love affair with Germanness. In the late 
eighteenth century the philosopher Moses Mendelssohn, the 
father of the Jewish Enlightenment, always wanted to play 
chess with Gotthold Lessing, the doyen of German kultur. 
Observers of friendships such as this one would comment: 
what kind of a faith is it that will surrender itself in order to 
belong where patently they can never belong? 
                                                 
70 Aschheim, Steven (1982), Brothers and Strangers: The East European 
Jew and the German Jewish consciousness, 1800–1923, Madison, 
University of Wisconsin Press.  
71 Büttner, 457–58. 
72 Goldhagen, Daniel (1996), Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary 






Motives and causal connections in history are always 
retrospective and, inevitably, they are often reflective, if not 
speculative. But they do need serious consideration.  
First, while it is clear that there were fractures, fractions 
and frictions within all Christian churches—on doctrine, on 
Gleichshaltung or the ‘synchronisation’ ordered by Hitler, on 
euthanasia—was their general attitude to the Nazi state one of 
support or mere acquiescence? The question can be asked 
another way: was church silence, indifference or hostile 
indifference towards Jews a norm to which most people 
conformed? Christopher Browning, among a number of 
Holocaust scholars, has looked hard for the ‘transmission 
belts’ that drove the Nazis and their ‘sacred mission’. Fear, 
coercion, obedience and dehumanisation have been analysed 
in many texts (including this volume). Browning has found an 
answer, perhaps the answer, in his research on the 500 men in 
Reserve Police Battalion 101 from Hamburg and later 
transferred to the Lublin district of Poland.73 When their 
commandant, Major Wilhelm Trapp, offered them the chance 
of not participating in the rounding up and shooting of 
women and children from the town of Jozefow in July 1942, 
fewer  than 15 stepped forward and opted for ‘other duties’. 
These reservists were not Nazis and not specially trained; 
these family-men, the Ordinary Men of the book title, were 
unfit for military service, even for the real police. After initial 
despair, trauma and breakdown after the first day’s ‘work’, 
this group became the most proficient killers of Jews in 
Poland. What kept some 485 united initially, Browning 
concluded, was male conformity.  
Second, the answer may lie in tradition which, in a sense, 
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is really a chronicle of conformity to lore, customs, norms, 
values and beliefs. Churchmen of all denominations have 
grown up with an ingrained and indelible feature of Western 
intellectual history, namely, antisemitism, one facet of which 
is that the Jews are now Israel carnalis (in the flesh) and no 
longer Israel verus (the true religion). Sixteen centuries of this 
is, indeed, weighty tradition—and heavy conformity.  
Third, there is a realisation that in many circumstances the 
forces of nationalism and ethnic fire transcend religious 
adherence and religious duties of care. Many, if not most, 
German Catholics were clearly Germans first and foremost. 
Certainly the ‘brown priests’ of Germany were suffused by 
fatherland fervour. Father Dr Phillipp Haeuser was not alone 
in his pursuit of Nazi ideals and, as we have seen, the more 
elevated and reputable bishops saw the promises and 
premises of National Socialism as the greater attraction. Some 
of the ‘brown priests’, Spicer wrote, had less noble motives, 
such as disaffection with clergydom, conflict with their 
superiors, and plain, naked ambition. 
Fourth, could an explanation lie in the fact that these 
churchmen simply didn’t know any better, or any more than 
they cared to know? There is a crucial question here and in all 
discussions about the role of Christianity in times of gross 
human violence: what knowledge would it have taken to deflect 
them from their paths of support or acquiescence? Had they had 
the chance to look into a viewing instrument that showed 
them scenes from the Implementation of the Law for the 
Restoration of the Professional Public Service in 1933, from 
the Nuremberg Laws on Reich Citizenship in 1935, from 
‘Kristallnacht’ in 1938, the first mobile gas vans in operation at 
Chelmno in December 1941, or of the Einsatzgruppen at their 
‘work’ in 1941 and 1942, would those images have deflected 
them? Now we look at the body bags and human wreckage of 
Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan and ask ourselves how we 





‘Kristallnacht’ as the curtain-raiser, especially after Göring had 
said that he would not like to have been a Jew in Germany at 
that time? We, the populaces, were lied to, and continue to be 
lied to, about many things, but the real question is what the 
liars knew. Did they know enough to suggest that they 
shouldn’t go there? In a strange truth, Göring didn’t lie: in 
1936 he said that Germany would deal with the ‘Jewish 
Question’ so oder so, one way or another. These clergymen 
may not have known about the death camps until later in 
1943, but they knew enough—enough for us to sit at the 
thousands of conferences, seminars and university courses 
since those events and be incredulous that men could make 
the choices and decisions that they did make in the face of 
what they knew.  
A fifth explanation comes to mind: enough indifference, 
lack of feeling or passion, to demur, desist or oppose. Herein, 
perhaps, lies the vexed matter of worthiness, or the absence 
thereof. Jews, after all, not only killed Christ but they rejected 
his messianic descent and purpose, they desecrated the host, 
they allegedly killed Christian children to make matzot at 
Passover time, they were the peasant peoples’ worst 
nightmare, the pawnbrokers and the tax collectors, they 
caused and spread the Black Plague, they were the urban-
dwellers who seemingly turned their backs on völkisch blood 
and soil and forests, who modernised the world and who 
tried to make rational the celebrated cults of irrationalism, 
who foreswore the sacred pig so precious in German 
romanticism, und so weiter. Who, indeed, could feel for such 
people? The hostile part of it is so much clearer cut.  
Finally, the matter of want and not want. In political 
science, social science generally, in history and philosophy, 
we always look for explanations in ideology, in 
administrative and organisational behaviour, in social 
physics, in procedure and mechanics, in psychological states 
of mind, in individual or group behaviour and, all too often, 
in what we call ‘grand theory’. There are times when the 





believe that something so plain, so unadorned, can answer the 
big questions.  
Much has been written about the charade that was the 
Evian Conference in 1938, the meeting called to deal with the 
crisis of German Jewry. Of the nations present, 31 offered 
some or other technical explanation for not taking any 
emigrants.74 Australia’s delegate, Lieutenant-Colonel T W 
White, said ‘it will no doubt be appreciated also that as we 
have no real racial problems, we are not desirous of importing 
one…’75 Only one nation, the little Dominican Republic, said it 
wanted 100,000 Jews. Wanted is perhaps misleading: what 
General Rafael Trujillo wanted was salvation for his sullied 
reputation, but in the end he took 500. Not enough has been 
written about the attitudes of Churchill and Roosevelt 
towards Jews in crisis, about their not wanting to take in a 
clearly imperilled people. Reams have been written about the 
bombing of the railway lines to Auschwitz, about the British 
who said they couldn’t do it technically so it had to be the 
Americans and the Americans who couldn’t do it because of 
this, that and the other. Martin Gilbert has analysed the many 
rationalisations in his Auschwitz and the Allies and his 
documentary film of that title. In the end, the answer is 
simple: those at the helms of the Allies didn’t want to. More 
reams have been written about Pius XII and his inaction, or at 
least his overt inaction. Paul O’Shea has traversed all the 
arguments in his recent book on Eugenio Pacelli. Why was 
this shy and cloistered man, this complex and convoluted 
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man, in so many ways a good man, so voluble on the Church 
and so silent on the Jews? Why, when he had the chance and 
even when the Nazis were in some fear of what he would say 
in his Christmas 1942 broadcast, did he agree to mention 
atrocities in general but no atrocity against Jews and against 
Poles? The answers are complex at one level, to do with Pius’ 
saturation in the Catholic tradition of supercessionism, of the 
Jews as always ‘the lesser victims’, where, in historian Saul 
Friedländer’s language, ‘whatever the motivations of the 
passivity…it always resulted from a choice in which the Jew 
was always less than whatever other consideration he was 
weighed against’.76 At another level, the key level, the answer 
was simple—because he didn’t want to. He wanted to 
confront the satanic Communist menace and he did so with 
vigour; he didn’t want to confront the National Socialists, 
even though he saw them as thugs and so, quite simply, he 
didn’t.  
We need to pause for a good while to consider 
Friedländer’s diagnosis: apart from some 24,000 Righteous 
Among the Nations, and less than a handful of righteous 
nations, the Jews were always less than anything else they 
were weighed against, always less worthy. For a people always 
considered more than, more manipulative, more controlling, 
more intellectual, more lascivious, more baleful, more 
destructive, their modern history has been that of a minorité 
fatale, always less than.  
In conclusion, we need to spend more time—as scholars, 
as students, as people with religious beliefs or at least, with an 
interest in the role of religion—examining and debating 
omission rather than commission, not wanting, not doing. 
Jews particularly seek to detect and to combat overt 
antisemitism. They waste endless hours, efforts and nervous 
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energy running down offbeat talkback radio comments, 
ambiguous or unflattering crossword puzzle clues, perceived 
or real enough pro-Arab biases in the media. Anti-Defamation 
League commissions conduct surveys on overt antisemitism 
across the continents, on Palestine Authority school syllabus 
materials, and write texts on ways to counteract the Iranian 
threats to Israel and to Jews generally. They, and other such 
anti-racism bodies, spend almost no time on ‘omissionary’ 
antisemitism, the kind that makes Jews ‘lesser victims’ or 
unworthy victims—or the kind that doesn’t consider them at 
all.




Towards the end of his long pontificate, John Paul II gave 
several directives to the Archivists of the Archivo Secreto 
Vaticano (ASV)—the ‘Secret Archives’. The first instruction 
was to finalise the cataloguing of the German files from the 
papacy of Pius XI (1922–1939) and have them ready for public 
inspection by 2003. The second instruction was similar. Once 
the files for Germany 1922–1939 were completed, the files for 
Germany and the Holy See during the war years under Pius 
XII were to be prepared for eventual inspection. On 15 
February 2003 the ASV opened its doors to scholars who were 
then able to study the files from the period 1922–1939. At the 
beginning of 2012, it is still unclear as to when the war files 
will be ready, but Bishop Sergio Pagano, Prefect of the 
Archives since 1997, believes the files will not be available 
until at least 2014. He cites the sheer scale of documentation to 
be sorted and classified as the reason for the delay. Pagano 
was quick to add that there is no conspiracy involved—it is 
the simple fact that it takes a great deal of time for a staff of 
fewer than 30, of whom about 15 are trained archivists, to 
make their way through several million pages of 
documentation.1 Offers from various groups, such as the Anti-
Defamation League in New York, to underwrite the cost of 
hiring Vatican approved staff to help in the cataloguing 
process, have been politely and firmly declined. The Vatican 
also holds to the principle of releasing all the files for a papacy 
at one time. Since Pius XII was pope from 1939 to 1958, much 
of the material to be sorted is post-war and more than likely 
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outside the particular interest of Holocaust historians. 
If this were the only archival source that could help 
explore the history of the Holocaust and the role of the 
Catholic Church during those years, historians and students 
would have justifiable claim to be suspicious and possibly be 
excused for indulging in conspiracy theories. It is one of the 
simple facts that the layers of myth surrounding the ASV have 
obscured some important historical realities for many 
historians over the last half century. This essay explores one 
particular aspect of this problem. 
Archives and Archives 
It may seem trite to open with the assertion that many people, 
including more than a few scholars, are blithely unaware of 
the complexities surrounding the Vatican archives, but 
continued poor history-writing from several sources make it 
necessary. The most recent (in)famous use of the ASV was 
undertaken by John Cornwall during the research and writing 
of his 1999 book Hitler’s Pope. Cornwall claimed in his 
introduction that he had access to the ASV, and uncovered 
long-buried documents that caused him to rethink his 
previously positive assessment of Eugenio Pacelli. To the 
unobservant reader, this claim sounds impressive. But it is a 
matter of public record that at the time of his ‘discoveries’, he 
could only have had access to files up to 1922—long before 
Hitler came to the attention of the then Nuncio to Germany or 
to Pacelli’s masters in Rome. Careful wording lends 
Cornwall’s writing an air of professional historiography that 
is unjustified.2  
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At the same time, it is important to recognise the work of 
scholars who have made extensive use of the ASV material 
since these files were made available in 2003. Using the 1922–
1939 Germany files, books, articles and essays have been 
written that have helped shape and nuance our 
understanding of the Church’s varied positions, internal 
debates, announcements and discussions surrounding the 
waxing and waning of the Weimar Republic, the National 
Socialist ascendency and finally, the first six years of the Third 
Reich.3 The sheer volume of material is enough to ensure 
scholars will be analysing the Catholic Church and its 
responses and reactions to pre-war Nazi Germany for many 
years. Perhaps the most significant discovery has been the 
layers of complex and intricate details found in the files that 
show the Holy See slowly feeling its way, cautiously and with 
major reservations, trying to find a way to live and work with 
the new German government; the path was, as Cardinal 
Pacelli remarked in 1934, ‘crazy’.4  
The work undertaken by historians has been made easier 
through digital technology. In 2010, ASV joined with German 
scholars, Thomas Brechenmacher and Hubert Wolf, in 
projects to make available the files of the Munich–Berlin 
Nunciature 1917–1929, and the files of the Berlin Nunciature 
1933–1939. All the material is freely available with substantial 
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contextual historical details.5 ASV provides digital copies of 
files upon request, making research work for students outside 
Rome accessible and affordable.  
There are dozens of archival holdings in the Vatican State 
and around the city of Rome. The ASV is simply the most well 
known. Each of the nine Vatican departments, or to use the 
technical term, ‘congregations’, has its own archive. The 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF), or as it was 
better known before 1965, the Holy Office or Inquisition, 
housed in the Palazzo del Sant’Uffizio, has been gradually 
opening its archives for scholarly research since 1996. In 
January 1998, all material up to 1903, the death of Pope Leo 
XIII, the first pope to open the ASV to historians, was made 
readily available. Among the files were included the stories of 
some of the Vatican’s less flattering moments—such as the 
trial documents of Galileo and the documents surrounding 
the Edgardo Mortara affair of the 1850s.6 
To the unwary researcher and the equally unwary reader, 
the possibility of operating in ignorance of what is available 
remains a problem. Other archival sources that are related to 
the Vatican are found in places such as the Archivio di Stato di 
Roma on Corso del Rinascimento which holds records for the 
City of Rome from 1871, including the German occupation 
and the roundup of the Roman Jews in October 1943. It is one 
of the basic tools of the historians’ trade to know not only 
what questions to ask of the issue being investigated, but to 
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know where and how to find resources and to be imaginative 
in seeking them.  
For students of the Holocaust and the role the Catholic 
Church during the war years, there is an abundance of 
material readily available. Much of it has not been used well. 
One of the most important sources is the set of 11 volumes 
published by the Vatican.7 
Actes et Documents 
In the storm of anti-Pius criticism that arose after the 1963 
opening of Rolf Hochhuth’s play, The Deputy, Pope Paul VI 
took the extraordinary measure of commissioning four 
professional historians, all Jesuits, to sort and sift their way 
through the files of the Secretariat of State of Pius XII between 
1939 and 1945. Their brief was to collate a selection of 
documents representative of the whole collection that would 
give as detailed a picture as possible of the work of the Pope 
and his closest collaborators, One of whom was Paul VI 
himself. Throughout the war years he worked in the 
Secretariat alongside the Secretary of State, Cardinal Luigi 
Maglione. Giovanni Batista Montini, the future Pope Paul, 
was privy to much of the confidential material that made its 
way to and from the Pope’s desk. He was one of the last 
surviving eye-witnesses to the internal workings of the 
Vatican during the war years. 
The four Jesuit historians—Pierre Blet (1918–2009, France), 
Angelo Martini (1913–1981, Italy), Burkhart Schneider (1917–
1976, Germany), and Robert Graham (1912–1997, United 
States)—began their work in 1964 and published their 
findings as they completed each major historical and logical 
section. All were professional historians with significant 
published works in church history. It would be 
                                                 






unprofessional to assert that there was a conspiracy operating 
among the four men as they selected documents for 
publication to ‘whitewash’ Pius and his war record. A cursory 
glance at the range of documents makes it all but impossible 
to accuse them of anything other than compiling a 
comprehensive portrait of the Vatican leadership trying to 
cope with the often horrific news streaming in from across 
Europe. When one looks at the documentation describing the 
plight of European Jewry, the picture assumes an even more 
desperate and dreadful visage.  
Structure of ADSS 
The Vatican Secretariat of State was not the equivalent of a 
foreign affairs ministry, but more akin to a combination of 
foreign affairs, prime minister and papal secretary. The 
Secretariat sent and received letters, telegrams, telephone 
calls, press clippings, summary tables, detailed reports, 
confidential personal files and notes concerning the internal 
life of the Church—for example, in matters of Canon Law, 
selection of bishops, requests for faculties (authority for 
bishops and heads of religious orders for the good-ordering of 
their dioceses, monasteries, and so on), as well as the religious 
life of the Church in areas like Catholic Action, the operation 
of charitable works, the Catholic press, schools and hospitals. 
The documents in ADSS reflect this. 
1. The archives of the Secretary of State contain: 
(a) messages and speeches of the Pope; 
(b) letters exchanged between the Pope and religious and 
secular leaders; 
(c) notes of the Secretary of State, private notes and 
memoranda; 
(d) correspondence between the Secretary of State and 





(e) correspondence between the Secretary of State and 
ambassadors and ministers accredited to the Holy See. 
2. ADSS has published the selected texts in the following 
manner: 
(a) The official addresses, speeches etc of Pius XII have been 
published in the Acta Apostolicae Sedis (1939–1958) or in the 
collection of the Pope’s speeches published after his death.8 
What is contained in ADSS are extracts relevant to a particular 
issue. 
(b) ADSS has published some, but not many, of Pius’ letters to 
religious and secular leaders. 
(c) Memoranda of the Secretariat were composed after 
audiences with the Pope, meetings with ambassadors or a 
reflection on matters that may have required further action. 
These were written or typed by the Cardinal Secretary of State 
(up to 1944, Cardinal Luigi Maglione 1877–1944), Secretary of 
the Congregation of Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, 
Domenico Tardini, (1888–1961), the Substitute of the 
Secretariat of State, Giovanni Batista Montini (1897–1978). 
3. The correspondence exchanged with the Holy See and its 
representative contains: 
(a) original reports sent by nuncios et alii to the Secretariat; 
(b) telegrams sent from nuncios etc to Cardinal Secretary of 
State and others by the department of telegrams and ciphers; 
(c) drafts prepared for the nuncios; 
(d) drafts of telegrams to be encoded. 
ADSS has published the documents in chronological order, 
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which gives an accurate impression of the flow of information 
into and out of the Vatican. Each document is listed with its 
archive number and original form (handwritten or typed). 
Internal cross-referencing follows in the footnotes. The editors 
did not print documents available in other published 
collections but referred readers to the appropriate sources. 
The vast majority of the documents are short reports, some 
as brief as one line. There are occasional detailed reports, but 
these are the exception. During war time, letter writing was 
more and more a luxury that was not indulged. Increasingly, 
the Vatican relied on sharp and concise communication. 
Lengthy reports were still sent and provide valuable 
information, but the time it took to reach Rome increased as 
the war went on, and could take as long as months when sent 
from Eastern Europe. This needs to be kept in mind when 
looking at Holocaust chronology and attempting to explain 
why a response sometimes took so long.  
There are lacunae. Notable missing documents include 
most of the letters from Bishop Konrad Preysing of Berlin to 
Pius XII in 1943 and 1944, almost any reference to the ‘brown 
bishop’, Austrian Alois Hudal, the Riegner Report (which is 
mentioned but not published),9 the Auschwitz Protocols and 
virtually everything appertaining to Eastern Europe except 
for Poland and the Baltic States. Interestingly, there are few 
major details missing from reports concerning the killing of 
the Jews. It would appear that as news of the killing process 
became more widely known, and a sense of moral outrage on 
the part of some Vatican diplomats grew, especially those in 
Slovakia, Croatia and Hungary, the customary cautious 
language was replaced by something far blunter. It could also 
point to a sense of frustration at what could have been 
                                                 






perceived as the Vatican’s delay in responding. 
The 11 volumes were published between 1965 and 1981. 
They include over 5,000 documents in original languages, 
(mostly Italian, the working language of the Vatican), many 
with footnotes and references to other published sources. A 
sentence synopsis of the text in French heads every document. 
Each volume has an introductory essay, also written in 
French, giving the main themes of the particular focus for that 
collection of documents as well as placing the documents 
within the broader context of the war. At the end of the first 
volume there are comprehensive appendices of the nuncios, 
internuncios and apostolic delegates who acted as the 
diplomatic representatives of the Pope across the world, 
giving a wealth of information on who was where and when. 
There is a detailed appendix of the diplomatic corps 
accredited to the Holy See, including the changes in personnel 
caused by the unpredictable nature of the war. In effect, the 
reader is given a considerable amount of help from the editors 
in order to better understand the documents.  
Volumes 1, 4, 5, 7 and 11 contain documents about the 
Vatican and the prosecution of the war in Europe and later, 
the global conflict. Volumes 6, 8, 9 and 10 are devoted to the 
work of the Holy See and the victims of the war, including the 
Jews of Europe. Volume 2 contains a selection of the letters of 
Pius XII to the bishops of Germany. Some of the letters of the 
German bishops to Pius are found throughout the other 
volumes or in independent references. Volume 3 is divided 
into two parts that deal with the Vatican, Poland and the 
Baltic States—‘the East’. There is a detailed index (in French) 
at the end of each volume.  
Within each volume there is evidence of considerable 
effort made to ensure a high level of continuity between the 
documents. One example from Volume 1 demonstrates this. 
In the final days before the German invasion of Poland on 1 
September 1939, the Vatican was engaged in a major 





Poland to the negotiating table. Cardinal Luigi Maglione, the 
Secretary of State, was in regular telegraphic, telephone and 
cable communication with the nuncios in Nand Warsaw as 
well as the other capitals of Europe listening and suggesting 
strategies to avoid a war. Throughout the documents there is 
a high level of Realpolitik about Hitler, the value of his 
promises and claims, and the webs of alliances between 
different states.  
ADSS 1.153 
In document 153 of 30 August 1939, Cardinal Maglione, the 
Secretary of State, directed Archbishop Filippo Cortesi, the 
Nuncio to Poland, to present to the President of Poland a 
proposal suggesting Poland ‘return’ Danzig to Germany in 
order to bring Hitler back to the negotiating table. Cross-
referenced to this document are earlier documents that show 
the development of this instruction which, if left standing 
alone and without context, could lead to a highly negative 
assessment of the Holy See. The reader must also keep in 
mind that this ‘string’ of documents occurred during the last 
days of peace, when communication between Warsaw and 
Rome was free and unimpeded. 
Document 102—18 August, Cortesi to Maglione: Polish 
government does not know what the Holy See can do to 
further peace; German troops are concentrated on the 
Pomeranian–German border;  
Document 121—25 August, Cortesi to Maglione: the Polish 
government has given the secret order to mobilise all men up 
to 40 years of age in the border province next to East Prussia;  
Document 125—26 August, Archbishop Cesare Orsenigo, 
Nuncio to Germany to Maglione: Germany is prepared for 
war with Poland but would prefer negotiation to settle 
problems; but be warned German honour has been insulted 
and they are prepared to fight; 





let the Polish government know that if they made some 
concession to Germany on the question of Danzig war could 
be avoided; 
Document 135—27 August, Cortesi to Maglione: Polish 
government is afraid of any concessions to Germany; 
Document 136—27 August, Cortesi to Maglione: added from 
document 135 that Poland is concerned that any move to 
granting concessions would suggest that German accusations 
of persecution of the German minority in Poland were true 
and the government knows too well Hitler’s method of 
extending territorial claims through such accusations. 
The outcome of all this manoeuvering came to nought; but 
Maglione, Cortesi, Orsenigo, and ultimately, the Pope, 
believed they had to make every attempt to work for peace. 
Perhaps the saddest and most poignant document that 
follows this example is the belated acknowledgement and 
thanks for the Pope’s efforts given by the Polish government 
on 14 September, written three days before the Soviet Union 
invaded Poland from the east and two weeks before Warsaw 
finally capitulated.10 In some respects, this example is atypical 
of much of the material. Conditions during wartime made 
correspondence difficult. There were ‘grades’ of difficulty. 
Diplomatic notes, letters and telegrams usually ‘got through’ 
with a minimum of interference, regardless of Axis or Allied 
origins. The glaring exceptions were Poland, the Baltic States 
(apart from the first Soviet occupation in 1940) and German-
occupied Russia and Ukraine. Some letters from bishops in 
Lithuania and Ukraine could take several months to reach the 
Vatican; but Berlin Nuncio, Cesare Orsenigo, was still sending 
promptly delivered communiqués to Rome until late March 
1945. There is, quite simply, no universal logic as to why some 
parts of German occupied Poland had virtually unrestricted 
communication with Rome and others had very limited 
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By the time the last volume of ADSS was published in 1981, 
the amount of edited and published wartime material 
available was staggering. It began in 1946 when the 
International Military Tribunal published the records of the 
Nuremburg Trials, providing a major source of primary 
material on the prosecution of the war in Europe with a 
particular focus on war crimes, especially the genocide of the 
Jews. Documents on British foreign policy 1918–1945 were 
published between 1949 and 1983; those of the United States 
had been published since 1932; and in 1957 the US 
Department of State published, in English, documents on 
German foreign policy between 1918 and 1945. Between 1953 
and 2000, Italy published Volumes 6 through to 10 of 
Documenti Diplomatici Italiani which covered the Fascist era, 
the 1939–1943 war, and the German occupation and 
liberation. All of these collections contained significant 
references to the murder of the Jews of Europe at all stages of 
the genocide.  
The ASV has continued its own research. A major 
documentary collection was published in 2004. The two 
volumes of Inter Arma Caritas: L’Ufficio Informazioni Vaticano 
per I Priginionieri de Guerra istituito da Pio XII (1939–1947) is 
one of the most significant works published in the area of 
war-relief work for prisoners of war and, despite the title, 
other victims of war, including Jews.11 Over three million 
records are contained in the collection. It is an impressive 
work and one that demands attention. It was released in both 
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book and CD form. 
Since my focus here is on the documentary evidence found 
in ADSS, it is important to note some of the more important 
collections of Church archives from outside Rome. Chief 
among the published collections are works such as Dieter 
Albrecht’s edited collection of the formal notes exchanged 
between the Vatican and Reich government, published 
between 1965 and 1980, practically contemporary with 
ADSS.12 This work has been complemented and expanded 
through the research work of Thomas Brechenmacher at the 
University of Potsdam.13 Another companion collection which 
appeared between 1968 and 1985 was the work of Bernhard 
Stasiewski and the six volumes recording the formal 
proceedings of the German bishops under the Third Reich.14 
Of further contextual value are the growing number of 
published archival records of individual German bishops. The 
formidable 1975 Akten Kardinal Michael von Faulhaber 1917–
1945, edited by Ludwig Volk, is just one example.15 In 2002, 
the entire Faulhaber archive was opened to researchers 
through the Munich Archdiocesan Archives. Since Cardinal 
Faulhaber was one of Pius XII’s vital communication links to 
Germany during the war, the material in this particular 
archive is of particular importance. 
                                                 
12 Albrecht, Dieter (ed) (1965–1980), ‘Der Notenwechsel zwischen 
dem Heiligen Stuhl und der Deutschen Reichsregierung’, 3 vols, 
Matthias–Grünewald, Mainz.  
13 Brechenmacher, Thomas (2005), ‘Pope Pius XI, Eugenio Pacelli and 
the Persecution of the Jews in Nazi Germany, 1933–1939: New 
Sources from the Vatican Archives’ in Bulletin of the German Historical 
Institute London, 27.2, 17–44. 
14 Stasiewski, Bernhard (ed) (1968–1985), ‘Akten Deutscher Bischöfe 
über die Lage der Kirche 1933–1945’, 6 vols, Matthias–Grünewald–
Verlag, Mainz. 






A word of caution is necessary. Archives in many parts of 
Germany and Eastern Europe often did not survive the war or 
were very badly damaged. Nearly the entire archive of the 
Berlin Diocese and the Apostolic Nunciature was destroyed in 
air raids. This means that attempts to rebuild the activities of 
the diocese and the nunciature with regard to the ‘Jewish 
Question’ is made all the more difficult. What remains fills a 
few slender files.16 Maintenance of archives under 
Communism was not a high priority for the Church and while 
a lot of work has been done to centralise and record archival 
evidence, there is much that remains unexamined and much 
that is lost.  
It is collections such as these that provide material to 
complement and sometimes challenge ADSS. One of the 
criticisms levelled at ADSS is what is not found in its pages. 
By using other published collections to cross-reference what is 
not found in ADSS, a more complete record is established. 
ADSS Volume 2 contains Pius’ letters to the German bishops 
but it does not contain the letters they wrote to him. By using 
Stasiewski, the historian is able to reconstruct some of the 
correspondence. This is not the most satisfactory method, but 
until the remaining archives are opened in 2014, it may be the 
only method for the foreseeable future. Other sources are the 
hundreds of local diocesan and congregational archives that 
are often willing to allow researchers access to files. The work 
of Susan Zuccotti in Under His Very Windows is a case in point.  
Tracing the Holocaust 
In a collection as considerable as ADSS, the historian needs to 
look carefully for threads across the volumes. Simply looking 
for key words will not suffice. A general appreciation of the 
history of the war is essential in order to search effectively for 
                                                 





the less than obvious antisemitic references or details about 
the ‘non-Aryans’. The Vatican used the political language of 
the day, varying according to the government or diplomat it 
was dealing with. Circumspection when asking for details 
about concentration camp prisoners from the German Foreign 
Office was replaced with plain speaking when discussing the 
same matter with the personal representative of President 
Roosevelt. And while it is true that the Vatican was as well-
informed as either Roosevelt or Churchill, although in 
different ways and by different means, it is inaccurate to 
presume that the Pope’s bureaucracy was a model of 
perfection—it was not. Mistakes were made; prejudices were 
present and confusion in reports sometimes meant the picture 
was obscured. But our purpose here is to point out what is 
present in ADSS. Interpretation of the documents is not the 
primary intention, even though some comment may be made. 
What emerges very early in ADSS is the rapidly expanding 
scale of both the Vatican’s attempts to help victims of the war 
and the requests made of the Holy See by governments and 
aid agencies, including Jewish communal and international 
groups. A statistical survey of ADSS demonstrates something 
of the Vatican’s involvement in, and awareness of, the ‘Jewish 
Question’. At the very least, the numbers point to an active 
concern to receive and transmit information, request 
information of governments and aid agencies as well as the 
internal structures of the Church across Europe and even as 
far afield as Shanghai where a group of refugee Polish rabbis 
waited while Rome attempted to broker a way for them to 
leave China. 
Within Volumes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 11, the documents deal 
with ‘conventional’ war, the restrictions placed on the Church 
in different parts of German-occupied Europe and the 
constant discussions with bishops, nuncios, diplomats, heads 
of state and military leaders over issues that ranged from 
discussions over episcopal appointments to appeals to spare 
Rome from bombing. References to the Jews are more 





illustrates the pervasive nature of Nazi antisemitism. Within 
these volumes there are close to 100 individual documents 
that mention Jews, Jewish suffering, antisemitism and 
German anti-Jewish atrocities. The following table sets out 
this information. 
Table 1 
Vol Title Documents Specific 
mention of 
Jews 
1 War Mar 1939–Aug 1940 379 4 
2 Letters of Pius XII to 
German bishops 
124 4 
3.1 Poland and the Baltic 
Sates Feb 1939–Dec 1941 
344 10 
3.2 Poland and the Baltic 
States Jan 1942–May 
1946 
261 6 
4 War: Jun 1940 –Jun 1941 433 8 
5 War: Jul 1941–Oct 1942 511 11 
7 War: Nov 1942–Dec 1943 505 7 
11 War: Jan 1944–May 1945 552 6 
The remaining Volumes, 6, 8, 9 and 10 deal with the victims of 
war. Here the number of documents that deal directly with 
‘non-Aryans’ or ‘Jews’ and the events led up to and including 







Vol Title Documents Specific 
mention of 
Jews 
6 Mar 1939–Dec 1940 419 154 (36%) 
8 Jan 1941–Dec 1942 581 195 (33.5%) 
9 Jan 1943–Dec 1943 492 205 (41.6%) 
10 Jan 1944–Jul 1945 488 180 (36.8%) 
Of the 5,089 documents in ADSS, 734 (14.5 per cent) relate 
directly to the persecution and murder of the Jews.  
What were matters that concerned Jews in particular that 
filled the documents sent to Rome? In brief, the documents 
refer to almost every aspect of Jewish life under German 
occupation. A detailed analysis of ADSS is beyond my scope 
here, but a tabulated excursus into the material concerning 
Slovakia in 1942 when the machinery and apparatus of the 
‘Final Solution’ were in the process of refinement gives the 
reader a clear idea of what information Rome received and, 
more importantly, what were Rome’s responses. The 
chronology that follows is taken directly from ADSS and 
attempts to show, across the volumes, what was known and 
what was done. Where necessary I have included external 
references. 
ADSS and the persecution of the Jews of Slovakia in 1942 
The year 1942 was the turning point for the Jews of Europe. 
Since the outbreak of war in September 1939, the European 
Jews who found themselves under German domination joined 
the Jews of Germany and Austria as the primary victims of 
Nazi violence. Dispossessed, despoiled and deported, walled 
up in ghettos, stripped of all legal protection, persecuted at 
whim and exploited as expendable slave labour, the Jews 
lived in a terrifying and murderous isolation from the rest of 
humanity. No other victim group of the Nazis was as isolated 





ADSS demonstrate, the isolation was not unknown, nor was 
the implementation of the ‘Final Solution’. However, the 
Germans could not murder Europe’s Jews without 
considerable co-operation from non-German sources. 
Centuries of Christian Jew-hatred and its more virulent 
mutation, racial antisemitism, meant that the Berlin ‘desk 
killers’ did not have to look far to find willing accomplices. 
The government of Slovakia was not slow to mimic their 
German overlords. And the Vatican’s diplomats reported 
regularly, and with a high degree of accuracy, the gradual 
process of dispossession, deportation and disappearance of 
the Jews. 
Slovakia was different from every other country in Europe 
both before and during the war. Created from the 
dismembered Czechoslovak republic in 1939, the right-wing 
government was given permission by Hitler to declare itself 
independent—which it certainly was not as far as Germany 
was concerned. Its head of state was a Catholic priest, Josef 
Tiso, and its governing ideology was a mix of Catholic 
restorationism and nationalism mixed with an adapted 
German-style fascism, which included a vicious hatred of 
Jews. The Vatican looked askance at Tiso the priest in politics, 
not so much the politics itself.17 When the Slovakian 
parliament passed anti-Jewish laws in September 1941, the 
papal Chargé d’affaires, Monsignor Giuseppe Burzio, was 
instructed to protest.18 Maglione summoned the Slovakian 
minister in Rome, Karel Sidor, and expressed his anger at the 
                                                 
17 Cf ADSS 4.52, Burzio to Maglione, 21 September 1940, note 2. 
Tardini had been instructed on 12 November 1939 to write to 
Orsenigo in Berlin telling his to find a way to let Tiso know of the 
Vatican’s displeasure at his appointment as President.  





passing of the laws.19 The protest did nothing to stop 
preparations for deportations that were planned for March 
1942.  
On 26 March 1942, the first transport of 999 Slovakian 
Jewish girls and women left Bratislava for Auschwitz. Since 
the passing of the anti-Jewish laws six months earlier, Tiso’s 
government had progressively impoverished the Jews of 
Slovakia, stolen and ‘Aryanised’ their businesses, pushed 
them out of the professions and industry and effectively made 
them paupers. It made economic sense to deport them. Prime 
Minister Vojtekh Tuka offered the Germans 20,000 Jews for 
forced labour outside Slovakia. Adolf Eichmann accepted the 
offer. He needed more workers for the building projects at 
Birkenau and nearly all the Soviet prisoners who had slaved 
on the new camp had been worked to death. Tuka also 
offered to pay RM500 per Jew on condition that they never 
return to Slovakia and their property forfeited to the 
Slovakian state. Eichmann agreed. 
Between March and June 1942, 52,000 Jews were 
deported—most of them to Auschwitz–Birkenau. After June, 
the deportations slowed largely due to the interventions made 
through the Vatican’s representative in Bratislava, Monsignor 
Giuseppe Burzio, not the Slovakian bishops, many of whom 
remained, if not hostile to Jews, then indifferent to their fate. 
The Slovakian minister to the Holy See, Karel Sidor, was also 
under pressure from Cardinal Maglione who spoke in the 
Pope’s name. The Holy Father wanted the trains stopped. 
And stopped they were for several months before resuming at 
a slower rate in September.  
Once the Vatican view was known among the Slovak 
bishops, attitudes began to change slowly. A pastoral letter 
written in April spoke of the right of the Jews to humane 
treatment based on civil and natural law while at the same 
                                                 





time berating them for killing Christ. The German minister in 
Bratislava, Hans Ludin, complained to Berlin that 
deportations were slowing because of the interference of the 
Church which had granted, with government approval, 
exemptions for at least 20,000 baptised Jews, more exemptions 
approved by the government for at least another 15,000 Jews, 
and the corruption of individual officials. For tactical reasons, 
Himmler and Eichmann accepted the deadlock, but only as a 
temporary measure. The Jews of Slovakia were slated for 
death in the same way that every other Jew in Europe was 
doomed to be murdered. Transports resumed in the autumn 
of 1944 in the wake of the failed partisan uprising. 
The following table sets out in chronological order the 
documents found in ADSS that deal with Slovakia in 1942. It 
is important to keep in mind that the information contained in 
each document was as accurate a record as possible at the 
time and is, in itself, a valuable indicator of the different types 
of information available —some true and some not. 
Table 3 
ADSS Chronology of the Persecution of the Jews of 
Slovakia 1942 
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Holy Father doing 
all possible. 
KL Auschwitz 
Another example is to trace the growing awareness of 
Auschwitz in ADSS. The history of Auschwitz–Birkenau 
demonstrates the measure of success the Germans had in 
cloaking the real purpose of their premier permanent killing 
centre from both its intended victims—the Jews of Europe—
and those regarded in the Nazi Weltanschauung as racially 
equal or near enough to warrant the granting of the right to 
live. This did not include the racially undesirable such as 
Poles, Slavs or the Roma or Sinti peoples. While the number 
of direct references to Auschwitz/Oswiecim are relatively 
few, the details contained demonstrate a growing awareness 
of the scale of the killing process and the recognition by 1944 
that Jews were sent there to die. The greater number of 
references occurs during the deportation of the Hungarian 
Jews in 1944.  
The table sets out the information about Auschwitz as it 
was received and understood at the time. It is for the historian 
to contextualise the material into the broader narrative. 
Table 4:  
ADSS References to Auschwitz in ADSS 
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prisoners at KL 
Auschwitz. 
This selection of documents referring to Auschwitz is 
consistent with the emerging awareness of the extermination 
camp in other contemporary sources. Disbelief at reports of 
industrialised killing dominated Vatican and Allied responses 
until the spring of 1944 when the report of Auschwitz 
escapees, Rudolf Vrba and Alfred Wetzler, reached 
Switzerland. Its publication in London and New York led to a 
dramatic effort to pressure the Hungarian government to stop 
the trains to Auschwitz. The Vatican knew of the so-called 
‘Auschwitz Protocols’ through the Swiss Nuncio, Filippo 
Bernardini in July 1944, but did not receive the document 
until October 1944.  
Conclusion 
ADSS represents one of the richest and most valuable sources 
for historians studying the role and roles of the Catholic 
Church during the years of the Holocaust. It does not contain 
everything, but then neither does any archive have 
‘everything’. What the student can and will find in ADSS is a 
substantial selection of documents that gives a comprehensive 
picture of how the Vatican and its representatives across 
Europe, and in this particular case, Slovakia, learned, in 
piecemeal fashion, of the ever-increasing dangers faced by the 
Jews, the responses and actions taken to ameliorate conditions 
and attempt the nigh-impossible, namely, stop the trains. The 
case of Slovakia shows one set of circumstances where the 
representatives of the Holy See did what they could with the 
information that was reported to them even when the results 
were meagre. 
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[T]hese defendants now ask this Tribunal to say they are not 
guilty of planning, executing, or conspiring to commit this 
long list of crimes and wrongs. They stand before the record 
of this trial as blood-stained Gloucester stood by the body of 
his slain king. He begged the widow, as they beg of you: ‘Say 
I slew them not.’ And the Queen replied, ‘Then say they were 
not slain. But dead they are…’ If you were to say of these men 
that they are not guilty, it would be as true to say there has 
been no war, there are no slain, there has been no crime. —
Robert Jackson, US chief prosecutor, closing address to the 
International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 26 July, 1946 
It is the virtue of the Nuremberg trial that it was conceived in 
hatred of war, and was nurtured by those starved of peace. To 
realise how grateful we should be for this birth, consider the 
alternative. —Rebecca West 
The 1945–1946 trial of major German perpetrators before the 
International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg has often been 
called the greatest trial in history. More than the prominence 
the major protagonists, the principles at stake guaranteed its 
historical importance. For the very first time the entrenched 
principles of state sovereignty and raison d’état came under 
challenge. In Nuremberg, state functionaries faced 
prosecution stripped of the impunity that had hitherto 
attached to state crimes. And they were forced to answer for 
actions that had hitherto self-evidently constituted 
prerogatives of a sovereign state, above all starting wars and 
massacring their own subjects—actions now declared so 
felonious as to attract the ultimate penalty. Nor were the 
orders of state functionaries any longer able to shield 
perpetrators from criminal liability.  
In short, the Nuremberg enterprise sought to strengthen 





contribute to an international rule of law— to the extent that all 
individuals were answerable as moral and legal agents, no 
matter who they were, the circumstances under which they 
wronged others, or where they did so. In this new dispen-
sation, every serious, deliberate wrong must attract a public 
and palpable legal sanction, one imposed on the perpetrator 
under fair procedures, in order to inhibit like wrongs in the 
future and to develop a particular kind of society—civil 
society, or ‘civilisation’. The Anglo-American expression of 
this ideal hails back to the Magna Carta of 1215, conceived as 
a bulwark against tyranny, and includes early expressions 
(the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 and that 
country’s Bill of Rights of 1791 prominent among them) of 
what later came to be known as human rights.  
From its inception, the International Military Tribunal 
(hereafter ‘the tribunal’ or ‘the IMT’) had its detractors, and 
like most pioneering ventures, it had manifold shortcomings 
and rough edges for its critics to snipe at. Conservative 
lawyers have objected to the trial’s theory and practice, 
especially its readiness to try defeated enemies for uncodified 
crimes; while later historians have criticised the way in which 
the trial wrote the first draft of the history of the Third Reich, 
including the Holocaust. Yet the trial irrevocably changed the 
international moral and legal climate. Together with contem-
poraneous moves to establish universal human rights and 
outlaw genocide, it made the world less safe for perpetrators. 
And at the dawn of the present century it gained the sort of 
successor that leading Nuremberg prosecutors agitated for in 
their later careers—a permanent international criminal court. 
But also in the current century, the Nuremberg heritage 
has acquired a surprising, intimate opponent to add to the 
more predictable rogues’ gallery of perpetrators and 
perpetrator states that have always condemned and defied it. 
The new opponent is none other than the American govern-
ment, which back in 1945 took the leading role in establishing 
the tribunal, and in subsequent years took sole responsibility 





Nuremberg against separate categories of German 
perpetrators. The current American recalcitrance towards the 
international rule of law, especially international criminal law, 
poses a considerable threat to the historical authority of the 
Nuremberg trial, and of course, to the efficacy of its successor, 
the fledgling International Criminal Court (ICC).  
In these adverse circumstances we need to retrieve the 
original inspiration for the trial, what was thereafter achieved 
in Nuremberg, and the immediate circumstances and wider 
historical context in which the tribunal handled its remit.1 On 
this basis we can give its achievements and shortcomings 
their due proportion, as well as appreciate the tribunal’s place 
in a wider pattern of formative international initiatives in the 
crucial years immediately following World War II. Just how 
‘grateful’ should we be, in terms of Rebecca West’s epigraph,2 
and thus how resolute need we be in defending the 
Nuremberg legacy against its current opponents? This essay 
addresses these questions. 
New York lawyers plan a war-crimes trial 
Telford Taylor opens his magisterial account of the trial with 
the observation that a group of New York lawyers, all at the 
time US wartime federal officials, laid down the principal 
ideas and innovations that crystallised in the four-power 
                                                 
1 The following account sketches the direct antecedents of the IMT 
only. For a wider perspective on how the issue of war crimes 
developed during the second world war, see Kochavi, Arieh (1998), 
Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied war crimes policy and the question of 
punishment, Chapel Hill & London, University of North Carolina 
Press. 
2 The quote comes from her ‘Foreword’ to Neave, Airey (1978), 
Nuremberg: A personal record of the trial of major Nazi war criminals in 





Intergovernmental Agreement and Charter signed in London 
on 8 August 1945—the charter which came to constitute and 
govern the tribunal.3 They did so in the autumn and winter of 
1944–1945. The then US president, Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
(‘though we do not usually think of him as a lawyer’) heads 
his list of the lawyers in question, which naturally also 
includes the most passionate, eloquent and creative of the 
tribunal’s progenitors, Justice Robert Jackson of the Supreme 
Court, the immediate past US attorney-general. The others 
held posts in the departments of State, Treasury, and War; 
some also held senior ranks in the armed forces, including the 
Office of Strategic Services (OSS, forerunner of the CIA).4 
Henry Stimson—a distinguished member of the New York 
bar, prominent member of the Republican establishment, and 
US Secretary of State from 1929 to 1933—led the crucial 
campaign to prosecute war criminals before an international 
tribunal based on ‘at least the rudimentary aspects of the Bill 
of Rights, namely, notification to the accused of the charge, 
the right to be heard and, within limits, to call witnesses in his 
defense’.5 In the upshot, the trial would fulfil these criteria.  
                                                 
3 The group enjoyed the encouragement and assistance of the 
Institute of Jewish Affairs: see Marrus, Michael (2006), ‘A Jewish 
Lobby at Nuremberg: Jacob Robinson and the Institute for Jewish 
Affairs’, in The Nuremberg Trials: International criminal law since 1945, 
(eds) Reginbogin, Herbert and Safferling, Christoph, Munich, K G 
Saur. 
4 Taylor, Telford (1993), The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, London, 
Bloomsbury, 4. The OSS connection has often been underestimated. 
Its founder and director, General William (‘Wild Bill’) Donovan was 
one of the New York lawyers in question, and the trial would open 
with him acting as Jackson’s deputy. Those working for Donovan at 
the OSS included Franz Neumann, the author of the groundbreaking 
1942 study of the nature of the Nazi state, Behemoth, and Raphael 
Lemkin, who gave genocide its name and contributed greatly to the 
1948 UN Genocide Convention.  






With military victory in sight, these lawyers were 
grappling with how to give effect to the Allied foreign 
ministers’ Moscow declaration of November 1943. Most 
Allied decision-makers assumed that, as soon as practicable, 
national courts in Europe would punish war crimes 
committed within their jurisdictions according to the laws of 
the land. For that purpose, captured suspects were to be sent 
back to the scenes of their crimes for trial according to those 
laws. But what of the main criminals, those whose activities 
transcended national borders? According to the Moscow 
declaration, they would ‘be punished by a joint decision of the 
Governments of the Allies’.6 This declaration was one of a 
series of general threats issued by Allied leaders during the 
war to try to ameliorate the Third Reich’s already notorious, 
large-scale atrocities.7  
From the German military catastrophe at Stalingrad in the 
winter of 1942–1943, after which any informed German could 
infer that the war would end badly, such threats may have 
had some psychological impact. But they fell well short of a 
specific plan to punish the major war criminals. Among 
America’s allies, the punishment of war crimes hardly loomed 
large, with the only other serious suggestion for giving effect 
to the Moscow declaration being the ‘political’ rather than 
judicial one espoused by the British government: draw up a 
list of principal Nazi perpetrators to be shot on capture and 
positive identification. This proposal also enjoyed support in 
the USA from, among others, the influential Treasury 
                                                                                             
Hartley (1995), Life Sentence: The memoirs of Lord Shawcross, London, 
Constable, 88.  
6 Quoted in Taylor, 27. In what follows I draw on Taylor’s both 
insider and highly scholarly account of the background to the 
London charter (chapters 1–2), as well as on Shawcross, chapter 7. 





Secretary, Henry Morgenthau Jr. Only Stalin evinced any 
enthusiasm for a trial, and his conception thereof—based on 
his own infamous show trials at home, ones with only one 
possible outcome—fell well short of due process as defined by 
the US Bill of Rights.  
Henry Stimson and his New York lawyers eventually 
overwhelmed their opponents at home and abroad through 
their assiduous planning and bold conception of a pioneering 
jurisprudence around the issues the Third Reich so starkly 
posed: the waging of aggressive war as such, war crimes 
proper, and crimes against humanity (including attempts to 
wipe out whole peoples, not least the Jews of Europe). As 
Jackson would put it in his opening address to the tribunal, in 
his own inimitable ‘winged words’: 
The real complaining party at your bar is Civilization… [It] 
asks whether law is so laggard as to be utterly helpless to deal 
with crimes of this magnitude by criminals of this order of 
importance. It does not expect that you can make war 
impossible. It does expect that your juridical action will put 
the forms of international law, its precepts, its prohibitions 
and, most of all, its sanctions, on the side of peace, so that 
men and women of good will, in all countries, may have 
‘leave to live by no man’s leave, underneath the law.’8 
In particular, the architects of the coming trial had to over-
come ‘Civilization’s’ dispiriting experience during and after 
World War I—an experience which throws this new ambition 
to create an international rule of law into dramatic relief.  
Back then, the law was so ‘laggard’ that when the Allies in 
May 1915 issued a joint declaration condemning the Turkish 
authorities’ ongoing massacre (or ‘genocide’ in the later 
coinage) of the Armenians, they did so knowing that this 
atrocity broke no international law: under the ‘Westphalian’ 
                                                 
8 Quoted in Taylor, 171–72. Jackson himself is quoting from Rudyard 





principle of national sovereignty, a nation-state could 
persecute and massacre its own subjects at will, just as it 
could start and wage wars in pursuit of state policy. All the 
perpetrators of the Armenian genocide, bar one officer 
sentenced to death by a Turkish court-martial in 1919, were 
amnestied under the treaty of Lausanne of 1923. At the end of 
the war, Germany’s 12 war-crimes trials in Leipzig in 1921–
1922, held under the provisions of the treaty of Versailles, 
ended in fiasco. The New York lawyers were all too painfully 
aware, as well, that attempts to extend the rule of law to 
international affairs after the first world war, and to establish 
an international court with criminal jurisdiction, ‘foundered 
on the rocks of American opposition,’ as Taylor puts it—
above all America’s refusal to join the League of Nations and 
to encourage the institutional creativity it stood for.9 
The legal coterie around Stimson in 1944–1945 worked 
from first principles. It made interwar attempts to outlaw war 
as such the leitmotiv of the trial it sought.10 Fundamentally 
evil in itself, war was also understood as the fons et origo of all 
the other evils the trial would highlight; for this reason, 
aggressive war (or ‘crimes against peace’) became the 
centrepiece of the trial. War created the pretexts and 
opportunities—as well as the veil of secrecy—for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, which constituted the other two 
heads of German mass criminality.  
But the scale of the criminality on all three counts, and the 
problem of what or whom to put in the dock, of how to 
                                                 
9 Ibid, 16. 
10 Stimson himself had served as Secretary of State previously, in 
Herbert Hoover’s administration (1929–33), and keenly supported 
the Kellogg–Briand pact, whereby its principal signatories, and later 
44 other signatory states, renounced war as an instrument of national 





spread the net wide enough, called for considerable creativity. 
The Allies themselves would inevitably dissolve the two main 
institutional perpetrators—the Third Reich and the Nazi 
Party—as they formally did on 8 May 1945 under the terms of 
the German surrender; the Allies would then exercise their 
own sovereignty over Germany, and no German state would 
remain to prosecute. Ultimately individuals had to be brought 
to book, potentially in large numbers.  
Colonel Murray Bernays of the Army General Staff came 
up with a compelling suggestion: charge the leading Nazis 
with the old common-law offence of conspiracy to commit 
felony, namely, that of unleashing aggressive war; and 
empower the intended tribunal to declare the principal 
perpetrator organisations to be criminal organisations, thus 
making all their members prima facie guilty of indictable 
offences for the purposes of subsequent prosecutions of 
lower-ranking perpetrators. Importantly, this step would 
bring domestic atrocities committed by members of these 
organisations against their own compatriots within the 
purview of international criminal law. At the same time, 
Colonel William Chanler—Stimson’s partner in a New York 
law firm, but now deputy director of US military government 
in Europe—assembled the argument close to Stimson’s heart: 
international initiatives during the interwar period, , the 1928 
Kellogg–Briand pact, had criminalised the waging of 
aggressive war, which thus now constituted ‘crimes against 
the peace’ in international law.  
These suggestions, which came to be called ‘the 
Nuremberg ideas’, won Roosevelt’s favour. After his death in 
April 1945, his successor, Harry Truman, continued to 
support Jackson’s project along these lines, albeit without 
FDR’s enthusiasm and specialist competence. In the last 
dramatic week of the war in Europe, the drama was by no 
means limited to that theatre of war. On 2 May 1945, Truman 
appointed Jackson ‘representative of the United States and 
chief of counsel’ for the purposes of bringing a war-crimes 





support for the ‘political solution’ to the war-crimes problem, 
partly because Hitler, Himmler and Goebbels among others 
had already killed themselves, and were thus no longer 
available for demonstrative execution. This decision left the 
way open for an in-principle agreement, made that same day 
at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Big Three, to hold 
an international trial as the Americans and Soviets had 
wanted. The foreign ministers were meeting in San Francisco, 
where the inaugural congress of the United Nations was in 
progress. As Jackson’s son William, who would also join the 
US prosecution team in Nuremberg, later remarked on this 
historical coincidence: 
It is perhaps not commonly apprehended that the principles 
of Nuremberg…go hand in hand with the organization of the 
United Nations as the twin foundation of an international 
society ordered by law.11 
‘The Nuremberg ideas’ were ideas whose time had come.  
The devil and the detail 
Before they saw the light of day in court these ideas had to be 
tested and honed in difficult negotiations on just how such a 
trial would proceed, and the procedural principles it would 
apply. Representatives of the four intended prosecuting and 
judging nations (the French had now agreed to join the 
venture) met in London 15 times between 26 June and 8 
August 1945. This ‘conference’ saw a clash of three quite 
different conceptions of law and trial procedure.  
The Americans (headed by Jackson) and the British (led by 
the attorney-general, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe)12 shared the 
common-law tradition in which judge-made law played an 
                                                 
11 Quoted in Taylor, 42. 





obvious part in proliferating and adapting a legal system, and 
the adversarial trial process—including rigorous cross-
examination—constituted the royal road to just (and thereby 
unpredictable) trial outcomes. For these two delegations, the 
trial was intended precisely to set a precedent that would 
extend international law. But this approach was foreign to 
continental traditions, in which law had purely legislative 
sources, including explicit codes, and trials proceeded along 
inquisitorial rather than adversarial lines. Heated arguments 
thus broke out over the proposed counts of conspiracy and 
crimes against peace in particular, as no existing continental 
code supported them. As well, the Soviet negotiators could 
not contemplate the possibility of acquittals, and had no taste 
for criminalising aggressive wars as such, only ‘Hitlerite’ 
ones.  
Jackson’s talents did not extend to diplomacy, and 
Maxwell Fyfe’s own diplomatic skills were sorely tried as he 
chaired the meetings and mediated between Jackson on the 
one hand, and the French and Soviet representatives on the 
other. Jackson was determined to defend the whole package 
of ideas he had arrived with, and made no bones of his 
government’s intention to mount the trial alone if the other 
powers did not accept it. He regarded Soviet participation as 
unhelpful in any event. The USSR had without provocation 
invaded both Poland and Finland in late 1939, and—
according to contemporary Western intelligence, since 
confirmed— was responsible for the Katyn Forest massacre of 
between eight and eleven thousand Polish officers found 
buried there. And yet its representatives were deter-mined to 
join in the prosecution of ‘Hitlerite’ aggressive war, and to 
sheet home the Katyn massacre to the German defendants. 
The chief Soviet delegate, General I T Nikitchenko (an army 
judge advocate who would become the senior Soviet judge at 
the trial) clearly had his orders from home, but faced an 
uncompromising American negotiator who would have 






Before and during these difficult negotiations in London, 
Jackson manifested a moral and political passion that would 
infect his British counterpart and affect the way both would 
discharge their functions at the trial itself. For his part, 
Jackson had on 7 June 1945, at the president’s behest, 
published a report which clearly stated his position. It alluded 
to the fact that US authorities held the most significant war 
criminals in custody, which made it the country’s ‘inescapable 
responsibility’ to deal with them in the most high-minded 
way possible.  
To free them without trial would mock the dead and make 
cynics of the living. On the other hand we could execute and 
otherwise punish them without a hearing. But undis-
criminating executions or punishments without definite 
findings of guilt, fairly arrived at, would violate pledges 
repeatedly given, and would not sit easily on the American 
conscience or be remembered by our children with pride. The 
only other course is to determine the innocence or guilt of the 
accused after a hearing as dispassionate as the times and 
horrors we deal with will permit, and upon a record that will 
leave our reasons and motives clear.  
Jackson’s concern for ‘the record’ was crucial: he already 
feared a future denialism, which only ‘a well documented 
history’ could thwart. In Nuremberg, he would make Nazi 
documents, photographs and film footage the core of the 
American case. 
Unless we write the record of this [Nazi] movement with 
clarity and precision, we cannot blame the future if in days of 
peace it finds incredible the accusatory generalities uttered 
during the war. We must establish incredible events by 
credible evidence.13  
Maxwell Fyfe, who would for practical purposes lead the 
                                                 





British prosecution team in Nuremberg, shared the same 
concern, and to a large extent the same approach. As he wrote 
in his memoirs: 
[E]very devil has his advocate. We have seen apologists for 
everything. It is, therefore, just as well that in respect of Nazi 
war crimes the apologist of the future will be confronted by 
the admissions of the many accused found guilty, and the 
mass of incriminating documents produced at the trials, 
whose authenticity has been established by the very men who 
wrote them. Both devil and advocate are faced by an 
unscaleable barrier of truth.14 
The coming trial would precipitate a scramble for 
documentary evidence of unprecedented proportions, and the 
German authorities’ obsessive documentation would 
guarantee its success. 
Gradually the logic of the uneven negotiating positions in 
London asserted itself. The French had no concrete counter-
proposals, and indeed would maintain a low profile through-
out the trial. The Soviets had no reasonable counter-pro-
posals, and were easily isolated. On 26 July the results of the 
British elections of 5 July were announced: Labour had won a 
crushing victory, and was even more enthusiastic about the 
American approach to the war-crimes problem than their 
outgoing Tory counterparts. Sir Hartley Shawcross, the new 
Labour attorney-general, replaced Maxwell Fyfe as the 
London Agreement and Charter approached fruition, though 
the former, now destined to become the British chief prose-
cutor at the trial, quickly appointed the latter as his deputy.  
On 8 August the agreement was signed. The charter it 
endorsed embodied all the New York lawyers’ principles; as 
well, it proved itself in the main to be a coherent and 
workable constitution for the tribunal and guide to its 
                                                 
14 Kilmuir, Lord (1964), Political Adventure: The memoirs of the Earl of 





procedure.15 Its coherence rested on its special indebtedness to 
Anglo-American conceptions of law and judicial procedure. 
At the same time, it contained all the features which, then as 
now, stirred legal controversy, not least among legal 
conservatives: the element of retrospectivity in the counts 
dealing with conspiracy and crimes against peace (article 6), 
the withdrawal of individual impunity for state crimes and 
for following orders (articles 7 and 8), and the suggestion of 
‘guilt by association’ in the provision for indicting 
organisations which, if held criminal, would lay the basis for 
prosecutions of individuals on the basis of membership alone 
(articles 9 and 10).16 As against these claims, as Shawcross 
would later stress in his closing address to the tribunal, the 
charter’s only innovation was ‘to provide the long-overdue 
machinery to enforce already-existing law’.17 
                                                 
15 Taylor, 75. His one substantive criticism concerns the charter’s 
failure to specify grounds of defence available to defendants in 
subsequent trials who are charged with membership of organisations 
declared criminal by the IMT: loc cit. 
16 Bradley Smith presents one of the most influential legal critiques of 
the trial in his Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg, New York, Basic 
Books, 1977. He also argues that the Anglo-American carpet-
bombing of German towns and cities (including Nuremberg itself) 
robbed the Allies of the moral authority to try German war criminals 
at all. While the bombing is today widely recognised as a war crime, 
it was not seen in this light around the end of the war. And since 
misguided military doctrines partly motivated it, and it involved 
heavy Allied casualties, it hardly compares with most of the crimes 
with which the Nuremberg defendants were charged. Its death toll 
of 600,000 civilians is appalling, yet amounts to a tenth of the 
Holocaust’s, to say nothing of Nazi Germany’s other prisoner of war 
and civilian massacres. 
17 Shawcross, 119. The term ‘holocaust’ was first used to describe the 
1896 massacre of Armenians under Sultan Hamid II; it was not a 





As we have seen, the New York lawyers had already 
anticipated and argued most of these points at length, but 
perhaps the former’s ultimate vindication lies in Rebecca 
West’s challenge, quoted at the beginning of this essay: 
consider the alternative. Undoubtedly that alternative, bar a few 
summary executions, would have closely resembled the 
dispiriting outcomes of attempts to bring war criminals to 
book after the first world war, and the law would have 
remained ‘laggard’ in the face of incomparably larger crimes. 
To read the charter now, together with the 18,000-word 
indictment based on it (signed on 18 October and served on 
the defendants the next day), we might be surprised to find so 
little made of the Jewish genocide. Its extent was known to the 
Nuremberg prosecutors, who led the appropriate 
incontrovertible evidence during the trial. But in fact Raphael 
Lemkin had only coined the term ‘genocide’ the year before it 
began;18 his influence as a member of the US prosecution team 
led to the term finding its first official use in the Nuremberg 
indictment. Genocide became a distinct crime in international 
law only with the widespread ratification of the 1948 UN 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide. And the concept and term ‘the Holocaust’ for a 
distinct catastrophe only became international common coin 
in the 1970s and 1980s.19 The charter was signed just two 
months after the war in Europe ended; it reflected the then 
current perception that the persecution and slaughter of 
European Jewry merged into a pattern of breathtaking 
criminality which also included widespread massacres of 
millions of prisoners of war and non-Jewish civilians, 
including the Romani and other ethnic groups, throughout 
German-occupied Europe.  
                                                 
18 See Lemkin, Raphael (1944), Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, 
Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
19 Novick, Peter (2000), The Holocaust and Collective Memory: The 





Compared to the charter, the indictment based on it was 
marred by haste and the inordinate number of lawyers 
engaged in its drafting. Its worst blemish consisted in 
extending the conspiracy count to all the other counts, such 
that some defendants were charged with devising a ‘common 
plan’ to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity as 
well, not crimes against the peace only as the charter 
envisaged. As well, the Soviets insisted on including the 
Katyn Forest massacre in the indictment. (In the end, they 
adduced no evidence for this charge, and the judges passed 
over it in silence.) But beyond that, even the indictment was a 
serviceable document which centred on four enumerated 
counts: conspiracy (‘the common plan’), crimes against peace, 
war crimes proper, and crimes against humanity. 
Selection of the defendants provided the least propitious 
feature of the trial preparation. Through bungling and 
miscommunication, Gustav Krupp, the aged and senile 
patriarch of the Krupp empire—foremost exploiter of the 
Reich’s 4,795,000 foreign slave workers who had toiled and 
perished in large numbers in its war industries—was indicted 
instead of his son Alfried, who in fact owned and controlled 
the conglomerate during the war.20 The tribunal would 
quickly rule the former too incapacitated to proceed against, 
and block his replacement with Alfried on procedural 
                                                 
20 Major Airey Neave — a young English war hero and barrister — 
led the initial investigation of the Krupp concern in mid-1945 on 
behalf of the British War Crimes Commission. His account of it in 
Nuremberg: A personal record of the trial of major Nazi war criminals in 
1945–6, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1978, makes salutary reading 
about the Krupp atrocities (including its exploitation of Auschwitz 
inmates) and the management’s compact moral indifference towards 
them that he encountered after the war. He later played an important 






grounds. Thus no representative of German war industry 
came to sit in the dock during the trial—its greatest 
shortcoming. 
Another mistake was indicting the radio journalist Hans 
Fritzsche, of the propaganda ministry, as a surrogate for the 
dead Joseph Goebbels, Nazi Germany’s propaganda minister. 
The Western Allies held Otto Dietrich, Goebbels’s immediate 
subordinate, but the Soviets insisted on charging the 
comparatively lowly Fritzsche as a matter of national pride: 
they had only one other major war criminal to contribute to 
the collection in the Nuremberg dock, Admiral Erich Raeder.21 
Yet another mistake was to proceed with an indictment in 
absentia against Martin Bormann, Hitler’s official secretary 
and manager of Party affairs who vanished when Berlin fell 
on 2 May 1945, and probably died that day in the fighting 
while escaping Hitler’s bunker.  
Nonetheless, when the trial began on 20 November 1945, 
21 defendants sat in the dock. They represented the Reich’s 
political, military and organisational elite, its governors of 
conquered territories, and its propagandists. Notionally the 
SS, SA, Gestapo, Reich cabinet, and military general staff and 
high command also sat in the dock, indicted as criminal 
organisations. In front of the dock sat legal representatives for 
each individual and organisational defendant.  
Isolation, discomfort and friction in Nuremberg 
I have emphasised above the extraordinary vision and 
determination that American policy-makers around Henry 
Stimson, the Secretary of War, brought to the formulation of 
US policy on war crimes 1944–1945, to the London 
negotiations, and to the drafting of the charter that emerged 
from them. With Jackson leading the 1,200-strong US 
prosecution team (and the authority figure for the wider 
                                                 





American contingent of around 1,700) in Nuremberg, that 
determination was, if anything, redoubled, as the world was 
now watching. If the trial was to set an invaluable precedent 
in international criminal law, it could not proceed in 
obscurity; it needed to present a salutary spectacle reported 
by hundreds of radio and newsprint correspondents, expert 
commentators, and a considerable number of dignitaries from 
around the world. The British and American prosecutors in 
particular were conscious of the performative dimension of 
the trial—they were playing to the galleries of their home 
publics, and after that, of international public opinion. Legal 
criteria would soon clash with dramatic desiderata, as we will 
see.  
American negotiators had to fight hard to gain agreement 
for the choice of Nuremberg, in the American zone of 
occupation, as the seat of judgment. The natural choice, as the 
Soviets insisted, was the German capital, Berlin, in their own 
zone. As a face-saving compromise, Berlin became the 
‘headquarters’ of the IMT, under the wing of the Allied 
Control Council there. The preliminary sessions of the IMT 
were thus held in Berlin from 9 October 1945, ending nine 
days later with the approval and signing of the prolix 
indictment, after which the actual trial was adjourned to 
Nuremberg. Here the occupying US Third Army could protect 
and resource it as trial participants in their hundreds began to 
arrive from the four host powers and from other parts of 
Germany, and correspondents flocked in from all corners of 
the developed world. For this purpose, the army set up a 
special administrative zone, the Nuremberg–Fürth enclave. 
Once there, the prosecutors, judges and their staffs found 
themselves virtually isolated. There was little land transport 
in or out of Nuremberg, as the ravages of war had destroyed 
infrastructure, and the various occupation zones across 
Germany set up a maze of travel and currency restrictions. 





pilots had already been demobilised. In any event, Allied 
governments were preoccupied with the more immediate 
issues of postwar reconstruction and had no interest in trying 
to influence the trial’s course from afar. The Western 
governments in particular made no attempt to influence the 
proceedings or their outcome.22  
These circumstances meant that the fate of the whole 
Nuremberg project now very much lay in the hands of the 
people on the ground. If their skill or dedication faltered, the 
trial could descend into chaos or farce, and a vital opportunity 
for the development of international law and human rights 
would be lost.  
The physicality of Nuremberg intimately impinged on the 
trial participants as they struggled to remain focused, faced 
their dilemmas and shouldered their responsibilities.23 Ninety 
per cent of the old town lay in ruins after 11 Allied heavy 
bombing raids on this city of elegant Romanesque and High-
Gothic buildings, and toy and gingerbread factories. For 500 
years it had served as the effective seat of government for the 
mediaeval ‘first reich’, the Holy Roman Empire, so Hitler 
chose it as the symbolic heart of his own ‘thousand-year’ 
Third Reich. The city’s name attached to the notorious Nazi 
race laws that Hermann Göring as president of the Reichstag 
proclaimed there in 1935. Up to 1938 annual Party rallies and 
mock battles were staged on the Zeppelin Field on the city’s 
outskirts; grandiose monumental masonry, some of it bearing 
the fingerprints of the architect and trial defendant Albert 
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Speer, still stood there to bear witness to the short-lived Nazi 
power and glory. Allied airforce and army commanders seem 
to have recognised Nuremberg’s symbolic status, which 
warranted their own special attention. The US Seventh Army 
overwhelmed the ferocious resistance of two Waffen-SS 
divisions to seize the city on Hitler’s 56th birthday, 20 April 
1945, ten days before he shot himself. Now the city had been 
chosen to host a new drama, the day of reckoning. 
Nazi Germany had not committed resources to recovering 
the dead from bombsites or to providing prosthetic limbs for 
its own war amputees. The new arrivals in Nuremberg were 
assaulted not only by startling images of mass destruction, 
but by the stench of around 6,000 corpses rotting under the 
rubble, rat plagues and the sight of the limbless crawling over 
the rubblescape, often living in cellars and bomb shelters 
beneath it. For want of any other burial place, relatives of the 
dead placed paper lanterns and candles in the rubble of last 
known addresses on the anniversary days of the dead 
beneath.24 Jackson would note in his opening address at the 
trial, as he warmed to his central theme: 
It is not necessary among the ruins of this ancient and 
beautiful city with untold numbers of its civilian inhabitants 
buried in its rubble, to argue the proposition that to start or 
wage an aggressive war has the moral qualities of the worst 
of crimes.25 
For the thousands of new arrivals whose business was the 
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trial and who passed through this devastation each day, the 
city itself bore mute testimony to the trial’s own iron 
necessity. 
Though most of the trial participants lived better than the 
local population, their everyday lives were spartan, even by 
immediate postwar European standards. There was nothing 
to buy and nowhere to buy it except flea markets and outlets 
for rationed food, although American troops also had access 
to their ubiquitous do-gooder PX stores. The makeshift 
cafeteria in the Palace of Justice (Justizgebäude) served basic 
army food to 1,500 people each sitting day at lunchtime, 
though the high-ranking could do a little better at the Grand 
Hotel, which the occupiers had hastily refurbished as the 
social centre for the trial. The trial itself ran from 20 
November 1945 to 1 October 1946 to a back-breaking 
schedule, sitting with only short breaks from 10 am to 5 pm 
on weekdays, and some Saturday mornings. In all, it held 216 
sitting days.  
Social and cultural life was minimal for lack of time, 
resources and camaraderie between the national delegations. 
The only exceptions were a high level of working co-
operation and after-hours socialising between the American 
and British delegations, and the French started a much 
appreciated nightclub in the outer suburb of Zirndorf where 
they, along with the British, occupied requisitioned villas. The 
35 German defence lawyers, of whom 14 admitted to being 
Nazi Party members, found their way onto nobody’s 
invitation list. The self-isolating Soviet delegation did not do 
much better.  
Under all these circumstances, the trial hardly unfolded as 
the smooth, natural and rational process that today’s peace 
studies and human rights idealists might see in the rear-vision 
mirror. It lived and breathed makeshift and conflict. 
Prosecutors and judges all came from diverse traditions and 
backgrounds, and engaged in rivalry and hostility while 





coloured the internal workings of the huge American 
prosecution team under Jackson’s irascible and highly 
dysfunctional management.26 And between prosecution and 
defence lawyers reigned mutual incomprehension. Especially 
in the latter stages of the trial, the defendants themselves 
jostled each other in shifting struggles for influence and 
authority, as well as engaging in mutual blame-shifting as 
they presented their individual defences. 
But makeshift and conflict did not weaken the trial—they 
were its condition of existence, its lifeblood. Anna Tsing 
argues that it is precisely friction—‘the awkward, unequal, 
unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection across 
difference’—that brings to life real-world global encounters. 
Friction provides the ‘traction’ or ‘grip’ that move 
international projects forward, while at the same time 
challenging the dubious universalisms that (in her idiom) give 
rise to dreams of the seamless evolution of a benign 
international order. 27 It is perhaps this sort of imaginary 
orderly development that the legal critics of the Nuremberg 
trial have always hankered after. Jackson anticipated them in 
his opening address: 
This Tribunal, while it is novel and experimental, is not the 
product of abstract speculations nor is it created to vindicate 
legalistic theories. This inquest represents the practical effort 
of four of the most mighty of nations, with the support of 
seven-teen more, to utilise international law to meet the 
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greatest menace of our times—aggressive war.28 
The trial 
As indicated, the scale of the Nuremberg trial beggars 
comparison. Though the prosecution case was overwhelm-
ingly documentary (including photographic and 
cinematographic material), it still called 33 witnesses, while 
the defence summoned 61. The tribunal generated its own 
documents, especially as it needed multiple copies of all 
written material in each of four languages. The English 
version of the daily transcripts alone fills 17,000 pages. In all, 
the trial produced 50 million pages of typing and 4,000 
recorded discs.29 A new professional corps, simultaneous 
interpreters, made its debut and constituted the nervous 
system of this multilingual institution.  
The bench consisted of two judges from each of the four 
powers—a voting judge, and an alternate who sat through the 
proceedings in case his senior became indisposed. The judges 
were of varying experience and ability, and the alternates 
tended to be the better lawyers, or to have more judicial 
experience, than their seniors. Sir Geoffrey Lawrence, a lord 
justice of the British Court of Appeal, presided, and thus ran 
the court during sittings. Though perhaps ‘much better 
known as a country squire with a good stable than as a great 
lawyer’, in Shawcross’s words,30 Lawrence made an 
invaluable contribution through his unfailing courtesy and 
firmness. He became a popular figure among the defendants, 
in whose favour his procedural rulings tended to err. They 
were not to know that, in the common-law tradition, this is 
usually a bad sign that the judge senses which is the weaker 
party and redoubles his or her efforts to be make the probable 
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outcome appear fair. 
The prosecution bore the burden of proof the whole way. 
Under the agreed division of labour between the prosecution 
teams, the Americans were responsible for proving the first 
count of the indictment (conspiracy); the British count two 
(crimes against peace); and the French and Soviets shared 
counts three and four (war crimes and crimes against 
humanity), with the French responsible for proving crimes 
committed in Western Europe and the Soviets for those 
committed in the east. The Americans’ task here was easily 
the most demanding, in terms of both legal theory and 
evidence. 
Not surprisingly, the proceedings were dominated, at least 
until the defence case began, by the huge American 
prosecution team. It would send no less than 23 of its number 
to the lectern to handle various aspects of their case; all of 
them, including their leader, tended to be indifferent or 
inexperienced trial advocates, though Jackson’s legal vision, 
passion and oratory soared above the rest of the legal 
fraternity assembled there. The British team, though only 163 
strong and thus a seventh the size of its American 
counterpart, deployed complementary skills. Apart from the 
usually absent Shawcross (who delivered only the opening 
and closing addresses on his team’s behalf), the British sent 
just six seasoned barristers to the lectern throughout the trial. 
They were led by the veteran criminal advocate Sir David 
Maxwell Fyfe, who also shone as an administrator behind the 
scenes. As the tribunal applied Anglo–American court 
procedure, both these teams found themselves on home 
ground. The French and Soviet teams were smaller still than 
the British, and disadvantaged by the unfamiliar procedure.  
A detailed account of the proceedings falls outside the 
limits of this essay and so some highlights must suffice. After 
the tedious reading of the indictment ‘onto the record’ on the 





address he later described as ‘the most important talk of my 
life’;31 his was far from the only superlative it would attract. 
He began right ‘on message’: 
The privilege of opening this first trial in history for crimes 
against the peace of the world imposes grave responsibility. 
The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been 
so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, that 
civilisation cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it 
cannot survive their being repeated. That four great nations, 
flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the hand of 
vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to 
the judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes 
that Power has ever paid to reason.32  
The speech spellbound the bench, the lawyers and the 
gallery. Telford Taylor, normally quick to criticise his 
colleagues (Jackson included), felt that ‘nothing said at 
Nuremberg thereafter matched its force, perception and 
eloquence. Indeed, I know of nothing else in modern juristic 
literature that equally projects the controlled passion and 
moral intensity of many passages.’33 Jackson’s opening 
address thus amply fulfilled both the legal and the theatrical 
demands on the trial. 
These contrasting demands soon collided as the American 
prosecutors began to lead their evidence. Proceedings quickly 
bogged down in the mass of captured German documents 
tendered, and serious logistical problems arose in making 
them available in multiple copies to all parties in the four 
languages that the tribunal used. The press and public seating 
emptied, and the bench became irate as ‘reading documents 
onto the record’ took up day after day. In normal pro-
ceedings, this tendering of hard documentary evidence would 
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have constituted best practice, but in Nuremberg it threatened 
to defeat a major purpose of the trial.  
Gradually the tribunal developed ways to handle 
documents more expeditiously, and the American team 
became more selective in the documents it tendered. It also 
began to introduce other forms of evidence. These included 
the gruesome films taken by the British when they liberated 
the Bergen–Belsen concentration camp, and by the Americans 
when they overran Buchenwald and Dachau. To the outrage 
of those in the dock, the American prosecutors also called 
high-ranking German officers who testified to the military 
defendants’ complicity in Hitler’s war planning and in 
atrocities against civilians. 
The British prosecutors had the advantages of a more 
circumscribed task in establishing crimes against peace, and 
of a very tight organisation; they called no witnesses and 
accomplished their task in four days. To the surprise of most, 
the senior French prosecutor, François de Menthon, delivered 
a brilliant, impassioned opening address on 17 January 1946, 
one that deeply impressed his audience, even the defence 
lawyers. But reading it 40 years later, Taylor notes ‘a jarring 
omission of reference to Jews and the Holocaust’, despite de 
Menthon’s identifying ‘racialism’ as the worst aspect of 
Nazism.34 The Soviet prosecution presented powerful 
evidence of German atrocities in eastern Europe, including a 
surprise star witness—Field Marshall Friedrich Paulus, who 
led the German forces in the disastrous Stalingrad 
campaign—and a documentary film recording German 
atrocities in the USSR, one even more horrifying than those 
screened by the American prosecution. 
The trial had then reached what the British alternate judge, 
                                                 





Sir Norman Birkett, described in his diary as ‘in a very real 
sense, the critical moment of the trial’—the opening of the 
defence case, starting with Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, 
commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, founder of the Gestapo, 
and Hitler’s longtime intimate and heir apparent.35 Legally 
speaking, this was not the critical moment. The prosecution 
case against this defendant was already formidable, and his 
evidence-in-chief did not seek to refute it, but rather to enter a 
long and fiery defence of Hitler and Nazism; it thus contained 
corroborating admissions. Göring never wavered from the 
view that a death sentence was certain, and he participated in 
the trial only to expose it as a sham and to speak to a 
resurgent German posterity which, he believed, would hail 
him and his ilk as heroes, exemplars and martyrs.  
But Birkett was right about ‘the critical moment’, as he was 
arguably not only the best jurist in the courtroom, but also 
keenly aware of how the trial was unfolding as a morality 
play writ large. In this sense, he saw Göring fulfilling a 
pivotal role, as he noted in his diary: 
Throughout this trial the dead Hitler has been present at 
every session, a dreadful, sinister, and in some respects 
inexplicable figure; but Göring is the man who has really 
dominated the proceedings, and that remarkably enough, 
with-out ever uttering a word in public up to the moment he 
went into the witness box… [I]t has been obvious that a 
personality of outstanding though possibly evil qualities, was 
seated there in the dock.36  
In his own diary, the prison psychologist Gustave Gilbert 
confirms Göring’s dominance among the defendants as he 
marshalled them to a common cause and stance. Like many 
others, he also notes Göring’s dramatic transformation in 
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American captivity, from a besotted, grossly obese drug 
addict, to a man of normal build, great charm, forceful 
personality and very high intelligence.37 
Though cross-examination was unnecessary from an 
evidentiary point of view, from a dramatic one it would have 
been unthinkable for Göring’s grandstanding in his own 
evidence-in-chief over two and a half days to have gone 
unchallenged. To a packed courtroom, Jackson rose to tackle 
him on 18 March 1946. He immediately made elementary 
mistakes in his cross-examination, posing open-ended 
questions and challenging Göring’s opinions rather than his 
factual assertions. The latter took the invitation to grandstand 
once more, humiliating Jackson in the process. Having 
palpably lost control of the cross-examination, Jackson 
became even more flustered when his ill-advised appeals to 
the bench to control the witness were turned down: Göring 
was within his rights in answering open-ended questions in 
extenso. He was also playing to his own gallery, his fellow 
defendants, with great success. Jackson never gained the 
upper hand, and virtually every commentator and diarist 
present reported the appalling effect the scene had on those 
present. Afterwards Jackson ‘was well-nigh unhinged by the 
torrent of criticism’, his then deputy, Telford Taylor, 
comments.38 ‘For a few hours, the fate of the Nuremberg 
Trials trembled in the balance’, Maxwell Fyfe notes in his 
memoirs.39 
He himself was due to cross-examine after Jackson, and 
suddenly had to assemble new material to recover the ground 
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Jackson had lost. After a night of frantic preparation, Maxwell 
Fyfe began his own duel with Göring. Transposed to the 
former’s usual places of work, what followed would have 
rated as little more than a workmanlike cross-examination by 
an experienced advocate who was on top of his brief and held 
some good cards. There were no open-ended questions, only 
questions of factual detail, the answers to which the advocate 
already held in his hand; and the witness’s attempts at 
diversionary sallies were abruptly cut off.  
In this particular setting with this particular witness, 
however, the interchange amounted to high-order courtroom 
pyrotechnics. Maxwell Fyfe had his own gallery to play to—
the British public—and highlighted Göring’s collusion in the 
murder of 75 recaptured RAF officers who had escaped from 
Stalag Luft III. He pressed his increasingly cowed prey into 
admissions that revealed the Reichmarschall as a heartless 
warmonger and murderer, a common liar, and a disgrace to 
any officer corps worthy of the name. In her dispatch to The 
New Yorker, Janet Flanner reported from the press gallery:  
During this vital cross-examination, Sir David’s professional 
affability disappeared…With his excellent mind, his vast legal 
knowledge, and the added passion of a just inquisition, he 
stood behind his lectern and prosecuted the seated Göring 
into at least a partial state of destruction. He succeeded in 
doing what had not yet been done: he forced Göring to 
separate himself intellectually from the Nazi myth, he forced 
him to admit the difference between the glorified Nazi plan 
and the ghastly human results.40 
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It was now clear to lay spectators—as it had long been clear to 
the lawyers—that Göring’s position was hopeless. He lost his 
grip on the other defendants, who in turn abandoned all 
solidarity with each other.  
As the other defendants now took turns to present their 
individual defences, they shifted blame onto each without 
restraint, to the prosecution’s advantage. And those who 
chose to step into the witness box faced the nemesis of 
Maxwell Fyfe, who in effect now replaced the wounded 
Jackson as the central figure at the prosecution tables.41  
The judges took a month of frequent, long meetings to 
reach their verdicts, agree on sentences and write their 
judgment applying the principles expressed in the charter. In 
the upshot they acquitted three of the 21 defendants—
Fritzsche, Schacht and von Papen. The German police would 
soon re-arrest them and submit them to new court 
proceedings, in the Spruchkammer of the denazification 
program. Each of the remaining 18 defendants was convicted 
on at least one count; 11 received death sentences, and seven 
received long custodial sentences.  
After their appeals to the Control Commission in Berlin 
failed, the 11 condemned men kept their appointment with 
the US Third Army’s hangman in the early hours of 16 
October 1946, except for Göring who took his own life two 
hours earlier. The remaining defendants found their way to 
Spandau prison in the British zone of Berlin. International 
criminal law had not only made its entrance; it came armed 
with palpable sanctions as Jackson had called for.42 
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The judges cleaned up the confusion in the indictment 
around the conspiracy count. The charter sought to apply this 
count to aggressive war only, and the tribunal now reinstated 
the charter’s more restrictive approach. It also refused to 
declare the Reich cabinet and German high command to be 
criminal organisations, as they did not constitute 
‘organisations’ in the strict sense (the cabinet in particular had 
not met since 1937), and were small enough for individual 
prosecutions to suffice. The Allies’ denazification program 
would trump the tribunal’s adverse verdicts against the SS, SA 
and Gestapo in the treatment of ‘lesser’ criminals in the years 
to come.43  
The main Nuremberg trial in historical context 
Around the time of the Nuremberg trial, the Allies conducted 
many other war-crimes trials in Europe along more 
conventional lines, the most prominent being those the British 
conducted in Belsen and the Americans in Dachau. More 
importantly, the original ‘Nuremberg ideas’, as expressed in 
the charter and the tribunal’s judgment, were enshrined in 
international law as ‘the Nuremberg principles’ adopted by 
the UN General Assembly on 11 December 1946. For three 
years after the trial ended, these principles and the precedent 
the trial had set were applied in 11 important subsequent 
trials of separate categories of German perpetrators. These 
trials were held under purely American auspices (with 
Telford Taylor now chief of counsel), also in the Palace of 
Justice in Nuremberg. 
When the cold war began in earnest in 1948, the major 
powers’ pursuit of geopolitical interests soon closed the 
valuable opening for progressive international initiatives that 
arose at the end of World War II. As we have seen, the 
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protagonists of the first Nuremberg trial seized this short-
lived opportunity. But they were not alone in so doing. The 
founders of the United Nations, and the drafters of its 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and 
abovementioned Genocide Convention (both adopted by its 
General Assembly in December 1948) built on the Nuremberg 
principles, and on the precedent the trial set.  
The UDHR is perhaps the clearer case in point. From the 
US Declaration of Independence of 1776, with its famous ‘self-
evident truths’ about equal human dignity and rights, 
authoritative bodies in several countries had impotently 
declared and proclaimed human rights in the absence of 
effective sanctions for their breach. The Nuremberg trial 
established the first supportive sanctions against major forms 
of human rights transgression. With that background, the UN 
gave its Human Rights Commission, formidably chaired by 
Eleanor Roosevelt, the task of drafting a declaration of 
universal rights.44 Like the trial itself, the workings of the 
commission and its drafting committee generated friction in 
generous proportions, as Mary Ann Glendon’s account makes 
clear: the intensifying east-west and Arab-Jewish conflicts 
contributed greatly to the drafting committee’s dynamism up 
to the UDHR’s unanimous adoption by the UN General 
Assembly in 1948.45 In her speech to the Assembly on that 
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occasion, Roosevelt commended the declaration for its 
potential to ‘become the international Magna Carta of all men 
everywhere’.46 Before Nuremberg, its adoption would have 
been an empty gesture; after 1948, the project itself would not 
have been politically feasible. Once this valuable platform was 
in place, however, the elaboration of an international rule of 
law could proceed under the human rights agenda during 
and after the cold war, albeit at a slower pace. Subsequent UN 
conventions against torture and slavery, and asserting the 
rights of women, children and refugees, among others, also 
build on the Nuremberg principles and the UDHR in fleshing 
out inter-national legal protections and responsibilities. 
As we have seen, the progenitors of the Nuremberg trial 
highlighted the need for sanctions for breaches of 
international criminal law, which presupposed the existence 
of a court with jurisdiction over all potential perpetrators. As 
Jackson noted in his opening address at Nuremberg, in an 
apology for the necessity, faute de mieux, for victors being left 
to try the vanquished: 
We must never forget that the record on which we judge 
these defendants is the record on which history will judge us 
tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to 
put it to our own lips as well.47  
Shawcross and Taylor, among others active in the 
prosecution at Nuremberg, were conscious of this issue and 
so agitated for a permanent international criminal court to 
succeed the IMT.48 Only in the 1990s did we see ad hoc war-
crimes trials in the Nuremberg lineage under the aegis of the 
UN, ones covering atrocities, including genocide, in Rwanda 
and former Yugoslavia. Since then, the UN has also initiated 
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similar criminal proceedings in Sierra Leone and Cambodia in 
partner-ship with the national governments in question.  
The idea of a permanent international criminal court 
remained alive in the UN General Assembly, and came to 
fruition in the 1998 Statute of Rome, which set up today’s 
International Criminal Court in the Hague—the Nuremberg 
tribunal’s logical and more robust successor.49  
‘The end of America’ 
In sum, the founding of the UN, the Nuremberg trial and the 
UDHR, taken together, represent a dramatic leap forward in 
creating an international rule of law intended to uphold 
rights—including the right to peace, security and individual 
inviolability—and to impose criminal sanctions on their 
breach. The country that contributed the lion’s share to this 
remarkable mid-twentieth century development was 
America. Fittingly, the UN was founded in San Francisco; 
American officials took the lead in devising and nurturing the 
Nuremberg project; and the UDHR was drafted on the shores 
of Lake Success, New York, under the leadership of one of the 
country’s twentieth-century national treasures, Eleanor 
Roosevelt. This startling achievement reversed the USA’s 
dismal interwar record of recalcitrance towards the League of 
Nations and towards proposals to develop an international 
criminal law, complete with an international court to enforce 
it. The country achieved an historically unprecedented moral 
authority. 
Unfortunately, the old interwar recalcitrance seeped back 
into American political culture in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, so weakening institutions that prominent 
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Americans had nurtured in the latter half of the 1940s. The 
country has thus turned on its own progeny, and thereby 
defiled its own founding ideals of individual rights, the rule 
of law and due process. It certainly gives comfort to 
perpetrators, including those who commit genocide. When 
this recalcitrance reached its climax in the early 2000s—
subverting peace, human rights and the rule of law both at 
home and abroad—it is no wonder that Naomi Wolf describes 
the process in a book entitled The End of America.50  
Successive US administrations have refused to ratify many 
important ramifications of international law, including UN 
covenants (and optional protocols to them) setting up the UN 
Human Rights Committee, seeking to abolish the death 
penalty, discrimination against women and torture, and ones 
in defence of the rights of children and migrant workers. The 
US has broken ranks with the rest of the Western world in 
retaining capital punishment and reintroducing torture as a 
routine recourse for its military and intelligence services, and 
its faux-judicial military commissions in Guantánamo Bay 
may admit evidence extracted under torture in its planned 
show trials—a throwback to the pre-1770s judicial torture in 
Western Europe.51 Unordinary rendition program’ whereby it 
abducts targeted individuals from any country to be tortured 
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in client states, such as Egypt, where this practice is a normal 
part of quotidian governance.  
America was one of just seven countries (with China, Iraq, 
Israel, Libya, Qatar, and Yemen) which voted against the 1998 
Treaty of Rome and the establishment of the ICC. At the last 
minute (31 December 2000), the Clinton administration signed 
it, but the incoming Bush administration refused to ratify it. 
Quite the contrary, it has chosen the route of outright defiance 
of the ICC, not least in 2002, the year the court came into 
existence, with the adoption of the American Service-
Members’ Protection Act, the express purpose of which is ‘to 
protect United States military personnel and other elected and 
appointed officials of the United States government against 
criminal prosecution by an international court to which the 
United States is not a party.’ The legislation, which has 
attracted the sobriquet ‘The Hague Invasion Act’, in particular 
authorises the President to use ‘all necessary and appropriate 
means to bring about the release of any US or allied personnel 
being detained or imprisoned by, or on behalf of, or at the 
request of the International Criminal Court’. It also prohibits 
any co-operation with ICC investigations. The impunity that 
the Nuremberg project denied perpetrators is thus reinstated 
as far as American power reaches. The days when that ‘power 
paid tribute to reason’ are now long gone—to return to Robert 
Jackson’s opening words to the Nuremberg tribunal cited 
above.  
America and its closest allies showed their contempt for 
the Nuremberg legacy in their unprovoked invasion of Iraq in 
2003—the specific crime of waging aggressive war, the central 
issue in the Nuremberg trial, the crime for which the tribunal 
sentenced eight individuals to death in 1946. As Geoffrey 
Robertson comments, ‘The Bush Administration regarded 





countries.’52 Ironically, the American and British governments 
invoked the Nuremberg principle on the criminality of 
aggressive war in justifying the first Gulf war after Iraq 
invaded Kuwait in August 1990.53 
The New York lawyers around Henry Stimson would have 
found all too familiar the pattern whereby war (even the 
rhetorical and protean ‘global war on terror’) provides the 
occasion and the pretext for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity of the kind symbolised by the US facilities of Abu 
Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay. What they would have found 
unfamiliar, 60-odd years after the Nuremberg trial, is the 
reversal of roles which has left their own country the most 
prominent international outlaw. In 1947, Stimson himself 
wrote:  
[I]n the judgment of Nuremberg there is affirmed the central 
principle of peace—that the man who makes or plans to make 
aggressive war is a criminal. A standard has been raised to 
which Americans, at least, must repair; for it is only as this 
standard is accepted, supported, and enforced that we can 
move onward to a world of law and peace.54 
But Robert Jackson and the other Nuremberg prosecutors, 
who went to work each day with the stench of death in their 
nostrils, would have found themselves in familiar territory 
with the massive destruction and loss of life of the Iraq war—
yet another deliberately begun and unwinnable war fought 
with no holds barred. 
For a few hopeful months in 2008, during the US 
presidential election campaign, it seemed that a line might be 
drawn under the recalcitrant turn in American political 
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culture, and an attempt would be made to restore the 
country’s moral authority. The Democratic nominee, Barak 
Obama, declared his intention, for instance, to close the 
notorious camp at Guantánamo Bay (‘a tremendous recruiting 
tool for al-Qaida’) and end other abuses of the Bush era. As 
his first term as President now draws to a close, though, 
Guantánamo is still in business, now graced with Obama’s 
own 2011 executive order legitimating a formal system of 
indefinite detention without trial.55 The same is true of the 
other transgressive institutions Obama inherited from Bush—
‘extraordinary rendition’, ‘enhanced interrogation techni-
ques’, the faux-judicial ‘military commissions’ that bar access 
to properly constituted courts, and of course ‘the Hague 
Invasion Act’. 
On 2 May 2011, Obama sent troops on a mission that had 
them violate the borders of an allied country, gun down 
Osama bin Laden in his bedroom and kneecap his wife, when 
these troops obviously could have been given the option to 
arrest their ‘target’ alive to face trial. Compared to some of the 
Nuremberg defendants who enjoyed due process, bin Laden 
was no more than a smalltime crook, and so it is worth 
recalling Robert Jackson’s words quoted above that the 
former’s proposed extra-judicial killing ‘would not sit easily 
on the American conscience or be remembered by our 
children with pride’. But Jackson was writing of another 
America, as Wolf’s thesis implies. How easily extra-judicial 
killing sits on the present American conscience can be gleaned 
from Obama’s recent gloating celebration of the anniversary 
of bin Laden’s killing, including his goading his Republican 
opponent in his second presidential campaign for supposedly 
lacking the ‘ticker’ to order an action like this.56  
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International criminal law, peace and human rights now 
Without American passion, creativity and resources, the 
Nuremberg trial would never have taken place, and William 
Jackson’s ideal of ‘an international society ordered by law’, 
quoted above, would have remained an impossible utopia. 
Miraculously, perhaps, this project has now come far and 
appears to be still advancing in spite of—though necessarily 
weakened by —outright American hostility. The ICC has now 
been ratified by 121 states, and has engaged with the cases of 
such high-profile perpetrators as the former Bosnian-Serb 
leader, Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic and the current 
president of the Sudan, Omar Hassan al-Bashir. The 
associated human rights project has been developing for 
much longer, and has been greatly strengthened by the 
monitoring or ‘watch’ practices that have arisen out of the 
Helsinki accords of 1975.57 
However, in betraying its own mid-twentieth century 
handiwork, today’s America is the main brake on progress in 
international law, justice and human rights, and no 
amelioration of its regressive political culture is in sight. Were 
a volte face to come to pass, however, the Nuremberg legacy 
might recover its true proportion in undergirding the 
international society based on peace, law and rights that its 
American progenitors foretold. 
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More than 60 years after the Holocaust, attempts to bring the 
few remaining perpetrators of war crimes to trial are 
complicated by questions of memory and its relationship to 
the contemporary societies in which they are pursued. This is 
particularly evident in the case of Károly Zentai, a man 
wanted by Hungary since 2005 for extradition and 
questioning over the murder of a Jewish man in 1944. Zentai 
has lived in Australia since 1950, a country in which a number 
of perpetrators and collaborators found safe refuge after the 
war, and in which their presence was never sufficiently cause 
for any Australian concern. In Hungary, the complicity of the 
state in the Holocaust remains subject to historical denial, 
silenced by the myth of Hungarian victimhood in the war. For 
the historian, this case provides important insights into the 
historical links that evolved in the postwar period between 
Australia and Europe, and illustrates a wider debate about 
memory and history in the face of the ‘perpetually remade 
past’.2 
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Given the distance to the event in temporal and, in the case 
of Australia, geographical terms, the role of memory is critical 
to understanding the contemporary context in which the case 
has been received in the two countries in which, at the time of 
mid-2012, it is still playing out. Since the French sociologist 
Maurice Halbwachs, himself a victim of the Nazis, first 
developed the notion of collective memory in the 1920s, the 
subject of memory has become an ever-expanding field of 
intensive scholarship and debate. Halbwachs’ theoretical 
analysis highlighted the social dimensions of remembering 
and the way the present works to influence what is 
remembered in societies, and the institutions that embody the 
public acts of remembering.3 Since then, memory analysis has 
developed most significantly in relation to the Holocaust and 
World War II, in particular, the connection between historical 
memory and human rights. Holocaust memories, write Daniel 
Levy and Natan Sznaider, ‘have evolved into a universal code 
that is now synonymous with an imperative to address past 
injustices (both legally as well as in commemorative terms).’4  
Halbwachs understood the link between memory, identity 
and human rights that is essentially the subject of this essay. 
For Halbwachs, as Jay Winter reminds us, collective memory 
is the binding agent of civil society.5 It is those associations 
and narratives about the past, shared and told by different 
groups of people, that tell them who they are and what they 
do. Memory, in particular the memory of past human rights 
abuses, also underpins the modern institutions of law and 
politics. For Levy and Sznaider, the universality of human 
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rights, a phenomenon that has emerged since the decade of 
World War II, ‘necessitates a certain distance from the actual 
events that are being remembered’.6 They build on Jan 
Assmann’s idea of a ‘cultural mnemotechnique’, which 
Assmann defines as ‘the transformation of communicative, 
that is, lived and witness-embodied memory into cultural, 
that is, institutionally shaped and sustained, memory’.7 As the 
actual events of the Holocaust have begun to slip out of living 
memory, the iconisation of its memory is undergoing its own 
transformation. This essay is a contribution to understanding 
this transition. 
The politics of memory 
Since the fall of Communism, the question of ‘which’ past to 
remember, which to use in the forging of a post-Communist 
identity has galvanised nationalist societies in East-Central 
Europe. Randolph Braham believes that in Hungary the 
Holocaust has undergone a ‘history cleansing process’ since 
1989, largely absolving Hungarian society and its political 
elites of responsibility for the destruction of two-thirds of its 
Jewish population. A reluctance to address the Holocaust past 
has been aided by a resurgence of antisemitism and the 
revival of the ‘Jewish question’, the forms of which have 
rehabilitated old stereotypes of the Jews as alien and 
unassimilable, and responsible for the evils of Communism. 
Preoccupation with the crimes of Communism has also been 
at the expense of a reckoning with the Hungarian Holocaust.8 
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This has represented a major setback to the project of 
historical understanding. Braham writes that although the 
number of populist champions of antisemitism and outright 
Holocaust denial is quite small in post-Communist Hungary, 
‘the camp of those distorting and denigrating the catastrophe 
of the Jews is quite large’, and includes many respectable 
public figures: ‘intellectuals, members of parliament, 
influential governmental and party figures, and high-ranking 
army officers’.9 Even in its more moderate forms, these voices 
of historical revisionism have tended to assert that it was the 
Germans who committed the atrocities with the assistance of 
their Hungarian fascist accomplices, the Nyilas (the Arrow 
Cross party), while the rest—politicians, soldiers, gendarmes 
and citizens—were largely bystanders, or victims themselves. 
This remains a majority view. Within this equation, Zentai 
represents one of a ‘few bad apples’ rather than a cog in the 
Hungarian genocidal machine. His trial, should it ever go 
ahead in Hungary, is more likely to reinforce the mythology 
of Hungarian innocence rather than expose the complicity of 
the Hungarian regime in the mass murder of Hungarian 
Jewry.  
Australia confronts an historical revisionism of a very 
different kind. Unlike East-Central Europe, where the 
atrocities took place, Australia has always seemed very far 
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away from this history.10 It carries its own burdens when it 
comes to remembering World War II, in which the theatre of 
battle and its war crimes are fixed firmly in the Asia-Pacific. 
Yet from the moment authorities began the process of 
selection and recruitment for mass immigration in the 
Displaced Persons (DP) camps of occupied Europe in 1947, 
Australia became complicit in enabling those who had 
committed war crimes to escape retribution.11 To do so, 
Australian authorities participated in their own version of 
historical amnesia, and except for a brief period in the 1980s, 
deliberately ignored or downplayed the evidence of war 
criminals living in refuge in Australia for the next 60 years. 
Instead, the popular imaginary of the postwar period of 
immigration has privileged a narrative of rescue of Hitler’s 
and Stalin’s victims. When evidence to the contrary emerged, 
as it did quite frequently in the 1950s, it was buried by a 
combination of disinterestedness and an unwillingness to act, 
on the part of the authorities: a case of ‘not our problem’.12 If 
he is finally forced to face a Hungarian military court and 
found guilty, Zentai will likely represent a minor ripple in an 
otherwise unblemished record of Australian postwar 
immigration as a story of rescue and salvation of Europe’s 
victims. Ironically, the real victims of war and the Holocaust 
were regarded as the least desirable of immigrants in 
Australia’s practice of migrant selection and recruitment in 
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the Displaced Persons camps of occupied Europe.  
Australia does not have a strong record when it comes to 
prosecuting or extraditing war criminals. Yet seven years after 
the initial request was made for Zentai’s extradition, it is still 
being fought in the courts, with the (then) Minister for Home 
Affairs, Brendan O’Connor, appealing against a decision by 
the courts to quash an earlier determination to extradite 
Zentai. This might suggest a shift in Australian attitudes, 
perhaps prompted by the Holocaust’s increasingly ‘global’ 
presence in recent decades. It is impossible to imagine a 
history of the past century without the place names that have 
come to describe its most cataclysmic event—Auschwitz, 
Treblinka, Sobibor, Belzec, Majdanek and Buchenwald. There 
has likely been no other event in human history as extensively 
documented and analysed, performed and memorialised.13 
Levy and Sznaider, speaking of the Holocaust ‘memory 
boom’, believe this has facilitated a new, global and 
cosmopolitan memory to aid a more moral, world-centred 
consciousness.14 Others have argued that the recent cultural 
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obsession in the West with the Holocaust is contributing to a 
project of forgetting in other ways. Today, the proliferation of 
Holocaust imagery has not necessarily assisted with historical 
understanding, and evidence is that it can sometimes work 
against it, tending towards the trivialisation of the past, its 
ossification in public memory.15 The Holocaust has become a 
trope for things that often have nothing to do with it, and 
‘Auschwitz’ is now a stylised, a-historical space in which to 
enact generic stories of pathos, drama and even comedy. 
Recently, too, there has been a new shift away from the theme 
of Jewish suffering towards a focus on the perpetrators. We 
have become far more interested in the human stories of 
Nazis than those of the victims.16  
To make the leap from the growth of a more universal 
Holocaust-centred awareness to Australia’s apparent 
newfound willingness to pursue and uphold Zentai’s 
extradition is pre-emptive and probably misguided. 
Moreover, as was made clear in statements by O’Connor to 
the press in 2009, Australia’s decision to grant extradition 
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rests not on establishing Zentai’s guilt or innocence, but in 
complying with Australia’s extradition laws.17 The 
representation of Zentai’s case in the mainstream media, 
meanwhile, does not support the theory that Australia has 
developed a more refined historical understanding of the 
Holocaust and the issues of justice or retribution. Rather, it 
resembles others in the way it is told, as the story of an old 
man who has led a largely blameless life in Australia pursued 
for some-thing that may or may not have happened a long 
time ago.18 Jane Cadzow’s piece, published in 2008 in the 
Sydney Morning Herald, for example, under the title ‘Another 
time, another place’, capturing Australia’s sense of remove 
from this history, and the idea that it has nothing much to do 
with the here and now.19  
What makes this case of further interest is the fact that the 
crime Zentai is accused of has been known to authorities for 
over 60 years. The Budapest People’s Court issued the 
warrant for his arrest in 1948 when his whereabouts in Allied 
occupied Germany were already known. Yet neither the 
Allies, under whose protection Zentai lived in Germany after 
the war, nor the Hungarian authorities who issued the arrest 
warrant, made any effort to bring him back to Hungary for 
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trial. It would have been far simpler to do so.20 When he 
applied for passage to Australia while in the care of the 
International Refugee Organisation (IRO) as a DP, the 
Australian migration selection team was probably ignorant of 
the warrant. The Wiesenthal Centre, whose request to the 
Hungarian authorities initiated this recent case for 
extradition, claims it knew nothing of Zentai’s case 
beforehand; but there is evidence that the Balàzs family had 
been trying to interest both the Wiesenthal Centre and the 
Hungarian authorities for decades.  
In 2008 I travelled to Hungary where I reviewed the 
original evidence that initiated the request for Zentai’s 
extradition. In Germany I uncovered documents relating to 
Zentai’s journey through Allied occupied Germany, and his 
application for migration as a DP. These reveal other aspects 
of the case hitherto untold, and shed light on Australia’s own 
contribution to the European process of forgetting, whereby 
through the postwar practice of immigration selection and 
recruitment in the Displaced Persons camps the crimes of the 
Holocaust were revised as purely German crimes, and anti-
Communists regarded far more positively than anti-fascists, 
or even Jews, as potential ‘New Australians’. 
The Holocaust in Hungary and the case of Peter Balàzs 
In 1944, the Jews of Hungary, numbering some 700,000, 
remained the most physically intact Jewish community in 
Europe. Close to 64,000 Hungarian Jews had already lost their 
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lives; 20,000 ‘alien’ Jews had been sent across the border into 
Poland and shot at Kamenets-Poldolsk, and a majority of the 
rest were Jewish men killed when serving in labour battalions 
on the Ukrainian front. A series of severe anti-Jewish laws 
had also been implemented, restricting basic civil and socio-
economic rights.21 But the conservative government of Miklos 
Kallay (9 March 1942 to 22 March 1944) had stopped short of 
complying with Germany’s demands for the deportation of 
Hungarian Jewry.22 The occupation of Hungary by Germany 
in March 1944 led to the implementation of the 'Final Solution' 
with a speed and efficiency unrivalled in other Nazi-occupied 
countries. Within a few short months, at a time when it was 
clear that the war was already lost, and when the realities of 
Auschwitz were public knowledge among the world’s 
leaders, more than 437,000 Hungarian Jews were deported 
from the provinces to the death camps. This was only made 
possible with the wholehearted support of the Hungarian 
constitutionally appointed government of Döme Sztójay, the 
endorsement of the Regent of Hungary, Miklos Horthy, and 
with the assistance of local authorities. As Braham writes: 
‘With Horthy still at the helm, providing the symbol of 
national sovereignty, the Hungarian police, gendarmerie, and 
civil service collaborated with the SS in the anti-Jewish drive 
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with a routine and efficiency that impressed even the 
Germans.’23 By 1 June, the average daily number of 
Hungarian Jews being deported to Auschwitz was 20,000.24  
By the end of July, virtually the only remaining Jews 
surviving in Hungary were in Budapest. In the month of July, 
25,000 were deported to Auschwitz, at which point the 
government temporarily suspended deportations. In October, 
the fascist Arrow Cross party, under the leadership of Ferenc 
Szàlasi, was installed in government in a Nazi-orchestrated 
coup. The Arrow Cross embarked on a reign of terror, 
enacting frenetic killing sprees of the remaining Jews seeking 
refuge in the city. Thousands were arrested and shot and 
dumped into the Danube, and thousands more were shot or 
perished during a death march of 70,000 to Austria. The 
Arrow Cross reign lasted until Soviet forces liberated the city 
on 13 February 1945; during this time, those Jews who 
managed to stay outside of the ghetto, using false papers and 
not wearing a yellow star, had a slim chance of survival. Péter 
Balázs, an 18-year-old boy, was among those who chose the 
Jewish underground.  
It was during this time that Zentai, a conscripted 
Hungarian Royal Army officer, was stationed at the Aréna 
Road military barracks in Budapest in 1944. Zentai’s 
commanding officer was Bela Máder, and his fellow officer 
Lajos Nagy. After the war, they were tried for the murder of 
Péter Balázs and found guilty, Máder in 1946, Nagy in 1947. 
Máder was sentenced to forced labour for life; Nagy was 
given the death sentence, later commuted to life 
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imprisonment.25 Evidence given at these trials prompted the 
Hungarian authorities to charge Zentai with the same crime; 
by that time, he was already in Germany living as a DP. These 
trials were part of the wave of war crimes trials held in 
Hungary in the immediate postwar period; approximately 
27,000 people were sentenced by the Hungarian 'people's 
courts' for war crimes, crimes against the state or crimes 
against humanity, among them a number of senior 
government ministers.26 These also included local and county 
government officials, gendarmerie and military officers 
responsible for the expropriation, ghettoisation and 
deportation of the Jews of Hungary.  
At his trial, Nagy told of how, under the orders of their 
commanding officer Bela Máder, Zentai went out on patrols 
regularly to perform identity checks and round up Jews for 
interrogation. According to Nagy, Zentai already knew Péter 
Balázs: in his statement after his arrest he told the police, 
‘Zentai told me that the boy and his family were old 
acquaintances of his’.27 The Zentai and Balázs families were 
both from Budafok, a small town on the outskirts of Budapest. 
The Balázs family were well known in their region as Jews 
and for their leftist sympathies; Dezsö Balázs, Péter’s father, 
had his legal practice there until 1942 when the family moved 
into Budapest. Zentai, only a few years older than Péter 
Balázs, was apparently his ‘Levente’ instructor for a time in 
Budafok.28 Balázs was surviving on false identity papers, and 
defied a call-up order for a Jewish forced labour unit in April 
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1944. On 8 November, Zentai recognised the boy on a Buda-
pest tram and arrested him for not wearing the yellow star. 
What happened afterwards, according to the evidence 
presented at Nagy's trial, is that between the hours of 3 pm 
and 8 pm, Zentai and Nagy beat Balázs so badly that by 8 pm 
he was dying. According to Nagy's evidence, they (Zentai, 
Máder and himself) saw that the boy was dying, and then 
went to an adjoining room and began drinking. In a macabre 
twist, Captain Máder decided to show off their handiwork to 
a number of other prisoners detained that night at Aréna 
Road. As a number of them testified at Nagy's trial, eight of 
them (some say six) were taken to Captain Máder's rooms, 
where one by one, they were shown a man lying on the floor 
covered by his own overcoat. His breath rattled, and it was 
clear that he was dying. ‘Can you hear that music?’ Sándor 
Révner stated that Máder asked him, when it came his turn to 
view the dying man. ‘That's the way you will go too.’29 Each 
of the witnesses said they were told the same thing. The 
prisoners were then brought back into the room and forced to 
say the Hebrew prayer for the dead, ‘and we said that prayer 
according to his instructions’.30 The next day, all but one of 
them escaped. Each confirmed, as did other officers present 
that day, that the man lying on the floor, according to his 
photograph, was Péter Balázs.  
I have before me the original court transcripts in which 
witnesses describe the brutalities they endured while they 
were detained at the barracks. There are various references to 
Zentai’s regular participation in these beatings. Imre Zoltan 
testified that in 1944, while in Budapest as a forced labourer, 
he was arrested and taken to the barracks ‘where at Béla 
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Máder's orders, Cadet Károly Zentai and Cadet Ferenc Érsek 
beat me up for hours with boxing gloves until I lost 
consciousness’.31 Ervin Barinkai, another soldier at the 
barracks, remembered seeing Zoltan ‘gravely assaulted 
several times, especially by Cadet Sergeant Károly Zentai’.32 
Another cadet, György Varsányi, stated that ‘it was Cadet 
Sergeant Zentai who did the beatings, I saw that myself 
several times’.33  
On the night in question, József Monori, another officer 
assigned to the barracks under Máder’s command, reported 
that he heard, but did not see, the beating going on behind 
closed doors. He ‘definitely’ remembered Zentai, Nagy and 
Máder present. He went to bed, but was woken up at around 
11 pm and told to harness a horse and carriage: ‘Nagy and 
Zentai brought down a corpse from the office, put it on the 
cart, and covered it with straw…Nagy sat on the driver’s seat, 
Zentai beside him, and I sat on the side of the cart. Nagy was 
driving the cart. We drove along Aréna Road…down to the 
Danube…There Nagy and Zentai took the corpse and 
dumped it in the Danube. They waited a while to see if the 
corpse would come up but it sank.’ Monori also stated that 
during the journey ‘Nagy and Zentai were talking about how 
they should not have beaten the boy so hard’.34  
These testimonies were taken before the warrant for 
Zentai’s arrest, which was issued on 29 April 1948. After the 
warrant was issued, Máder, already a condemned man, stated 
that Zentai ‘took part in patrols as well as in beating and 
maltreating Jews…He and 1st Lieutenant (Nagy) were always 
ready to volunteer to do the atrocities.’35 Imre Parázsló, 
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another cadet, stated that the identity checks on Jews were 
‘mostly carried out by 1st Lieutenant Lajos Nagy and Ensign 
Károly Zentai accompanied by the worst imaginable 
beatings…Zentai hit hardest but Nagy was not far behind. 
They hit the Jews with fists, boxing gloves or sticks, kicked 
them, and I often saw these Jews beaten to a bloody pulp 
coming out of the office moaning and crying. Bela Máder 
knew about these tortures, indeed, he gave orders to them.’36 
Hungarian journalist György Vámos, referring to the 
‘unusual circumstances’ of judicial practices in postwar 
Hungary, recently cautioned that witness testimonies relating 
to this case should be treated with care. He offers no detail 
beyond remarking that social justice, as opposed to merely 
criminal justice, was an important objective of the government 
at the time.37 This is largely true. The people’s courts were 
driven less by legal concerns than by the desire for retribution 
and, in many cases, revenge. Confusion, insufficient 
preparation and political bias were rife during the major 
political trials, of which there were 14 between 1945 and 1946. 
‘The historical responsibility of the Hungarian principal war 
criminals is beyond question’, wrote historian Laszlo Karsai. 
‘What is questionable, however, is whether the people's courts 
were sufficiently equipped to establish their criminal 
responsibility.’38 
Yet we must tread carefully in assessing minor trials such 
as those of Máder and Nagy. It is common in the West to 
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dismiss all postwar trials in Hungary as Communist 
propaganda, but it was a little more complex than that. In the 
first place, the Communist Party did not entirely lead the fight 
against war criminals in the Hungarian courts in the 
immediate postwar years. The people’s courts were party 
courts, in which representatives from across the anti-fascist 
political spectrum were chosen to take part. Delegates from 
the Bourgeois Democratic Party, the Social Democratic Party, 
the Communist Party, and the National Peasants Party, in 
addition to representatives from the right wing Independent 
Smallholders Party, were appointed people's judges. Later, 
delegates from the National Trade Union Association were 
also included. A professionally trained judge headed each of 
the courts, and a majority of votes determined a verdict. What 
determined the outcome of a particular trial or conviction was 
usually less the political sway of the parties involved in the 
process than the personal background and conviction of the 
judge. Moreover, the influence of the Communist Party only 
increased after 1947 in the courts, and only then did the 
number of trials dealing with war crimes or crimes against 
humanity significantly decrease.39  
In the second place, condemning all postwar trials as 
‘show trials’ also diminishes the contributions of the many 
Jewish survivors who did participate in what they saw as a 
way of achieving some kind of justice, and the importance of 
these trials at this time for gaining historical recognition. 
Braham writes that the ‘tragedy of individual Jewish 
communities in Trianon Hungary was exposed in the war 
crimes trials held between 1945 and 1948 under the auspices 
of people’s tribunals in Budapest and various county seats.’40 
Jews were heavily involved in the judicial process in Hungary 
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after the war, a fact that is often overlooked in the anti-
Communist revisionism of this history. This often took great 
courage: to give testimonies and to stand witness was an act 
of bravery for many Jewish victims of wartime atrocities. This 
is not to say that these trials were neutral or devoid of 
ideological bias; but they were often the only forum in which 
survivors could bear witness, and this should be taken into 
account when evaluating their testimonies. In trials 
specifically concerned with deportations or murder of Jews, 
the spectators at these proceedings also tended to be Jewish. 
Journalist Geza Losonczy was present at the joint Endre–
Baky–Jaross trial, the three men most directly responsible for 
the Hungarian Holocaust. He expressed his disappointment 
in the ‘complete uninterestedness and indifference that the 
majority of the non-Jewish public manifests towards the case’. 
This was ‘not a trial on behalf of the Jews’ but ‘a trial of the 
Hungarian nation against its executioners’.41  
By 1948, official memory was writing the Jewish 
experience out of the war altogether as the Communist 
rereading of history began to take shape. Fascists became, 
before all other things, anti-Communists, their enemies 
Communists, even if their victims appeared otherwise.42 
Hopes for restitution and indemnification were soon dashed 
in the new Communist Hungary, and any chance of 
rebuilding their communities was soon recognised to be 
futile. In all Soviet Bloc countries, despite an initial flourishing 
of scholarly discourse and literary publications addressing the 
tragedy of the Jewish genocide, as the Cold War deepened 
towards the end of the 1940s, discussion or acknowledgement 
of the uniqueness of Jewish suffering during the war largely 
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disappeared and the millions of Jews killed was revised as 
general war losses.43 During the Stalinist era of the 1950s, the 
Holocaust ‘as a distinct historical phenomenon was usually 
downplayed, distorted or at best hardly referred to even in 
textbooks’.44  
Yet, following the uprising of 1956 and the subsequent 
liberalisation of Communism under the Kádár regime, and 
due to the increasing efforts of what was a comparatively 
large Jewish population for an East-Central European country 
(80,000), there was a slight thawing of attitudes.45 Braham has 
argued that this period was one of increasing liberalisation, 
not only in economic policy but in cultural and artistic life, 
and that the Holocaust became an important subject for 
literary, artistic and scholarly attention among Jewish and 
Christian intellectuals.46 This should not be overstated; as 
Zsuzsanna Osvath observed, ‘a few texts emerged that did not 
capitulate to the state-imposed ban on Jewish memory’, and 
these ‘recalled, repeated and expressed the events of the 
Shoah, bearing witness to the immensity of the trauma it 
created’. But the dominant trend in Hungarian literature and 
media throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s ‘either 
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suppressed or portrayed the Shoah as having only 
coincidentally Jewish features’.47 As István Rév noted, the first 
state-sponsored Hungarian exhibition held at Auschwitz in 
1965 articulated the official stance: of the 120 panels 
displayed, only ten related to the fate of the almost half a 
million Hungarian Jews who perished there, despite the fact 
that around one in three Jewish victims of Auschwitz were 
from Hungary, and not one of the panels related to the 
murder of thousands of Hungarian Roma. Instead, the 
exhibition, like official Hungarian memory, ‘fell victim to the 
ideological war between Communists and anti-Communist 
Fascists’.48 
The end of Communism led to a resurfacing of antisemitic 
prejudice in the public arena, drawing in part on a deep-
rooted tradition of linking Jews with Communism in the 
popular historical imagination, in particular the high visibility 
of Jews in positions of leadership in the Communist regimes 
of 1919 and the post-World War II era. This antisemitic 
mythology ignored the fact that these leaders were almost all 
purged from their positions during the Communist era. Yet it 
has recently found new expression in a post-Communist 
preoccupation with ‘the Jewish Question’, a more extreme 
variant of which supposes that Jews used the postwar 
Communist regime for 40 years as payback against the 
Hungarians for the suffering they experienced at the hands of 
the Nazis.  
In the first free elections of 1990, several politicians and 
prominent writers and journalists exploited these mythical 
connections. ‘References to "alien" elements controlling the 
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media and playing a disproportionately prominent role in 
academia and the professions in the capital—a clear reference 
to Jews—were subtly interwoven with discussions of the 
political and socio-economic issues troubling the post-
Communist society.’49 Since then, local anger at unemploy-
ment, economic downturns, inflation, impoverishment and 
government corruption has continued to find a convenient 
target in the Jewish population. Professor György Poszler, a 
member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, remarked on 
the recent turn in public discourse, in which the antisemitic 
voice, once tentative and sporadic, has become stronger and 
more frequent: ‘The tone has positively degraded. It would be 
worth…comparing these texts with the phraseology and 
metaphors of the extreme right wing press of 60 years ago.’50 
As recently as April 2009, at a rally of the ultra right-wing 
Magdar Gárda (Hungarian Guard), there were open calls for 
physical violence against Jews.51  
To some extent it would be possible to argue that the 
silence has deepened rather than thawed. The desire to 
absolve Hungarian responsibility in favour of German guilt is 
prevalent in government, the churches and other leading 
institutions. There are also those who continue to ‘de-Judaise’ 
the Holocaust, relativising Jewish loss in terms of all civilian 
and military losses incurred in the war.52 For Tony Judt, 
Hungary is the prime illustration of the difficulty of 
incorporating the destruction of the Jews into historical 
memory in post-Communist Eastern Europe. He uses the 
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example of the immensely popular Terrorháza (‘House of 
Terror’), the museum set up in Budapest after the fall of 
Communism to document the history of state violence and 
repression from 1944 to 1989: 
the Terrorháza’s version of Hungarian history draws no 
distinction between the thugs of Ferenc Szalasi’s Arrow Cross 
party, who held power there from October 1944 to April 1945, 
and the Communist regime that was installed after the 
war…The not particularly subliminal message here is that 
Communism and Fascism are equivalent. Except that they are 
not: the presentation and content of the Budapest Terrorháza 
makes it quite clear that, in the eyes of the museum’s curators, 
Communism not only lasted longer but did far more harm 
than its neo-Nazi predecessor.53 
Tim Cole agrees that the Terrorháza not only claims an 
equivalence between the victims of Fascism and Communism, 
but suggests that the Communist era was far more significant. 
The specific history of the Holocaust is subsumed within a 
more monolithic history that traces a story of universal 
Hungarian victimhood from 1944 to 1989, first at the hands of 
Nazi Germany and their foot soldiers, the Nyilas, and then the 
Communists.54 Yet across town, another museum is 
competing with this historical version of the Holocaust. The 
Budapest Holocaust Memorial Centre was created in 2004 on 
the site of the former ghetto in Pest.55 The Centre’s permanent 
exhibition, From Deprivation of Rights to Genocide, is a 
comprehensive, state-of-the-art display of the history of the 
Hungarian Holocaust, and pays particular attention to the 
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relationship between the State and the main victims of racial 
persecution, namely Jews and Roma. The exhibition’s time-
frame begins in 1938, when the first Anti-Jewish Law was 
enacted. Extending the periodisation of this history in this 
way significantly challenges the version of history presented 
at the Terrorháza, which starts with the period of Arrow 
Cross rule in 1944, thus ‘forgetting’ or silencing the role 
played by the Hungarian state in implementing the 
Holocaust. Despite Cole’s optimism that the short distance 
between the Holocaust Memorial Centre and the Terrorháza 
would make it possible to take in both museums in one day, 
the Terrorháza remains the far more popular option by locals 
and tourists alike.56 
Istvan Hargittai is a professor of chemistry at Budapest 
Technical University and one of a few to have published in 
Hungarian his Holocaust experiences and the wall of silence 
that surrounds this history. He recalls that he and his 
generation grew up thinking ‘it was the Germans’ who were 
responsible for the Hungarian Holocaust. Members of the 
Arrow Cross were outsiders, so the theory went, 
unrepresentative of the Hungarian people. This myth 
prevails. Most Hungarians, he says, have lived since World 
War II as if Auschwitz never happened.57 The crimes of the 
Communist regime command the sphere of public debate 
over retribution and justice. The question of Hungarian 
complicity in the crimes against a significant number of its 
own people in World War II has yet to be asked. 
Even those who might be expected to be supportive of 
seeing Zentai go to trial suspect that the effect is likely to be 
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detrimental to the Jewish cause. Hargittai predicts that the 
overwhelming image of Zentai will be that of a ‘poor old man’ 
who, if sentenced, will in all likelihood become a martyr of 
Jewish vengeance. Nevertheless, this does not mean, in 
Hargittai’s view, that he shouldn’t be tried. But there are 
others who feel that the negative impact such a trial is likely 
to have outweighs the argument for historical justice.58 Many 
intellectuals fear that a case such as this will strengthen 
antisemitism, particularly at a time when the rise of the 
extreme right is already threatening its resurgence. The fact 
that the Hungarian state has never acknowledged its own role 
in the destruction of Hungarian Jewry further complicates the 
issue. Without this acknowledgment, a trial such as this could 
become a tool for reinforcing the idea of a ‘few bad apples’ 
and the wider mythology of ordinary Hungarians’ innocence 
and victimhood.  
Károly Zentai and the route to Australia 
Hungary’s demand for Zentai’s extradition has its own 
history. In 2004, Efraim Zuroff, the director of the Jerusalem-
based Wiesenthal Centre, visited Hungary to launch 
Operation Last Chance, which offered a reward of 10,000 
euros to anyone with information leading to the arrest of war 
criminals. For Zuroff, such an operation was motivated by a 
universal obligation to the victims of the Holocaust; beyond 
that, Zuroff defended it as particularly significant in a country 
where acknowledgement of the Holocaust was still poor and 
where, in his view, the credibility of past trials was tainted in 
the popular imagination by their Communist associations.59 
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Operation Last Chance was not welcomed by a significant 
number of Jewish intellectuals in Hungary. A heated 
exchange erupted in the pages of Hungarian journal Élet és 
Irodalom (Literature and Life) between leading Holocaust 
historian László Karsai and Efraim Zuroff, in which Karsai 
attacked the operation as a ‘blood money operation’, labelling 
it unnecessary, unhelpful and ‘without a chance’.60 According 
to Karsai, this strategy had no merit in the cause of historical 
justice: 
For 10,000 euros, it occurs to someone that their dear old 
neighbour is possibly, very probably, an Arrow Cross (mass) 
murderer… Now try to imagine our 80–90 year old relative 
one day who is taken away by policemen, interrogated for 
hours, kept in remand in crowded, filthy cells perhaps for 
weeks or months only to be told before the court that his 95 
year-old accuser is not so absolutely certain that he had seen 
him on the bank of the Danube in Pest, or in the brickyard at 
Békásmegyer in October or December 1944…I still insist that 
there is not much chance of finding real war criminals…and 
even less of having them convicted in Hungary today. On the 
other hand, the odds are very good for hundreds of innocent 
octogenarians being denounced in this country in the hope of 
10,000 euro blood money.61 
Not only would such cases be virtually impossible to 
prosecute so long after the event, but if anything, ‘a Nazi 
hunting campaign with blood money in Hungary today could 
only result in the strengthening of anti-Semitism’. Karsai 
challenged Zuroff instead to look in places like Canada, the 
United States or Australia where most, he said, had ended up 
after the war. In his parting shot, he used the example of the 
Péter Balázs case to further illustrate his point: 
On July 15, a Holocaust survivor gave me a ring. He told me 
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that he had informed the Jerusalem Centre of the name and 
[Australian] address of the murderer of his brother. In the last 
17 years the Centre has not even found him worthy of letting 
him know that the case has been shelved…(this) man…made 
it clear that he was not interested in the 10,000 euros, but 
wanted to see the murderer brought to court.62 
Although Karsai did not mention the Balázs case by name, 
Zentai’s extradition request was expedited soon after this 
exchange took place.  
Presumably Zentai was never a big enough fish when 
Simon Wiesenthal was alive and his organisation was 
engaged in tracking down Nazis who had committed murder 
and brutality on a massive scale. The Balázs files held by the 
Holocaust Memorial Centre in Budapest attest to the long 
struggle of the family to resurrect the case and bring Zentai to 
trial. These papers tell a story of tenacity and despair, 
beginning with the small advertisement Péter’s father, Dezsö, 
placed in a Budapest paper the day after Péter’s 
disappearance, and subsequent advertisements looking for 
information about his son’s whereabouts. ‘My son, Péter 
Balázs, disappeared on 8 November. High reward for anyone 
bringing news of him’ reads one, from 1 April 1945.63 Dezsö 
Balázs devoted the remaining 25 years of his life, until his 
death in 1970, to obtaining justice for his son’s murder. His 
other son, Adam, inherited his father’s cause. I have one 
letter, dated 20 November 1987 from Adam Balázs to a 
representative of the Wiesenthal Centre visiting in Budapest 
at the time, in which he includes a 1958 address for Zentai in 
Perth. Efraim Zuroff has since maintained that the first the 
Wiesenthal Centre heard of the Balázs case was in 2004, and it 
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acted upon the information immediately.64 
The story of how Zentai came to be in Australia is part of 
the history of Australia’s first immigration program, in which 
tens of thousands of DPs were brought out on ships from the 
DP camps in Germany and Italy to Australia on its mass 
resettlement scheme. For many genuine refugees, Australia 
was ‘the farthest place’, far removed from the Europe of old 
race hatreds that had led to the concentration camps of World 
War II; for others, Australia was a country of last resort. 
Zentai’s own application for refugee status, for example, lists 
Canada and Argentina as countries of preference for 
immigration. There is no mention of Australia. Contemporary 
observers were often struck by how comparatively easy it 
could be, if you were non-Jewish and ‘fit’, to get in to 
Australia when applications elsewhere had failed. Ron 
Maslyn Williams—on location in Germany in 1949 to make 
Mike and Stefani (1952)—wrote to his boss at the 
Commonwealth Film Unit, Stanley Hawes: ‘As one intelligent 
DP put it to me “It is Australia or Siberia or 
starvation…Australia is the gambler’s shot”. Moreover, “quite 
literally, very many IRO officials regard Australia as a kind of 
modern Van Dieman’s (sic) land where they can dump the 
people who constitute IRO’s problem”.’  
The Australian authorities, for their part, counted physical 
attributes above all else as criteria for migration: one needed 
to be fit, preferably young and, more preferably still, fair-
skinned. Until 1960, humanitarian principles did not inform 
motives for assisted refugee migration—pragmatism did. 
Australia needed to expand its labour force and its 
population, and the only way that the government could sell 
its scheme of mass migration was by assuring its public that it 
remained committed to the principles of a ‘White Australia’ 
                                                 






on which the Commonwealth was founded. Jews were 
especially unwelcome. Immediately after the war the 
government announced a humanitarian scheme to permit the 
arrival of concentration camp victims with Australian 
relatives; the scheme was met by antisemitic protest, and in 
response, the immigration minister Arthur Calwell 
introduced a quota system, in which only 25 percent of each 
ship carrying migrants could comprise Jews. These would be 
admitted only on the grounds of their potential contribution 
to Australia's economy, not on humanitarian grounds.65  
As Klaus Neumann has written: ‘Suitable non-British 
settlers were young, educated and healthy and, ideally, 
possessed certain racial features. Australian selection teams 
preferred vigorous, flaxen-haired, fair-skinned and blue-eyed 
young men and women from the Baltic countries who did not 
or could not return to the Soviet Union.’ These were to 
resemble Australia's ‘own kind’ as closely as possible.66 
Beyond this, a philosophy of assimilation governed 
immigration policy and popular attitudes towards new 
arrivals. Immigrants, labelled ‘New Australians’, were 
expected to merge, quickly and quietly, into the Australian 
cultural and social landscape. This kind of thinking also 
implied, of course, that people's political pasts were as 
irrelevant as their cultural pasts—a slate wiped clean by the 
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promise of Australian acculturation. 
The Zentais ticked the right boxes: ‘fit worker’ is 
handwritten across both Károly and Rozsa’s migration 
selection forms.67 In March 1949, Zentai, his wife Rozsa, their 
two sons born after the war, and Zentai’s older sister, Julia, 
were at Tuttlingen in southern Germany’s French zone, where 
they were interviewed and accepted by the Australian 
Migration Team for resettlement in Australia. Zentai’s 
screening card twice states that he arrived in Germany on 9 
March 1949, and that he had ‘fled from the Communist Party’. 
His wife’s card indicates the same information. The 
accompanying resettlement card from the IRO, which 
establishes their status as DPs, also states that Zentai and his 
wife were in Budafok between 1945 and 1949, and that their 
son Gabor was born in Budafok, Hungary, in 1946.  
Except that he wasn’t, and they weren’t. Documents held 
by the International Tracing Service (ITS) tell a different story. 
The ITS, located in Bad Arolsen in Germany, is a massive 
storage house of SS records of the death camps, yet it also 
holds the records created by the Allies in the DP camps. 
Zentai’s file includes his application for refugee assistance to 
the IRO, and lists his places of residence from 1938 onwards: 
in March 1945 he was already on his way to Dietersburg, 
Bavaria, where he arrived, according to the information he 
provided, on 19 April 1945 and remained until March 1948. A 
document dated 14 August 1946 confirms that he, his wife, his 
sister and his son, Gabor, born 26 February of that year, were 
in Dietersburg. His son Gabor is twice recorded as having 
been born in Arnstorf, Bavaria. Another, dated 15 July 1947, 
indicates that Zentai was temporarily in Kösslarn, in the 
district of Griesbach, also in Bavaria.  
In his application for IRO assistance, a routine statutory 
declaration states that Karl Zentai was ‘never a member of the 
                                                 





Arrow Cross or any political party and never committed any 
atrocities’. It is signed by Zentai and three witnesses, dated 12 
March 1948 at the Hungarian office (Ungarisches Büro) in 
Pfarrkirchen. A handwritten statement by an IRO officer 
concludes: ‘On account of credibility of the statement of the 
Hungarian office and the witnesses he should be found 
eligible for refugee status with IRO assistance. Refuses to 
return home for the present regime there—no political 
freedoms.’68 
None of these official records hint at the warrant for his 
arrest issued by the Budapest People’s Court in April 1948, 
despite the fact that his whereabouts were well known to the 
Hungarian authorities. The warrant even lists an address, ‘the 
American occupation zone in Germany, where his address at 
present is…Furth in Pfarrkirchen district with farmer Jakob 
Schneiderbauer’.69 It appears that Zentai was able to make his 
way safely to Tuttlingen almost one year after the warrant 
was issued. Was the warrant ever communicated to the Allied 
Occupation Forces in Germany, and if so, why was it ignored? 
Did Zentai know about his warrant? The answers to these 
questions, of course, can only be speculative. Yet the 
inconsistencies in the records as to his whereabouts for the 
four years between 1945 and 1949 seem to indicate some kind 
of attempt to cover his tracks. In his recent interviews with the 
media, Zentai has never tried to deny that he was already 
living under the protection of the Allied Occupation Forces in 
Germany from 1945. Why then did he lie about his 
whereabouts in 1949? I contend that his decision was 
strategic: rewriting those four years in this way so as to 
convey that he was coming from Hungary in 1949 rather than 
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1945 distanced his decision to leave Hungary from the imme-
diate aftermath of World War II, thus making it simpler to 
argue that he was ‘fleeing the Communists’, as so many other 
East Europeans were doing in the years of 1948 and 1949.  
Moreover, as Zentai’s case makes clear, the DP camps, and 
their route to Australia, could provide avenues of escape for 
those wishing to avoid retribution or exposure. It was well 
known to contemporaries that a number of collaborators and 
war criminals were hiding in the DP camps. G Daniel Cohen 
has examined the extensive technologies of screening and 
identification developed by the IRO, which took over from the 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
(UNRRA) in 1947, to determine the authenticity of refugees 
and displaced persons. It was a daunting task, but according 
to IRO officials, ‘of first importance in its work’.70 Refugees 
were now required to fill in numerous forms and 
questionnaires, yet as Cohen explains, if there was no 
apparent reason for exclusion, that is, if they seemed to fit the 
story they presented, they were not required to prove their 
right to be included as eligible. IRO officers received manuals 
that included sample cases and historical information to guide 
their decisions, and were taught how to detect untrue 
statements, yet in practice their mission to cleanse the system 
of ineligibles was often frustrated. Visitors reported that the 
‘right answers’ to IRO questionnaires were circulating in the 
camps; further, it was clear to IRO officials that many simply 
destroyed their identity papers and made up new ones. Dates 
of displacement were frequently altered during interrogations 
to make their applications more plausible. Within the IRO, 
Cohen quotes, it was commonly believed that ‘after many 
months of observation and listening, the DPs are told what to 
say and know how to craft an acceptable story leading to 
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Over one million people arrived in Australia under 
various immigration schemes by the end of the 1950s, and 
there are estimates that even in its earliest years, 4,000 to 5,000 
Nazis may have found sanctuary there, most of them from 
East-Central Europe.72 As Konrad Kwiet notes, during the 
screening process they lied about their wartime activities, 
usually claiming to have been subjected to ‘forced labour’ or 
‘deportation to Germany’. ‘In reality’, he writes, ‘many of 
them had actively enthusiastically assisted the Nazis. Their 
claims concealed “police work”, military and Waffen SS 
service and participation in killing operations’. 73  
This should also be viewed in the context of a broader 
Allied retreat from the issue of denazification and 
punishment of wartime activities. Zentai was in Germany at 
the very moment that Europe’s postwar memory was being 
moulded, by all sides, around the notion of German guilt, in 
which all responsibility for the war was made to lie squarely 
at the feet of the Germans. This focus on Germany meant the 
postwar status of other countries could be resolved. Thus 
Austria was retrospectively declared the ‘first victim’ of Nazi 
aggression and with Austria’s innocence assured, the 
responsibilities of other non-German nationals in Europe 
were similarly eradicated.74 As the Cold War deepened, the 
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Allies were determined to avoid alienating Austria and 
Germany, and this meant removing attention from the past. 
‘In a process that would have been unthinkable in 1945’, Judt 
wrote, ‘the identification and punishment of active Nazis in 
German-speaking Europe had effectively ended by 1948 and 
was a forgotten issue by the early fifties’.75 
IRO policy also reflected a softening towards those who 
previously may have been denied eligibility as collaborators. 
Ideological motives for assisting enemy forces, for example, 
became as important as their actions during the war; in other 
words, if someone had voluntarily enlisted in the German 
army because they wanted to oppose the Soviet regime, this 
was reason enough for inclusion. DP claims of anti-
Communist sympathies and fear of Communist persecution 
began to carry as much, if not more, weight than claims of 
Nazi persecution. ‘By 1950, refugees deemed "imposters" or 
"security threats" in the days of UNRRA were now offered 
the chance to emigrate to Australia or the North American 
continent.’76  
This strategic refocusing of attention away from the crimes 
of the past identified by Judt was enormously significant for 
the thousands, if not millions, whose wartime pasts were 
being reframed by a deliberate process of forgetting and 
denial, and whose identities were recast as refugees of an 
oppressive Communist regime. Australia’s own role in this 
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history was one of passivity and equally, one of denial.77 In 
the 1950s, protests by the Australian Jewish community over 
the migration of Nazis and their collaborators were even-
tually silenced by the continuing apathy and even hostility to 
their campaign.78 The politics and ideology of anti-
Communism coloured government rhetoric and attitudes to 
the evidence of Nazi war criminals and collaborators living in 
Australia, and governed the state’s failure to act.79 This was 
made explicit in the official response in 1961 to a request by 
the USSR for the extradition of an Estonian immigrant Ervin 
Viks, who was accused of murdering 12,000 Jews and Roma 
in the Tartu concentration camp. The Liberal government of 
Robert Menzies refused. In a speech defending the decision, 
Australian Attorney General Sir Garfield Barwick declared 
that against the ‘utter abhorrence’ felt by Australians against 
war crimes, ‘there is the right of this nation, by receiving 
people into this country to enable men to turn their backs on 
past bitternesses and to make a new life for themselves in a 
happier community’. He concluded, in what has become an 
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infamous phrase: ‘the time has come to close the chapter’.80  
This directive to forget in order to create ‘new lives’ and a 
‘happier community’ became a prevailing ethos in the next 
few decades, assisted by the fact that there was no legal 
framework established for extradition or prosecution of 
suspected war criminals. This changed briefly in the late 1980s 
when, under the Hawke Labor government, a special inquiry 
was set up to investigate allegations of Nazi war criminals 
living here, inspired largely by the forensic investigations of 
journalist Mark Aarons in a series of reports for ABC radio 
and television, which resulted in the Menzies Report. 
Controversial legislation was passed in parliament enabling 
Australian courts to prosecute suspects for war crimes (War 
Crimes Amendment Act, 1988)81. Most importantly, a Special 
Investigation Unit (SIU) was created within the federal 
Attorney General’s department to investigate suspected war 
criminals. In its five short years of operation, there were 843 
investigations, three individuals charged and tried in 
Adelaide, with no successful conviction.82 In 1992, the SIU 
was closed down, and responsibility for following up war 
crimes’ accusations delegated to the federal police, who were 
either unwilling or unable to investigate them. It was, in 
Kwiet’s words, ‘a clear signal that the second chapter of the 
war crimes debate in Australia was closed’. During his brief 
tenure as chief historian for the SIU, Kwiet observed both the 
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negative, ‘even damning’ attitude that prevailed within the 
legal fraternity towards war crimes’ legislation and the 
proceedings themselves; and the frequent indifference of the 
Australian public. He recalls: 
In the public domain the war crimes debate had, in my view, 
little, if any impact on public awareness and memory… The 
public proceedings in Adelaide took place in front of empty 
galleries. Quite popular in the scant media coverage were 
references to the accused as ‘nice neighbours’ or ‘old’ and 
‘sick’ pensioners. For the overwhelming majority of 
Australians, the news of the closure of the SIU went almost 
unnoticed. 83 
David Fraser has also noted that the presence of 
unpunished perpetrators never became part of the cultural or 
political dynamic of Australian national identity or Australian 
values.84 Yet others have recognised that in spite of a lethargic 
community response to war crimes trials, these are important 
forums for producing cosmopolitan ideals of justice and 
human rights. They also affirm the role of history, in the form 
of evidence that 'things happened', in justice work and in the 
work of remembrance. 
Although the legal framework was successfully developed 
by the SIU in the late 1980s, the resources for the investigation 
of people who have committed war crimes overseas have not 
been forthcoming and there have been no charges laid since.85 
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The Wiesenthal Centre recently listed Australia as the ‘only 
major country of refuge’ and former diplomat Fergus Hansen, 
in a recent report compiled for the Lowy Institute, writes that 
Australia ‘has inadvertently become a safe haven for war 
criminals’. This is certainly the impression Australia has been 
giving the world, and presumably its war criminals, for some 
time. Hansen notes that there are indications war criminals 
have come here from Afghanistan, Palestine, Sri Lanka, 
Nepal, Sierra Leone, India, Cambodia, Iran, Iraq, Chile, 
Lebanon, Nigeria, Bangladesh, the former Yugoslavia, 
possibly Rwanda and East Timor as well, among other 
countries.86  
The twilight of memory and the struggle for historical 
justice 
Zentai’s appeal against his extradition to Australia’s Federal 
Court in April 2008 failed, with Federal Court judge John 
Gilmour finding that there was no reason why Zentai should 
not be extradited to face trial. The court agreed to bail for 
Zentai on the grounds of ill health, and his lawyers took the 
case to the Minister for Home Affairs, O’Connor. This appeal 
failed, and Zentai was ruled fit to travel. This time Zentai’s 
lawyers based the justification for their appeal on the 
argument that the offence for which Zentai is convicted did 
not constitute a war crime at the time it was committed. The 
implications of an argument such as this, although not new, 
are momentous, legitimising what was, in effect, a fascist 
regime at the time and putting forward the quite 
extraordinary idea that for Jews like Balázs, being beaten to 
death was somehow lawful. A similar argument was made 
during the Nuremberg Trials, in which the question of 
                                                 
86 Hansen, Fergus (2009), ‘Confronting Reality: Responding to War 
Criminals in Australia’, Policy Brief, Lowy Institute for International 





whether the 24 German leaders87 should have to answer for 
actions rendered illegal after the fact—ex-post-facto—was put 
forward by the defence. The prosecuting lawyers never 
conceded this point, arguing that the charges were grounded 
in international law and what they called a common law of 
nations. Such an argument suggested that the accused had no 
idea they were acting illegally, an argument without merit in 
the minds of contemporary observers: murder is murder. The 
legality of the charge of war crimes was upheld at 
Nuremberg, and it is commendable that Federal Court judge 
John Gilmour resisted such logic today.  
His lawyers successfully appealed the decision, taking it 
back to the Federal Court. In July 2010, Justice Neil 
McKerracher ruled that the Government had made an ‘error 
of law’ in agreeing to extradite him, and that the crime for 
which Zentai was charged was not an extraditable offence 
under the Extradition Act. Zentai returned home, but in 2011 
the Federal Government returned to the High Court for 
another appeal, seeking a ruling on what constitutes a war 
crime. It is thought that such a ruling will have a significant 
impact on Australia’s extradition regime.  
Zentai has clearly led an exemplary life in Australia. He is 
the embodiment of the multicultural ideal, a man who 
worked, brought up a family here and settled quietly into the 
suburban landscape. It is not easy to watch a frail elderly man 
being hauled in front of the courts to face trial. He might, 
despite all the evidence, be innocent. There are powerful 
incentives to simply turn our collective back on this story and 
let the old man be. But are we also prepared to accept a 
statute of limitations on war crimes or crimes against 
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humanity? Is there a time when it is too late for justice? ‘That 
the past slips into the oblivion of forgetting does not change 
its moral nature’, writes Booth. ‘The passage of time may dull 
our recollection of events, but it does not erase the (morally 
weighty) fact of their having happened nor the wrong 
involved in them.’88  
Mnemonic struggles over past wars and injustices have 
become common sites of battle over the legacies of the past in 
contemporary politics and law. How far the practice of 
retribution and punishment can generate reconciliation and 
acknowledgement is recognisably limited. Punishment, writes 
Jeffrey Olick, ‘cannot be the ultimate measure of how a society 
has “dealt” with its past’. This was one of the lessons of 
Nuremberg, which despite its importance in forcing a certain 
truth to be told and for establishing moral and legal 
precedents had its costs as well, ‘providing an alibi for an 
expertly equivocating population eager to lay the blame on a 
narrow "clique"’.89 As Booth writes, the trial of a perpetrator 
inevitably looks to individual accountability in its 
proceedings. ‘In regimes where there was a gray area of 
collaboration and passive acquiescence or even support, that 
creates a very narrow focus…The co-responsibility of a people 
and state does not readily fit into the horizon of a courtroom 
proceeding, which looks for bloody hands that no one except 
the direct perpetrators will have.’90 
The question remains: will Zentai’s extradition and trial 
promote the cause of historical justice? Or will it, rather, 
reinforce the dominant mythology of a ‘few bad apples’? 
What is most fascinating, and disturbing, are the ways in 
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which an affair of memory of this kind is able to be 
appropriated and subsumed by the dominant historical 
narrative, reinforcing rather than challenging historical 
myths. The danger is that what Zentai’s case reveals about the 
past will be rewritten by the language of contemporary 
prejudices rather than illuminate those of history. 
Andreas Huyssen has described our time as the twilight of 
memory. ‘Twilight’, he writes, ‘is that moment of the day that 
foreshadows the night of forgetting, but that seems to slow 
time itself, an in-between state in which the last light of the 
day may still play out its ultimate marvels. It is memory’s 
privileged time.’91 As did Levi, Huyssen believes the struggle 
for memory is also a struggle for history. When we think of 
the Holocaust today, we often imagine our present time in 
terms of it being ‘too late’ for justice. But perhaps today, 
despite the risk of what I have outlined above, in this brief 
twilight of Holocaust time when victims and perpetrators are 
gradually leaving our world behind, we should be ensuring 
that these cases are told and not forgotten. Justice, not 
memory, is the antonym of forgetting, writes Booth. ‘In other 
words, the imperative to remember is not the leaden voice of 
what has gone before, but rather it is the call of justice 
insisting on the irreversibility and persistence of what has 
been done, its claims on us which are neither diminished nor 
augmented by the extra-moral passing of time, and which call 
on us to bear these injustices in mind.’92 History’s purpose is 
to give meaning to the present even as it seeks knowledge of 
the past; justice, or the attempt at it, however flawed and 
incomplete, belongs squarely within the historical project of 
understanding. A 1987 cartoon by Ben Sargent about the 
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Klaus Barbie trial in France remains pertinent: ‘It's been more 
than forty years’, a younger man remarks. ‘Why are we 
hunting down a bunch of pathetic old men just to prosecute 
them for…er…uh…well, you know…uh…whatever that stuff 
was they did…?’ The older man replies: ‘That's precisely 
why.’93 
As Huyssen writes, ‘the inner temporality and the politics 
of Holocaust memory, however, even where it speaks of the 
past, must be directed towards the future. The future will not 
judge us for forgetting but for remembering all too well and 
still not acting in accordance with those memories’.94 Zentai’s 
case is not just about Zentai. The important question of a 
regime and a country that enabled, indeed encouraged, the 
murder of thousands of Jews like Péter Balázs, and a country 
that then gave murderers refuge and even prosperity is still to 
be addressed. It is about the legacy of both countries in the 
denial and silencing of a ‘memory of offence’, and a 
responsibility towards our present and their future. 
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This essay examines the evolution, since antiquity, of the 
forcible transfer of children by dominant groups at the 
expense of subordinate groups. It traces the development of 
the intentions, motivations and justifications behind this 
practice. Deliberate, systematic mass abduction and forced 
assimilation have enabled the exploitation of children as 
working slaves, as sexual chattels, as deft or supple skilled 
workers, and as ‘substitute’ progeny. This study highlights 
aspects of the phenomenon across societies and generations. It 
is designed to provide a broad background to the defining of 
the forcible transfer of children as an act of genocide, an act 
deemed criminal in international law since 1948.  
The United Nations Convention on the Punishment and 
Prevention of the Crime of Genocide1 identifies five acts that can 
constitute the crime, any one of which when conducted ‘with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group’, constitutes genocide. The first four 
acts2 are linked by the common element of the physical 
extermination of, or physical harm to, human life. Article II(e) 
stands out because while it still involves a systematic attack 
on the group’s essential foundations, it does not involve the 
actual extinction or attempted destruction of biological life. 
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How then does the forcible transfer of children3 achieve a 
perpetrator’s aim of destroying a targeted group? Where did 
the drafters of the Genocide Convention (including the Polish 
jurist Raphael Lemkin) find cause to include this behaviour as 
a criminal act in the legal definition of genocide? An 
examination of a series of case studies across history may 
provide some answers. 
While child removal by governmental entities has taken 
place since antiquity, it is only in the last century that these 
acts have been deemed genocidal. Specific cases show that a 
defining element has been the intent of the perpetrators to 
destroy their chosen victim groups—in whole or in part—
through the removal of their young and ‘processing’ them 
into a new culture or belief system. This was usually, but not 
always, carried out in addition to the more typical methods 
employed in the physical destruction of targeted groups. Nazi 
Germany, for example, removed and ‘Germanised’ some 
200,000 Polish, Russian, Ukrainian and other European 
children, but systematically murdered 1.1 million Jewish 
children.  
Enslavement and voluntary assimilation 
The employment of means of killing en masse as ‘solutions’ to 
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social, political and economic problems have been recorded 
since earliest history. Thus, The Iliad by Homer, the Old 
Testament, and the archives of the Assyrian and Neo-
Babylonian Empires contain the earliest accounts of targeted 
mass murder. These events also typically involved the 
wholesale transfer of captive children and teenagers for use as 
manual, skilled, domestic, and sexual slaves. 
These situations differ from their later counterparts in the 
nature of the perpetrators’ intent. The victors did not enslave 
tens of thousands of children and youth to destroy their 
opponents as distinct groups. Their defeat on the field of 
battle and subsequent destruction of their military capabilities 
were the aims of the victorious kings and generals who 
ordered the forced transfers of the underage persons. Forcible 
transfer of the young was most often a byproduct of the 
subjugation of the vanquished. 
The rise of Islam and the Arab Empire from the mid-600s 
CE brought a major shift in attitude towards the enslavement 
of humans and transfer of youth. The Prophet Mohammed 
forbade free-born Muslims being made slaves.4 Yet the 
economic requirements of the Caliphate demanded the 
continuation of the slave trade. The dilemma was resolved by 
sourcing slaves from among the non-Muslim peoples of sub-
Saharan Africa and Europe. These new slaves were, in time, 
converted to Mohammed’s faith, ensuring that these children 
would be able to live their lives as free and equal citizens. 
Thus victim group children were actively and passively 
encouraged to abandon their original identities and assimilate 
into the dominant group. The practice became state policy 
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and resulted in a substantial increase in the numbers of the 
dominant group at the expense of the subjugated.  
Over centuries, the subject groups would cease to exist as 
they could no longer reproduce themselves and sustain their 
ethnicity and culture. An illustrative example is the 
indigenous Assyrian population of Mesopotamia (modern 
southeast Turkey and northern Iraq). In the period of 13 
centuries since the Islamic conquest of their homeland, the 
Assyrians have changed from being the largest group in their 
homeland to a minority so small it is clinging to its very 
existence. 
Lemkin and his Genocide Convention drafting colleagues 
had these practices in mind when they included the act of 
forcible transfer of children in their genocide definition. In the 
opening paragraph of the chapter on ‘Genocide’ in his 1944 
work, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, Lemkin states that the 
term genocide ‘is intended rather to signify a co-ordinated plan 
of different actions aiming at the destruction of the essential 
foundations of life of national groups, with the aim of 
annihilating the groups themselves’.5 Albeit a long-term 
method, child removal was seen as a serious contribution to 
the eventual annihilation or decimation of a group.  
Devshirme 
The Islamic Arab Empire’s system of recruiting 
administrators and fighters from amongst non-Muslim slaves 
and prisoners of war was adapted by the Ottoman Turkish 
Empire. Founded in 1299 by Sultan Uthman I,6 it was under 
his successor, Orkhan,7 that a revolutionary tax was 
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introduced, the devshirme.8 Payment was made in the form of 
children, collected from the empire’s Christian subjects alone.  
Under Sultan Murad II,9 the devshirme became regulated. 
Ottoman soldiers and army doctors would tour rural areas of 
the Empire to draft recruits from among children aged six to 
16. According to historian Artak Shakaryan, this range was so 
wide because the physical appearance of the child was more 
important than his or her actual age. ‘A devshirme child had to 
be healthy, not too tall or too short and not too fat or too 
thin.’10 Children who were collected and brought to 
Constantinople (today’s Istanbul) would be shown to 
devshirme specialists. Based primarily on their physical 
characteristics, but also on verbal tests, these ‘experts’ would 
suggest in which realm the removed children would be 
suitable. The most attractive and intelligent were sent to the 
palace; others were absorbed by Jannisary Corps (military 
musketeer units); the rest were sold as slaves. Available 
sources allow us to approximate that 60 per cent of the 
children would be enslaved, 30 percent would become 
Janissaries, and only 10 percent would go to the palace. Until 
the mid-1600s, those who went to the court of the Sultan 
dominated the imperial government. They were totally reliant 
on the Sultan for their wealth and power, but their sons, as 
free-born Muslims, could not inherit their positions.11 
As Bat Ye’or wrote in The Decline of Eastern Christianity 
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under Islam, the offspring of ‘dhimmis’12 were regarded as a 
reservoir of slaves for economic or political purposes. In 1836, 
for example, Sultan Mahmud II (Adli) ordered the dispatch of 
Armenian children and teenagers aged eight to 15 years from 
Sevasteia (modern Sivas) and other Anatolian towns to the 
imperial capital where they were put to work at the spinning 
mill, royal shipyard, to manufacture ship sails and produce 
iron in the foundries. Payment consisted of bread and 
clothing. Avedis Perperean, writing in 1871, recorded that:  
this order is renewed year after year and they collect 
hundreds of Armenian children from every town, depriving 
them of their parents and their homeland, and during this 
thirty-day march in bare feet and rags, take them to 
Constantinople. Several die of cold and want on the way and 
later through the tyranny of their masters, while others 
convert to Islam, hoping thus to obtain their freedom.13 
The devshirme met the need for personnel in the empire—at 
the expense of their Christian subjects. Generations of future 
leaders and potential opponents were systematically removed 
by the Ottoman state. The devshirme served different needs of 
the rising imperial power. First, it gave the Ottoman Turks a 
legitimate solution to their ‘problem’ of how to deal with 
thousands of prisoners of war captured from various 
Christian rival states. Second, it provided the (until recently) 
nomadic Turkic tribes with the knowledge of administration 
required to maintain an empire. Third, and arguably the most 
important asset, it provided the Ottoman Turkish state with a 
means of population control.  
When the Turkic tribes first invaded Anatolia in 1061, they 
were a small, powerful, warrior elite. They had subjected a 
large non-Muslim population through force of arms while still 
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a small minority. The system of the devshirme permitted the 
new rulers to methodically enfeeble their non-Muslim subject 
populations by forcibly removing a portion of their children 
at regular intervals. Over the lifetime of the Ottoman Empire 
(almost six centuries), the devshirme played a major role in 
reversing the demographic face of Anatolia. During this 
period, the territory went from being almost exclusively 
Christian in population in the 1000s, to having an Islamic 
majority by the 1800s. While the intent of the Ottoman Court 
may not have been intentionally genocidal in the 
Convention’s sense, the effect of policies and practices such as 
the devshirme was definitely genocidal.  
Colonial contexts 
Just as their European rivals did, from the mid-1000s the 
Seljuk and Ottoman Sultans dominated peoples and lands 
other than their own. The Turkish Sultans looked to their 
Islamic religion for explanation and justification of how they 
came to dominate the Near East. In a similar way, the 
European colonisers looked initially to religion for 
explanations of their world views. The Renaissance and the 
subsequent Scientific Revolution meant that theological 
justification did not satisfy as it once did. Science was looked 
to as a means of providing more rational analyses. One result 
of this fusion of theology and science was the movement that 
came to be known as ‘scientific racism’—which may be 
defined as ‘the attempt to develop biological solutions for 
social problems’, typically building upon theological 
foundations. According to Robert Proctor, it ‘was an 
explanatory program, but it was also a political program, 
designed to reinforce certain power relations as natural and 
inevitable’.14 In the words of social philosopher David Hume 
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(regarded as the father of the social sciences): 
I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the 
Whites. There scarcely ever was a civilised nation of that 
complexion, nor even any individual, eminent either in action 
or in speculation. No ingenious manufacture among them, no 
arts, no sciences.15 
The emergence of this school of thought from the 1800s 
rapidly brought an impact on the indigenous peoples of a 
number of territories colonised by European powers and by 
the British Empire in particular. Unlike their continental 
European rivals, which preferred to maintain social and 
familial barriers between conquerors and conquered, the 
British instituted the assimilation of the indigenous peoples of 
a number of the territories they colonised—Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, the United States as the most prominent 
examples.  
An outcome of the social revolution brought about by the 
explosion of scientific knowledge of the 1800s was the 
incorporation of the ‘racial’ element to existing religious 
prejudices. This ‘scientific racism’ was particularly applied to 
indigenous peoples in British colonies and dominions as 
highlighted by the forcible transfer and accompanying 
assimilation of indigenous youth. ‘Scientific’ justification was 
provided by academics, theological justification from 
clergymen, and bureaucratic ‘social’ justification for the 
abduction of children and teenagers from hearth and home, 
ostensibly ‘for their own good’. 
Western eugenicists in the early 1900s were aware of the 
Janissary phenomenon. As recorded by Henry Morgenthau, 
converts, voluntary and forced,  
strengthen the Empire as the Janissaries had strengthened it 
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formerly. These Armenian girls represent a high type of 
womanhood and the Young Turks, in their crude, intuitive 
way, recognised that the mingling of their blood with the 
Turkish population would exert a eugenic influence upon the 
whole.16 
A similar principle was at work in colonial Canada, America, 
Australia and New Zealand—not so much for the 
improvement of the British ‘bloodline’ by absorbing the 
indigenous peoples but as a way of eliminating a threat to the 
colonists’ designs for their new lands. In these plans, non-
Europeans were assigned subservient roles, if they were 
permitted to retain a distinct identity at all. 
The Canadian residential school system, for example, 
consisted of a number of institutions for indigenous children, 
operated since the 1800s by churches of various 
denominations (about 60 per cent Roman Catholic, and 30 per 
cent Protestant). They were funded under the Indian Act by 
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, a branch of the federal 
government. The schools’ purpose was ‘to take the Indian out 
of the Queen’s Red Children’ according to the Gradual 
Civilization Act (1857) under which the system was 
implemented.17 Students were often forcibly removed from 
their homes, parents, and communities. Most had no contact 
with their families for up to ten months at a time because of 
the distance from home. Often, they did not have contact with 
their families for years at a time. The locations of the schools 
were planned deliberately to ensure a ‘proper distance’ from 
the reserves. They were required to stay in residences on 
school premises, often walled or fortified in some manner. 
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Students were prohibited from speaking indigenous 
languages, so that English or French would be successfully 
learned and their own languages forgotten. They were subject 
to often unreasonably severe corporal punishment for 
speaking other languages or practising non-Christian faiths. 
The process of phasing out these institutions began in the 
1970s and the last one did not close its doors until 1996.18 
Australia’s practice of forcible child removal was assuredly 
the most thorough in the colonial context. Europeans had 
been visiting various parts of the Australian coast from the 
1600s. The invasion and colonisation of the continent was 
undertaken by the British from 1788. Europeans rapidly 
spread out from the harbour now known as Sydney, 
colonising the country within 14 decades. The fierce resistance 
of the indigenous people was no match for the technological 
superiority of the European colonists. By 1860, the Parliament 
of the Colony of South Australia had been presented with a 
report declaring that the country’s indigenous inhabitants 
were doomed to extinction.19 A few years later (1873), the 
English writer Anthony Trollope wrote that the ‘doom’ of the 
Australian Aborigines ‘is to be exterminated, fragments of 
them only remain’.20 
In The Australian Race, E M Carr stated that ‘the White race 
seems destined, not to absorb, but to exterminate the Blacks of 
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Australia’.21 The question of the dominant Europeans 
‘absorbing’ the minority indigenous population largely grew 
out of the emergence of a new ‘mixed race’ population in 
Australia. Since the earliest days of British colonisation, 
European men had been taking Aboriginal women as sexual 
partners. As late as the 1890s, evidence was being presented 
to colonial parliamentary inquiries that the abduction and 
rape of Aboriginal women was common.22 The result of these 
(typically involuntary) unions was the population of ‘mixed 
race’ children. ‘Full-blood’ indigenous Australians were 
deemed to be a ‘dying race’ and therefore of little conse-
quence; these ‘mixed race’ youngsters were deemed to be a 
threat to the dream of an Australia that was ‘white’ and 
British.  
Morgan Blum states that the solution hit upon for this 
‘Aboriginal problem’ in newly-independent Australia was 
through biological absorption.23 In brief, Aboriginal children 
were to be removed from their families, educated in state and 
private institutions as livestock and agricultural labourers or 
domestic servants, and severed from all contact with their 
native people and culture. Such removals, or ‘retentions’ of 
Aboriginal children, began as systematic policy in colony 
Victoria as early as 1839. The Colonial Secretary of New South 
Wales stated during a debate in that state’s parliament on the 
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Aborigines Protection Amendment Bill on 27 January 1915: 
The Aboriginals will soon become a negligible quantity and 
the young people will merge into the present civilisation and 
become worthy citizens… It is not a question of stealing the 
children but saving them. The moral status of these 
Aboriginals is very different from that of white people.24 
Although Social Darwinist ideology held that the 
Aboriginal ‘race’ would sooner or later die out, it was decided 
that the process was to be hastened by ‘breeding them out’. 
From 1839, the colony of Victoria began removing Aboriginal 
children from their families. In 1909, C F Gale, Chief Protector 
of Aborigines in the state of Western Australia, reported the 
view of one of his inspectors on taking children from their 
mothers: ‘no matter how frantic her momentary grief might 
be at this time, they soon forget their offspring’.25 Years later, 
in 1937, a federal–state government conference on Native 
Welfare adopted a resolution that stated, in part, that ‘the 
destiny of the natives of aboriginal origin, but not of the full 
blood, lies in their ultimate absorption by the people of the 
Commonwealth, and it therefore recommends that all efforts 
be directed to that end.’26 
Those removed have come to be called the Stolen 
Generations, a term coined by historian Peter Read in 1981. 
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Political scientist Robert Manne suggests that ‘approximately 
20,000 to 25,000’ were removed between 1910 and 1970, based 
on the Australian Bureau of Statistics report of 1994.27 The 
figure may be substantially higher as the report noted that 
formal records of removals were very poorly kept, and many 
records ‘went missing’ when inquiries began. Although very 
few children of full Aboriginal descent were removed, ‘half-
castes’—the children of ‘mixed descent’—were the most 
targeted. Estimates were given that between 10 and 30 per 
cent of all Aboriginal children born during the period were 
removed by state and federal authorities. 
As young men formally educated in the early 1900s, 
Lemkin and his colleagues would have been exposed to 
eugenicist teachings during their secondary and tertiary 
educations. Such Social Darwinism as practised in Australia 
was the predominant ideology in the Western world. 
Therefore, the forcible transfers of indigenous children and 
teenagers in Oceania and North America into state-run 
institutions during the lifetimes of Lemkin and his colleagues 
provided them with an immediacy of experience. That was 
significant to their later work on codifying genocide and the 
relationship of children to this crime. 
The Hellenic, Armenian and Assyrian genocides 
Samantha Power, writing in ‘A Problem from Hell’: America and 
the age of genocide, highlights the impact that knowledge of the 
Armenian Genocide had on Lemkin from his student days at 
the University of Lvov (modern Lvyv, Ukraine).28 In his 
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unpublished essay, ‘Nature of Genocide’, Lemkin compared 
the treatment of the Moriscos29 with the deportation marches 
of the Armenians. His conclusion was that ‘techniques of 
physical genocide have repeated themselves through 
history’.30 Attacks on the family unit constitute biological 
methods of genocide. Lemkin specifically cited the Ottoman 
Turkish Empire as another recurring theme in the history of 
genocide: ‘The children can be taken away from a given group 
for the purpose of educating them within the framework of 
another human group, racial, religious, national or ethnical’.31 
Robert Kempner, responsible for preparing the cases 
against the leading Nazis at Nuremberg, had earlier written a 
legal paper on the Armenian genocide.32 The forcible transfer 
of Christian Hellene, Armenian and Assyrian children by the 
Ottoman state, its auxiliaries and successors was ‘an integral 
part of the Hellenic, Armenian and Assyrian genocides (1914–
1924) and a key historical precedent to the inclusion of the 
forcible transfer of children as an act of genocide.’  
Amid the (till then) unprecedented civilian death toll of the 
triple genocide that wracked Anatolia for a decade, the 
forcible transfer of tens of thousands of children and 
teenagers is an oft overlooked aspect of the deliberate 
destruction of the indigenous peoples of Anatolia.33 Taner 
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Akçam and others have recognised that the pre-World War I 
pogrom against the Hellenes in eastern Thrace and western 
Anatolia constituted a dress rehearsal for the Armenian 
Genocide. The Danish Consul in Smyrne (modern Izmir) 
reported in March 1914 that the provincial valis (governors-
general) had conducted tours of inspection of coastal 
settlements. They advised the local Muslim leaders to force 
the Hellenic population out, first by economic boycotts; and 
when that did not have the desired effect, by violent 
persecution.34  
The favoured method of killing came to be known as the 
‘white death’ by the Hellene deportees. It was so named 
because it did not involve the shedding of blood. The victims 
were simply marched across Anatolia, without provisions, 
until they dropped by the wayside of hunger, dehydration, 
infection, disease or exposure. Many of those who made it to 
the final destination—the desert of northern Syria—were 
butchered.35 En route, thousands of women and children were 
forcibly removed from the caravans of death by the Ottoman 
guards, by Kurdish tribesmen or by Bedouin nomads. As 
recorded by League of Nations reports, ‘young women and 
girls were kept for the harems; with few exceptions, they 
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were violated as soon as captured’.36 Cities like Harput and 
Mezreh became centres of the trade in Armenian, Hellene 
and Assyrian slaves, 
where the most desirable females, first and foremost women 
of wealthy families, were searched for by local Muslims and 
checked by doctors for diseases etc. If a woman refused to 
follow her new ‘owner’, she was detained by the local 
authorities until she accepted a life in slavery.37 
The Christian captives were forcibly Islamised, renamed 
and assimilated into the households of their captors, either as 
wives or servants. As time went on, the native Armenian, 
Hellenic or Assyrian tongues of these victims came to be 
forgotten. Although the older ones retained some memory of 
their lives before the genocide, the younger ones came to 
forget that they were ever Christian.38 
One of the first individuals to attempt a rescue effort was 
Karen Jeppe. While she was able to affect a few individuals 
during the War years, the sheer scale of the problem was 
overwhelming. Not until the conclusion of the war and the 
occupation of large parts of the Ottoman Empire by the Allied 
powers were large numbers of Armenian, Hellene and 
Assyrian women released from captivity.39 
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Elif Shafak’s novel, The Bastard of Istanbul,40 deals with the 
complexity of the consequences of the forcible removal and 
subsequent forced Islamisation, of Christian children by 
Muslim soldiers and irregulars, three generations after the 
initial events. The novel’s key episode unfolds in this way: 
...a horde of bandits arrived, searching and plundering the 
houses. They stopped and ransacked every Turkish and 
Kurdish village in the region. It didn’t take them long to find 
out that there was a little Armenian girl there… They had 
heard about the orders to deliver all Armenian orphans below 
the age of twelve to the orphanages around the country… 
Like all of the children there she was dressed in a white robe 
and a buttonless, black coat. There were both boys and girls. 
The boys were circumcised and all the children were 
renamed. So was Shushan. Everyone called her Shermin now. 
She was also given a surname: 626.41 
While The Bastard of Istanbul is fiction, there are substantial 
threads of fact running through it. This extract refers, in effect, 
to a renewal of the devshirme. The orphanage Shushan was 
removed to remains nameless in the novel. One of these 
centres was at Aintoura in Ottoman Syria.42 The school 
became home to 800 orphans, 30 soldiers who guarded the 
compound and a staff of 10 Lebanese. The boys were 
circumcised and given Islamic names beginning with the first 
letter of their Armenian names: Haroutiun Najarian became 
Hamid Nazim, Boghos Merdanian became Bekim 
Mohammed, Sarkis Sarafian became Safwad Suleyman. 
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Partly due to director Nebih Bey’s incompetence, poor 
sanitary conditions, disease and malnutrition prevailed, many 
children died, attracting the attention of the central 
government. Aintoura was visited by Cemal Pasha,43 who 
upon arrival dismissed Nebih and appointed Halide Hanum44 
as principal of the orphanage. This aspect of the Aintoura 
story was recorded in a photograph caption in The Lions of 
Marash.45 Cemal also brought 400 new orphans between the 
ages of three and 15 years. They were accompanied by 15 
young women from powerful Turkish families, part of the 40-
strong team whose task was to Islamise and Turkify the 
Christian Armenian orphans. While Lebanon was wracked by 
famine, livestock and grain were available at Aintoura in 
abundance. Education was only in Turkish. The older orphans 
were taught various trades, like shoemaking and carpentry. 
The mullah called the children to prayer five times a day. 
Every night the school band would play ‘Long live Cemal 
Pasha’. 
                                                 
43 Commander of the Syrian-based Fourth Turkish Army, and the 
junior member of the triumvirate that ruled the Ottoman Empire 
between 1913 and 1918. From Pasha, Cemal (1922), Memoirs of a 
Turkish Statesman 1913–1919, New York, George H Doran Company, 
http://archive.org/details/memoriesofturkis00cemarich 
44 Halide Edib Hanum (later known as Halide Edib Adivar, 1884–
1964) was a famous Turkish feminist, author and nationalist. She was 
assisted by five Lebanese nuns from the Sacred Heart Order, who 
were made responsible for sanitation and nutrition. Besides 
Aintoura, Halide Hanum was also responsible for the Sisters of 
Nazareth school in Beirut, until its closure in 1917. Halide had the 
final say on everything, aiming to develop the ideal Turkish 
nationalist educational institution, a model for the new Turkey that 
was to come after the successful conclusion of the war. 
45 The Lions of Marash was written by Stanley E Kerr, President of the 
American University of Beirut. In this volume, Kerr recorded his 
personal experiences working with the Near East Relief organisation 





The Ottoman Army abandoned Lebanon in early 1918, 
with French forces moving in. The orphanage at Aintoura was 
in chaos, the 470 boys and 200 girls abandoned. The Catholic 
clerics approached Bayard Dodge, an officer of the American 
University of Beirut, for assistance; shipments of food began 
to arrive through the American Red Cross. With order 
restored, the process of reversing the Turkification process 
began, by encouraging the use of the orphans’ Armenian 
names.46 
Largely through the efforts of the relief workers 
throughout the Ottoman Empire, the events unfolding were 
made known across the world almost immediately. For 
example, the story of one of the abducted children, Aurora 
Mardiganian, was made into a film in 1918, Ravished Armenia. 
Under the title Auction of Souls, it was screened throughout 
the British Empire, with The Herald newspaper in Melbourne 
advertising screenings in February 1920.47 
The primary source of evidence on the involvement of the 
Turkish state in the forcible transfer of Christian young into 
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Muslim households comes from the Extraordinary Courts 
Martial, instituted by the new Turkish Government in March 
1919 to try officials from the Ittihad ve Terakke i Cemayeti. A 
Turkish commentator, writing in a Turkish-language 
newspaper in Constantinople the following month, described 
these as ‘the most important trial[s] in the six hundred year 
history of the Ottoman Empire’.48 The trials, held in major 
centres across Anatolia in 1919 and 1920, were recorded in the 
official Ottoman government gazette, Takvim-i Vekayi. The 
Courts Martial recorded that the systematic distribution and 
abuse of Armenian females and boys was practised at the 
highest levels of Turkish society. For example, the chief police 
officer of Trapezounta (Trebizond/modern Trabzon), a man 
named Nuri, brought young Christian girls to Constantinople 
as gifts from the Governor-General to members of the Ittihad’s 
central Committee. 
With knowledge of these events spread by the 
international media and by charitable organisations such as 
Near East Relief, it is fairly certain that Lemkin and his 
colleagues would have been moved by this exposure to 
include the forcible transfer of children in the United Nations’ 
Convention a mere two decades later. 
The Republican phase 1919–1924 
These child removals were by no means limited to the 
Ottoman period. The practice continued with barely a pause 
as Kemal’s Republican forces assumed control across 
Anatolia. A specific clause was inserted in the peace Treaty of 
Sevres (1920), binding the Turkish authorities ‘to allow and 
give all assistance to a League of Nations Commission to 
make enquiries and liberate the remaining victims’. Mustafa 
Kemal’s revolution against the Ottoman Sultan prevented 
ratification and implementation of the treaty’s provisions. 
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Relief workers in the Middle East estimated that by 1921 
there remained an estimated 12,000 captive Christian women 
and children (predominantly Armenian) even in the areas 
occupied by the Allies (mainly among the Arabs of Syria). In 
addition, there were some 70,000 captives amongst the 
Muslim inhabitants in the interior of Anatolia, in areas 
beyond the reach of the Allied forces and of western relief 
workers. In 1922, Jeppe—by now a League of Nations 
Commissary—reported that there were approximately 6,000 
Christian women and children held in Muslim households in 
the French zone49, and at least 30,000 in the district accessible 
from Aleppo, including some hundreds in Aleppo itself. The 
French refused permission to send a rescue mission among 
the Arab tribes ‘on the ground that this would only produce a 
fresh outburst of anti-foreign fanaticism’, and even in Aleppo 
the women could not be rescued for fear of disturbances.50 
These abductions of Christian children were not restricted 
to females. Vasileios Anastasiades was born in the Kaesareia 
(Kayseri) district of Kappadokia but grew up in the town of 
Ak Dagh Maden, Pontos. His family was deported in 1916. 
After World War I, Anastasiades was reunited with the 
surviving members of his family, only to be exiled again in 
1920 ‘when the Turks hit Pelemet, attacking the French’. The 
men were separated from the women. The children were 
assembled as a separate group and sent to Zonguldagh on the 
Black Sea coast of north-west Anatolia: 
Next to us was a camp for Hellene prisoners of war, all but 
one of whom died as slave labourers. The sole survivor was 
Demetrios Pairahtaroglou. The soldiers gave us some of their 
                                                 
49 The Cilicia region of modern Turkey, as well as modern Syria and 
Lebanon. 
50 See Macartney, C A (1930), Refugees: The work of the League, League 





meagre food rations, so that we would not starve to death. 
When the Red Cross was notified about us and came looking 
for us, the Turks would move us around by night. One 
Christian prisoner, who was serving as a guard, told the Red 
Cross where we were hidden, on condition that they free him 
also. That is how 150 children were saved. I came to Hellas in 
1924.51 
Despoina Ioannou’s story illustrates the use of forcibly 
removed Christian children and teenagers as slave labour 
during Kemal’s time in power. Ioannou was born in Palaia 
Phokaia (modern Eski Foca), a small city north of Smyrne on 
Anatolia’s Aegean coast. In September 1922, she was deported 
on foot, first to Kediz, then to Menemene. There, the male 
deportees were separated from the females. Ioannou escaped, 
only to be recaptured and returned to Phokaia. After 
convincing the Turkish authorities that she was someone else, 
Ioannou was sent on another march, this time to Ankara. 
There she was assigned to serve a French family as a domestic 
servant. Ioannou revealed her true identity when a letter 
arrived seeking news of her whereabouts. With the help of the 
French family she served, Ioannou was reunited with the 
surviving members of her family in Piraeus.52 
Reverberations 
Within a decade, the physical indigenous Christian presence 
had been virtually extinguished. By 1925, what remained 
was—on the surface at least—a ‘purely’ Turkish Muslim 
population. In recent years, this image has begun to 
metamorphose. The exploration of their own genealogies is 
leading large numbers of people in Turkey to ‘discover’ 
Armenians and/or Hellenes and/or Assyrians in their own 
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immediate ancestry. The rediscovery of this cultural diversity 
in Anatolia is also making itself felt through the literature 
produced by authors who identify themselves as Turkish. 
Writers like Elif Shafak and Fethiye Çetin are a prime 
illustration.  
Representative of the more factual strand of this 
movement is Çetin’s Anneannem.53 After the deportation of the 
men of her village by the military police in 1915, some of the 
women take their children and find refuge in a nearby village. 
Amongst them were 10-year-old Heranush, with her mother 
Isquhi, brother Horen and sister. The second village met the 
same fate as the first: the men were killed and the women and 
children banished and forced on a death march towards the 
Syrian desert. Heranush survived the march. She was forced 
out of the caravan and her mother’s arms by Hüseyin, a 
corporal of the military police. He took Heranush into his 
house, gave her a new name, Seher, and an Islamic up-
bringing. He treated her well, considered her his daughter, 
but his wife Esma treated her as a house slave, especially after 
Hüseyin died young. Horen also survived in this way. 
Heranush’s mother also survived the death march, 
eventually reaching Aleppo. After the war, her husband 
returned from the United States to seek out the family he had 
left behind years before. He found his wife and together they 
tried to find their kidnapped children. Working through 
intermediaries they found both Heranush and Horen. They 
succeeded in recovering Horen. By this time, Heranush had 
married and even though at first her husband agreed to visit 
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the family in Syria, he changed his mind as he feared losing 
his wife and children. Heranush remained Seher. Only when 
she had passed the age of 90 and felt the end of her life 
approaching, did she confide in her granddaughter. 
Anneannem was the result, published four years after 
Heranoush passed away. 
The fate of the indigenous Christian Armenian, Hellenic 
and Assyrian populations of Anatolia and eastern Thrace 
(modern Turkey) remains a subject of extreme sensitivity 
within Turkey’s borders. This is so not only for the Turkish 
state, but for large sections of the populace. According to 
Taner Akçam, the modern Turkish state has a ‘very strong 
moral responsibility in relation to the Armenian, Hellenic and 
Assyrian genocides’. As he argues in A Shameful Act, there are 
a number of factors that form a continuity between the three 
genocides and the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. The 
political group which organised the genocides was the same 
party which organised the Turkish movement against the 
British and French occupation of parts of Anatolia. ‘An 
important number of party members who committed crimes 
against the Armenians were also very active’ in the movement 
led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.54 In an interview with the Los 
Angeles Examiner,55 Kemal laid responsibility for the 
Armenian, Hellenic and Assyrian genocides squarely at the 
feet of the Ittihad’s triumvirate of Talaat, Enver and Cemal: 
‘the former Young Turkey Party, who should have been made 
[to] account for the lives of our Christian subjects who were 
ruthlessly driven en masse, from their homes and 
massacred…’ 
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Eastern Europe under the Swastika 
The granite wall of the Exhibition Hall of the United States’ 
Holocaust Museum in Washington DC is engraved in block 
letters with a statement attributed to Adolf Hitler: ‘Who after 
all is today speaking of the destruction of the Armenians?’56 
The role of the Armenian, Hellenic and Assyrian genocides as 
precursors of the Shoah was clearly elaborated by Lemkin and 
others. A lesser known aspect of the devastation visited upon 
Poland by the Nazis was their forcible transfer and systematic 
‘Germanisation’ of Christian Polish (and other Baltic) 
children. By virtue of their faith, Jewish children were 
destined for the death camps. Losing many relatives in the 
Shoah, Lemkin was intimately familiar with the developments 
regarding children and teenagers in his homeland. In Chapter 
Nine of Axis Rule in Europe, Lemkin discussed the Nazi 
colonisation of western Poland, a policy to which the forced 
assimilation of selected Polish children was crucial.57 
On 25 November 1939, Reichsfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler 
was presented with a special report.58 Given the multi-
national nature of the existing population, the report pointed 
out, ‘[t]he necessity arises for a ruthless decimation of the 
Polish population and, as a matter of course, the expulsion of 
all Jews and persons of Polish–Jewish blood’. In similar ways 
to the fears of the Ottoman Turks regarding their subject 
Christian populations, the Nazis were afraid that if left alone 
the Polish inhabitants of the annexed territories would come 
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to outnumber the Germans.59 
Over the following months, special directives were drafted 
considering the mass forced removal of Polish children that 
was being prepared. These directives were formulated into 
one document60 on 15 May 1940. In December of that year, 
Himmler’s office61 issued a publication stressing the ‘essential’ 
nature of this ‘chief national task’: ‘it is an absolute national 
political necessity to comb out those of German blood in the 
Incorporated Eastern Territories, and later also in the General 
Government and to return the lost German blood to its own 
German people.’62 In the plans for the creation of the 
Thousand Year Reich, ‘Germanisation’ of ‘racially desirable’ 
people was as important in determining the future of the 
German nation as military victories against the Allies. As 
Himmler was once quoted as saying, ‘What the nations offer 
in the way of good blood of our type, we will take, if 
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necessary by kidnapping their children and raising them here 
with us’.63 Just as was the case in the Ottoman Empire and 
Republican Turkey, Nazi ideology regularly took a back seat 
to practicality when it suited them. The first SS ruler of the 
Government General, Hans Frank, once stated that,  
When we see a blue-eyed child we are surprised that she is 
speaking Polish...if we were to bring up this child in a 
German spirit, she will grow up as a beautiful German girl. I 
admit that in Poland one can find German racial traits among 
the people and with caring and development will give us 
Germans in the course of time a possibility to destroy this 
part of the General Government.64  
On the orders of SS Gruppenführer Ulrich Greifelt,65 six to 12-
year-olds ‘recognised as worthy blood bearers for the 
Deutschtum’ were forcibly transferred to Nazi boarding 
schools, while younger children would be farmed out to 
German families by the Lebensborn program.66 
Himmler delivered a speech on the issue of the forcible 
transfers of children from eastern Europe at Bad Schahen on 
14 October 1943: 
I think that it is our duty to take their children with us, to 
remove them from their environment, if necessary by robbing 
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or stealing them… Either we win over any good blood that 
we can use for ourselves and give it a place in our people 
or…we destroy this blood.67 68  
Children with suitable ‘Aryan’ characteristics were arbitrarily 
removed from orphanages or abducted from parents, 
grandparents and guardians. Children from unmarried Polish 
women working as forced labourers in the Reich met the same 
fate, as did many Polish teenagers who were working as 
forced labourers.69 The members of the Nazi Welfare 
Organisation (NSV), nicknamed the ‘Brown Sisters’ (because 
of their uniforms), played a major role in this systematic 
forced transfer of children and teenagers. NSV Youth 
operatives were in action throughout occupied eastern 
Europe. Using treats such as sweets and bread as lures, the 
Brown Sisters would seek information on families from 
unsuspecting children. Armed with this information, the NSV 
operatives would proceed to the local genealogical records. If 
the compiled data promised ‘racially desirable’ results, the 
child would vanish into the Lebensborn program.70 
Even the concentration camps were scoured for candidates 
for ‘Germanisation’. Each selected young inmate was placed 
in quarantine prior to deportation to the Reich. Polish inmate 
physicians did their utmost to rescue the youngsters by 
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creative diagnoses of various illnesses. Unlike most of those 
who went into the Lebensborn program, many of the children 
who returned from quarantine did not survive the war.71 
The SS Race and Resettlement Office72 established branch 
offices throughout occupied eastern Europe for the screening 
and classification of suitably ‘Aryan-looking’ Poles and 
others. Classification came in three groups: (a) children with 
desirable racial characteristics were dispatched to designated 
centres for further examination; the ‘fortunate’ ones went on 
to the homes of Nazi Party loyalists or to Lebensborn (‘Well of 
Life’) residences for ‘Germanisation’; the unfortunate ones 
were murdered in Majdanek and Auschwitz; (b) ‘racially’ less 
desirable Poles who could contribute economically were sent 
to the Reich as forced laborers in the Reich; (c) Poles deemed 
worthless were deported to Auschwitz and almost certain 
death.73 
In a number of Kindererziehungslager (child camps) around 
Poland, preselected children would go through a battery of 
tests aiming at determining their suitability to 
‘Germanisation’. Nazi ‘racial theoreticians’ had developed a 
checklist of 62 points to assess the candidate’s ‘racial 
suitability’. As with most Nazi ‘race theory’, physical traits 
were of supreme importance: arms, legs and heads were 
carefully measured; even the size of a girl’s pelvis and a boy’s 
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penis were considered important for reproductive purposes.74 
The object of the tests was not to establish the German descent 
of the candidate, but rather to assess their physical and mental 
qualities. 
While the process had the veneer of science, it was 
completely arbitrary, relying heavily on the whim of the 
medical examiner. For example, 13-year-old Wojciech 
Wysocki was described as ‘Eastern Nordic’. His calm, candid 
appearance made him ‘very promising’ for ‘Germanisation’. 
However, if candidates displayed ‘negative’ character traits—
a resistance to ‘Germanisation’—they were removed from the 
program, which usually meant dispatch to a death camp and 
a cardiac phenol injection.75 
The Reich authorities were under no delusions that the 
forcible transfer of Polish and other eastern European children 
could be justified by any lawful principles. As with much else 
that they did, they did their utmost to conceal this crime from 
international and domestic public opinion. The majority of 
written directives were classified top secret or confidential. In 
no Nazi document does the term ‘Germanisation of Polish 
children’ appear. The most favoured phrase was 
Wiedereindeutschung (‘re-Germanisation’). 
It has been estimated by Tadeusz Piotrowski that only 
between 10 and 15 per cent of the Polish children and 
teenagers forcibly removed returned home after the defeat of 
the Nazi state.76 As one Polish survivor of the process 
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informed another youngster at a DP camp after the war: ‘We 
used to be Germans. But we are Poles now. In a few weeks 
you will get to like it too.’77 
According to official Polish estimates, about 200,000 
children and teenagers were forcibly removed by the Nazis.78 
The Nazis went to great lengths to conceal the origin of the 
children who ended up in the Lebensborn program and kept 
few concrete statistics on the abductions. Available figures 
allow scholars to draw some conclusions about the numbers 
of forcibly transferred eastern European children and 
teenagers.79 Dr Isabel Heinemann estimated that at least 
20,000 Polish children had been kidnapped, as well as a 
similar number of children from the Soviet Union and a 
further 10,000 from western and south-eastern Europe,80 a 
total of approximately 50,000 children and teenagers. Dr 
Susanne Urban, head of historical research at the International 
Tracing Service in Bad Arolsen in Germany is still dealing 
with cases of ‘Germanisation’ and finding the families and 
origins of victims of those abducted.  
In his testimony at one trial at Nuremburg dealing with 
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the mass transfer of non-German children to the Reich, Louis 
Lavitan81 stated that ‘a few less than 10,000 children have 
been located by us, and have either been repatriated or are in 
stages of repatriation’. Of these, his office had ‘complete 
evidence on exactly 340 as having been in the hands of 
Lebensborn at one time or another’.82 
Hellenic Civil War 
The transfers of youth during the Hellenic Civil War of 1946–
1949 added a new dimension to this crime. Thousands of 
youngsters from across mainland Hellas were taken from 
their homes and sent across the country’s northern frontiers in 
the later stages of this fratricidal conflict. This case was 
unique until that time as the primary motivation was 
ideological and the perpetrators were not the dominant group 
but a minority within the Hellenic state. 
Beginning within months of the conclusion of World War 
II, the civil war was a result of the efforts of the Communist 
Party of Hellas (KKE) to secure the country for the Soviet bloc 
in the aftermath of Germany’s defeat. The West responded 
with massive Anglo–American support for the Royal Hellenic 
Government. Beginning in early 1948, when it was becoming 
clear that they would be defeated, the Communist guerrillas 
began systematically removing their young from villages in 
areas they controlled. Initially, they were sent to the 
Communist areas along Hellas’ northern frontier. From there, 
they were scattered across the Eastern Bloc, as far as Soviet 
Central Asia.83 
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A protest note from the government in Athens stated that 
more than 7,000 children from 59 rebel-controlled villages had 
been ‘conscripted’ and sent over the country’s northern 
borders.84 85 With the cessation of hostilities, the Royalist 
government proclaimed that 29 January 1950 would be 
marked as a national day of mourning for the removed 
children.86 An investigation by the United Nations’ Special 
Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) ‘verified the mass 
deportation of Greek children’87 and found that the total 
number of persons under 15 years removed behind the Iron 
Curtain came to 28,296.88 89 
This event is perhaps unique in genocide and war crimes 
history as the primary motivation for the removals was 
neither for the purpose of religious conversion nor for reasons 
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of ‘racial purity’—it was openly ideological. The majority of 
the removed children were not assimilated into other groups 
but encouraged to retain their Hellenic identities. The victim 
and the perpetrator groups were members of the same ethno-
cultural entity; they were all Hellenes, divided solely by 
politics. 
The rhetoric of the Cold War era overshadows much of the 
literature surrounding the event. For instance, as Karl Rankin 
claimed: 
the [United States’] embassy believes that Markos’ abduction 
of Greek children…is a major psychological blunder which 
we should exploit by [the] widest possible publication in [the] 
US and abroad…it can be turned into useful anti-Communist 
propaganda.90 
According to the rebels who conducted the mass transfer 
campaign, the Hellene young were sent to the Eastern Bloc 
states for humanitarian reasons; to safeguard them from the 
onslaught of the ‘monarcho–fascist’ Royal Greek Army. In a 
radiogram sent on 30 January 1948, the rebel command in 
northern Hellas demanded that the Belgrade-based KKE 
Central Committee ‘put the question of helping small 
children, who suffer famine and other misfortunes, in the Free 
Greek territory’.91 In early March 1948, the Communist 
military leader, Markos Vaphiades, called for the ‘evacuation’ 
of 80,000 youths from villages under rebel control in western 
Macedonia. The Communist authorities in Budapest declared 
that Hungary welcomed the young Hellenes ‘in response to 
the appeal of the People’s Councils of Free Greece’.92  
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The Hellenic Liaison Service to the United Nations 
declared that the removed children were destined for ‘re-
education’, converting the young Hellenes to ‘Communist 
ideology’ and ultimately take Hellas into the Soviet bloc.93 
Although the United Nations Special Commission on the 
Balkans (UNSCOB) was denied access behind the Iron 
Curtain, individual Western investigators visited some of the 
centres hosting removed Hellene children in Bulgaria. They 
all reported a pattern of ideological indoctrination that 
matched the accusations of the Royalist government in 
Athens.94 
While there was certainly an element of altruism behind 
the removals, there are a number of effects that support 
ideology as the ultimate motivating factor. Their education in 
the Warsaw Pact states was typical of the Communist regimes 
of that time. In two resolutions (17 November 1948 and 18 
November 1949), the United Nations General Assembly called 
on the governments ‘hosting’ Hellenic children to return them 
to their families.95 Nor was this the only influential body to 
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make such an appeal. In a letter to his vice-president, Albert 
Barkley, United States’ President Harry Truman stated that 
his administration ‘has exerted and will continue to exert 
every feasible effort to encourage the repatriation of these 
children’. The US House of Representatives expressed its 
support for this outcome in House Resolution 514 of 22 March 
1950,96 while Senate followed suit with Resolution 212, 
adopted on 13 September 1950.97 
According to media reports, the Communist governments 
had ‘agreed to return any children called by petition of their 
parents’. By the end of 1949, the Hellenic Red Cross had 
forwarded 8,000 petitions but none of the children had 
returned.98 By 1952, only 684 removed children had been 
returned to their families; by 1963, some 4,000 had returned 
home (including a number of children born in Communist 
states to children and teenagers who themselves had been 
removed). The assertion that the motive behind the removals 
was purely humanitarian is undermined by the exploitation 
of the removals as a means of psychological warfare against 
the Hellenic state, refusal to repatriate children as requested 
by their families and by the rebels’ employment of some of 
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the elder teenagers as fighters in the final battles of the civil 
war. 
As noted by one member of the United Nations 
observation teams, Kenneth Spencer, the key factor in 
determining the question of how many of the 28,296 Hellenic 
children were removed voluntarily and how many by force 
was the status of the parents. As he noted in his article—
‘Greek Children’ in The New Statesman and Nation—in pro-
rebel villages parents decided for themselves whether to send 
their children away; in ‘hostile villages’, there was ‘little doubt 
that the approach was different and a process of virtual 
conscription enforced’.99 Milan Ristovic estimated that even in 
anti-government strongholds along the Albanian and 
Yugoslav frontiers, ‘the percentage of the forcibly removed 
“voluntary refugees” was extremely high, so that in the towns 
they amounted to up to 29 per cent of the population in 1948–
1949’.100 
This is an illustration of the methods used by the rebels in 
‘hostile’ villages. Phourka is a mountain settlement nestled 
next to the Albanian border in the Konitsa district of the 
Epiros region of north-west Hellas. UNSCOB members 
recorded Mrs Sophia Makri’s statement: when the mothers of 
the village heard of the rebel plan to ‘evacuate’ all children 
under 14 to the Communist countries, they hid their children 
rather than give them up. When the 21 mothers of the village 
refused to divulge the location of their children, the women 
were taken to an isolated spot away from the village and 
tortured: 
                                                 
99 Spencer, Kenneth (1950), ‘Greek Children’, The New Statesman and 
Nation, 39, 31–32. 
100 Ristovic, Milan (2000), A Long Journey Home: Greek refugee children 





They hung us from pine trees. They burned our feet with 
coals. They beat us. When we fainted they revived us with 
cold water from the spring. Fourteen of us died up there but 
we did not tell. When the Greek army entered our village they 
found the dead living, for out of the earth came our 
children.101 
Kallirhoe Gouloumi, from the village of Gorgopotamos, also 
in Epirus, had a less bloody but no less traumatic story: 
They were in our village for a year. First they took our 
animals, then our food, then our children. I had three. They 
did not even let me say goodbye. They said they were no 
longer my children but their children.  
Kleoniki Kyprou, from the village of Monopilo in the Kastoria 
district of western Macedonia, reported: ‘First they hanged 
the priest, then they cut off his mother’s hands, and then they 
ordered us to follow them. What could we do?’ In Albania her 
8-year-old girl and 5-year-old boy were taken from her and a 
rifle was thrust into her hands. Tapping the weapon, the rebel 
kapetanios said: ‘This is your husband, this your child’. 
Kleoniki was forced into the battle of Vitsi. She deserted and 
got back to her village—without her children.102 
Many fathers (in some cases both parents) of removed 
children had migrated abroad before the outbreak of World 
War II. This was a common phenomenon amongst economic 
migrants in the inter-war period. The head of the household 
would migrate then bring out his immediate family as his 
financial circumstances improved.103 Some of the forcibly 
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102 ‘Refugees: Innocent’s Day’, Time, 9 January 1950, 11, 
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removed children and teenagers returned home in the 1950s 
and 1960s, either in Hellas or in the Diaspora. The majority 
were not so fortunate. A handful who became involved in 
activities deemed to be ‘anti-Hellenic’ by the state remained 
barred from entering their country of their birth. 
The forcible transfer of children from Hellas to the Eastern 
Bloc states may or may not constitute a case of genocide. 
There is no evidence that the Communist leadership of the 
rebel forces responsible for the removals intended to destroy 
any particular group, in whole or in part. Whether their acts 
constitute crimes of war depends on the ideological viewpoint 
of the observer. Given the involvement of the United Nations 
in these events, it is highly probable that Lemkin and his 
drafting colleagues were influenced by them in their decision 
to include such removals as an act of genocide. 
Reflections 
How does forcibly transferring children achieve the 
perpetrator’s aim of destroying a targeted group, considering 
that it does not involve actual killing? What is it that caused 
the drafter of the Genocide Convention (including Raphael 
Lemkin) to include these actions as criminal in the legal 
definition of genocide?  
As evidenced by the contents of Lemkin’s [until recently] 
unpublished papers, genocide in colonial contexts 
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preoccupied the eminent jurist. On two unpublished pages 
titled ‘Revised Outline for Genocide Cases’, Lemkin recorded 
religious fanaticism, military conquest, political crisis and 
factors weakening the victim group as ‘conditions leading to 
genocide’. In the same documents, the ‘separation of families’ 
is a ‘biological method and technique of genocide’; ‘forceful 
conversion’ is listed as a ‘cultural’ method of destruction.104 
As elaborated here, motivations of perpetrators for child 
transfer vary. What remains a constant is the intent to destroy 
family and broader group solidarity by removing members of 
the next generation of these family and group units. 
Perpetrators set out to inflict trauma and humiliation by 
forcibly transferring the most vulnerable members of the 
group targeted for destruction or disappearance of their 
ethnicity. In this way, they try to undermine the morale and 
the ability of that group to resist. By abducting the young and 
forcibly assimilating them into the dominant group, the 
targeted minority is denied the opportunity to procreate and 
therefore to replace themselves. Through the forced 
impregnation of females from the targeted group, the 
genocidairés seek to exert a eugenic influence upon the entire 
population under their control, affecting demographic change 
to suit their designs. 
Ara Sarafian has established that there are four categories 
of Armenians assimilated by force during the holocaust that 
engulfed the indigenous Christian peoples of Anatolia. Group 
A includes those who converted to religion and/or national 
identity ‘voluntarily’. Group B—the individuals who were 
selected and assimilated by individuals. Group C includes 
those who were distributed to members and agencies of the 
dominant group by agencies of the state. Group D enlisted 
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government-operated orphanages in the forced transfer of 
children and teenagers. As shown in this essay, these 
categories apply well beyond the bounds of Sarafian’s 
particular case study. Yet we have to concede that while we 
assume that the five acts of genocide in the Convention are 
motivated by malevolence or evil, it is the intent, not the 
motive, that matters. Nowhere does the Convention indicate 
that the intent must be of bad faith, and so the ‘excuse’ of 
‘good intent’ does not arise. In the Australian case, as with the 
Hellenic children, it matters not that the intent was to be for 
the children’s benefit. What matters is whether they were 
forcibly removed. They were. 
THE HOLOCAUST AND ROMANI ROMANIANS: 




At the border (of Transnistria) the train stopped. They let us go 
to the market with the guards. Some Romanians there told us, 
‘Brothers, you are being sent there for extermination!’ —Irimia 
Gheorghe, Romani survivor 
There were two camps. Ţigani (Roma) were on one side, and 
Jews on the other. We watched them dying, they watched us 
dying. So many were shot. When they saw a Jew—Bang! 
Shot! When they saw a Ţigan—Bang! Shot. —Calin Petre, 
Romani survivor 
In World War II, the Romanian government deported 
Romanian Jews and Roma to the [artificial] geographical 
region named Transnistria as racial, political and social 
threats to the Romanian nation. Bounded by the Dniester and 
Bug rivers in what is now Ukraine, Transnistria was 
administered by the Romanian government at Hitler’s behest 
for the period of its existence between summer 1941 and 
January 1944. This was a territorial incentive for Romania’s 
military role in advancing the Nazi front into Russia in 1941. 
Under the orders of Ion Antonescu, the antisemitic right-wing 
prime minister of Romania and ally of the Third Reich, 
approximately 150,000 Romanian Jews and 26,000 Romanian 
Roma were deported to Transnistria in 1941 and 1942.2 There, 
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both Jewish and Romani deportees were forced to labour and 
left to starve and freeze in a haphazard constellation of ill-
administered ghettos and camps. Approximately 90,000 of the 
deported Jews and 6,000 Romani Romanians survived to 
return to Romania in 1944 behind the Russian front.3  
Just as Jews were deported in groups according to 
Romanian designations of class and geographical location, 
Roma were deported in two distinct groups in 1942. The first 
were Roma identified as ‘nomadic Ţigani’, and the second as 
‘convicted and dangerous…sedentary nomads’. The first 
group of ‘nomads’ were Roma of various ethnic sub-groups 
(Caldarari, Fierari) who often owned property in villages to 
which they returned in winter, and who travelled as an 
agricultural labour force in the summer. The second group 
comprised individuals with prison records (overwhelmingly 
for petty crimes, with incarceration periods of less than six 
months), and included single mothers (as ‘morally 
dangerous’), the families and children of people without an 
income, and people whom the police deported without noting 
a justification.  
The Romanian deportations of Roma as pejoratively-
                                                                                             
continued until late 1944. 
3 The survival rate was much lower for Romani deportees, who were 
also arrested and used as forced labour as they re-entered Romanian 
territory, according to Ordin Circular no 150.263, 19 April 1944. 
ANIC Fond Inspector General of the Gendarmeria (Inspectoratul 
General al Jandarmeriei, henceforth IGJ), dosar 86/1944 f75, f89, f220. 
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300,000 who were massacred by both Romanian and German 
Einsatzgruppen D soldiers in 1941 and 1942. Total Jewish deaths in 
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named Ţigani is an event in the broader context of anti-Ţigan 
racism as a catalyst for Romanian identity. Understanding the 
long history of anti-Romani persecution that informed the 
actions of the Romanian government, police and public in 
1942, destabilises continuing assumptions that Roma were 
rightfully deported as criminals, somehow a social group 
separate from racialised categories. This blinkered approach 
to history has thus far ensured that the Romani experience of 
the Holocaust years is largely unexamined and widely 
considered ‘unknowable'. This essay traces how local police 
decided who to deport to Transnistria, what happened to 
deportees in Transnistria, and the ways that Romani 
Romanians resisted exile and death in the Transnistrian lagar.4 
The final section documents Romani resistance to the 
genocide in Transnistria and thus explodes the pervasive 
assumption of many historians that Roma did not leave a 
written trace in the archives of the Holocaust. In fact, Romani 
people who were for the most part unable to read and write, 
found people to transcribe their letters for them, and they 
understood the bureaucratic hierarchy and where to direct 
their petitions. The Romanian archives hold hundreds of 
letters written by Romani deportees to various Romanian 
government officials, providing narratives of deportation and 
the horrific conditions in Transnistria as well as engaging 
with the racist discursive frameworks of persecution. 
A short history of the problem: making Romanians by 
persecuting Ţigani  
The history of anti-Romani persecution in Romanian society 
must be read in the context of almost 500 years of 
institutionalised slavery. Between 1385 and 1856, every 
Romani person who entered the principalities of Wallachia or 
Moldova was considered a slave of the state. The state could 
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retain slaves for their own use, or sell them to boiers (private 
landowners) or monasteries. Slaves were called sclavi, robi, or 
Ţigani.5 Other ethnic groups were also slaves, as with a small 
percentage of Tartars, but these groups were freed by the end 
of the 15th century. Only Roma remained slaves.6 The term 
‘Ţigan’ came to conflate the legal and social position of slaves 
with ethnic Roma. To be a slave was to be considered 
ethnically and racially (culturally and biologically) Ţigan. 
There was no such thing as a free Ţigan, or a free Rom.  
Ţigani slaves were vital to the Romanian economy, 
working the trades of their traditional family groups. The 
Fierari were metalsmiths, making tools and equipment for 
farming. Lautari musicians played at village fairs, weddings, 
and for those who could afford them. The Ursari entertained 
with their tamed bears, and other Roma worked as horse 
trainers and traders, gold panners and goldsmiths, traders of 
small items, as domestic workers and as cleaners. As with 
slavery elsewhere, Ţigani were controlled by a detailed legal 
and social system; the Ţigan as slave was created and 
scaffolded within an entire system of stereotypes to justify 
violent enslavement. Elite and subaltern Romanians 
discursively constructed the Ţigan other as lazy and stupid, 
yet vindictive and cunning; as requiring forced labour and 
close supervision in all respects.7  
                                                 
5 The word ‘Ţigan’ (plural Ţigani ) derives from the word ‘Tsiganoi’ 
which was widely used in the Byzantine period to name Romani 
populations that moved west with the Ottoman forces. Roma have 
consistently identified themselves thus as an ethnic group, and there 
are a heterogeneous dynamic community of groups within that 
umbrella term.  
6 Achim, Viorel (1998), Ţiganii în istoria României, Bucharest, Editura 
Enciclopedia, 33. 






The pervasive institutional and social stereotyping of the 
Ţigan as the lowest social group and requiring enslavement, 
especially as they played a vital economic role in society, 
placated ethnic Romanian peasants. Landowners (when 
talking to the peasants) and peasants (when talking of 
themselves) articulated themselves as moral, obedient, and 
attached to the land—in contrast to the Ţigani who would 
supposedly roam the land and refuse to work at all if they 
weren’t enslaved. In the 1848 Romanian nationalist 
movement, Mihail Kogalniceanu and other nationalists 
discursively relied on the manumission (or dezrobirea, literally 
the ‘unslaving’) of Ţigani as the means to produce a united 
ethnic Romanian nation, to be civilised and worthy of 
independence in the eyes of modern Europe. Romanian 
historian George Potra wrote in 1939 that ‘the idea and fact (of 
dezrobirea) was welcomed by foreigners, from whom we asked 
for the recognition of certain rights’.8 The lack of forethought 
or afterthought regarding what would happen to Romani 
individuals after slavery is evidence that uncivilised Ţigani 
slaves provided an object upon which the ethnic Romanian 
nation could cut its humanitarian teeth. 
The actual steps taken in the process of dezrobirea were 
legislative, and these laws dealt with the issue of how much 
compensation would be paid to owners, including 
monasteries. There were no government measures, in terms of 
legislation or social policy, that addressed the supposed 
change in status of more than 250,000 people.9 Ţigani 
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University Press.  
8 Potra, George (1939), Contibuţiuni la Istoricul Ţiganilor din România, 
Bucharest, in the edition republished by Cartea Veche (2001), 
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continued to be called Ţigani, but were no longer considered 
of primary state concern after the final law of dezrobirea in 
1856. When a boier’s slaves became free men and women, they 
no longer had the right to live on his property, resulting in 
large numbers of homeless Roma. Many emigrated and 
travelled in search of places to stop and work for a living, and 
these Roma were easily identified by appearance, occupation 
and landlessness as Ţigani. Many made agreements with their 
former owners to continue living on that land in their employ; 
these people continued to be called Ţigani, despite their legal 
status as free men. By World War I, the Ţigani were no longer 
considered slaves to be privately owned, but Romani peoples 
continued to exist socially as Ţigani without owners, the 
internal ethnicised 'others' who required constant policing 
within the nation.  
In 1918, the Treaty of Trianon granted Romania the former 
Hapsburg territory of Transylvania, more than doubling 
Romania's area and population. The increase in urban 
populations of non-Romanians, as well as an overall increase 
in non-Romanian populations, spurred two decades of 
Romanian ethno-nationalist policy.10 The predominant 
anxieties of the Romanian state and population in the 
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interwar period were pinned to the spectres of Jewish urban 
control, Hungarian irredentism in newly gained Transylvania, 
and Bolshevism in the East. Romani Romanians were 
increasingly policed in their socio-economic position as the 
inferior, marginalised ethnic minority by Romanian state 
bureaucracy.11 From the Romanian perspective, Ţigani were 
considered radically other to, but inextricably of, the 
Romanian people.12  
The Romanian fascist movement known as the Legion of 
the Archangel Michael (later, the Iron Guard), gained strength 
in the 1930s through physical threats and popular appeal. 
Racist and antisemitic at heart, the Legionary movement 
articulated a Romanian nationalism that moved beyond 
socially pervasive ethno-nationalism to racialise Romanian 
identity in eugenic discourses on national hygiene resonant 
with National Socialist ideology.13 Newspaper articles and 
‘scientific’ studies conducted by academics at the Central 
Institute for Statistics described the Romanian nation as a 
                                                 
11 Romanian Romani communities responded to the new ethno-
national tensions by forming their own trade unions stressing the 
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racial body threatened primarily by Jews and Ţigani. An 
article entitled ‘Race and National Destiny’ in Cuvântul, the 
Legion’s semi-official newspaper, on 16 January 1941 ranted 
that ‘the decline of the Romanian people is due to the 
infiltration into our ethnic group of elements of inferior races, 
the crossing of the ancient Getic–Roman blood with Phanariot 
and gipsy (sic) blood, and, of late, with Jewish blood.’14 Sabin 
Manuilă, director of the Central Institute for Statistics, 
referred to ‘the Ţigani problem’ as ‘the most important and 
acute racial problem in Romania’,15 and suggested in a 1941 
memo to Antonescu that ‘unilateral transfer’ of these 
populations—to send them outside Romanian borders—was 
the solution.16  
Antonescu walked his own line of institutionalised 
antisemitic and anti-Romani persecution after purging the 
Legion in January 1941, and in the following years as an ally 
of Germany with attendant pressure to follow Nazi racial 
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Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 147. 
16 See Achim, Viorel (2001), ‘The Romanian Population Exchange 
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policies.17 It is possible to say that Antonescu’s racial policies 
were in line with Nazi genocidal racial policies, although he 
proved more canny in considering the economic and political 
effects of deportations of Jews to Transnistria at crucial 
moments in the war, halting fresh and large-scale 
deportations of Jews and Roma in 1943 rather than pursuing a 
‘final solution’ as in German-administered territory. 
Romanian pre-war anti-Romani racism—inherent, repro-
duced and policed in the naming and marginalisation of 
Romanian citizens deemed to be ‘Ţigani’—was thus fully 
racialised in the fascist decade of Legionary popularity. It was 
this racially identified group that was targeted for deportation 
and destruction in the Holocaust alongside Romanian Jews. 
Antonescu’s intent to destroy certain perceived parts of the 
Romani community (as Ţigani) through their deportation, 
forced labour, and murder in Transnistria, was implemented 
by members of the Romanian government, military, and the 
military police, the gendarmerie.18  
Deportation to Transnistria 
Marshall Ion Antonescu issued two decrees in May 1942; first, 
for the census of all ‘nomadic’ and ‘sedentary’ Ţigani, and 
second, for the deportation of ‘all nomadic Ţigani’. The 
specific order to deport ‘nomadic Ţigani’ read:  
In line with the general order to remove all parasitical and 
disorderly elements, Marshall Ion Antonescu orders—
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through this act—that all groups of nomadic Ţigani from the 
whole country be sent to Transnistria. These measures are to 
be executed through local organs of the gendarmerie, so that 
no group of Ţigani and no police can know the final scope of 
the order. The removal will be implemented by the legions of 
the gendarmerie. These orders are to be executed 
immediately. For other categories of Ţigani the orders will be 
given in good time.19 
The frame for the decree refers to the removal of 
‘parasitical’ elements from Romanian society, in line with 
racialised discourse of the time. Important is the intentional 
withholding of information about what awaited deportees in 
Transnistria, although local police documents continually 
referred to ‘evacuating’ deportees to the lagar (prison) in 
Transnistria.20 From the archival evidence, it can be concluded 
that Romanian gendarmes across the country easily 
understood who was meant by the category ‘nomadic Ţigani’. 
Without confusion, gendarmes identified and deported 
groups of Caldarari, Fierari and other Romani family units 
who were beginning their summer work season of travel. 
These groups often owned property and animals in villages 
where their families had lived for generations, and travelled 
on established routes between markets and fairs with their 
trades in the summer. Their property was nationalised in 
many cases, and simply taken over or stolen by Romanian 
inhabitants in other cases.21 On 1 June 1942, 11,441 people 
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identified as ‘nomadic Ţigani’ were assembled across 
Romania and marched on foot under armed guard to 
Transnistria.22 The quotation that opens this essay is from a 
survivor of this forced march to Transnistria.  
The decree for the census of ‘non-nomadic Ţigani’ in May 
1942 specified that gendarmes were to deport 'sedentary 
nomads (especially those who, being non-nomadic, are 
convicts, recidivists, or have no means of existence or precise 
occupation from which to live honestly through work, and 
thus constitute a burden and a danger to public order').23 
The lists of non-nomadic Roma sent back to the Council of 
Ministers were short. Most gendarmerie branches simply 
wrote ‘we don’t have any Ţigani like this here’. Indeed, while 
‘nomadic’ Ţigani were recognisable by their wagons and 
sometimes their dress, the concept of ‘non-nomadic’ Ţigani 
did not reference a pre-existing group that could be easily 
defined and deported. The Council of Ministers ordered the 
General Inspectorate of Gendarmerie to resolve the lacklustre 
performances of its regional offices, and on 25 July another 
telegram was sent to all branches ordering another census of 
‘all sedentary Ţigani who have had prior convictions, are 
recidivists, or live without a means of existence’.24 
Gendarmerie who still reported they had no such people in 
their jurisdiction were ordered by telephone again on 4 
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August, and finally, on 15 August 1942 the General 
Inspectorate of the Gendarmerie telephoned every regional 
branch with the order to return the censuses of ‘convicted, 
dangerous, etc Ţigani’ on 16 August.25 This change of 
categorical shorthand to qualify ‘sedentary nomads’ as 
‘dangerous’ indicates a discursive shift in cadence to one of 
threat rather than ‘burden’ or ‘disorder’, in line with the 
radical racial rhetoric pervasive in policy of 1942.  
This series of requests for longer lists of non-nomadic 
Ţigani prompted intense activity and confusion on the 
ground. It wasn’t simply a matter of deporting everyone of 
Romani ethnicity, or occupation, or colour of skin, though all 
of these things could signify ‘Ţigan’. There were clearly dark-
skinned Romani Romanians who were, by their behaviour, in 
no way Ţigani. Similarly, there were non-Romani Romanians 
who were disparagingly referred to as ‘Ţigani’ because of 
their renowned laziness, dirtiness, and generally uncouth, 
‘un-Romanian’ lifestyle—but these Romanians could not be 
deported as Ţigani because they were racially not capable of 
being Ţigani. Individual groups of gendarmes discussed 
amongst themselves how to identify people to fit the category 
set for deportation.  
In the first place, gendarmes usually trawled prison release 
lists for anyone they knew as Ţigan who had been convicted 
of a crime. Although the ethnicity of convicts was not usually 
recorded, gendarmes were working in their own local 
communities and knew which families were considered 
Ţigan. In the lists they compiled of the sedentary/non-
nomadic Ţigani, the column beside the names of all the family 
members to be deported was entitled ‘observation’ or ‘motive 
for deportation’. The vast majority of those with previous 
convictions before the law had been in prison for just a few 
                                                 





months, or had been fined for petty theft.26 One deportee in 
Cernauţi was listed for deportation because he had been 
‘active in a communist organisation’.27  
In the city of Buzau, gendarmes explored the ‘Ţigani area’ 
around the local market place, and included people who had 
untidy houses and courtyards for deportation.28 In Botosani, 
the local gendarmes added 155 people to the list of 
individuals ‘to be deported because they don’t have certain 
means of existence…they go from Ţigan to Ţigan to work, 
then spend all they earn on food and drink’.29 Similarly, in the 
city of Roman, the column listing motives for deportation 
include descriptions like ‘he sits in the pub all day’.30 In 
Rimnicu Sarat, the chief of the gendarmes in the village, Ilie 
Ionescu, had a particular obsession with deporting Ţigan 
women who lived with men without being legally married. In 
response to the pleas of a father of a deported woman, he 
wrote that she could not return to Romania because ‘she had 
lived as a concubine with different men, floating between the 
most dubious of them’.31 In Timişoara, the Commander of 
Timiş–Torontal gendarmerie, Major I Peschir, argued for 
‘cleansing the Romanian race of Ţigani’, which mirrors the 
discourses of racial hygiene prevalent in Hungarian, 
Romanian and German literature available in Timişoara of the 
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The titles gendarmes gave to the lists of non-nomadic 
Ţigani also indicate the different ways that local gendarmes 
articulated who they were to deport. In Storojinet, gendarmes 
made a list of ‘dubious sedentary Ţigani’.33 In Lapuşna, 690 
people were listed in the category ‘Ţigani to be evacuated 
from the categories of the dubious, convicted, thieves, 
pickpockets and those who occupy themselves with stealing 
from which they win their existence’.34 On this list of people 
to be deported are women who read palms, beggars, and the 
families of people with prior convictions for anything at all. 
In one of the Bucharest gendarmerie, the census of non-
nomadic Ţigani was entitled ‘stable Ţigani who have been 
convicted of crimes, are recidivist, etc’ but the list was 
primarily constituted by ‘war invalids, children, concubines, 
workers, lautari, flower sellers, vagabonds, and even a small 
shop owner’.35 The list of another Bucharest gendarmerie used 
‘dubious occupation’ as a category in the column for motive 
of deportation.36 Many Bucharest gendarmes simply left the 
‘observation/motive for deportation’ column blank, or wrote 
‘no occupation’. Yet in these very documents from Bucharest, 
the column listing property is often filled with at least a cow 
or sheep, and regularly with houses. Considering that these 
individuals had not been convicted of any crimes—on the 
contrary, they lived a sedentary lifestyle in houses with a few 
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animals in the suburbs of Bucharest—they could not fit 
technically in the category of ‘dubious occupation’. This is 
until we consider, of course, that simply being interpellated as 
Ţigan made the semblance of a respectable Romanian lifestyle 
an unacceptable parody of racial and social organisation, 
powered by the anxiety of Romanian ethno-national identity 
that the Ţigani ‘other’ be recognisable as such.  
When the regional gendarmerie branches returned their 
revised and lengthened lists to the General Inspectorate of 
Gendarmerie, they included letters explaining the revised 
numbers. The gendarmes of Dolj added 1,227 people to the 
list, and explained that the first list had been ‘superficial’ and 
limited by time.37 Commander Gh Tofan of the Vaslui 
gendarmerie wrote that they ‘weren’t conscientious enough 
on the first census’.38 Others presented their orders to increase 
the lists as their own acknowledgement of how this is useful 
for Romanian society—for example, Commander Cristescu in 
Valcea wrote that he had ‘put (on the list) people who are 
predisposed to commit all kinds of infractions, having 
decided that this is the moment to rid ourselves of these 
insubordinates of public order and security’.39 Needless to 
say, only ethnic Roma thus suspected were listed and 
deported; no other ethnic groups of ‘insubordinates’ were 
targeted, thus proving again that deportees were targeted as 
an ethnic—not a ‘social’—group. In Ialomita, an extra 308 
people were added to the original 159, all in the category of 
‘people who own no property, have no occupation and are 
living off dishonest work’.40  
The ad hoc development of the very concept of non-
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nomadic Ţigani to be deported shows that the category did 
not simply refer to a recognisable and pre-identified group. 
The terms on which such a category were to be applied, on 
the contrary, were developed in regional variations when 
local gendarmes responded to simple pressure; they invoked 
and applied historically developed and contextualised 
stereotypes of what it meant to be Ţigan.  
Between 12 and 20 September 1942, 13,176 Romani Roman-
ians were deported to Transnistria on overcrowded trains as 
sedentary Ţigani.41 Reports written by the gendarmes in 
charge of taking Romani from their homes and putting them 
on trains to Transnistria, recorded the deportees physically 
resisting deportation. Like Jews, Romani deportees were not 
only heavily guarded, but lied to and told they would be 
given property in Transnistria in order to gain a degree of 
compliance of the victims in their deportation. In multiple 
cases this led to mass panic and officials in Bucharest sent 
orders that police were to stop spreading such false rumours.  
Resistance to genocide in Transnistria 
Roma, as with Jews, crossed the Dniester river under armed 
guard with constant beatings and searches. In Transnistria, 
Roma were settled in a variety of camps—some entirely in the 
open surrounded by armed guard, some on the collective 
farms of the Ukrainian state, and others in the houses of 
evacuated local peasants. Romani camps were primarily in 
the regions of Oceakov (Alexandru camp), Berezovka and 
Balta. As Ioanid has pointed out, ‘the Gypsies (sic) suffered 
the same fate as the Jews; they died either by execution or 
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because of the cold or hunger'.42 Having had their wealth, 
wagons and means of making a living confiscated, Roma were 
then at the mercy of the horrific winter of 1942, the resulting 
starvation and typhus epidemics, a total lack of Romanian 
administrative provision for Roma, and the cruelty of 
Romanian and German armed forces.43 While the Romanian 
government maintained dialogue with the various 
international Jewish associations, which in turn secured the 
delivery of some financial and aid assistance for Jewish 
deportees, Romani Romanians had no such international 
assistance. Roma were not considered a factor in international 
relations during the war.44 
                                                 
42 Ioanid, Radu (2008) in the chapter 'The Deportation, Persecution, 
and Extermination of the Gypsies' in his book The Holocaust in 
Romania, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington 
DC. While this sentence appears in the online edition of the text 
available at http://www.romanianjewish.org (last accessed 12 
September 2008), it does not appear in the print edition.  
43 For more details of the conditions in Transnistria for Romani 
deportees, see Ioanid, ibid, Achim, Viorel (2004), The Roma in 
Romanian History, Budapest, New York, Central European University 
Press, and Michelle Kelso’s groundbreaking documentary film 
Hidden Sorrows: The Persecution of Romanian Gypsies in WWII 
(available from the author, contact michellekelso@yahoo.com). 
44 For more on Jewish experiences of Transnistria see Carp, Matatias 
(1994), Holocaust in Romania 1940–1944, Budapest, Primor Publishing; 
Braham, Randolph L (ed) (1997), The Destruction of Romanian and 
Ukrainian Jews During the Antonescu Era, Boston, East European 
Monographs no CDLCXXXIII; Ancel, Jean (ed) (1986), Documents 
Concerning the Fate of Romanian Jewry During the Holocaust Jerusalem, 
the Beate Klarsfeld Foundation; Iancu, Carol (2001), Shoah în 
România: Evreii în timpul regimului Antonescu 1940–1944, Editura 
Polirom, Iaşi; Butnaru, I C (1992), The Silent Holocaust: Romania and its 
Jews, New York, Greenwood Press; Institutul Român de Istorie 
Recentă (2004), Holocaustul evreilor români: Din mârturiile 





The following extract from an anonymously authored 
‘State of Affairs’ report dated 5 December 1942 provides one 
example of the recorded situation of one part of the Romani 
deportees:  
During the time that they have spent in the barracks in 
Aleksandrodar, the Ţigani have lived in indescribable misery. 
They weren’t sufficiently fed. They were given 400 grams of 
bread for the ones that were capable of working and 200 
grams each for the elderly and the children. They were also 
given few potatoes and, very rarely, salty fish, and all these in 
very small quantities. Due to the malnutrition, some of the 
Ţigani—and these make up the majority—have lost so much 
weight that they have turned into living skeletons. On a daily 
basis—especially in the last period—ten to 15 Ţigani died. 
They were full of parasites. They were not paid any medical 
visits and they did not have any medicine. They were 
naked...and they didn’t have any underwear or clothing. 
There are women whose bodies...were [completely] naked in 
the true sense of the word. They had not been given any soap 
since arriving; this is why they haven't washed themselves or 
the single shirt that they own. 
In general, the situation of the Ţigani is terrible and almost 
inconceivable. Due to the misery, they have turned into 
shadows and are almost savage. This condition is due to the 
bad accommodations and nutrition as well as the cold. 
Because of hunger...they have scared the Ukrainians with 
their thefts. If there had been some Ţigani in the country who 
were stealing...out of mere habit, here even a Ţigan who used 
to be honest would begin stealing, because the hunger led 
him to commit this shameful act. 
Due to maltreatment, by 25 November, 309 Ţigani had died. 
Roma bodies were found on the Otchakov Aleksandrodar 
road. They died of famine and cold.45 
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In this situation of chaos, lack of provisions, and 
widespread death in the community, many Romani 
developed complicated strategies for escape. Deportees such 
as Ion Stancu wrote long complaints detailing the misery and 
injustice to Bucharest and many built networks with 
Romanian soldiers to create an underground trade in 
counterfeit travel permits. Like some Jewish deportees, Roma 
found ways of making business, trading, and stealing to 
procure food for their starving and sick families. Evidence of 
this resistance, on individual and group scale, can be found 
throughout the Romanian archives. Deported and persecuted 
Ţigani also engaged bureaucratically with the Romanian 
government to contest and refute the 'status' by which they 
had been deported. Romani petitions for repatriation 
submitted to the Ministry of Internal Affairs were forwarded 
with clarification requests to the regional police in the 
complainant’s village, who conducted their own investigation 
and replied to the Ministry. Only the miniscule number of 
individuals who had requests for repatriation approved and 
had left before January 1943 made it home before the borders 
were closed to all Ţigani seeking return to Romania for fear of 
typhus epidemics. Roma imprisoned in Transnistria, 
however, continued petitioning the authorities throughout the 
war. This paper trail thus documents the active resistance of 
deportees and the gamut of localised Romanian reactions to 
and interpellations of Romani ethnicity in wartime Romania. 
I focus on ‘bureaucratic’ resistance here to highlight the 
wealth of written sources concerning Romani Romanians and 
the Holocaust. Roma accessed scribes to write their petitions 
and submitted them to local gendarmerie offices, regional 
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town halls, and directly to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
the General Inspectorate of the Gendarmerie in Bucharest. 
Requests were made by the heads of deported families 
(especially of nomadic Roma, in December 1942), by soldiers 
who returned on leave from the front to discover their 
families had been deported, and by extended family members 
who endeavoured to bring back their deported family 
members. Deportees and their family members dictated 
petitions to scribes, and thus provide narrative constructions 
of the deportations and interrogations of discursive 
interpellations of the victims as Ţigani rather than Romanian 
citizens of Romani ethnicity. Many petitioners travelled 
without or with falsified permits between Bucharest (Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, General Inspectorate of Gendarmerie) and 
their home village, and some even travelled clandestinely to 
Transnistria on multiple occasions to check on their family, 
then returned to continue petitioning for their return. For 
escaped deportees, the extra element in the fight was to avoid 
arrest while ‘lingering’ outside official buildings trying to 
speak to clerks about the case. Briefly, avoiding arrest for 
travelling and simply being in Romania without permission 
required in itself a high level of discursive agility and physical 
mobility. Many of these escapee petitioners were arrested and 
re-deported to Transnistria at least once, and most often with 
a group of other Roma rounded up by local authorities.  
Let us examine a few examples of how these requests for 
repatriation can be read in order to raise new questions and 
provide new voices in what I term the bureaucratic resistance 
of Romani Romanians imprisoned in Transnistria. First, look 
at the following returned soldier’s narrative of realising his 
family were deported to Transnistria. 
 
9 January 1943 
Domnul Prefect, 





respectfully brings the following to your attention: 
I fought at the front for 18 months, and in Stalingrad, in which time I 
had no kind of vacation. This month I was granted leave for 25 days 
and I returned home to my family in Comuna Balateşti, Jud. Ilfov. 
When I got home I entered the courtyard and met a stranger who 
asked me what I was looking for in his house at this late hour. On 
my own property I asked him what he was looking for in my house. 
Later I found that my family had been sent to Transnistria, Comuna 
Bogdanovca, because we are Ţigani. 
At present I am serving with Reg. 21 Infantry which is at the front in 
Stalingrad, but I have a permission of leave for 25 days, please give a 
permission to return for my family, composed of my wife, Anica 
Mamai, and the child Ion Mamai. My true father Constantin Mamai, 
my mother Florea Mamai, my uncle Nicolae Raducanu, my brother 
in law Gheorghe Steian, my brother Dinu Ion Mamai, and my uncle 
Tanase Costea, and Steian Nicolae, the brother of my wife, Petre 
Medin my brother in law, and my uncle Dinu Lean. I am decorated 
with the Military Virtue (medal). 
With profound respect, Tudor Marin.46  
This narrative of a soldier coming home to find his family 
deported was common. The use of the term Ţigan as a simple 
unproblematised identity term, as we see in this letter, is 
actually quite rare, reflecting the fact that it was written before 
the news that Romani Romanians were being deported as 
Ţigani reached even the front lines of Romanian regiments. In 
Tudor Marin’s narrative, being a Romanian Ţigan in no way 
excluded the right to own property, and the letter reminds us 
that Romani Romanians identified as Ţigani were not excused 
or prevented from fighting in the Romanian army.  
The variety of discourses that petitioners use to refute and 
nuance the interpellation of their families as Ţigani are also 
indisputable evidence that Romani individuals and 
communities did engage with the power structures in which 
                                                 





they were named and persecuted.47 Many argued for 
repatriation by invoking multiple discourses of national 
identity, familial love, and legal concepts of justice as tied to 
nation and state. Many petitioners also tried to work within 
the definition of Ţigan which they perceived to have been 
given by the government to claim their family were mistaken 
for nomadic or non-nomadic Ţigani, in various ways.  
In one letter, Vasile and Teca Covaci from Comuna 
Acmariu in Judet Alba, requested the return of their four 
children.48 They stated: 
We are Roma, and thus legally married and these are all our 
legitimate children. We are not nomadic Roma, we are Fierari, 
with property and a household and we move for work, to 
earn a living. At the time they were taken we were at work 
and the children were mistakenly taken with the other Roma. 
We hope that you understand our pain as parents remaining 
without our children, and give permission for them to return. 
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The petitioners here refer to themselves as Roma, and 
stress that their familial structure is the same as Romanians 
(marriage, legitimacy). They also stake a claim for the validity 
of their lifestyle as property owners who travel for work, yet 
it is their replacement of the term ‘nomadic Ţigani’ with 
‘nomadic Roma’ that tethers their self-identified ethnic 
identity to that of the pejorative Ţigani 'Other' to be deported. 
This discursive attempt to replace the government’s category 
with the Romani category of Fierari, a respectable traditional 
trade-based identity, serves to incorporate the group of self-
identifying Fierari into the gendarmerie’s definition of 
nomadic Ţigani. In fact, after much paperwork and 
investigation between various regions, the gendarmerie found 
that this entire family had been deported to Transnistria, and 
the father (Vasile Covaci) had escaped, returned to his home 
town to make the petition, and continued to live on the run. A 
search warrant was released for his arrest and he was 
redeported to Transnistria in April 1943.  
This is a petition from a sedentary war veteran: 
Ion D Paun 13 February, 1943. 
Dear Minister,  
The undersigned Ion D Paun, invalid of the war, resident in Com. 
Miloseşti Jud. Ialomita, respectfully brings the following: 
On the 15th of September 1942, my family were coming home from 
agricultural work in Comuna Tandarei, and were stopped on the 
road by gendarmes and included in the convoy of nomadic Ţigani, 
and deported to Com. Cavaliopca, Jud. Oceacov, Transnistria.  
This was a mistake, because my family are not nomads, but have 
lived in Jud. Ialomita for generations, working as useful and 
established tradesmen. On the other hand, I cannot work anymore 
due to injuries from the war, thus please repatriate them, as a 
passionate people caught up in a momentary mistake, without any 
cases against them, and known as having only acted for good in 
society.  






Ion D Paun49 
Ion D Paun doesn’t refute the categorisation of his relatives 
as Ţigani, but as nomadic Ţigani, and by claiming that they 
were returning from agricultural work he refutes the 
stereotype that Ţigani don’t work the land as do ideal 
Romanian peasants. The location of his family on land and 
property over generations is supplemented by his self-
presentation as a good Romanian veteran of World War I. The 
intent to destroy all Ţigani of particular groups is made clear 
in the subsequent decision of the General Inspectorate of 
Gendarmerie, that because this family did travel in the 
summer for agricultural work they were correctly deported as 
nomads, and because this man is unable to work and thus 
guilty of avoiding deportation, he was also to be deported to 
Transnistria.50  
Cases written by sedentary small business-owning Romani 
Romanians in large cities often mobilised more strident 
nationalist discourses to request repatriation. Dumitru Marin 
typed his own request letters and petitioned multiple times 
over the period of the war. The following excerpt from the 
much longer letters he sent to the Minister of Internal Affairs 
highlights the stereotypical symptoms of ‘Ţigani’ that he 
refuted in those deported, such as criminality, lack of loyalty 
to the Romanian nation, and nomadism. In addition, he 
reminds the government that Ţigan Romanians (sic) fought 
for Romania in the Great War, thus claiming an ethnicity 
within the Romanian national community called Ţigan.  
Dear Minister, 
My relatives are serious people, honest, workers and home owners, 
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not one has any criminal records against them…In this family there 
were people in whose veins flowed the coagulated blood of the holy 
greater Romania.  
Even though I am of Ţigan origin, I have lived my whole life a 
Romanian life, and we identified with the obligations and aspirations 
of the Romanian people (neam). No blame, no reproach, against any 
one of these banished from their property and their beloved country 
can justify their deportation to a foreign land. I ask you respectfully 
with all my soul to remember that in the Great War there were Ţigan 
soldiers of Ţigan origin and you have seen with how much 
generosity they gave their blood for our country—because they do 
not have any other.51 
The Romanian government had decreed on paper that all 
veterans of World War I, and soldiers and families of active 
soldiers or potential conscripts for World War II, were to be 
exempt from deportation. In practice, this decree was never 
seriously considered. The government investigation found 
that half of Dumitru Marin’s family had not even been 
included on any census or deportation list—another of the 
uncountable number of Romani Romanian families deported 
to their deaths in Transnistrian ghettos without evidence 
other than these petitions. They were not given permission to 
return to Romania. 
Rafaila Raveca wrote her petition in February 1943 and 
was clearly aware of the government decree to not deport the 
families of soldiers currently serving: 
The undersigned Rafaila Raveca, living in Posaga de Jos in Jud. Cluj 
Turda, unmarried with 3 children, brings it to your attention with 
honour that my daughter Maria, married to Nuţ Emil, all living in 
this commune, was taken away together with the 4 year old child 
and deported to Transnistria because we are of ethnic origin Ţigani. 
In this case, the fact her husband, Nuţ Emil, is a mobilized soldier 
currently fighting at the front in Reg. 85 Infantry, Comp. 3A wasn’t 
                                                 






considered. They were illegally deported…without any 
consideration of the injustice this is for those fighting for the rights of 
the People, and of the country.52 
The following petition by a soldier home on leave from 
active service doesn’t mention ethnicity in terms of Romani or 
Ţigan identity, but petitions from the premise that the local 
police chief abused his personal authority in order to deport 
his family:  
February 6, 1943 
Dear Minister of the Interior 
The undersigned Munteanu Petre, commercial trader from Comuna 
Caushani Jud. Tighina, currently a soldier in Regiment 3 Border 
patrol Cernauti, Comp. V-a Cauşani, respectfully puts the following 
complaint: 
Due to the work of enemies, my parents Simion Munteanu and 
Sofiea Munteanu, my brothers Ilie and Gavril Munteannu, and also 
my sister Olga, married to Berdaga Haralambie, all stable residents 
owning land and property and living for decades in Comuna 
Cauşani, Jud. Tighina, were rounded up by the Chief of Post in this 
comuna and taken to Comuna Sustacova, Jud. Oceacov to the state 
company there. 
Soon the fatherland will send me to fight for the integrity of its 
borders. It causes me pain to do this thankfully when I know my 
parents, without any guilt and under the holy cross of justice, were 
sent to suffer there with foreigners. 
I ask you, Minister, to conduct an investigation to ascertain that my 
parents were sedentary people and good citizens and that the Chief 
of Police in our comuna expelled my relatives to this far away part of 
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Transnistria as an abuse of his power. After this research please give 
permission for my parents and brothers to be free to return to the 
comuna where they have lived for decades and where they were 
born. Please find the certificates from the Mayor’s office attached, I 
send my respect,  
Petre Munteanu. 53 
The Chief of the Section of the Cauşani gendarmerie 
replied on a small piece of paper with two sentences stating 
that this family no longer owned property in the village, and 
that they were musicians who worked by going from place to 
place, and thus were nomadic Ţigani. This reply, as with the 
others, provides the historian with insight into how the 
factors of local property development and fluid government 
categories for ‘Ţigani’ intertwined. The reply of the Chief does 
not specify what property the family had owned before they 
were deported, and all deported persons’ properties were 
nationalised or bought by bystander Romanians. The 
paperwork remains today in regional archives of the 
municipal administration. The Chief’s designation of the 
Munteanu family as musicians—who obviously need to work 
by travelling to functions, including public fairs—as nomadic 
Ţigani, illustrates that even socially integrated and vital 
community service providers were deported in many cases as 
nomadic Ţigani, primarily because they were perceived as 
ethnic 'Others' to the Romanian decision-makers.  
Conclusion 
The repatriation requests of Romanian Romani deportees to 
Transnistria as Ţigani highlight the need for critical attention 
to how categories describing potential victims of genocide are 
formed, disseminated, rearticulated, and enacted. The ways 
that Romanian officials named and deported ‘Ţigani’ between 
1942 and 1945 need to be approached in their historical 
context of more than 500 years of intense discursive 
                                                 





construction of the Ţigan as enslaved and inferior other 
against which an ideal ethno-national Romanian identity was 
articulated. Antonescu’s order to deport the non-nomadic 
Ţigani is a way for us to look at how individuals and 
authorities in different regions decided how to identify non-
nomadic Ţigani from amongst Romanian Romani 
communities. Categorisations using words like ‘dubious’, 
‘dangerous’, and ‘immoral’ tell us a lot about the stereotypical 
construction of these others which, in times of non extreme 
stress, were implicit and articulated in much more subtle 
ways. The requests for repatriation are valuable evidence of 
how some Romani Romanians engaged with and refuted 
these discursive constructions in a myriad of dynamic ways in 
order to survive. While the majority of those deported to 
Transnistria died of starvation and disease in barren ghettoes, 
those who did survive not only continue to tell their stories of 
endured atrocity, but are supported by a wealth of traditional 
historical sources that evidence their contemporaneous 
struggles for recognition and survival. 





In December 1915, Charles E W Bean, the Australian war 
correspondent in Gallipoli, reported that ‘the Turks as the 
world knows’ are endeavouring ‘to wipe out the Armenian 
nation’.1 Bean had observed an event which would later be 
widely recognised as the first major genocide of the twentieth 
century.2 At the time, every major newspaper in Australia 
regularly covered the genocide—the Sydney Morning Herald 
alone published more than 50 articles on the event in 1915. 
Headings like ‘Armenians Butchered’, ‘Million Armenians 
Massacred’ and ‘More Armenians Massacred—girls sold in 
open market’ were common and indicated the tone of the 
articles at that time.3 Emerging from a world-wide movement 
to save the survivors of the Turkish onslaught, a relief fund 
was established in Australia in late 1915 and it continued for 
more than a decade.  
While the Australian citizenry was learning about the fate 
of the Armenians through the media, Australian and New 
Zealand (ANZAC) prisoners of war captured by the Ottoman 
Turks were witnessing first hand the unfolding of the 
murderous events. Yet, despite the strong connection between 
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Australia’s Gallipoli experience and the Armenian genocide, 
Robert Manne has poignantly observed that ‘not one Austra-
lian historian has devoted more than a passing page or 
paragraph to the relationship, or even the mere coincidence, 
of the two events’.4 Consequently, the Armenian death toll 
has no role in Australia’s collective memory of Gallipoli, only 
a memory and a noble story about that bloodied venue as the 
birthplace of a nation. This essay helps redress that omission 
by focusing on the role Australians played in what is certainly 
the nation’s first major international humanitarian relief 
effort. 
The Armenian Genocide 
‘The Armenian Question’ emerged as an issue in international 
politics towards the end of the nineteenth century. The 
Ottoman Empire, which had ruled the largest portion of 
historic Armenia since the sixteenth century, had declined to 
the point where western diplomats came to call it ‘the sick 
man of Europe’. The Armenians experienced increased 
political repression, religious persecution and heavy taxation. 
Following the Ottoman Empire defeat in the Russo–Turkish 
war of 1878, the European powers pressed the Ottomans to 
carry out reforms in the Armenian-inhabited regions of the 
Empire.5 Abdul Hamid II, the sultan of the theocratic 
Ottoman Empire, was defiant. Between 1894 and 1896, a series 
of massacres were carried out against the Armenians, greatly 
shocking and alarming the western world. According to Dr 
Johannes Lepsius, a German missionary who witnessed and 
investigated the massacres, at least 100,000 Armenians were 
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killed and another 500,000 made destitute.6 Winston Churchill 
and several American writers and journalists were openly 
using the word ‘holocaust’ to describe these events.7 
In July 1908, a group of secularist revolutionaries known 
as the ‘Young Turks’ launched a coup and within days they 
removed the autocratic powers of Sultan Abdul Hamid, 
making him a constitutional monarch. In March 1909, the 
Sultan mounted a counter-coup. Initially successful, he was 
ultimately deposed by the Young Turks. During this turbulent 
period, another large-scale massacre of Armenians was 
launched in the Adana province of southern Turkey, one in 
which approximately 20,000 Armenians perished.8 After a 
series of military defeats and the loss of Ottoman territory in 
the Balkans to its former Christian subjects in 1912–1913, the 
Young Turks decided to follow a strategy of aggressive, 
narrowly ethnic Turkish political and linguistic nationalism. 
Fearing that the Armenian provinces would also be lost with 
the intervention of foreign powers, the Young Turks began to 
regard Armenians with increased suspicion.9  
In October 1914, the Ottoman Empire—after much debate 
and dithering—entered World War I on the side of Germany. 
After a series of Ottoman military setbacks by the Russians, 
the Young Turks accused the Armenians of conspiring with 
the Russian forces to ensure an Ottoman defeat. The legend of 
‘Armenian treachery’ gave the government the pretext to 
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sanction measures designed to remove all traces of the 
Armenian population from the Empire. Triggered by what 
many scholars argue was the impending landing by the 
Anglo–French forces on the Gallipoli peninsula, the Young 
Turk government arrested some 250 Armenian intellectuals in 
the capital, Constantinople (now Istanbul), on 24 April 1915.10 
This marked the beginning of what Henry Morgenthau, the 
United States ambassador to the Ottoman Empire in 1915, 
described as a ‘campaign of Race extermination’.11 
Soon afterwards, the Minister of the Interior of the 
Ottoman Empire, Talaat Pasha, ordered the deportation of 
Armenians throughout Ottoman Turkey. Their properties 
were seized and the deportees given insufficient provisions to 
sustain life. Forced to march through hostile terrain, tens of 
thousands died from starvation and disease. There was no 
security and columns of people were set upon, robbed, raped, 
abducted or killed by paramilitaries, by Kurdish brigands, 
released prisoners and gendarmes under the control of party 
officials or local governors. The Armenians had, as Geoffrey 
Robertson QC observes, ‘been deliberately ordered to suffer 
“conditions of life calculated to bring about their destruction 
in whole or in part”‘.12 During the death marches, tens of 
thousands of Armenian women and children were abducted 
and were forcibly converted to Islam as a price for their 
lives.13 
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Anzac prisoners of war as witnesses 
Among the plethora of foreign eyewitnesses to the Genocide 
were the Anzac prisoners of war taken by the Turks. They 
include prisoners captured at Gallipoli, the Sinai, 
Mesopotamia and the submariners who penetrated the 
Dardanelles in 1915.14 Perhaps the most well-known 
Australian prisoner in Turkey was Captain (later Sir) Thomas 
White, a pilot for the Australian Flying Corps, and in later 
years a cabinet minister in the Menzies government. White 
was captured by the Ottoman army in November 1915 while 
on a mission to cut telegraph wires near Baghdad. He had his 
first encounter with the Armenian massacres when he 
reached a ‘mainly Armenian town’ called Tel Armen in 
northern Mesopotamia. He noticed that only a very few 
Armenian women and children had remained, ‘the males 
being conspicuously absent’. After climbing a little rise, he 
found ‘thirty-six newly-made graves which spoke eloquently 
of what had become of the Armenian men’. He noticed a little 
girl who had been watching him from a side street and looked 
pleadingly towards him. Powerless to help her, White was 
‘horrified at the Turk’s handiwork, learning later that these 
massacres had been simultaneous and to order throughout 
the entire country’.15 
In addition to the demographic change brought about by 
the forced deportation of Armenians and other Ottoman 
Christians, the policy had served another useful purpose for 
the Ottomans. The homes, churches and monasteries the 
Armenians were forced to abandon became the prison camps 
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where many Australian and other Allied prisoners were held 
captive. Lieutenant Leslie H Luscombe of the 14th Battalion 
AIF was taken prisoner at Gallipoli on Hill 971 in August 
1915. While being transported to the centuries-old Sourp 
Asdvadzadzin (Holy Mother of God) Armenian monastery in 
Ankara, he witnessed ‘a sad and depressing sight’ at the 
station in Eskisehir, a railway junction town in western 
Turkey: 
On the opposite side of the platform another train was 
standing. It was composed of a number of empty two-tier 
steel sheep trucks. On the platform a considerable number of 
Armenian women and children were huddled together. As 
our train pulled into the platform, Turkish soldiers armed 
with whips were driving the women and children into the 
sheep trucks. It was evidently intended to transport them to 
some distant concentration camp... All the Armenian men 
that could be rounded up were liquidated.16  
Another prisoner was Able-Seaman John H Wheat, a crew 
member of the Australian submarine ‘AE2’, which was 
captured shortly after penetrating the Dardanelles in April 
1915. He was taken to the Sourp Asdvadzadzin Armenian 
church at Afyon Karahissar, a town in western Turkey. Before 
the war, the Armenians comprised about one-third of the 
town’s 30,000 inhabitants. Wheat observed that ‘all the 
Armenians’ had been ‘driven from the town’ before his 
arrival. Another prisoner interned at Afyon, George Handsley 
of the 2nd Australian Light Horse Unit, describes how the 
town ‘had been the scene of a horrible massacre’ before his 
arrival, adding that ‘blood stains’ were ‘still there, and were 
quite plain on the wall of our quarantine prison room’.17 
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John Halpin, of the 12th Light Horse Regiment, captured 
in the Sinai, described his ‘new-found home’ at Afyon:  
We live in an atmosphere of desecration—the desecration of 
the House of Christ, and His martyred children of Armenia. 
This was their structure, is now their resting place. By day the 
blood-bespattered walls cry out to us, imagination magnifies 
the shrieks of massacre by night. Within the narrow 
churchyard, their bones lie underfoot.18 
Curious to know what had happened to the Armenians, 
Halpin caught the attention of a Turkish officer named Abu 
Makarish, passing him a few para’s for information. Makarish 
related to Halpin how he had ‘killed Armenians’ sweeping his 
hands ‘across his throat from ear to ear, in a sequence of 
significance’ about eight times. Makarish gestured again in ‘a 
sequence of significance…Women…screaming, childish 
victims of his ravishments’.19  
The Armenian relief movement 
The relief movement to save Armenian survivors began in the 
United States in 1915. It was sparked by a telegram sent by the 
United States ambassador, Henry Morgenthau, to the 
Secretary of State in Washington on 6 September 1915. 
Morgenthau reported that the ‘destruction of the Armenian 
race’ was ‘progressing rapidly’ and he proposed the 
formation of a relief fund in the United States to ‘provide 
means to save some of the Armenians’ who had survived.20 In 
response to his appeal, an emergency meeting was held in 
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New York on 16 September 1915 by a group of civic, business 
and religious leaders. They formed the American Committee 
for Armenian and Syrian Relief (ACASR), with headquarters 
in New York. Steps were taken immediately to organise 
volunteer committees in every state in the nation to maximise 
the Fund’s outreach to the American people. The ACASR was 
eventually incorporated by an Act of Congress in August 1919 
and renamed Near East Relief (NER). Within a decade, the 
organisation had successfully raised over $110 million and 
rescued more than a million Armenians, Greeks and 
Assyrians from certain death. This figure included over 
130,000 children who were housed, fed and educated in more 
than 200 orphanages.21 The American Red Cross was also 
involved in sending relief supplies to the Near East and by 
1918 they had appropriated about $US1.8 million for 
Armenian relief. 
Britain soon followed America’s lead and in October 1915 
the Lord Mayor of London, Charles Johnson, inaugurated the 
Armenian Refugees (Lord Mayor’s) Fund at Mansion House, 
London. In British cathedrals and churches it became the 
practice to designate a Sunday in February as ‘Armenia 
Sunday’, and to give the proceeds of the collections to 
Armenian relief. By the end of World War I, British charities 
had raised tens of thousands of pounds for the Armenian 
refugees.22 
Australia’s role in the relief effort 
The fate of the Armenians aroused the sympathy of many 
Australians. In December 1915, Miss M E Searle, honourable 
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secretary of the newly-formed Armenian Relief Fund, made 
an appeal by letter to the editor of the Melbourne Argus. 
Searle stated that the Young Turks were bent on 
‘exterminating the Armenians’ and had made ‘appalling 
progress’ towards this goal. She urged fellow Australians to 
follow the American lead and to ‘spare something for these 
most pitiful of all’.23 
The Fund had emerged from a large wartime Australian 
culture of relief movements for various countries, such as the 
Belgian Relief Committee, Serbian Relief Committee and 
Polish Relief Committee. Searle’s efforts helped raise a modest 
£300 until her work was taken over by the Friends of Armenia 
organisation in early 1917. The organisation was formed in 
Melbourne by three prominent citizens: Dr Alexander Leeper, 
Master of Trinity College in the University of Melbourne, 
William H Edgar MLC, and Pastor James E Thomas, President 
of the Council of Churches of Victoria.24 In February 1917, a 
public meeting was held in the Assembly Hall, Collins Street, 
Melbourne, by the Friends of Armenia committee, chaired by 
William H Edgar. The stated purpose of the meeting was to 
awaken ‘fresh interest in the cause’ of the Armenians. A 
motion was put forward by members of the committee calling 
for 
the attention of the public to the urgent needs…of the 
remnant of Armenia. We are convinced that their claims for 
help are so strong that the whole civilised world should co-
operate forthwith to save them. We trust that the government 
of Australia and the community at large will take up their 
cause, so that, where possible, protection and help may be 
given, and that liberal supplies of money may be received.25 
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In response to requests made by the Friends of Armenia 
committee, the Lord Mayor of Melbourne, Sir David V 
Hennessy, convened a meeting with the Council of Churches 
of Victoria in March 1917. He suggested that ‘the various 
Churches should set apart a Sunday for special collections in 
aid of the suffering Armenians’. They agreed to designate 22 
April 1917 as ‘Armenia Sunday’, a day for intercessions and 
collections for the starving Armenians. The Lord Mayor 
proclaimed: 
I gladly accede to the request made to me by several 
prominent citizens of Melbourne, and by the Victorian 
Friends of Armenia Committee, to open a fund for the relief 
of the remnant of Armenia. Many of these poor people are 
dying through starvation in Mesopotamia and Arabian 
Deserts, whilst others who are returning to Armenia are in 
urgent need of help and the re-establishment of their 
desolated homes.26 
This initiative by the Lord Mayor, supported by the 
Church leaders in Victoria, became the first major grassroots 
drive for destitute Armenians. The appeal was a great success; 
the Melbourne Age reported that over £2,000 had been 
collected. A ladies subcommittee was formed and some bales 
of goods were made up for transport to Armenia at the 
earliest opportunity. Unfortunately, the lack of shipping 
facilities prevented their dispatch.27  
The Commonwealth Button Fund (CBF), an organising 
body which co-ordinated and sponsored the fundraising 
activities of other funds, produced a badge to help with the 
Armenian relief campaign in November 1917.28 It featured a 
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coloured illustration of a Middle Eastern scene, with date 
palms, a white town with minarets and three Arabs on camel 
against yellow sand and a blue sky. The words ‘Servia Syria 
Armenia’ were printed in red across the sand. During the war 
these badges were sold in trams, buses, at railways stations 
and rallies to raise money for the stated cause. 
Before long, the movement for Armenian relief spread 
across to other Australian states. In December 1918, the Lord 
Mayor of Sydney, James J Smith, along with many prominent 
businessmen and clergy, adopted a resolution put forward by 
Sir Thomas Anderson calling for a ‘fund to be established in 
NSW…to save a Christian people, who are now living in 
abject poverty, from extinction’.29  
In a pioneering move to increase collections, the New York 
based ACASR commissioned a veteran Hollywood film 
producer, William N Selig, in early 1919 to produce a film 
based on the story of Aurora Mardiganian, an Armenian girl 
who had survived the genocide. The Armenian relief 
committees in Australia received a copy of the six-reel film 
and eagerly used it as an effective fundraising tool. On 28 
February 1920, the Union Theatres Ltd under the auspices of 
the Sydney and Melbourne Armenian relief committees, 
presented a premiere at the Princess Theatre in Spring Street, 
Melbourne.30  
While only one reel of the film has survived, a book 
entitled The of Souls: The Story of Aurora Mardiganian first 
published in 1918, provides the screenplay. It opens in an 
Anatolian village on Easter Morning 1915, where the large 
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Mardiganian family is preparing for the forced deportation. 
On the road, Aurora is continuously molested and she finally 
apostatises in order to save her mother, but to no avail. At a 
certain point during the exodus, 16 girls in the caravan are 
‘crucified’ on crude crosses—the most sensational scene in the 
film. Aurora is finally rescued and taken to Russia, where she 
embarks on a Norwegian ship for the United States.31 It was 
the first movie ever made explicitly for the work of advocacy 
for humanitarian relief. It was described by the Melbourne 
Herald as the ‘most powerful human drama of all time’.32 
The internationalisation of the Armenian Relief movement  
In May 1922, the Reverend Dr Lincoln L Wirt, an American 
Congregational minister and the International Commissioner 
of the NER, visited Australia to organise and expand 
Australia’s relief potential. He had spent much time in the 
Near East and had been directly involved in the relief work. 
Prior to his arriving, Wirt had helped establish committees in 
Hawaii, Japan, China, and the Philippines.33 The stated aim of 
his mission was to ‘forge a chain of mercy’ from one end of 
the world to the other. 
Wirt travelled to the major capital cities in Australia where 
public meetings were organised. He spoke of the dire needs of 
                                                 
31 Gates, H L (1919), The Auction of Souls: The story of Aurora 
Mardiganian, the Christian girl who survived the Great Massacre, 
London, Odhams Press. 
32 Babkenian, Vicken (2010), ‘An SOS from Beyond Gallipoli’, ‘An 
SOS from Beyond Gallipoli: Victoria and the Armenian Relief 
Movement’, Victorian Historical Journal, vol 81, no 2, 261. 
33 Babkenian, Vicken (2010), ‘Cuba, China, Korea, Hawaii and the 







the Armenians and called on Australian government to 
provide a ‘mercy ship’ for goods donated by Australians to be 
sent directly to the areas of need. The heads of the major 
religious organisations, as well as prominent political and 
civic leaders, expressed their support. The Prime Minister of 
Australia, William ‘Billy’ Hughes, promised ‘that free freight 
would be provided by the Commonwealth Steamers’.34 
As a result of appeals made in Melbourne, Sydney and 
Adelaide during Wirt’s visit, shipments of relief supplies—
which included flour, tinned milk, clothing, leather and 
woollen material—were dispatched aboard the Common-
wealth Government steamers, Hobson’s Bay and Parratah. The 
supplies were escorted by Miss Hilda J King, the daughter of 
the Reverend Joseph King, formerly organising agent of the 
London Missionary Society in Australia.35 
Before returning to the Near East, Wirt had succeeded in 
forming relief committees in every state in the 
Commonwealth. He expressed his delight at the result of his 
mission, which had far exceeded his greatest expectations: ‘I 
have never seen anything like the generosity of the Australian 
people. I look upon it all as more beautiful than anything else 
in my life.’36 On 16 September 1922, shortly after Wirt’s 
departure, news of the destruction of the port city of Smyrna 
at the hands of the Turkish nationalists reached Australia.37 
Fire had been set to the Armenian quarter, spreading 
ferociously to the Greek and European quarters. Over 300,000 
Armenians and Greeks fled to the quay for safety and were 
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later removed to Greece as refugees. The Reverend Dobson, 
previously an Anzac chaplain at Gallipoli, witnessed the 
catastrophe and was involved in providing relief to the 
victims of the tragedy. He later wrote a detailed report on the 
event, poignantly titled ‘The Smyrna Holocaust’.38 
In November 1922, with the help of Wirt, the Australian 
committees established an orphanage in Antilyas, Beirut, 
named the ‘Australasian Orphanage’.39 The orphanage 
initially housed some 1,700 Armenian children who had no 
responsible living relatives upon whom they had any moral 
or legal claim for support. The site was previously a paper 
mill and was well supplied with fresh water. It was partly 
surrounded by an orange grove on one side and the 
Mediterranean Sea on the other, which became a convenient 
bath house for the orphans. The motto of the orphanage was 
‘Hold Fast to Honour’.40 
Letting the public know 
In their drive to educate the public, the Armenian Relief 
committees prepared a number of pamphlets containing vivid 
descriptions and photographs portraying the plight of the 
Armenians. One of them—titled ‘An SOS from Beyond 
Gallipoli’—included an excerpt from an ‘authenticated’ 
telegram purportedly sent by Talaat Pasha to the provincial 
governors in 1915 stating: ‘the government has decided to 
complete the extermination of all Armenians resident in 
Turkey, without regard to whether they are women, children 
or invalids’.41  
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The Australian daily newspapers provided invaluable 
assistance to the relief committees. From the early days in 
1915, when Miss M E Searle made her first appeal until the 
early 1930s, the daily papers gave liberal space to news items 
on various phases of the relief work. The official organ 
newspapers and magazines of Australian religious and 
humanitarian organisations—such as the Red Cross Record and 
the Australian Christian World—gave prominent coverage to 
the Armenian relief appeal. The South Australian Armenian 
relief committee went as far as publishing a magazine titled 
the Armenian, with the intention of awakening the interest of 
the public towards the Armenian plight.42  
In a bold attempt to grapple with the problem of 
supporting such a vast number of orphans, the South 
Australian committee announced in 1922 the formation of the 
Armenian Adoption Association, appealing for 2,000 
members. Soon after, the Sydney committee developed its 
own way of helping the orphans with the ‘Big Ten’ 
movement. Members were requested to ask ten of their 
friends to subscribe 6 shillings per week for one year to be 
paid to the member as their ‘Captain’. The money’s collected 
were used to ‘rescue, feed, clothe, and educate’ a ‘helpless’ 
Armenian child for a year.43 
Because of the strict censorship practiced by the Ottoman 
government during the war, visual publicity illustrating the 
Armenian plight was generally unavailable until after the 
war. Following the armistice, moving picture companies with 
the assistance of the NER, produced a number of 
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documentaries for educational purposes. Many of these films 
made their way to Australia, such as ‘Alice in Hungerland’ 
and ‘Jackie in the Near East’. The latter documentary was 
based on the work of Jackie Coogan, a famous child movie 
actor in America, who was involved in helping promote the 
cause of the destitute Armenian and Greek children in 1924. 
Arguably the first ‘celebrity humanitarian’, Coogan 
successfully helped gather a shipment of over one million 
dollars worth of supplies donated by the children of America. 
As the leader of the ‘children’s crusade’, Coogan accompanied 
the shipment and was given a royal welcome by the orphans 
when he arrived at the orphanages in the Near East.44 Another 
documentary, entitled ‘Uncle Australia Sees It Through’, 
illustrating Australia’s role in the relief effort, was also 
produced by the NER, and shown to gatherings across 
Australia.45 
The Revered James Edwin Cresswell’s tour of inspection 
In December 1922, at a conference held in Melbourne by the 
interstate representatives of the relief committees, it was 
decided to form a national executive committee. The 
Reverend James E Cresswell, a Congregational minister from 
Adelaide, was appointed unanimously as National Secretary 
of the Australasian Armenian Relief Fund. Cresswell was 
asked by the committee to make a tour of the Near East and 
report on the work being carried out. In January 1923, 
Cresswell embarked on his mission aboard the Hobson’s Bay. 
He was accompanied by Melbourne nurse, Miss G Gordon, 
                                                 
44 Babkenian, Vicken (2011), ‘Hollywood’s First Celebrity 









who had volunteered to engage in relief work at the 
Australasian Orphanage. Part of their equipment was a large 
Australian flag to be used as a symbol of Australia’s 
humanitarian presence overseas.46 
Cresswell’s first destination was Syria, the epicentre of the 
relief operations. After having disembarked at the port of 
Antioch, Cresswell and Miss Gordon travelled eastwards to 
Aleppo. It was here that they first encountered the situation of 
some 6,000 Armenian and Greek refugees who had recently 
fled persecution in Turkey. Cresswell found the refugees clad 
in mere rags gathered apparently from the ‘rubbish heaps of 
years’. They had sought shelter in caves which had previously 
been used as slaughter houses. One of the caves was set apart 
as a field hospital treating patients suffering from pneumonia 
and tuberculosis. Another was used as a church. Cresswell 
recorded his observations: 
The sights within these caves are beyond words. No words 
seem adequate to describe the misery that must be the portion 
of these poor people… Here were women pale and 
emaciated, children with swollen abdomens, the result of 
starvation. Again, one saw little babies pinched and pallid— 
further on a little one just recently born, one tiny atom among 
thousands of the suffering children to be seen here.47 
Travelling in a south-westerly direction on a bleak journey 
through arid and barren grasslands, the pair arrived at 
Antilyas in February 1923, warmly received at the 
Australasian Orphanage. They were greeted by the directors, 
Mr and Mrs John H Knudsen of New Zealand, whom 
Cresswell described ‘as the most efficient heads of 
orphanages’ he had met.48 Present also was Miss Hilda King 
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who was conducting relief work amongst the orphans. 
Cresswell was presented with a beautiful embroidered 
tablecloth in appreciation on behalf of the orphanage teachers 
and workers. The desire was expressed that this should be 
used at the periodic gatherings in Australia of the national 
Armenian relief committee. 
Cresswell toured the orphanage. He was impressed to find 
that in addition to receiving food and clothing, the boys had 
14 different trades to choose from as a means towards their 
future self-support.49 The directors were assisted by about 40 
teachers and vocational leaders, as well as the same number 
of women known as ‘mothers’ who attended to the food and 
clothing of the children.50 He inspected the dormitories and 
noticed blankets which had recently arrived from Melbourne 
and remarked: ‘It was delightful to turn over the corners of 
these blankets and find the name of a well-known Australian 
firm, and to know that in Australia we are ministering to such 
dire necessity as one sees here.’ He continued to see a vast 
array of Australian brand products being consumed ‘and 
heard of those who spoke with no little appreciation of South 
Australian honey’. He witnessed the orphans, some of them 
quite small boys, making boots out of leather from Sydney 
tanneries. Further on, he visited the bakery where Australian 
flour was being made into tiny loaves of bread which were an 
essential part of the orphans’ diet.51 
Cresswell departed Antilyas in March 1923 and continued 
his journey to refugee camps and orphanages in Palestine, 
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Turkey, Southern Russia, Armenia and Greece before return-
ing home from his tour aboard the Makura in August 1923.52  
The Armenian Relief Fund and Save the Children Fund 
In late 1919, Australian opera singer, feminist and peace 
activist, Cecilia A John, formed a branch of the Save the 
Children Fund, an organisation aimed at helping destitute 
children, in Melbourne, Victoria. A co-founder of the 
Women’s Peace Army in 1915, John had previously worked 
with the International Red Cross in Geneva and the SCF in 
London.53  
The refugee crisis in Greece reached its peak in 1923 when 
the total number of refugees from Turkey swelled to about 1.4 
million, becoming the greatest single refugee movement in 
history to date. A relief worker observing the child refugees 
remarked: ‘They have forgotten how to smile…Fear is the one 
emotion with which they are familiar.’54 A large portion of the 
Armenian and Greek refugees had been settled in Salonika, 
the second largest city of Greece and capital of the northern 
prefecture of the same name. After protracted negotiations 
between Cecilia and the executive committee of the Armenian 
Relief Fund of Victoria, it was resolved to merge their appeals 
to one. The purpose was to render the greatest possible 
assistance to the humanitarian crisis engulfing the Near East. 
The co-operative association of the two funds was formally 
inaugurated at a meeting of elected representatives of both, 
held on 3 December 1923.55 The name of the new joint 
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committee was the Save the Children Fund and Armenian 
Relief Fund (SCF & ARF). 
The Armenian Relief Fund of Victoria thereby terminated 
its connection with the NER administration, and auto-
matically became associated with the activities of the Save the 
Children Fund International Union, and the Lord Mayor of 
London’s Armenian Fund, which were intimately related by 
written agreement. The Chairman of this new joint committee 
was Meredith Atkinson, previously the director of tutorial 
classes at the University of Melbourne, and Dr Leeper the 
Vice-Chairman. The Armenian relief committee in Adelaide 
followed Melbourne’s move and merged with the SCF. The 
Sydney and Perth committees on the other hand continued 
their association with the NER, and the headquarters of the 
Australasian Armenian Relief Fund moved to George Street, 
Sydney, in 1924.56  
The SCF and ARF focused their attention on the 
humanitarian crisis engulfing Greece and Armenia sending 
large consignments of food and clothing to the refugee camps. 
The well known Melbourne firms, Swallow and Ariell, Myer 
Pty Ltd, Messrs C M Read & Co, along with others generously 
assisted in the relief campaign. The Victorian and South 
Australian governments participated by allowing relief 
parcels donated to the SCF and ARF to be carried free of 
charge on their State railways.57  
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Australians in Greece 
Australians were also at the forefront in the relief work in 
Greece. Lieutenant George D Treloar, an Anzac veteran from 
Ballarat, Melbourne, was appointed as the League of Nations’ 
representative at Salonika responsible for the settlement of 
refugees in eastern Macedonia and western Thrace in 1922. 
Within a year, he was handling more than 108,000 refugees. 
For his outstanding humanitarian work, Treloar was 
appointed to the Order of the Saviour (gold cross) by the 
Greek government, and a refugee village, Thrilorion, near 
Komotini, Greece, was named after him.58  
Joice NanKivell was born in Ingham, Queensland in 1887 
but had spent most of her childhood on a farm in Gippsland, 
Victoria. After the death of her brother during World War I, 
her father abandoned the farm and NanKivell went to 
Melbourne where she reviewed books for the Herald and 
worked as secretary to Professor Leeper at the University of 
Melbourne. In response to the Smyrna Catastrophe, Joice 
along with her Gallipoli veteran husband, Sydney Loch, 
volunteered to conduct relief work at a Quaker-run farm 
school near the teeming refugee camps of Salonika. They were 
joined by Caroline Ethel Cooper, daughter of the deputy 
Surveyor-General of South Australia, who had previously 
worked with the Lochs during the famine in Poland in 1921. 
Caroline and the Lochs set about improving conditions for 
the refugee villagers, who found themselves without proper 
water supply or any form of medical assistance. To help the 
villagers become self-sufficient, Joice sourced wool and 
cotton, had a loom built, learned about natural dyes and 
formed a women’s weaving co-operative called Pyrgos Rugs. 
She designed Byzantine style rugs, two of which are now on 
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display: one in the Powerhouse Museum in Sydney and the 
other in the 12th century tower that is now the Loch 
‘Australian’ Museum in Ouranoupolis, Greece. In addition to 
teaching the women and children literacy and economic skills, 
Loch acted as an assistant medical officer. Throughout her 
life, Loch maintained a keen interest in humanitarian work. 
During World War II she helped save thousands of Polish and 
Jewish children from the Nazis by leading a daring escape 
known as ‘Operation Pied Piper’. She has been awarded more 
medals than any other Australian woman for her heroism, her 
humanitarian work, and her innovative programs instituted 
in various refugee camps throughout Europe.59  
Caroline remained at the Quaker Relief unit in Salonika 
until 1928. Before returning to Australia in 1930, she assisted 
the work of Miss Karen Jeppe, the commissioner for the 
protection of women and children in the Near East, based in 
Aleppo, Syria. Jeppe had been appointed by the League of 
Nations to reclaim the thousands of Armenian women and 
children who had been abducted during the Armenian 
Genocide and forcibly converted to Islam. While visiting the 
headquarters of the Armenian Relief Fund of NSW in Sydney, 
Caroline thanked the New South Wales committee for the 
generous contribution towards Karen Jeppe’s work. Caroline 
stated that ‘Miss Jeppe much appreciated the help of 
Australia’, and that the money sent had been ‘used for a soup 
kitchen and a clinic for the orphan children’.60  
Australian women advocate the Armenian cause 
Australian women played a prominent role in the cause of 
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Armenian relief both on the field and at home. Three 
prominent feminists of Sydney, Lady Caroline Edgeworth 
David, Edith May Glanville and Eleanor Mackinnon (OBE), 
were the driving force behind the success of the Fund in 
NSW. Lady David, the wife of Sir Tannatt William Edgeworth 
David, a renowned geologist, became the president of the 
New South Wales branch of the fund in 1922. Lady David 
along with Edith Glanville, a well known social worker and 
honorary secretary of the fund, spoke at public gatherings in 
which branches of the fund were formed in towns across New 
South Wales.61 They also helped organise many fundraising 
events such as bazaars and fetes where needlework made by 
the orphans in the Near East were sold. During one of these 
events, Mrs Preston Stanley MLA, the first female member of 
the NSW Legislative Assembly, made this moving appeal on 
behalf of the Armenians:  
When one reflects upon the moving history of that all too 
tragic nation…one is deeply concerned. Armenia is an 
honourable nation with one of the saddest histories…surely 
we will not be deaf to the cry of 120,000 orphans.62 
Eleanor Mackinnon, the founder of the Junior Red Cross in 
1914, was also a prominent member of the Armenian Relief 
Fund of New South Wales. In 1925, Eleanor was selected to 
represent Australia at the Sixth General Assembly of the 
League of Nations held at Geneva. She was invited to speak 
on the platform on the situation of the Armenian refugees by 
Fridjof Nansen, the President of the League of Nations. 
During her speech, Eleanor reminded the delegates that  
the Armenians have lived in such a state of misery, 
persecution and suffering and have been subjugated to such 
atrocities as might well freeze our blood even to hear of them. 
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I do not wish to harrow your feelings, but I would ask you 
whether we are not indebted to this people.63 
In Victoria, prominent feminist and academic, Jessie Webb, 
was also an outspoken advocate on behalf of the Armenians. 
Jessie was chosen as Australia’s alternate delegate to the Fifth 
General Assembly to the League of Nations held in Geneva in 
1924. On her return to Australia, Webb appealed to the 
women of Australia ‘who live in such free and happy 
conditions’ to show ‘practical sympathy with Miss Jeppe’s 
undertaking by raising the money necessary’ for the rescue of 
Armenian women.64 
In addition to Hilda King, Miss G Gordon, Joice Loch and 
Caroline Holmes, three other Australian women are known to 
have conducted relief work among the Armenian refugees. 
Leila Priest, a nurse from Tasmania, had joined the NER after 
having served in the US army during the war. She was sent to 
Alexandropol, Armenia, in 1919 where she provided relief to 
over 20,000 orphans who were being cared for by the NER.65 
Another nurse, Isobel Hutton RRC, who had previously been 
with the AIF in Palestine, also joined the NER following the 
War. She was sent to Aleppo where she conducted relief work 
among the approximately 70,000 ‘wearied and frightened’ 
Armenian refugees.66 
In 1926, Edith Glanville was appointed as liaison officer 
between the League of Nations (the predecessor to the United 
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Nations) and the NER organisation.67 In the same year, 
Glanville embarked on a journey to the Near East in order to 
investigate the condition of the Armenian refugees and 
orphans. She reported her findings at the NER conference 
which met prior to the annual League of Nations Assembly 
meeting at Geneva.68 
The Relief Fund wraps up 
By 1928, only a core group of 500 orphans had remained at the 
Australasian Orphanage, and by the following summer, it was 
closed. The orphanage program not only provided the 
orphans with a home but gave them the means for self 
support. The Armenian relief movement continued to exist in 
Australia until the early 1930s, during which time a vast 
number of Armenians and other Ottoman Christians had been 
saved from starvation and disease. Thousands of Armenian 
women and children had also been reclaimed through the 
work of Karen Jeppe which was generously supported by 
Australians. Cresswell eloquently expressed the significance 
this event had for his own beloved nation: 
The generosity of the people of Australia had made the name 
of the Commonwealth known to almost every person in and 
around Athens. From Jerusalem in the south, up through 
Syria, Greece, Turkey, and even southern Russia, there sprang 
up the lips…words of thankfulness for the kindness of 
Australia.69 
Conclusion 
Despite a strong connection between Australia’s Gallipoli 
experience and the Armenian genocide, the latter does not 
form part of Australia’s collective memory of Gallipoli today. 
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Australia’s response to the Armenian genocide provides an 
early instance of international humanitarian activism that 
served as a precursor to many further instances of Australian 
engagement in relief operations through the League of 
Nations and the United Nations. 
The Armenian relief movement mobilised a broad 
spectrum of Australia’s political, civic and religious leaders, 
with Australian women playing a prominent role. The relief 
campaign produced a generous response, culminating in the 
establishment of an Australian-run orphanage in the Near 
East. As a result of the global reaction to the Armenian 
genocide, a significant number of Armenians and other 
Ottoman Christians were saved from death and destitution. 
Through the Armenian Relief Fund, Australia became one of 
the leading countries in the world to help rescue the 
Armenians from oblivion. It was a landmark event which 
would see Australia enter the world stage as an international 
humanitarian force. 
The conundrum lies in the dissonance between these two 
mindsets and behaviours: on the one hand, an outstanding set 
of achievements in humanitarian intervention for a victim 
community; on the other, an expungement of Armenian 
history at the hands of Turkey, a former enemy now 
embraced, almost ‘loved’, by modern Australia for helping 
the country ‘find itself’ as a nation, as a separate national 
identity rather than a sibling daughter of Mother Britain. 
Recent federal governments have sought to minimise criticism 
of these ‘partners in war’, to evade discussion of any of the 
genocidal issues involved. Given the extent to which state and 
federal governments supplied transport and waived charges 
to assist Armenian refugees, there was clearly governmental 
complicity in relief action. How, then, is it possible for recent 
governments to disassociate themselves from the events of 
1915 to 1923, and beyond? 
RESPONDING TO GENOCIDE IN RWANDA: LOCAL 
KNOWLEDGE AND COUNTER-STORIES 
 
DAVID DENBOROUGH AND CHERYL WHITE 
(in collaboration with Hodali Irakoze Pierre Claver, Jill 
Freedman and Gene Combs) 
 
From April to July 1994, a genocide perpetrated against the 
Tutsi people in Rwanda claimed over one million human 
lives. It is now 18 years later and the survivors of the genocide 
continue to face profound hardships in relation to housing, 
health, education, extreme poverty, and security. The vast 
majority of survivors still live in great suffering and with 
nightmares of the traumatic past. The genocide aimed to 
eliminate the Tutsi, and this entailed the elimination of 
families—fathers, mothers, and children. After the genocide, 
the survivors regrouped on the basis of kinship, friendship, or 
just kind-heartedness of spirit. Associations fighting for 
victims’ rights are constantly committed. Ibuka is a national 
organisation in Rwanda that represents survivor associations 
throughout the country (see Kaboyi, 2007). 
Six years ago, the authors first met with Kaboyi Benoit, at 
that time the executive secretary of Ibuka. After initial 
introductions, and in response to our ‘down under’ accents, 
Benoit said ‘Ah, Australia…there’s a country that knows all 
about genocide.’  
This recognition and our conversation following signalled 
the beginning of a partnership between Ibuka and Dulwich 
Centre Foundation International, an Australian-based 
organisation which responds to groups and communities who 
have experienced significant hardship. Much of our work 
involves cultural partnerships and building the capacity of 
local workers through the use of narrative practices to elicit 
and richly describe local knowledge. Within any community 





responding to these difficulties: they will take whatever action 
is possible—in their own ways, based on particular skills and 
local knowledge—to try to address the effects of the 
hardships on their lives and of those they love. These 
initiatives may not currently be widely recognised, and they 
may not in themselves be enough to overcome all that is 
presently facing their community. But these initiatives are 
highly significant. They make it possible for community 
members to identify these initiatives, to describe them so that 
the skills and local knowledge implicit within them become 
more visible to themselves and to others, and to trace the 
social histories of these skills and knowledge so that the ways 
these are linked to local culture and tradition are understood. 
These initiatives can be strengthened in ways that make 
further action possible.  
After our initial meeting, Kaboyi Benoit expressed his 
willingness for meetings to be held between Ibuka trauma 
counsellors/assistant lawyers and a range of international 
narrative therapists and community workers. Four such 
meetings have taken place. The partnership has also resulted 
in an interview with Kaboyi Benoit, 2007, and two 
publications: Strengthening Resistance: The use of narrative 
practices in working with genocide survivors (Denborough, 
Freedman and White, 2008) and Working with Memory in the 
Shadow of Genocide: The narrative practices of Ibuka trauma 
counsellors (Denborough, 2010).  
This essay conveys some of the intricate, local knowledge 
of Ibuka counsellors/survivors in relation to:  
•the continuing effects of the genocide;  
•what sustains survivors as they live in the shadow of 
genocide; 
•ways in which survivors negotiate ‘living side by side’ with 





•ways of responding when survivors cannot locate the bodies 
of loved ones.  
Significantly, we also explore how narrative practices have 
been used to facilitate the excavation, documentation and 
circulation of this local knowledge and what this is making 
possible.  
(i) Local knowledge in relation to the continuing effects of 
genocide 
One of the first realms of local knowledge that was articulated 
by the Ibuka survivors/counsellors relates to the continuing 
effects of the genocide. The following collective narrative 
document was constructed from the rescued spoken words of 
participants:  
The effects of the genocide that took place in Rwanda in 1994 
are not over. Many people still live with the effects of the 
extreme violence, killings, and degradation that took place 
here during those one hundred days. So many of our loved 
ones are no longer with us. We are a group of trauma 
counsellors and assistant lawyers who work for Ibuka—the 
national survivors’ association in Rwanda. We work around 
our country to support and assist survivors of the genocide. 
The people with whom we meet are often dealing with many 
different effects of the genocide. They may be having 
nightmares and be unable to sleep. They may experience 
powerful feelings of despair and hopelessness. Often they 
have profound sorrow, fears, or anger. Some may not know 
whether they wish to live or to die, which means they are 
negotiating with death. Some survivors experience severe 
headaches. Others have difficulty swallowing and may feel as 
if they are choking. Many survivors are very isolated, very 
alone. When you have lost so many people it is sometimes 
very difficult to have relationships with others again. Some 
women who were raped during the genocide are now HIV-
positive and are living with the consequences of this.  
And then there are the problems of memory. Some survivors 
have lost their memories and therefore have lost aspects of 





and again. What is more, some survivors may feel guilty for 
being alive. The genocide has made them doubt that they 
have a right to live. These are all effects that the genocide is 
still having on survivors. 
There are also circumstances in the present that are very 
difficult to deal with. Some survivors are living in the same 
villages as those who killed their relations and family 
members. There is hostility and hatred that they have to deal 
with every day. Many survivors are also living in severe 
poverty. These are continuing obstacles to dealing with the 
effects of the genocide. 
Children and young people are also living with the effects of 
the killings. Even if they were not born at the time of the 
genocide, they are living with the effects that these events had 
on their parents and relatives. 
These are just some of the effects of the genocide that people 
are living with. These are the effects which we are responding 
to in our work (Denborough, Freedman and White, 2008, 1–2). 
The retelling of this document, which took place in a 
ceremonial way within our first meeting, was experienced as 
powerfully resonant by Ibuka counsellors who stated:  
This is an important document. We would be honoured if you 
could send this to others, to your friends in other countries 
who are also dealing with difficulties. And to the United 
Nations! 
Listening to this collective retelling enabled the Ibuka 
counsellors to place their initiatives, their efforts and 
anguishes, into a broader storyline. Such retelling enables a 
particular distance from the immediacy of one’s own 
experiences, which in turn provides the possibility for 
renewed compassion for one’s own life and the life of one’s 
community. And through interweaving the words of many, a 
sense of ‘communitas’ (Turner, 1969, 1979) is generated. The 
generation and performance of this particular document can 





(Humphrey cited in Westoby, 2009, 88) to accompany the 
many other collective rituals of remembrance that are held in 
Rwanda during the 100 days of memory each year.1  
The effects of genocide are informed by an ‘externalising’ 
ethic (White and Epston, 1990; White, 1997). Narrative 
practice refuses to locate problems within people—instead, it 
insists that problems are placed back into the social contexts 
in which they were produced. And so, rather than survivors 
being described by professionals as ‘suicidal’, the description 
reads: ‘Some may not know whether they wish to live or to 
die, which means they are negotiating with death.’ Similarly, 
rather than experiences of ‘survivor guilt’ being located 
internally, the description reads: ‘What is more, some 
survivors may feel guilty for being alive. The genocide has 
made them doubt that they have a right to live.’ 
As Kaboyi Benoit explains, the message of this document 
about the current effects of genocide has a wider significance:  
During the genocide, the wider world largely turned its backs 
on us and we know that many people regret this. Perhaps if 
the wider world reads this document, if they realise that the 
effects of the genocide are continuing, they will also realise 
that it is possible for them to take action now to assist us in 
our work with survivors (personal communication, 15 
November, 2007). 
(ii) Local knowledge in relation to ‘living in the shadow of 
genocide’ 
Narrative practice is vitally interested in what has been 
referred to as ‘double-listening’ (White, 2004) and the 
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development of ‘double-storied testimonies’ (Denborough, 
2006). It is both relevant to elicit and richly acknowledge the 
effects of the externalised problem—in this case the 
continuing effects of the genocide—and to unearth the diverse 
responses, initiatives and skills of survival that survivors/ 
counsellors are enacting as they live in the shadow of 
genocide. A particular method was used to ensure a ‘rich 
description’ of these survival skills.2  
The words and stories of Ibuka counsellors were collated 
into a collective document entitled: ‘Living in the shadow of 
genocide: how we respond to hard times—stories of 
sustenance from the workers of Ibuka.’  
Included here are just five of the 15 themes that comprise 
                                                 
2 Participants were asked to break into groups of three and consider 
the following questions:  
•Please describe something (a particular value, belief, skill or 
knowledge) that gets you or your family/friends through hard 
times.  
•Share a story of a time when this special value, belief, skill or 
knowledge has made a difference to you or to others.  
•Please speak of the social history of this skill, value or belief. How 
did you learn this? Who did you learn it from? Or who did you learn 
it with?  
•Is this linked in some way to any particular groups, family, 
communities or cultural histories of which you are a part?  
Participants were asked to consider these questions in groups of 
three. Each person took turns to respond to the questions, to ask the 
questions, and to take notes of the responses. Participants were 
invited to try to elicit particular details, to pay attention to metaphors 
and word images, and to take note of rich descriptions including 
ways in which people included sensory descriptions in their 
responses. All the responses from participants were then gathered 
and woven into a collective document. Patrick Iregura played a 






—Listening and learning from the lives of others  
Listening to the stories of others helps some of us get through. 
In our work, we hear stories from people who are carrying on 
their lives even though so much has happened to them. I 
recall listening carefully to one widow in particular who is 
continuing to live and care for her three children. This idea of 
listening to people carefully came from my mother. She 
would always listen to me during my childhood. Listening is 
also a part of Rwandan culture. We have seen people over-
come very difficult problems. Their lives serve as an example 
that problems can be solved, that many things are possible. 
—Tears and then talking  
Some of us are sustained by our tears. To cry, to shed tears, to 
allow them to fall, can make a difference. For some of us, 
there is a tranquillity that comes after tears that can allow us 
to sleep. After sleep, we may then take time to talk to 
someone. One person described that, ‘When I am sleeping, 
the tears that I have cried give me strength. When I sleep after 
I have cried, I am tranquil. There is no noise, only calmness. 
This way of sustenance came from my mother. Whenever my 
mother was in pain, she used to allow herself to cry. After her 
tears had fallen she would go and talk to her friends.’ Some of 
us are sustained by tears and then talking. 
—New ways of carrying on traditions 
There is a tradition in Rwanda that we respect the parents in 
our families. We see them as capable of everything, and we 
trust the answers that they give to us. We rely on their advice. 
Many of us lost our parents in the genocide and so we have to 
find ways to continue to stay in touch with their advice. One 
person said, ‘When I have hard times, I write. I imagine that it 
is my father writing to me, giving me answers. I think these 
answers are the appropriate ones.’ Some of us are finding 
new ways to carry on our tradition of seeking and respecting 





—Recalling good memories  
Sometimes good memories protect us. During the war, I was 
fighting on the front when we ran short of ammunition. We 
were left with no options. We had nowhere to flee and no 
supplies. It was at this time that I started to think about how 
my life was going to end. I remembered then that my father 
used to say that a true man, a real man, is strengthened by the 
good moments in his life. And then good memories started to 
come into my mind. I started to think about my girlfriend 
who I had left in my village. And I remembered how my 
father loved me so much. At this point, I stood up and told 
the rest of the company to pull back. We did this and even 
though it was through bullets and fire we made it. We found 
safety. Sometimes good memories protect us. And some of us 
learnt this from our families. 
—Realising I am not the only one to have that kind of pain 
The experiences we have had are so extreme that we may 
think we are the only ones to know this kind of pain: the pain 
of torture, the pain of seeing your loved ones murdered, the 
pain of surviving when others were killed in your place. 
Now, though, we realise that others also know this kind of 
pain. When an old woman came to see me in counselling she 
told me a terrible story. At first I was not sure what to do, but 
then an idea came into my head. I decided to talk to some 
other old ladies and hear what happened to them. I realised 
that that old woman who came to see me wasn’t the only one 
to have that kind of pain. Once we realise this, it is then 
possible for people to talk together. Now, whenever I have a 
problem, I talk to someone else to see if I am the only one to 
have that kind of problem. That’s how some of us sustain 
ourselves. We consider not only what we went through, but 
also what others have endured. 
Other themes among the 15 included: ‘Acts of prayer—talking 
with a strength beyond us’, ‘music and song’, ‘finding ways to 
rest’, ‘making family’, ‘bringing emotions and opinions out 
into the world’, ‘respecting ancestors’, ‘sports’, ‘keeping a 





and ‘turning to friends and seeking company’.  
The generation and retelling of this document was partly a 
response to the Ibuka counsellors’ descriptions of the 
‘problems of memory’: ‘Some survivors have lost their 
memories and therefore have lost aspects of their past. Others 
have painful memories that return again and again.’ Eliciting 
local knowledge about what sustains survivors in the present, 
carefully excavating the social histories of the values and skills 
implicit in these practices of sustenance, and then 
documenting/representing/circulating this knowledge, 
involves travelling down alternative pathways to memory 
and to history. When within the document survivors speak in 
terms of ‘this way of sustenance came from my mother’ or 
‘some of us learnt this from our families’, they are linking 
their actions in the present to the legacies of lost loved ones. 
They are travelling through time in ways that contribute to 
sustenance. In contexts where relationships with memory are 
fraught, this process seeks to work both individually and 
collectively to develop an alternative ‘rich textual heritage’ 
(Lowenthal in Wertsch, 2002, 62) and to provide a more 
‘usable past’ (Wertsch, 2002, 45).  
Along the way, this process of excavation, documentation 
and retelling can contribute to the development of a particular 
‘community of memory’ (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler 
and Tipton, 1985, 105). Just as the earlier document 
represented the ‘communalisation of suffering’, this form of 
documentation represents shared memories of sustenance. As 
the Ibuka counsellors described: 
This document can be used to advocate for survivors. And we 
can also use it in our work with survivors. It can assist us to 
notice the many different forms of resistance that we as 
survivors are demonstrating. 
The 15 themes of the document also act as the seeds of 
‘counter-stories’ (Nelson, 2001):  
…counter-stories aim to free not only individuals but the 





master narrative’ (183). As Nelson (2001) describes, many 
counter-stories start small—‘like a seed in the crack of a 
sidewalk, but they are capable of displacing surprising 
chunks of concrete as they grow’ (169). The Ibuka counsellors 
reported that when they shared the document ‘Living in the 
shadow of genocide...’ with others during the 100 days of 
commemoration that take place each year in Rwanda, this 
sharing contributed to a decrease in the number of survivor 
crises.  
Further, in their daily work, Ibuka counsellors elicit and 
co-author counter-stories with individuals and groups in 
highly skilful ways. They do so by using the following 
principles:  
•Bridging the gap: listening for what survivors have endured 
and the effects of this; 
•Bringing the current effects of the genocide out of the 
shadows; 
•Listening for what has survived and how this has survived;  
•Tracing histories of what is important to survivors; 
•Making it possible for survivors to see how they are carrying 
forth the legacies of loved ones who have died; 
•Acknowledging special skills of survival; 
•Never separating healing from justice;  
•Enabling survivors to make contributions to others; and 
•Sharing memory: finding ways to ensure that survivors are 
not left alone with memories that are too hard to bear.3 
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(iii) Local knowledge in relation to ‘living side by side with 
those who have done us harm’ 
In November 2010, Ibuka counsellors spoke of the dilemma of 
how they can assist survivors in ‘living side by side’ with 
those who have done their families great harm. Many 
survivors of the genocide in Rwanda continue to live in the 
same villages as those who participated in the killings. Some 
women also live alongside those who sexually assaulted 
them. Eighteen years on from the genocide, even in situations 
in which the perpetrators served prison sentences, many have 
now been released and Ibuka workers report that some 
survivors currently live with continuing threats and hostility.  
As the counsellors are survivors, it was decided to elicit 
and describe the skills, practices, philosophies and local 
knowledge that they themselves are using to respond to the 
complexities of ‘living side by side’. In small groups, they 
were invited to name their particular responses, to share 
stories about these, and to trace the social histories or the 
source of their particular approaches. Individual responses 
were then woven into the following collective document:  
Living side by side with those who have done us harm 
We are survivors and we are also counsellors. So we bring 
together our experiences as survivors and our experiences as 
professionals. These are like two different worlds. When we 
bring these two worlds together—the world of our 
experiences, and the world of the trainings that we attend—
we create new understandings. As we go, we even have to 
coin new words. 
This document describes some of the skills that we as 
survivors use here in Rwanda as we have to live side by side 
with those who perpetrated the killings during the genocide.  
This is very difficult. Some survivors are living in the same 
villages as those who killed their relations and family 
members. These survivors are sometimes living with 
continuing threats and violence to try to intimidate them not 





do speak up, when they do seek justice they must deal with 
people’s reactions. There is hostility and hatred that they have 
to deal with every day. Now that the Gacaca4 process is over, 
witnesses who have testified are sometimes harassed and 
persecuted.  
So how do we as survivors respond? How do we go about 
living side by side here in Rwanda? There are many different 
ways. We do not all do the same thing. We have documented 
here some of the skills we use. We hope this document may 
be of assistance to others.  
To keep a distance  
Some of us try to keep a distance from those who caused our 
families harm. At first, straight after the genocide, many 
survivors moved to a different part of the country—especially 
from rural areas into the towns. Now, with the unity and 
reconciliation policies of the government this is not possible. 
But even if we cannot move, if we are forced to live in the 
same community, then we might still try to keep a distance 
                                                 
4 Gacaca is a traditional form of dispute resolution in Rwanda that 
was used to bring perpetrators of the genocide to some form of 
community justice. As Rakiya Omaar (2007) explains: ‘[After the 
genocide] it was very apparent from the outset, that given the 
unprecedented level of Gacaca, popular participation in the killings 
in Rwanda, unprecedented in world history in terms of the 
percentages of people from the very old to the very young who 
participated, that it was never going to be possible to achieve justice 
using the formal western justice system. If there was even an attempt 
to put the majority of detainees through the courts, let alone all those 
yet to be arrested, then they would die of old age in the prisons 
because the entire system would be overwhelmed. The formal court 
system was simply not a viable option (54).’ The community courts 
were therefore established as a method of transitional justice, 
designed to promote three imperatives (which were sometimes 
competing and conflicting): justice, truth, and reconciliation. For 





because this lessens the chance of a direct clash. For me, if I 
realise that something is going to bring me into direct contact 
with the person who harmed my family, I try to avoid him. I 
do this so that I will not lose momentum. I know that seeing 
him will take me back to zero. It will cost me all the efforts I 
have made to rebuild my life. I don’t want to be stopped in 
my path towards a better future. I don’t want to lose 
momentum in reconstructing my life, so I try to keep a 
distance. Sometimes we have to keep this distance only in our 
minds. Some of us act as if the perpetrators are not actually 
living here. I relate as if they are non-existent. This is my way 
of keeping a distance. I try to convince myself that they are 
not here. I don’t give them any space in my mind. I erase 
them from my mind. Some of us still find ways to keep a 
distance.  
Acts of prayer  
Others of us turn to prayer. My prayers strengthen me to live 
alongside the perpetrators. God has often understood me in 
ways that provide strength. And when I feel there is no justice 
then I remember that it is God who judges. This gives me 
strength to live side by side during this lifetime. Some of us 
also join prayer groups. Being part of something bigger can 
bring a sense of peace. When I am joined with others, and feel 
a sense of peace, it helps me to consider forgiveness. Before 
the genocide almost all families were very religious. For many 
survivors, acts of prayer are not only a way of finding a 
refuge but also a way of honouring what our parents and 
relatives respected. Some of us turn to prayer in order to live 
side by side.  
To rebuild a certain bond 
For others, when we realise there is no way we can change 
this situation, we accept it and then try to be diplomatic and 
friendly with those who are a threat. If we are living in the 
same neighbourhood, we find ways to rebuild a certain bond. 
Often we have to make the first move. This might involve 
socialising or taking part in community events. If they have a 
family member in hospital then we might show our concern 
and care for that person. Some of us act as engaged citizens to 





To focus on the positive aspects of cohabitation  
Some of us try to not only remember the terrible history here 
but also to focus on the positive aspects of cohabitation. I look 
for any service I can offer. And I look for any form of integrity 
in the families that have caused my family harm. Even with 
people who have done the worst, there is always something 
you can build on. It is easy to find hate, but I have found that 
it is also possible to find one aspect from which to build a 
new relationship. Some of us try to focus on the positive 
aspects of living side by side.  
To speak in a general way 
Sometimes we have to express our frustrations and we have 
learned to do this in particular ways. During public 
presentations of meetings, we speak generally. If the person 
standing next to me is from a perpetrator family, then I will 
not curse his family. I will not express my outrage directly at 
him. I will instead curse in a general way. I will express my 
frustration at the whole general group of perpetrators and the 
harm that they have done. Some of us have learnt special 
skills in how we express our frustrations.  
Deep breathing  
The act of breathing deeply is significant to me. As soon as I 
come in contact with a person who will raise all the memories 
and who could break my heart, I step aside and I breathe 
deeply. In order to appease the negative emotions rising 
within me, in order to appease the flashbacks, I deeply 
breathe. 
Times when survivors have a voice  
There are other times and places where survivors have a 
voice. During the commemoration period, if a survivor has a 
trauma crisis then this is an opportunity to get everything off 
their chest, to give voice to all their frustrations. During such 
a crisis, survivors can say whatever it is necessary to say. 
Sometimes we even find people expressing their emotions by 





genocide. During the commemoration period there are also 
events that give voice to all that we experience. These 
moments and these commemoration events are important. 
They contribute to making it possible for us to live side by 
side in this land.  
Offering forgiveness for peace 
Sometimes, particularly in the country, in small villages, 
when survivors notice how delicate our position is, when we 
are surrounded by the families of perpetrators, we may go to 
these families and offer them forgiveness even before they 
have asked for it. Life in the village depends on harmony 
between people so sometimes we offer this forgiveness for 
peace.  
Seeking justice  
In order to live side by side, it has been important for many of 
us to seek justice. Despite the difficulties and disappoint-
ments many survivors have experienced with Gacaca, trying 
to find the truth of what happened in the genocide, is also 
about living side by side.  
Families  
Sometimes, living side by side happens within families. In 
families where there was intermarriage and one parent has 
been killed by the other side of the family, what is to happen 
with the children? They are sometimes raised by the side of 
the perpetrator because no one wants them to be completely 
isolated from their family. In these situations, for the children, 
even though the family has taken part in the massacre, we 
must find ways to integrate these families, to live side by side.  
Responsibility 
One of the things that can help us to live side by side is when 
only one member of a family was the perpetrator but the 
others were innocent or did not take part in the killings. 
When we know this, when we remember this, it can help. 
Even though the family’s reputation is tarnished, we acknow-
ledge that the responsibility was only with the people who 





possible to rebuild relationships with that family.  
Sticking together  
When we are lucky enough to have a few neighbours who are 
also survivors this makes the difference. If there are three of 
four families in the same neighbourhood then we try to help 
one another. We gather every once and a while and discuss 
the challenges we are facing. Some of us have also sought out 
training so we can assist others. Because we can relate to each 
other’s difficulties, we stick together and this can make all the 
difference.  
Working hard 
As survivors, we work hard. We work hard so that we can 
prove to the perpetrators that they did not ruin us completely. 
Others did not expect us to survive or to go on and live good 
lives. So we work hard so that we can have a better life, so 
that we can thrive.  
The source of these skills 
What is the source of these skills, these strategies, this 
strength? Like a river, there are many different sources. 
Necessity  
For some of us, the reason why we live together is that we 
don’t have anywhere else to go. If we did have somewhere 
else to go, some of us would have gone there.  
Rwandan culture  
We draw strength from our culture. There are traditions 
within Rwandan culture that train us to be tolerant and 
resilient and to value our relationships with others. These 
cultural practices encourage us to always move forwards, to 
look to the future. And these ways of thinking tend to bring 
people together. We draw on these aspects of our culture and 





Concern for our children  
For some of us, it is our concern for our children that gives us 
strength and makes it possible to start new relationships with 
the families that have done us harm. My children will grow 
up in this country. I don’t want them to be isolated here and 
so I have taken the initiative to start participating in the lives 
of the other families. The source of some of our initiatives to 
make peace is our concern for our children. We are taking this 
journey for the new living.  
Government policy 
Our government promotes unity and reconciliation. It tries to 
introduce these notions at all different levels of life in the 
community. This policy contributes to our efforts, our skills 
and our strategies.  
Social interest  
Here in Rwanda, we are not autonomous individuals. People 
are interdependent. Our economic and social interests are 
joined. We need each other. This knowledge is one of the 
sources of our efforts to live side by side.  
Drawing inspiration from our loved ones 
We are survivors and we draw inspiration from our lost loved 
ones. We use their strength to move us forward and to better 
our lives. We use our parents as inspiration. We continue 
their dreams, their ambitions, and the projects that they had 
for their lives.  
Our lost loved ones inspire us to live a good life. For when we 
are living a good life it is then possible to live side by side 
with pride. Every day, as we live in the shadow of genocide, 
we draw inspiration from our lost loved ones, and keep their 
legacies alive.  
We are survivors and we are counsellors. These are our skills 
of living side by side in the shadow of genocide. We have also 
included the sources of our skills, our strategies, and our 
strength. Like a river our skills have many sources. We hope 





The words in this document were also transformed into a 
song ‘Vivre ensemble dans l’ambre du génocide’ (Living side by 
side in the shadow of genocide)5 which was ritually 
performed and recorded. This song became a motif that was 
repeated at significant times during the week-long workshop.  
The development and performance of such a document 
and song can serve many purposes. For instance, each time 
they are performed this enacts:  
•An acknowledgement of the difficulty of the continuing 
circumstance of survivors;  
•A recognition of the skills, knowledge and agency of 
survivors;  
•A proclamation of preferred collective identity;  
•An honouring of those who have been lost and the legacies 
that are being carried forth;  
•A method of sharing knowledge between survivors;  
•An invitation to other survivors to consider their own skills, 
knowledges that are implicit in how they are responding to 
‘living side by side’. 
This entire process involved eliciting and richly describing 
particular local knowledge about ‘living side by side’. This 
emphasis on local knowledge recognises the profoundly 
diverse concepts of living that individuals, groups, 
communities and cultures use in attempting to deal and come 
to terms with experiences of social harm. One aim of narrative 
                                                 
5 The words of the document were skilfully transformed into song in 
French by Pierre Blanc-Sahnoun. The recording of the song features 
Pierre Claver Hodali Irakoze, Venant Tumukunde, Pierre Blanc-






practices is to honour and sponsor such diversity. The phrase 
‘living side by side’ had been offered by the Ibuka workers 
and so this was the theme around which the response was 
generated. Had the Ibuka counsellors initiated conversations 
that privileged alternative concepts such as those of 
‘reconciliation’ or ‘forgiveness’ (which are common themes in 
other contexts), then the document created would have richly 
described these alternative concepts and the social histories of 
these. But these were not the concepts that were put forward. 
Instead, narrative practices were used to elicit and then richly 
describe the knowledge, values, skills and philosophies 
implicit within the phrase ‘living side by side’.6  
We are now looking forward to sharing this document 
with others who are ‘living side by side’ with those who have 
done them harm. We are also interested in exploring how this 
sort of document could be shared and put to broader use 
within ‘peace-building’, ‘justice’, ‘social healing’ and/or 
‘reconciliation’ projects within Rwanda and elsewhere. 
(iv) Exchanging local knowledge and enabling contribution  
Over the last six years, collective documents, songs and 
messages have been exchanged between Ibuka counsellors 
and Aboriginal Australian, Jewish and Native American 
colleagues (Denborough, Freedman and White, 2008). One of 
the most powerful exchanges took place in Cairns, when we 
played a DVD of the Ibuka document ‘Living in the shadow 
of genocide: how we respond to hard times’ to a group of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander counsellors who made 
up the ‘Drop the Rock’ team. Tileah Drahm-Butler sent the 
                                                 
6 See Lederach (1995) in relation to the significance of elicitive 
approaches to peace-building in order to avoid cultural imposition. 
For rich discussions about diverse concepts of ‘forgiveness’, see 
Wiesenthal (1998). See also the special issue of the International 
Journal of Narrative Therapy and Community Work on ‘The question of 





following message back to Ibuka workers:  
Hearing your words and stories about how you are going 
about reclaiming your lives and living with dignity makes me 
think of our ancestors. These are the sorts of things they 
would have been trying to do fifteen years on from the 
genocide that took place in this land. We would like to send 
to you our ‘Drop the Rock song’ in appreciation of your 
words and your work.  
This song was embraced by the Ibuka counsellors7.  
This sort of interchange involves an exchange of local 
insider-knowledge between groups of genocide survivors and 
their descendants (see Epston, 1999, 2001). Within these 
exchanges, all those who are participating experience being 
linked with and making contributions to the lives of others 
(Denborough, 2008). This experience of making contributions 
to the lives of other survivors can be powerfully significant—
particularly when these contributions are consistent with 
carrying on legacies from one’s ancestors.  
On our most recent visit, Ibuka counsellors explicitly 
requested that our discussions consider a complex dilemma 
they are often dealing in their work:  
During the Gacaca justice processes, some survivors had 
hoped that perpetrators who came forth and confessed their 
crimes would be able to tell us where they buried our loved 
                                                 
7 As Jill Freedman (personal communication, 20 January 2011) 
describes: ‘We brought a number of copies of the song on CDs. We 
played it and talked about it and Patrick Iregura translated the lyrics, 
and then the Ibuka counsellors wanted to hear it again. Although 
most of the Rwandan counsellors don’t speak English, the next day 
at break, you could hear people singing “Drop the rock. Drop, drop 
the rock...” I think this song really brought home to the workers of 
Ibuka that these were real people from a different place who wanted 





ones. But some of us did not learn this and it has undermined 
the healing process. Now some survivors are continually 
asking and lamenting ‘how can we find the remains of our 
loved ones? How can we bury them?’ How can we assist 
these survivors who cannot find the bodies of their loved 
ones?  
The Ibuka counsellors said they would be interested to 
hear from Jewish colleagues about how they have responded 
to similar situations. During this most recent meeting, a 
number of Jewish narrative practitioners were present. Prior 
to coming to Rwanda they had conducted their own research 
both personally in relation to their families, and 
professionally, about some of the ways in which Jewish 
survivors of the Holocaust had responded to ‘the problems of 
memory’. 
In response to the Ibuka counsellors request, these Jewish 
practitioners gathered together some of their ‘local 
knowledge’ on this issue of honouring those who have been 
killed when their bodies have never been found. Representing 
the Jewish colleagues who were present, the following 
knowledge was shared8:  
Good morning. This is a very profound moment for us. We 
will do our best to respond to your question by sharing with 
you thoughts that have been gathered through a group effort. 
As you probably know, the majority of the six million Jews 
who were murdered in the Holocaust were burned and so no 
remains were left. In Jewish tradition, the taking care of dead 
ones and burying them is a profoundly sacred act. It is 
considered an act of genuine kindness as you have no 
intention of receiving back. Being unable to bury our loved 
ones is a devastating experience in Jewish culture. As a result, 
after the Holocaust, very many practices have developed in 
                                                 
8 The Jewish narrative practitioners present included Yishai Shalif, 
Yael Gershoni, Jill Freedman, Ruth Pluznick, Rachel Paran, and Tali 





response to this difficulty of not having the remains of our 
loved ones. I will share with you some of these responses.  
Many Holocaust survivors place in their wills that when they 
die and are buried they want not only their name written on 
their grave, but also the names of their loved ones who have 
no graves. In Jewish graveyards you can see these 
inscriptions.  
As there were whole villages and whole communities in 
which no one was left, in cemeteries there are also headstones 
which list the names of those communities—in order to 
commemorate whole villages from where there were no 
survivors. 
Naming is also significant in Jewish tradition. In many ways 
names have become a way to commemorate those who died 
with no remains. Children who were born after the Holocaust 
have been named after family members whose remains were 
not found. Similarly, places of significance such as homes, 
universities, avenues of trees, and institutes have also been 
named after people and communities who died during the 
Holocaust.  
In Israel there is a particular national day on which we 
remember the Holocaust. It starts with a ceremony in which 
six fires are lit in memory of the six million people who 
perished. Usually these fires are lit by survivors or their 
descendants.  
In more religious circles, there are a range of religious 
practices that are conducted in memory of those ones who 
died. In Jewish tradition, a person who lost a loved one says a 
particular prayer for 12 months after the death. This prayer is 
called a Kaddish. Because so many within the Holocaust did 
not have anyone to say Kaddish for them, a particular Kaddish 
day is set aside for them. We fast during this day in the 
temples and we say laments and prayers during this day. 
Another project involves a particular Jewish text that has six 
parts. These six parts act as a reminder of the six million who 





of Jews say parts of these prayers in remembrance of those 
who died. 
There is another response that is highly significant. Many 
Jews who know they will never find the remains of their 
loved ones seek memories of them. To this day, 65 years since 
the Holocaust, there is a program on the radio in which 
people call up and ask listeners if anyone has particular 
memories of their lost loved ones.  
Many people also undertake personal searches, they travel 
back to Europe trying to find remains of memories. Some 
people transform these memories into movies or books. 
And just as you have here in Rwanda, there is also a project in 
the centre for commemoration to collect the names of those 
who died. Any person who knows someone who perished is 
asked to fill out a form with their information on it. So far 
they have collected three and a half million names and the 
process continues. On a personal note, whenever I go to this 
place and see the empty places set aside for those whose 
names have not yet been recorded I am very moved. 
These are some of the ways that Jewish people have 
responded to the devastating experience of not being able to 
find the bodies of their loved ones.  
A Hebrew prayer was then sung. The Ibuka counsellors 
spoke between themselves for a time before responding:  
It was very moving to us to listen to the ways you are 
continuing to honour the victims of the Holocaust. It means a 
great deal to know that as a people, after many generations, 
you are able to keep the spirit of remembrance.  
When you described the steps you are taking, I was reminded 
of all that we have been through here in Rwanda. I 
particularly related to the idea of having a place in the 
cemetery for the loved ones lost, a place of remembrance with 
their names and maybe a picture. I have made a personal 
commitment to do similarly, so that I too will be able to (visit) 
the cemetery and remember and feel more connected to those 
I have lost.  





oration that we undertake here during the 100 days of 
memory each year. For instance, every year, in honour of 
those who were thrown into the rivers we go to the water for 
memory. There are so many ways in which we share memory 
during those 100 days. 
Thank you for your words. It is important for survivors who 
are not able to bury their loved ones in dignity, to find other 
ways to honour them. I am going to share these stories with 
those with whom I am working. Please tell others in the 
Jewish community that they are our brothers and sisters. 
Please tell your people that.  
Some of the Jewish participants were visibly moved by this 
exchange to the extent that the Ibuka counsellors offered 
comfort and tissues. A direct descendant of survivors of the 
Holocaust tried to articulate the significance of this exchange:  
Something has changed for me today which is difficult to put 
into words. Until today, the Holocaust has always been a 
solely ‘Jewish’ experience. But being here with you, I feel 
joined in our mutual suffering and survival. One of the things 
that genocide tries to do is separate peoples and having the 
chance to feel that our experiences could be a contribution to 
you gives us renewed strength. At the same time, being 
welcomed by you in these ways, hearing from you about the 
ways in which you live in the shadow of genocide, and how 
you live side by side with those who have done you harm, 
has much to teach us. I am reminded by you that we are more 
than ‘victims’ to our experiences; we can also do great social 
good because of what we have learned from these 
experiences. In this way, the suffering of those who perished 
‘will not be for nothing’. Taking what we learned from their 
experiences and using it to make changes in our own 
communities and the world is a way to honour the lives and 
deaths and suffering of those we love. 
At the end of this ritual, one of the Ibuka workers invited 
everyone to stand and to join in memories and honouring 






The words of Ibuka counsellors/survivors spoken 14 years 
after the genocide in Rwanda were so significant to 
Aboriginal Australian colleagues because it was as if these 
offered a glimpse as to how Aboriginal ancestors may have 
tried to deal with the genocide in Australia. And then the 
words of Jewish colleagues were so significant to Rwandan 
survivors because they demonstrate that 65 years after the 
Holocaust, future generations are continuing to honour and 
remember lost loved ones. These exchanges across time, 
across place, across culture involve the sharing of intimate 
local knowledge. This richly described knowledge honours 
the dead and the suffering, and contributes to the construction 
of sstories. These are stories of individual and collective 
identity that honour acts of resistance and sustenance, and 
that link these with the skills, values, commitments and 
philosophies of lost loved ones.  
Over the last six years, Ibuka, Dulwich Centre Foundation 
International, and Evanston Family Therapy Center, have 
engaged with narrative therapy (White and  Epston, 1990; 
Freedman and Combs, 1996; White, 2007) and collective 
narrative practice approaches (Denborough, 2008) in order to 
facilitate the excavation, documentation, performance and 
exchange of the local knowledge of Ibuka counsellors/ 
survivors. 
This has included intricate insider knowledge in relation 
to:  
•the continuing effects of the genocide, 
•what sustains survivors as they live in the shadow of 
genocide, 
•ways in which survivors negotiate ‘living side by side’ with 
those who have done them great harm, and  
•ways of responding when survivors cannot locate the bodies 





This essay has detailed this knowledge and the narrative 
processes that have facilitated its visibility.  
Looking back, looking forwards 
We began this essay with the words Kaboyi Benoit greeted us 
with when we first visited Rwanda: ‘Ah, Australia…there’s a 
country that knows all about genocide’. Since that first 
meeting, six years ago, we have consistently retold Benoit’s 
words in our work in Australia with both non-Aboriginal and 
Aboriginal colleagues. His words remind us to refuse to 
forget the genocide that occurred in this land, Australia, and 
to respond in partnership to its continuing effects.  
It is hoped that there will be continuing possibilities to 
facilitate the linking and sharing of local knowledge between 
survivors of genocide and their descendants in Rwanda, 
Australia, in Jewish communities around the world, and 
elsewhere. 
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LOOKING UPSTREAM: INCREASING OPTIONS TO 
PREVENT GENOCIDE 
 
ISABELLE MACGREGOR AND  
DEVIN C BOWLES 
 
Genocide prevention scholarship focuses almost exclusively 
on immediate causes of genocide, those 'downstream' factors 
which tip an already troubled nation or region into 
committing atrocities. Neglected are those 'upstream' factors 
which trouble a nation or region in the first place. These 
include poverty, lack of freedom, education and health care, 
and environmental degradation and resource scarcity. While 
these are not direct causes of genocide, they contribute to 
them, thereby increasing the likelihood that genocide will 
occur. Because of the focus on interrupting the downstream 
causes of genocide—using measures which are implemented 
only when it is believed genocide is imminent—prevention 
analysis has generated strategies like sanctions, peacekeeping 
operations and prosecutions. Each of these measures has 
associated costs and is likely to be implemented by the 
international community in only a limited range of 
circumstances. Further, the triggers for the implementation of 
these measures generally involve serious discrimination and 
some level of violence, making it likely that even when full-
blown genocide is averted, lives are nonetheless lost and 
tensions are raised within the society along ethnic or religious 
lines, increasing the long-term likelihood of genocide.  
The upstream causes of genocide represent a number of 
prospective intervention points for prevention which have not 
received enough attention. These include the stimulation of 
the economy, the promotion of democracy, the provision of 
education and health care, and the protection and 
management of environmental resources. These measures are 
not new, but their role in genocide prevention has been 





measure is associated with implementation costs and factors 
making it unlikely to be implemented in certain situations, 
these costs and factors are different from those associated 
with downstream preventative measures, making the 
upstream measures a useful complement. By looking at both 
ends of the stream, genocide scholars can increase policy 
options for prevention, deterrence or deflection of the crime.  
Major causes of genocide in the literature 
To prevent genocide, we have to understand its root causes. 
Genocide and mass killing do not simply erupt 
spontaneously. They are incremental processes, building 
blocks, which aggregate and develop into their final form. The 
literature has produced diverse explanations. This essay 
focuses on structural causes. While precedent factors are 
analysed in the broader conflict-prevention literature, most 
scholars concentrates on the more 'last-minute' causes—those 
which have already been preceded by some level of violence. 
Few scholars trace the causes back to the contexts before the 
violence or repression began.  
There are a number of possible genocidal catalysts. Helen 
Fein suggests war, challenges to the structure of domination, 
the threat of internal breakdown or social revolution, or 
economic development or recession (1984, 5). Many scholars 
see genocide as arising during periods of change, especially—
as Mark Levene argues (2000)—when empires, even nation 
states, are forming or crumbling. Genocide is sometimes seen 
as caused by hegemonic myths, and sometimes extreme 
religious views, which identify the victims as being outside 
the perpetrator’s 'sanctioned universe of obligation' (Fein 
1984, 18), for example, the Nazis’ 'master race' myth. Genocide 
can also occur when a particular group becomes the scapegoat 
of an anxious state—when leaders believe that a particular 
group is weakening the already vulnerable state (Kuper 1984, 
39). Genocide can be a retributive act against a group whose 
members have caused pain in the past. This becomes 





governing class and the other the subject class (Fein 1984, 11). 
Kuper points out that this can occur during the 
'decolonisation of a two-tier structure of domination', as in 
Burundi and Rwanda following the withdrawal of the Belgian 
colonists (Kuper 1984, 34). 'Developmental' (Fein 1984) or 
'creeping genocide' (Levene 1999) are the names given to a 
form which Kuper simply refers to as 'genocides against 
indigenous peoples' (1984, 32). These 'episodes' are aimed at 
getting rid of obstacles blocking the path of economic 
exploitation.  
Straus argues for a general consensus in the recent 
genocide literature—for example, among scholars Mark 
Levene, Michael Mann, Manus Midlarsky, Jacques Semelin, 
Benjamin Valentino and Eric Weitz—that genocide develops 
from a process of 'escalation and contingency'. These analysts 
contend that there is a degree of improvisation and that 
genocide does not seem to be predetermined or inevitable. 
Straus adds that while this 'casts further doubt on the 
prospects of a general theory', if genocide is not highly pre-
planned, this should provide opportunities for the 
international community to 'shape outcomes' (2007, 492, 493). 
These authors agree with Fein that war was (and is) an 
important factor in determining when and why genocide 
occurs (Straus 2007, 494)—demonstrating that genocide 
prevention scholarship can potentially benefit from the more 
general conflict-prevention literature. 
The conflict-prevention literature 
The existing genocide literature does very little to answer the 
question of why some conflicts escalate into genocidal killing 
and others do not (Valentino et al 2004). It is therefore difficult 
to know how to prevent a genocide. There is, nevertheless, a 
significant literature on conflict-prevention and, if genocide is 
one of the paths down which a disintegrating, conflict-ridden 
state can go—as Straus puts it, as 'part of a range of possible 






The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict 
outlines two broad strategies for conflict-prevention. 
Operational prevention involves measures in response to an 
immediate crisis. Structural prevention involves measures to 
keep crises from occurring in the first place, or to keep them 
from recurring (1997, xix). Structural prevention approaches 
'not only make people better off but also inhibit the need to 
resort to violence' (Hamburg and Holl 1999, 368). It also 
involves the promotion of 'thriving states with representative 
government, the rule of law, robust civil societies and open 
economies with social safety nets' (Hamburg and Holl 1999, 
368). It is this structural prevention, consisting of 'upstream' 
measures, which is lacking from the genocide literature. These 
include: 
•Promoting indigenous democracy; 
•Fostering equitable socio-economic development, for 
example, the provision of skills, knowledge, freedom and 
health; and 
•Facilitating education on violence prevention, conflict 
resolution and mutual accommodation (Hamburg 2010b, 12). 
Conflict-prevention requires a concerted, long-term 
strategy on the part of the international community, and this 
must encompass a wide range of developmental measures. 
No one element of a society can successfully be developed to 
the neglect of others—they must be developed in unison. As 
Hamburg and Holl state, 'economic growth without 
widespread sharing in the benefits of growth will not reduce 
prospects for violent conflict—and it could exacerbate 
tensions' (1999, 374). 
The broader conflict-prevention literature presents a 
number of precursor events of violence that are, for the most 
part, not addressed. Linking with this broader field would 
thus provide genocide theorists with an increased number of 





Downstream genocide prevention strategies: an analysis 
and critique 
Peacekeeping 
The most direct form of genocide prevention discussed is 
peacekeeping (Woodhouse, Bruce and Dando 1998, 
Shawcross 2001, Krasno, Hayes and Daniel 2003, and Lebor 
2006). Its directness means that it does not rely heavily on 
theories of genocide causation. Military force is deployed to 
stop violent conflict with the threat or practice of violence 
which, borrowing from Clausewitz, forces potential 
genocidaires to do the peacekeeper’s will (1950).1 The benefit of 
this option is that success in most circumstances is highly 
likely if the mission is adequately supported and if the 
primary goal of the mission is short-term genocide 
prevention. Unfortunately, these assumptions cannot be taken 
for granted because of the costs and limitations associated 
with such idealised intervention. 
There are three main costs to outside countries deploying a 
peacekeeping mission: financial costs, the lives of its troops, 
and the commitment of its military forces. The capacity and 
willingness of would-be genocidaires to forcibly resist the 
intervention force dictates the size of these costs to the 
international community. Ideally, the intervention force has 
sufficient fighting capability to make the option of genocide 
unattractive to those who might otherwise engage in it, 
leading to a minimum of casualties both for the intervention 
force and locals. Constraining the international community’s 
drive to deploy an overwhelming force are opportunity costs 
that come with military––the inability to project military force 
elsewhere—and financial costs. Even when an overwhelming 
                                                 






international force is deployed, refinement of asymmetrical 
warfare puts it at risk, as demonstrated in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Further, as genocide analyst Benjamin Valentino 
(2006, 740) argues:  
‘humanitarian intervention’ is nothing more than another 
name for war. The ends of humanitarian intervention may be 
different from those of traditional wars, but the means are 
much the same. And as human rights advocates understand 
better than most, war is never cheap or clean. It seldom makes 
anything better without making something else worse.  
Arms alone rarely change hearts and minds. One 
important limitation of peacekeeping missions is their failure 
to address the causes of genocide. Depending on the specific 
circumstances, a genocide prevention mission might have to 
support efforts to strengthen the rule of law, protect the 
integrity and independence of the judiciary, promote honesty 
and accountability in law enforcement, enhance protections 
for vulnerable groups, reintegrate ex-combatants and 
strengthen civilian control mechanisms. It might also be 
beneficial to provide support to local human rights 
organisations (ICISS report 2001, 23). Technical assistance for 
any equitable reform of the legislative, judicial or penal 
system could also be given (Cockell 2002, 197).  
Yet the forced marriage between military intervention and 
civilian development is often problematic. If military missions 
are to reduce capability, and civilian missions are to enhance 
it, then international actors must be able to distinguish and 
effectively target the separate people and structures to be 
disempowered or strengthened. This task, particularly when 
genocide is imminent and there is a high level of internal 
tension within a society, is exceptionally difficult.  
There is also the risk that foreign intervention—which is 
seen to benefit one group over another—will exacerbate 
internal conflicts. These unintended consequences of 
humanitarian intervention are liable to bog down military and 





international forces or increased costs to the countries 
supporting them.  
The current geopolitical situation makes large-scale 
peacekeeping efforts to prevent genocide unlikely in the 
foreseeable future, for two reasons. First, the humanitarian 
intervention in Libya may have made international support 
for intervention less likely. To intervene in accordance with 
international law, an international force requires the 
authorisation either of the government of the country in 
which intervention is occurring or United Nations Security 
Council. Yet Russia and China viewed the recent military 
action in Libya as exceeding that which was authorised, 
making similar authorisations less likely to pass in the future, 
as has been shown by their veto of force in the current (2011–
2012) Syrian uprising. This, in turn, may limit future 
humanitarian intervention to countries where governments 
acquiesce. 
Second, demand for humanitarian intervention often 
exceeds what the international community is willing to offer. 
International police, such as UN police (UNPOL), represent 
the low end of the continuum of force which the international 
community might offer. International police deployments 
generally have lower human, financial and opportunity costs 
than full-scale humanitarian interventions. Despite 
international demand and the acknowledgement of its 
importance, UNPOLs deployable capacity is lacking. There is 
not adequate recruitment or preparation, and timely 
deployment of qualified police to new missions is therefore 
impaired. The UN is also currently unable to adequately 
manage and guide their police forces (Smith et al 2007, xiv). 
As Durch and Berkman state, 'serious lags in police 
deployments have been chronic' (2006, 44). After a UN 
mission, it takes approximately nine months for the 
authorised number of police personnel to deploy. Though 





generally reluctant to nominate officers, as police are often 
needed in their own countries and states do not like parting 
with them (Smith et al 2007, xiv).  
Many of the countries which traditionally contribute to 
military intervention forces will be reluctant to do so in the 
future. Even before the global financial crisis, there were far 
more potentially pre-genocidal situations than there were 
forces to be deployed. It has traditionally been Western, 
technologically-advanced democracies which engage in 
peacekeeping missions. The global financial crisis has 
wrought havoc with the economies of the United States and 
the European Union as a whole. At the time of writing, the 
military budget of the United States is being reduced, 
impacting its war-fighting capability. Military deployments 
are exceptionally expensive, for instance the post 9/11 US 
wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan are thought to have 
cost some $4 trillion (Watson Institute for International 
Studies, Brown University, 2011). The financial situation of 
Western democracies dramatically reduces the likelihood that 
they will bear the costs of military engagement solely for the 
purpose of genocide prevention. 
Additionally, many Western democracies are war-weary, 
having been engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan for years. Their 
people have little appetite to see more troops come home in 
coffins. Involvement in both these countries continues to 
stretch Western militaries, limiting their capacity to deploy 
forces elsewhere.  
Libya provides an example. Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s 
government is believed to have participated in the bombing of 
civilian passenger Pan Am flight 103 from London to New 
York on 21 December 1988 (known as the 'Lockerbie 
bombing'). He also characterised those participating in a 
revolt against him as 'cockroaches', and threatened to execute 
all those who took up arms against him (Bellamy 2011), 
strongly suggesting that atrocity crimes were imminent. The 





impending atrocity crimes must surely rank highly on the list 
of scenarios in which Western democracies would be 
prepared to deploy military force in order to prevent genocide 
or other atrocity crimes. Yet they gambled that airstrikes and 
political pressure would be enough to achieve their aims, 
because of an unwillingness or inability to bear some or all of 
the three types of costs of further involvement. While Libya is 
now free of Gaddafi, it is unclear whether the fragmented 
opposition will cohere into a stable, democratic government. 
(The signs in mid-2012 were not hopeful, with increasing 
friction between tribal militias.) 
In sum, humanitarian intervention is an important, last-
minute tool to prevent genocide but a number of factors limit 
the circumstances under which it is likely to occur. The need 
for overwhelming force favours intervention by wealthy, 
technically-advanced countries and reduces the likelihood 
that any countries without a high level of military capability 
will intervene in this way. Yet these countries will have a low 
willingness to engage in such missions over the medium term. 
Intervention against potential genocidaires with advanced war 
fighting capabilities is also unlikely because of the need for 
military dominance. Finally, humanitarian intervention alone 
does little to address the causes of the genocide and can 
inflame underlying tensions within a society. At best, it 
simply decreases the intensity or extent of the violence; at 
worst, it increases suffering and exacerbates conflicts.  
Sanctions 
After a potential genocide has been detected, sanctions may 
prove an important preventative. Sanctions imposed on a 
state inhibit its ability to interact internationally, thus 
dissuading it from pursuing murderous policies (Doxey 1980, 
9; ICISS report 2001, 29). This approach can be used in cases 
when general diplomatic pressure might not appear decisive 






For expository purposes, sanctions can be classified as 
economic, diplomatic or military, though overlap between 
categories occurs. Economic sanctions may target the foreign 
assets of a country or particular leaders. Restrictions on 
income-generating commodities such as oil, diamonds, timber 
and drugs are becoming common. Restricting access to 
petroleum can also restrict military operations (ICISS report 
2001, 30)—although they can also prove disadvantageous in 
situations immediately preceding genocide as they could also 
immobilise the victim group. 'Freezing’ assets is a common 
sanction (Alerassool 1993, 8, 20). Diplomatic sanctions often 
involve restrictions on diplomatic representation, including 
expulsion of diplomatic staff. This is largely symbolic and 
limits the possibility of illicit transactions like the sale of 
sanctioned goods, purchase of military-related material or the 
movement of funds. They might also prove disadvantageous 
if they diminish contact with the country and thus potential 
influence. Such sanctions include restrictions on travel for 
specific leaders. One form would be suspension or expulsion 
of the perpetrating state from international bodies (ICISS 
report 2001, 30). These sanctions are not likely to be successful 
on their own but they create severe inconveniences for the 
country’s politicians and bureaucrats and cannot be ignored. 
Military sanctions can be effective. They can involve arms 
embargoes or the halting of military co-operation and training 
programs shared with that country (ICISS report 2001, 30).  
The costs of sanctions to the international community are 
relatively small compared to armed intervention. Most 
sanctions involve the cutting of ties between participating 
sanctioning countries and the sanctioned country or group. 
The cost borne by each sanctioning country is therefore 
relatively small, as the sanctioned target accounts for only a 
small proportion of its economic, diplomatic, or military 
activity. 
Sanctions have drawbacks. Most are blunt instruments 
that can be applied only to countries or a small number of 





to civilians suffering because of sanctions directed at their 
government or prevent arms sales to victims of genocide, 
impeding self-defence. Once in place, sanctions can be 
difficult to lift. Each of these unintended consequences of 
sanctions can make genocide more likely. Additionally, to be 
most effective, any kind of embargo must be implemented 
quickly, often requiring the co-ordination of many countries. 
Sanctions work best when targeted at either a few leaders 
or whole countries. There has been little success in applying 
most sanctions to large, potentially or actually genocidal 
social groups. For instance, during the 1990s, Bosnian Serbs 
could not be directly targeted by UN sanctions. Instead, the 
UN applied a range of sanctions against Yugoslavia, 
including freezing all Yugoslav financial assets on their 
territory, stemming the flow of hard currency into Serbia. The 
goal was to decrease Serbia’s ability to support the Bosnian 
Serbs and prompt Belgrade to urge the Bosnian Serbs to make 
peace (Sloan 1998, 15, 46). While the Serbian leader Slobodan 
Milosevic publicly appealed to the Bosnian Serbs to accept the 
Vance–Owen peace plan (Sloan 1998, 48–49), neither his 
requests nor the sanctions were enough to halt Bosnian Serb 
violence. 
Even when implemented quickly, sanctions are often 
indiscriminate weapons and can, on occasion, do more harm 
to the civilian population than to the targeted group (ICISS 
report 2001, 29). If the objective is to bring about economic 
and social disintegration, making it physically impossible for 
the state to continue its actions, sanctions may lead to the 
unexpected suffering and death of civilians (Kuyper 1978, 10). 
This was demonstrated when the UN imposed sanctions on 
Iraq in 1990. All transhipment of oil was forbidden as well as 
all trade with Iraq, except in medicine and food. They did not 
have the desired effect, instead causing harm to the Iraqi 
population. The magazine US News & World Report claimed in 





fearfully under the international sanctions, smugglers and 
clandestine sales of Iraqi oil have kept [Saddam] Hussein and 
his murderous coterie of hangers-on in relative comfort’ 
(Summers 1995, 221). As Harff states, wherever possible, 
‘economic sanctions should not apply to domestic goods, 
those whose lack would endanger the survival of the 
population of the culprit state…’(1984, 153).  
One claim is that civilian populations may be protected by 
‘smart sanctions’, those designed to target specific decision-
making personnel. This argument dovetails with Valentino's 
claim that leadership is an important cause of genocide and, 
where leaders see advantage in genocide, they will frequently 
pursue it as a strategy (Valentino 2004, 4–5). These might 
involve targeted ‘financial sanctions, travel sanctions, specific 
commodity boycotts, and arms embargoes’ (GAPWP 
Programme Statement 2008–2010, 24). According to Moller, 
‘smart sanctions’ are not always smart. For example, there has 
been a travel ban on Robert Mugabe preventing him from 
flying out of Zimbabwe. This means that it will be harder for 
anyone in the country to overthrow him as there is always a 
greater possibility of ousting an absent leader. Smart 
sanctions, therefore, need to be tailor-made for each situation 
(2008). The risk is that the international community will 
outsmart itself with such sanctions; while efforts to use smart 
sanctions are frequently made, their negative effects are 
normally more diffuse than intended. Economic sanctions 
often hurt those already most disadvantaged, as more 
powerful groups ensure that their relative advantage is 
maintained. Even when not the case, the deprivation caused 
by sanctions can increase tensions within a society, making 
genocide more likely. 
If genocides tend to occur when the balance of power is 
tipped drastically in favour of one group over another, then 
arms embargoes can in some situations make genocide more 
likely, as they prevent the less powerful side from arming 
itself. Bosnia demonstrated the problems which can arise in 





arms ban in the Balkans, imposed on 25 September 1991, left 
the two warring factions unevenly matched: the Muslims 
defenceless against well-equipped Serbs (Robertson 2002, 304; 
Krasno et al 2003, 239; Gow 1997, 37; Ramet 1999, 211). The 
Bosnian government repeatedly called for the embargo to be 
lifted to give the state and its threatened people a chance to 
defend themselves, claiming that it was an illegal breach of its 
right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter (Gow 
1997, 37, 38). Once the UN arms embargo had been applied, it 
was extremely hard to reach an agreement to lift it—there 
would have to be a vote in the Security Council; France, the 
UK and Russia were unwilling to lift it (Gow 1997, 38).  
Speed is essential for embargoes to work. If action is not 
immediate, the target state will have time to anticipate and 
adjust to sanctions, lessening their damaging impact (Kuyper 
1978, 10). It can do this through stockpiling materials, finding 
alternative sources, producing substitutes, stimulating and 
diversifying national production and imposing controls on 
key commodities (Kuyper 1978, 11; Doxey 1980, 106).  
Because of the seeming decline of America's superpower 
status and the economic and military rise of developing 
countries like China, co-ordination between many countries is 
now required for effective sanctions. Yet group sanctions 
produce co-ordination problems. The countries involved may 
have different objectives. Many states, for economic or other 
reasons, do not apply sanctions strictly (Kuyper 1978, 10). 
Members of the UN, for example, generally avoid decisions 
about enforcement because they do not agree on culpability 
and are not prepared to undertake the inherent risks and costs 
(Doxey 1980, 81). Perhaps more importantly, governments 
often operate to maximise their own self-interest, rather than 
for any greater good. The Apartheid case in South Africa 
demonstrates a common situation where the self-interest of 
global superpowers ranked higher than their humanitarian 





international sanctions were blocked by the economic self-
interests of Britain and the United States. The first mandatory 
UN sanctions were imposed in December 1963. They were 
relatively weak, simply proscribing the shipment of 
equipment and materials for arms manufacture. No serious 
measures beyond this were adopted until 1985 (Institute for 
International Economics 1998). Britain and the United States 
refused to act because of their trade interests (Danaher 1989, 
131, 142, 143). This illustrates the difficulties of international 
co-ordination.  
Punishment as a deterrent 
If the prosecution and punishment of genocidal criminals acts 
as a deterrent to others, then it might be viewed as an early 
prevention strategy. To be effective, prosecution must be 
rapid and consistent. Clearly this has not been the case. Trials 
have been inconsistent and slow even when they take place. 
The most effective forms of trial are most likely to be 
international tribunals, yet these are rare in the legal realm. 
After the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials of the Axis leaders, 
there were no new international tribunals until the Security 
Council created the international tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR) 
and the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the 1990s (Fierke 2005, 
73). While the International Criminal Court (ICC) offers some 
hope, it prosecutes only when the suspect’s own country 
refuses to do so and there is no guaranteed uniformity in 
procedure and sentencing (Lebor 2006, 221–20).  
The deterrent effect of prosecution is lessened the longer it 
takes to bring criminals to justice, and is negated entirely if 
trials fail to take place. There was a significant lack of timely 
punishment for the genocide in Cambodia. It is only now that 
a UN-backed Cambodian tribunal has become a reality. The 
delays in Bosnia and lack of prosecution of leaders of the 
Sudanese genocide would give comfort to potential 
genocidaires calculating the odds of prosecution. 
The costs of prosecution are often too great to bear, 





system implemented in Rwanda is an example. There has 
been a conscientious effort to prosecute all those involved in 
the killing and throughout the 1990s, more than 100,000 
suspects were forced to wait in detention. More than 18 years 
after the genocide, tens of thousands still awaited trial. This 
has been a huge economic burden on a country which is 
already one of the poorest in the world (Schabas 2005, 880; 
Fierens 2005, 900). 
There are also drawbacks to using the possible deterrence 
capacity of prosecution as a preventative measure. The 
existence of tribunals can also serve to hamper the peace 
process: in a country where atrocities are continuing, the 
prospect of a trial means that it is more difficult to induce the 
combatants to sign a ceasefire (Bjorn Moller interview, Danish 
Institute for International Studies, 29 May 2008). The arrest 
warrant for Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir for 
genocide and crimes against humanity prompted concerns for 
the fate of a potential political settlement in Darfur and the 
hybrid United Nations–African Union peacekeeping force 
(Thakur 2008; de Waal and Stanton 2009).  
Effective deterrent prosecution is unlikely to be 
implemented for several reasons. First, it requires significant 
finances and resources both on the part of the international 
community and the country in question. Second, it is often not 
possible if genocide suspects have fled or are being protected, 
potentially by a different country. Third, it might not be 
diplomatically expedient to press charges and risk a delicate 
peace settlement. Prosecution can only be classified as an 
upstream preventative measure if trials are speedy, efficient 
and uniform. As this is not the case, it probably has no 
significant deterrent impact and should be viewed as a 
downstream measure. 
Conclusions 





a medium to high level of international co-operation to be 
implemented. Armed humanitarian intervention and 
sanctions require this co-operation to be achieved in a short 
space of time, once it is clear that genocide is likely. While 
there have been instances where this has occurred, an ideal 
policy toolbox would contain prevention measures that did 
not require a high level of international consensus.  
Downstream measures also tend to rely on the knowledge 
that genocide is about to occur. This means that they are 
reliant on identification of pre-genocidal situations. While 
criteria for making such an assessment have been suggested 
(one of the most prominent examples is that of Fein, 1984), the 
prediction of genocide is hardly an exact science. Indicators 
may not provide sufficient detail regarding the kind, scale, 
time or place of these incidences. It is still not possible to 
predetermine the extent of the wider implications, for 
example, a subsequent refugee crisis (Thoolen 1992, 172–71). 
Beyond questions of timing and scale, there is room for doubt 
in any prediction of which situations might tip into genocide. 
Yet doubt provides countries which do not feel it is in their 
interests to intervene with an excuse for inaction. Even when 
all countries are operating with the best of intentions, the 
international community may not be able to bear the multiple 
costs of erring on the side of assuming that most or all 
potentially pre-genocidal situations will turn genocidal. This 
is particularly true for policy measures with high costs, such 
as armed humanitarian intervention and some forms of 
sanctions. Finally, if the international community hesitates 
until indicators of imminent genocide are recognisable, any 
measures implemented are likely to come too late to fully 
avoid death, suffering, and the hardening of ethnic and other 
divisions.  
Upstream genocide prevention strategies: a formulation and 
analysis 
The limitations of the downstream intervention measures 





particularly those that are less costly and can be implemented 
unilaterally, well in advance of the genocide. Because of the 
problems of genocide prediction, they will need to be applied 
to a broad range of situations, some of which would not have 
become genocidal. Therefore, they should have positive 
outcomes beyond genocide prevention. Development aid 
meets all of these criteria, yet with very rare exceptions 
(Hamburg 2010a, Hamburg 2010b), the genocide literature 
pays little attention to development as a form of prevention. 
Development should ideally occur across a broad range of 
areas simultaneously, including those discussed below. 
Economy and infrastructure 
When poverty exists alongside ethnic or cultural divisions, 
mass killing can result. The provision of economic equality 
might thus prevent genocide. In the long term, there needs to 
be a general promotion of economic growth through better 
terms of trade. This involves allowing developing countries 
greater access to external markets, encouraging necessary 
economic and structural reform, and providing technical 
assistance for strengthening regulatory institutions (ICISS 
report 2001, 23). The World Bank launched its Operational 
Policy on Conflict and Development Cooperation in 2000, 
committing it to more vigorous action regarding countries at 
risk, experiencing or recovering from conflict (Cleves et al 
2002, 322).  
Economic development can increase risk of genocide if it 
occurs for just one group. Fein notes that development of 
unsettled land by states or multinational companies often 
creates conflict with the indigenous people, as profitable 
expansion provides the incentive to destroy indigenous 
people either directly or indirectly. She therefore advocates 
institutionalising human rights impact reports, similar to 
environmental impact reports, before such a project is 





Democracy and freedom 
Political inequality provides fertile ground for genocide. 
Promotion of democratic systems and values around the 
world is an important preventative measure. Democracies 
generally provide higher levels of ‘public goods’ to their 
populations than non-democracies. To maintain office, 
democratic leaders must win the support of a majority of 
citizens. In non-democracies, leaders owe their power to a 
smaller, less representative group of supporters (Valentino et 
al 2010, 529). 
Countries in which rights and participation are based on 
ethnicity are more likely to lead to genocidal situations than 
nations which base rights on common citizenship. It is 
important to promote integration through establishing 
decentralised power-sharing and forums for multi-party 
dialogue. It might also be necessary for a peace-building 
mission to provide technical assistance to reform deficient 
governance institutions like the judiciary, the police or the 
civil service. Supervising transitional elections and supporting 
a free press is also significant (Cockell 2002, 197; ICISS report 
2001, 23).  
Conflict is common in societies which lack a democratic 
political system capable of managing disputes peacefully 
through dialogue, negotiation and compromise (Save-
Soderbergh and Lennartsson 2002, 359). Preventative efforts 
should therefore ensure that all major groups in society 
participate in political power, administration, the army and 
police. It is not just a matter of creating democracy. Majority 
rule can still bring about the persecution of minorities, as was 
seen in Rwanda and Cambodia. A preventative mission 
should oversee the development of checks and balances in 
political institutions (Stewart 2002, 127). According to 
Horowitz, a mitigation of conflict can be achieved through the 
use of political incentives to encourage inter-ethnic 
moderation, for example, if politicians must rely in part on the 





be elected (Horowitz 2003, 12, 14). Establishing political 
inclusivity is particularly difficult; nevertheless, there have 
been instances in which it has almost certainly prevented 
conflict. 
The UN planning and supervision of Cambodian elections 
in 1993 probably prevented future violence in that country. 
The aim was the introduction of democracy and peace to 
Cambodia, a country which had undergone 22 years of civil 
war. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC) protected the electoral process and ensured civil 
order, while the actual electoral process was run by UN 
volunteers. This involved the registration of the 4.8 million 
prospective voters. Despite difficulties, the electoral process 
was a success (Shawcross 2001, 54, 55, 63). The mission 
repatriated over 350,000 Cambodian refugees and opened up 
Cambodian society to 'press freedom, pluralism and 
grassroots organisations independent of the state and 
governing party' (Fawthrop and Jarvis 2005, 107).  
Legal inequality is prevalent in high risk societies. The 
protection of law is an essential component of genocide 
prevention. The rule of law 'forms the basis for the just 
management of relations between and among people. It also 
helps ensure the protection of fundamental human rights, 
political access through participatory governance, social 
accommodation of diverse groups and equitable economic 
opportunity' (Hamburg and Holl 1999, 375). The promotion of 
justice should emphasise three areas: human rights, 
humanitarian law, and non-violent alternatives for resolving 
disputes, including more flexible intrastate mechanisms for 
mediation, arbitration, grievance recognition and social 
reconciliation. These areas require constant attention through 
democratic processes (Hamburg and Holl 1999, 375). 
Education and skills 





prevention. As David Hamburg (2008, 1133) states: 
Just as lifelong learning in mathematics, science, and 
technology is essential for the success of a modern economy, 
so too the teaching of pro-social behaviour across the lifespan 
can help to prevent immense destruction. This involves 
explicit information and hands-on experience with conflict 
resolution, violence prevention, mutual accommodation 
between groups, and conditions conducive to peaceful living. 
It has been suggested that the education of women is a 
lucrative development investment in developing countries. 
Education increases the skills and choices of women, and of 
their children. Education also helps to delay marriage—partly 
because of an educated woman’s greater chances for 
employment—and increase knowledge and use of family 
planning (Hamburg 2006, 37). Reduced population growth 
means that the society will place less pressure on environ-
mental resources. 
Health care 
The links between health and peace have been under-
explored. Furst et al state that 'an adverse public health 
situation may spur violent conflict, and violent conflict may 
favour the spread of infectious diseases'. Better understanding 
of this dynamic would help make critical infrastructure and 
public health systems 'crisis-proof' and thus reduce the 
occurrence of armed conflict (Furst et al 2009). 
Health serves as an effective bridge to peace for several 
reasons. First, health is a shared interest valued throughout 
the world. Second, health interventions have an immediate 
impact of people’s lives, as well as long term benefits. They 
inspire 'trust, confidence, and hope' in the societies in 
question and, in many cases, further development cannot be 
achieved without first reducing illness and death—for 
example, in African countries ravaged by AIDS. Third, health 
interventions are seen as largely non-ideological and thus 
more acceptable than some other programs (Hamburg 2006, 





place them in an excellent position to implement 'medical 
diplomacy' or 'health diplomacy'. Without clean drinking 
water and medical care, anger and frustration can grow 
within a society, leading to internal and regional conflict. 
Many of the world’s current conflict zones—Sudan, Somalia, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Palestine Authority 
and Sri Lanka—also 'bear disproportionate burdens of 
disease'. Medicine is rightly seen as a peacekeeping tool 
(Wexler 2009).  
Beyond the direct links between health and peace, 
healthier populations are also more economically productive, 
providing a second route link peace (Hamburg 2006, 35). 
Health and internal stability are linked: ‘healthy populations 
are able to work, cultivate food, and earn wages—all of which 
contribute to economic productivity and a functioning 
society’ (Wexler 2009).  
Environmental protection and management  
The link between environmental protection and conflict-
prevention is recognised by scholars and policymakers 
outside genocide studies (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998). As 
Hamburg and Holl assert, natural resources often lie at the 
heart of conflicts which have the potential for 'mass violence'. 
Perpetrators sometimes manipulate resource shortages for 
their own ends, for example, using food or water scarcity as a 
weapon. Conflicts can also arise over competing claims of 
sovereignty over certain resources such as rivers or oil. 
Increasingly, there is ‘environmental degradation and 
resource depletion in areas characterised by political 
instability, rapid population growth, chronic economic 
deprivation and societal stress’ (Hamburg and Holl 1999, 373). 
Environmental management is important if we are to prevent 
genocide and mass killing. Hamburg and Holl argue that 
more effort is needed to develop 'sustainable strategies for 
social and economic progress' and that this sustainability is 





In 2005, the Division of Early Warning and Assessment 
(DEWA), within the United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP), developed the ‘Environment and 
Conflict Prevention Initiative’. This initiative is designed to 
‘promote conflict-prevention, peace, and co-operation 
through environmental protection, restoration, and resources’. 
The environment becomes a ‘pathway to co-operation’ 
(Environmental Change and Security Program, Woodrow 
Wilson Center 2005). The Environment, Development and 
Sustainable Peace Initiative states that the protection of trans-
boundary rivers in Africa is highly important. Water scarcity 
in Southern Africa increases potential for conflict in the 15 
international river basins in that area. These rivers are also 
vital for socio-economic development, farming and 
hydroelectric power (Tanzler et al 2004, 13). 
Conflicts based on environmental resources are most likely 
to occur in the world’s poorest countries, those least able to 
implement sustainable development. The provision of 
assistance generally falls to multilateral agencies like the 
World Bank. This organisation is attempting to remedy the 
problem through distributing more than US$ 20 billion 
annually and acting as a trustee for the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF). This facility is ‘designed to add environmental 
dimensions to projects funded for more general development 
purposes’ (Payne 1998).  
Assistance packages might be used to tie border groups in 
one or more countries to their shared interests in land and 
water development and environmental protection (Hamburg 
and Holl 1999, 374). Environmental protection and 
development can also strengthen a country’s economic 
growth and population health. 
Analysis and conclusions  
One drawback to development as genocide prevention is that 
it is unclear which, if any, genocides were prevented. This 
raises challenges for scholars seeking to study this form of 





costs. Valentino states that while the costs of prevention in a 
conflict will be much less than a purely reactive intervention, 
these costs must be multiplied many times because these 
prevention measures are likely to be applied to many crises 
that would never have become genocidal (2006, 735). But if 
prevention is based on developmental aid, then benefits 
include not just averted genocides, but the prevention of more 
conventional violent conflicts, decreased social unrest, 
reduced population growth, increased economic 
development, healthier populations and more robust 
environmental systems. These are valuable outcomes, not just 
for the country or region directly impacted, but for the world 
community.  
Upstream intervention, and particularly development, also 
generally avoids issues of state sovereignty—a powerful 
restriction on downstream prevention. How does one justify 
forfeiture of state sovereignty to allow sanctions, a military 
presence or fact-finding investigations when no atrocity has 
yet been commit-ted? Even without the legal questions, until 
atrocities are committed, the people may ‘prefer their tyrants 
rather than see their homeland overrun’ (Teson 2003, 105–06). 
Few countries are likely to reject a broad, well-planned aid 
package on the grounds that it interferes with state 
sovereignty, even if they resist democratic reforms.  
Options to prevent genocide must include more than only 
downstream policies. While these can be crucial to stop 
deadly violence, by themselves they do not result in real 
peace, only a cessation of violence. A wide-ranging program 
of aid and development is the best means of preventing 
genocide in the long term. Prosperous, healthy nations with 
educated populations and economic and legal equality are 
unlikely to witness genocide. Upstream strategies for 
prevention therefore seem to complement the downstream 
strategies on which genocide literature has focused and are 
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RIGHTEOUSNESS IN THE FACE OF EVIL 
 
PAUL R BARTROP 
 
Genocide scholars study human evil. By contrast, only very 
rarely have acts of human goodness been examined, with the 
singular—and crucially important—example of those who 
tried to save lives during the Holocaust, people recognised by 
Israel and many around the world as the Righteous among 
the Nations (Chassidei umot ha-olam).1 So little work has been 
done in respect of goodness during genocide, other than in 
the Holocaust, that one might despair at the predominance of 
evil in the world over the relatively few chronicled acts of 
goodness.  
Yad Vashem—the Holocaust Heroes’ and Martyr’s 
Remembrance Authority in Israel—is charged with 
remembering the tragic events of the Holocaust and 
acknowledging those non-Jews who risked their lives, 
property or status to save Jews. Soon after the Yad Vashem 
statute was passed unanimously by Israel’s Knesset on 18 
May 1953, it was realised that a definition of ‘righteous’ 
behaviour was needed. After much redrafting, it was decided 
                                                 
1 On Righteous Gentiles — in an already large literature — see 
especially Paldiel, Mordecai (2007), The Righteous Among the Nations: 
Rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust, New York, Harper; Tec, 
Nechama (1987), When Light Pierced the Darkness: Christian rescue of 
Jews in Nazi-Occupied Poland, New York, Oxford University Press; 
Gushee, David P (2003), Righteous Gentiles of the Holocaust: Genocide 
and moral obligation, 2nd ed, St Paul MN, Paragon House; Tammeus, 
Bill and Cukierkorn, Rabbi Jacques (2009), They Were Just People: 
Stories of rescue in Poland during the Holocaust, Columbia MO, 
University of Missouri Press; Oliner, Samuel P and Oliner, Pearl M 
(1988), The Altruistic Personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe, New 





that for a person to be classed as ‘Righteous’, several criteria 
must first be met, specifically, that only a Jewish party can put 
forward a nomination; that helping a Jewish family member 
or individual to convert to Christianity is impermissible; that 
the assistance given had to have been repeated and/or 
substantial; and that the assistance had to have been given 
without any financial gain other than reasonable expenses for 
rent and food. Since 1963, a commission headed by a justice of 
the Supreme Court has been charged with investigating and 
awarding the title of ‘Righteous among the Nations’ to those 
fitting the criteria. 
On balance, it might be said that the main forms of help 
extended by the Righteous during the Holocaust fitted one of 
four main categories: hiding Jews in the rescuer’s home or on 
their property; providing false papers and false identities; 
smuggling and assisting Jews to escape; and, through various 
means, rescuing Jewish children. Given the enormous risks 
involved in rescue efforts, it is remarkable that any of these 
initiatives took place. This was a time when living space, food, 
sanitation facilities, and medicine were at a premium, and 
those who hid Jews risked not only their own lives, but, 
crucially, those of their families. Depending on where one was 
located, people caught hiding Jews were, more often than not, 
executed—either on the spot, or later, in public as an example 
to others. The eminent Holocaust historian, Christopher 
Browning, was once asked why there were so few 'Righteous'; 
his reply was to ask, how come there were so many?2 Despite 
the immense dangers, by the beginning of January 2012, Yad 
Vashem had recognised 24,355 men and women from 45 
countries as ‘Righteous’, representing over 10,000 
authenticated acts of rescue. 
                                                 
2 Personal communication from Colin Tatz; Browning made this 





It isn’t easy being a rescuer. To stand out from the crowd, 
to refuse to acquiesce, to not compromise one’s own values in 
order to guarantee personal safety at the expense of others—
these are extremely difficult decisions for people when 
exposed to extreme situations. Human behaviour during the 
Holocaust is the paradigmatic example of this, but there have 
been many other instances, both before and after the 
Holocaust, that also fit the paradigm. This essay is a first 
attempt to look at several instances of goodness in genocide 
beyond the Holocaust. Acts of heroism do not have to be on a 
grand scale to be effective, and those attempting them do not 
always have to put their lives on the line when confronting 
acts of genocidal violence. While showing that there have 
been some exceptionally brave acts on the part of some 
individuals, this brief analysis demonstrates that it is in small 
ways that the worst excesses of genocide can sometimes be 
avoided.  
The nature of ‘goodness’  
What do we mean when we speak about goodness in the face 
of evil? Genocide occurs for several reasons: to eliminate a 
real or imagined threat, to terrorise a real or potential enemy, 
to acquire wealth, and in the current context, most frequently 
to implement a belief or an ideology (for example, racial or 
ethnic ‘purity’). In the latter case, genocide speaks of human 
dreams: of how we can perfect humanity, or the society in 
which we live, or the community of which we are part. In 
attempting to reach such 'perfection', some people deem it 
both necessary—and even proper—to eliminate those whom 
they consider impeding their goal. In their view, they do so 
with the 'best of intentions', and for the current good and 
guaranteed future of their group. Their victims, on the other 
hand, have neither a present nor a future, other than as a 
group that until now has avoided their intended fate. 
While this might sound 'reasonable' to some, the twentieth 
century witnessed dozens of acts of murderous violence. 





perpetrators, who planned, carried out, and/or presided over 
it. Some stood by and watched it unfold, while others took it 
upon themselves to try to stop it. The perpetrators were 
committed, for reasons clear to them, to the realisation of the 
dream of achieving homogeneity, a ‘pure’ society comprised 
only of others like themselves, a place representing the closest 
possible approximation to their 'vision' of human perfection. 
Even though perpetrators of genocide saw (and see) 
themselves as 'noble servants' undertaking a necessary 
struggle, obviously their victims do not agree. Nor, for the 
most part, do the vast majority of bystanders, though all too 
often they are either immobilised by the sheer horror of what 
they are witnessing, or silently acquiesce in the perpetrators’ 
actions. Practically all agree that the deeds of genocide 
perpetrators are violent, inhumane, and from the perspective 
of Western tradition at least, morally wrong. Yet it takes 
exceptional courage and commitment to stand against them. 
Theologians and philosophers are much more concerned 
about the problem of evil than they are about good. From a 
religious perspective, some will ask, if God (or the gods) is all-
loving and all-powerful, why do the wicked prosper and the 
righteous suffer? While an answer might be that we are too 
puny to recognise God’s Master Plan, but that everything will 
nonetheless work out for the best in the long run, this is far 
from acceptable to many secular thinkers, who prefer to look 
for other reasons to explain the problem of evil.3 
                                                 
3 The problem of evil in the world is a massive one that has occupied 
the thoughts of philosophers, theologians and dreamers (among 
others) for millennia. While it is clearly not possible to provide a 
bibliography of the subject in a single footnote, the following are 
useful starting points insofar as they also refer to genocide: Wolfe, 
Alan (2011), Political Evil: What it is and how to combat it, New York, 






Very few consider the opposite pole of evil, namely, good. 
What is a 'good' action? Is it simply the opposite of evil? If 
evil behaviour is a departure or aberration from the norm, can 
that norm be labelled as 'good'? And if a person engages in 
some caring or compassionate action, is that beyond good? 
Further, does it matter why he or she does it? If a person does 
something out of the ordinary for the betterment of humanity, 
by what are their actions motivated? If they feel better by their 
actions than they did beforehand, are they in fact self-
interested rather than other-interested? In some traditions, the 
motive matters less than the action, and thus if by virtue of 
that action a victim might be spared suffering or death, then it 
doesn’t really matter why action was taken. On the other 
hand, the very notion that a 'good' action is something 
beyond 'normal' makes one wonder whether that norm is, in 
fact, ethically neutral until tested. The questions mount up 
with each successive issue raised.4 
Goodness during genocide 
Recently one of my seminar students asked: is there a hierarchy 
of righteousness when we speak about acts of goodness in genocide? 
An excellent question—the more so as I had been discussing 
                                                                                             
report on the beguilings of evil, Albany NY, State University of New 
York Press; Eagleton, Terry (2010), On Evil, New Haven CT, Yale 
University Press; and Morrow, Lance (2003), Evil: An investigation, 
New York, Basic Books. 
4 An excellent discussion of the question of goodness can be found in 
the Introduction to Grant, Ruth W (ed) (2011), In Search of Goodness, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Other discussions of human 
goodness can be found: Needleman, Jacob (2007), Why Can’t We Be 
Good?, New York, Jeremy P Tarcher/Penguin Books; and Shermer, 
Michael (2004), The Science of Good and Evil: Why people cheat, gossip, 
care, share, and follow the golden rule, New York, Henry Holt. A major 
recent work arguing that humans have become more and more good 
as society has evolved is Pinker, Steven (2011), The Better Angels of 





the actions of those who had saved lives as well as those who 
had saved elements of culture and gone out of their way to 
raise international awareness of what they had witnessed or 
experienced. There can be no greater act of righteousness than 
the saving of an innocent human life in danger, but what can 
we say about other acts of selfless courage that see people put 
themselves in danger to save the cultural, religious or other 
artefacts of another people’s entire identity? They, too, have 
an important role to play in combating genocidal evil, given 
that genocide often seeks to destroy all traces of a group’s 
existence. The issue was articulated in a short story by the 
Yiddish writer Chaim Grade, published in English in 1954: 
Here in Paris there’s an old lady, a Lithuanian. I know her 
well. Everybody knows that in the Vilna ghetto she saved the 
lives of Jews, and also hid books. The Germans sentenced her 
to death, but she was spared by a miracle. She’s an old 
revolutionist, an atheist; that is to say, she doesn’t believe in 
God. 
Why do you think [she] saved the lives of Jews? [She] didn’t 
try to make anyone an atheist; on the contrary, she hid our 
sacred books. [She] saved the lives of Jews not from pity 
alone, but for [her] own sake as well. [She] wanted to prove to 
[herself]…that the whole world does not consist only of 
criminals and those who are indifferent to the misfortunes of 
others. [She] wanted to save [her] own faith in human beings 
and the lives of Jews as well.5 
In this case, the old woman sought to reaffirm life in the 
face of the forces that would destroy life, of humanity in the 
face of those who would expunge it. The nature of the many 
acts in which people of good will can engage when seeking to 
                                                 
5 Grade, Chaim (1954), ‘My Quarrel with Hersh Rasseyner’ in Howe, 
Irving and Greenberg, Eliezer (eds), A Treasury of Yiddish Stories, 
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rescue humanity is immensely varied. But these acts serve to 
crack the edifice of terror, provide hope for others, and work 
for the defeat of those whose anti-human ideologies and goals 
threaten to return the world to a new Dark Age.  
I have retrieved here but a few of these inspirational 
stories which might otherwise be lost and/or unrecognised. 
They are 'good' actions in the midst of the horror of genocide, 
and show what can be done in a positive and life-affirming 
sense, rather than through our continuing emphasis on the 
worst expressions of human behaviour as witnessed through 
the actions of the murderers.6 
Zoran Mandlbaum  
Zoran Mandlbaum is a former president of the Jewish 
community in the city of Mostar, the capital of Herzegovina. 
He is best remembered for having rescued innumerable 
Bosniaks during the Bosnian War of 1992–1995, earning the 
title of the 'Oskar Schindler of Bosnia'.7 Born on 9 September 
1946, as a young Jewish boy growing up in post-Holocaust 
Yugoslavia he was all too aware of how the Nazis and their 
collaborators had murdered many members of his family, and 
was conscious of the need to take care of life in the face of 
atrocity. 
When the war began, the Mostar Jewish community, first 
established in 1570, had a population of some 128 members. 
For one of the few occasions in the history of Western warfare, 
Jews were on this occasion not a target for any of the warring 
                                                 
6 For the most part, these accounts are largely unknown to the 
general public, and have been drawn from Bartrop, Paul R (2012), A 
Biographical Encyclopedia of Contemporary Genocide: Portraits of evil and 
good, Santa Barbara CA, ABC-CLIO. 
7 Schindler was a German industrialist who saved 1,100 Jews by 
employing them in his hardware factory, claiming that his products 





parties, and the Jewish community was more or less ignored 
by the Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks. Faced with this unique 
circumstance, and mindful of the Holocaust experience that 
preceded him, Mandlbaum decided to achieve positive 
human out-comes rather than simply stand by.  
At first he helped civilian Serbs leave Mostar for safer 
territory. He then began remarkable initiatives, using his 
position to serve as a go-between respected by all sides. This 
was especially valued by those being held as prisoners in 
notorious Croat-run concentration camps like Heliodrom and 
Dretelj, where conditions were harsh and inhumane, with 
severe overcrowding, inadequate medical and sanitary 
facilities, insufficient food and water, deficient ventilation, 
and in the summer, suffocating heat. 
Mandlbaum tried to find ways to get letters, news and 
food to those imprisoned. At the same time, he was also active 
in trying to save lives and bring families together. Coming 
from a city whose various communities had been largely 
integrated, he helped reunite dozens of couples in mixed 
relationships within the wider community; secretly he took 
one or another of those separated in the divided city across 
the Neretva River and to their waiting partner. 
His activities did not stop there. Recalling how Jews 
seeking to flee Nazi persecution were forced to have the letter 
‘J’ stamped in their passports as a draconian discriminatory 
measure, Mandlbaum decided that this negative could be 
turned into a positive through the forging of false documents 
for Bosniaks. He arranged that their identity documents also 
bear the letter ‘J' (in Croatian, Jevrejin or Jew), and thereby 
certify that the bearers were Jewish. With these new identities, 
people were able to procure official documents to enable them 
to leave the country (and in some cases, obtain release from 
the concentration camps). He issued more than 200 
documents bearing a ‘Jewish’ identity, facilitating the holders 





Soon after war came to Mostar, local Croatian forces 
gained control over most of the city. The Bosniak population 
west of the city centre were either expelled or sent to 
concentration camps. Those on the eastern side of the city 
were confined in a kind of ghetto, and lived through daily 
shelling and sniper fire. Cut off from the city and deprived of 
food supplies and medicine, the population soon found itself 
in crisis. Mandlbaum used his neutrality to bring in convoys 
of humanitarian aid. Managing to break through the military 
blockade, between 1993 and 1995 the Jewish community sent 
over 106,000 kilograms of food through to east Mostar, and 
thousands of letters from outside. 
Unlike most residents of Mostar, Mandlbaum had the 
choice of whether or not to stay. He could have found safety 
elsewhere. Many Jewish families emigrated to Israel, or to 
Canada, Germany, Britain or Sweden. Closer to home, some 
moved to Croatia or Serbia. By the end of the war, it was 
estimated that only about 30 members of the Jewish 
community remained in Mostar. Mandlbaum could have 
stayed in the city to ensure the Jews were safe. But while 
doing this he remained in Mostar to help some of the innocent 
citizens who were in danger.  
His efforts were not universally appreciated. During the 
war he faced a number of assassination attempts, was evicted 
from his apartment, and had his car blown up. When asked 
later why he put his own life at risk, he stated that as a Jew he 
called upon his religious heritage for inspiration at a time 
when he could otherwise easily have looked the other way. 
He was aware of the ruling in the Talmud that states: ‘He who 
saves a life, saves a whole world’ (Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:5; 
Babylonian Talmud Tractate Sanhedrin 37a), and that owing 
to the Jews’ experience in World War II, Jews had a positive 
role to play in the future of Mostar. He was very conscious of 
his duty: in the fate of Mostar’s Bosniaks, he recognised the 
historical fate of Jews everywhere. He wanted to show that 
people from different backgrounds, ethnicities and religions 





Mostar. His attitude today is the same as it was during the 
war: he did nothing special, only that which was right in the 
face of suffering. 
Sister Rachele Fassera, CMS 
Rachele Fassera is a Roman Catholic nun of the Comboni 
order, best known around the world for her efforts in rescuing 
almost all of the girls kidnapped from her school by members 
of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda in 
October 1996. She was born in Pessina Cremonese, Italy, on 15 
June 1946. At the age of 19 she gave up her job with an Italian 
electricity company to become a missionary. Joining the 
Comboni Sisters, she was posted to Uganda in 1982 where she 
taught biology and eventually became the deputy head-
mistress of St Mary’s College for Girls, a residential boarding 
school in Aboke, northern Uganda. 
Continuous war and massive killing of innocents was 
taking place in this region between the guerrilla army known 
as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by religious fanatic 
Joseph Kony, and the security forces of the Ugandan army. By 
1986 the region had become completely devastated, with LRA 
slaughter and brutality, and the destruction of villages, 
homes, and schools the order of the day. The LRA made the 
kid-napping of children a priority: about 90 per cent of LRA 
soldiers were children under 16, and teenage girls were 
routinely forced to become sex slaves and 'wives' of the 
rebels. 
At around 2:00 am on the night of 9–10 October 1996, some 
200 armed members of the LRA broke into the dormitories of 
St Mary’s College and abducted 139 girls aged between 13 
and 16. They left at about 5:00 am, taking all the girls with 
them. After crisis discussions with other members of the 
faculty and the Mother Superior, Sr Alba, Sr Rachele and a 
young male teacher, John Bosco, decided to follow the rebels 





could find from the school office—enough to meet a ransom 
demand if there was one. The road was signposted with traces 
left by the rebels: food remains, discarded loot, and the like. 
Eventually locating them later the same day, Sr Rachele 
immediately entered into negotiations with the commander, 
Mariano Ocaya. He was not interested in money, but offered 
instead to surrender some—though not all—of the girls. 
Making the offer that 109 of the girls could go, his trade-off 
was that 30 had to stay. Faced with this decision, Sr Rachele 
begged him for the lives of all the girls, offering her own in 
exchange for their freedom. He refused. If she did not accede 
to his demands, she was told, the LRA men would keep all 
139. Thirty of the most attractive girls, already chosen by the 
rebels, would have to remain, and as an added trauma Sr 
Rachele herself would have to convey the news. After this, 
she was sent away with the 109 she had rescued, while the 
LRA and their captives slipped back into the bush. 
Returning to Aboke, Sr Rachele immediately sought all 
possible means of freeing the girls, and appeals were made 
throughout the world to find ways of achieving their release. 
In a direct appeal to Pope John Paul II, she secured his 
support, and at his Sunday Mass on 20 October 1996 the Pope 
publicly called for the girls’ freedom. This took the case to the 
international media, leading to other efforts to release the 
girls. Over the next several years, Sr Rachele met with United 
Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, United States First 
Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, South African President 
Nelson Mandela, Libyan President Muammar al-Gaddafi, 
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, Zimbabwean President 
Robert Mugabe, presidents of a number of other African 
nations, members of the European Parliament, and many 
other diplomats. In short, the Aboke abductions and Sr 
Rachele’s dramatic actions in pursuit of the LRA kidnappers 
drew what was up to that point unprecedented international 
attention to the insurgency in northern Uganda. 





sought every avenue to negotiate the release of other hostages 
as well as the Aboke girls, making contacts wherever possible 
with political, military, religious, and other organisations in 
the region. In June 1997, she met with LRA commanders in 
Juba, Sudan, who initially denied that they held the girls. 
After a standoff, the commanders admitted that they did have 
the girls, and offered to release them if the Ugandan military 
declared a ceasefire. The Ugandan government of President 
Yoweri Museveni rejected the proposal and stated that it was 
not responsible for anything that might happen to the girls. 
Constant political bickering of this sort undoubtedly set back 
their cause repeatedly throughout the early part of the 21st 
century. 
Five of the 30 girls died in captivity, while over time all but 
two of those remaining eventually made their escape. On 14 
March 2009, Catherine Ajok, the last of the abducted Aboke 
girls still held by the rebels, returned to Uganda with her 21-
month baby, who she said was fathered by Joseph Kony. 
The story of Sr Rachele Fassera’s action is an outstanding 
example of how to live by the courage of one’s convictions, 
even at personal risk, and then to seek a peaceful solution 
through negotiation and dialogue. Her efforts helped bring 
world attention to the LRA’s practice of abducting children, 
and even forced the Museveni government to start direct 
negotiations with Sudan in an effort to obtain the Aboke girls’ 
release.8 
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Jakob Finci  
Jakob Finci, a native of Sarajevo, is a leading member of the 
Bosnian Jewish community. During the Bosnian War of 1992–
1995, as president of La Benevolencija, Bosnia’s Jewish cultural, 
educational and humanitarian society, he provided medical 
and relief supplies and arranged for the evacuation to safety 
of over 3,000 people of all backgrounds. 
Originating from a family that arrived in Sarajevo in the 
mid-16th century after the Jews’ expulsion from Spain, Finci 
was born on 1 October 1943, soon after his parents had been 
liberated from an Italian internment camp. He graduated in 
law from the University of Sarajevo in 1966, and became an 
expert in international trade law. With war looming, in 1991 
he set to work to bring goodness to his city. He was among a 
number of those again supporting the establishment of La 
Benevolencija, a Jewish cultural, educational and humanitarian 
society first established as far back as January 1892 for the 
purpose of fostering Jewish culture and tradition, rescuing 
Bosnian Jewish history, assisting with educational activities, 
and providing humanitarian assistance and health care to 
those in need.9 
As vice-president in 1991, and then president from 1993, 
Finci directed an organisation that became the only local body 
delivering humanitarian relief on a non-sectarian basis. With 
the conflict spreading from Slovenia to Croatia during 1991, 
La Benevolencija managed to get medicine through the front 
lines to a small group of elderly Jews trapped in besieged 
Dubrovnik. In Sarajevo, Finci and his colleagues stockpiled 
medicines and foodstuffs sufficient to get through the winter. 
When the first shots were fired in the Bosnian War in April 
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1992, the organisation immediately planned and carried out 
the first evacuation of children and the elderly. La 
Benevolencija also opened a soup kitchen, serving 300 hot 
meals a day, seven days a week, for anyone who arrived. 
The commitment shown by Finci, Ivica Ceresnjes, the then-
president of the Jewish community of Bosnia–Herzegovina, 
and countless volunteers, saw remarkable humanitarian work 
undertaken during the siege of Sarajevo. In the first two years 
of the siege, La Benevolencija opened three pharmacies and 
dispensed 1.6 million prescriptions; opened the city’s only 
clinic, where multi-ethnic staff tended 25,000 patients; gave 
away 380 tonnes of food; served 110,000 hot meals in the soup 
kitchen; started a postal service that handled 100,000 letters; 
set up a two-way radio connection with the outside world; 
looked after refugees from elsewhere in Bosnia; and started a 
thriving Sunday school for 50 children, only 20 of whom were 
Jewish. 
On account of La Benevolencija’s Jewish identity, the 
organisation found itself in a unique position of neutrality. 
Finci sought, and received, clearances from all warring parties 
that eventually enabled nearly 3,000 people, in 11 mixed 
rescue convoys of Muslim, Croat and Serb families, to flee the 
country. Somehow, the organisation managed to obtain 
permission from the Bosnian government for people to leave, 
negotiated safe passage from the Serbs, and arranged their 
entry to Croatia. Finci also arranged for 'new' Jews to leave—
people who arrived at La Benevolencija headquarters stating 
that they had suddenly discovered a long-lost Jewish 
connection in their family. Among his many activities, Finci 
smuggled people out on false documents, even arranging for 
one elderly Muslim couple to use his own late parents’ 
identities (and papers) as a way to clear Serb roadblocks. 
Arranging for food convoys was not easy. Finci and his 
colleagues had to negotiate with all sides, and clear a path 





the ingress port of Split, Croatia. Finci would himself 
accompany La Benevolencija’s two trucks to Split each month 
to get the much-needed supplies, and soldiers on all sides 
respected the efforts of the Jewish welfare body. 
In 1995, Finci became the first elected president of the 
Jewish community of Bosnia–Herzegovina. By war's end, he 
had become one of Bosnia’s most respected public figures. 
The esteem in which he was held saw him as one of the 
founders, in 1997, of a new Interreligious Council of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (IRC), which worked towards reconciliation 
between the three ethnic groups, seeking to achieve peace and 
co-existence through the building of tolerance and a civil 
society. In February 2000, he was also elected chairman to a 
national committee charged with setting up a truth and 
reconciliation commission. 
In an ironic twist, in 2008 Finci—though ineligible to run 
for parliament or the presidency owing to the terms of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement which only allows Serbs, Croats and 
Bosniaks to run for public office—was appointed to represent 
his country when he became the ambassador of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to Switzerland. 
Mbaye Diagne  
Mbaye Diagne was a Senegalese army officer who worked as 
a United Nations Military Observer (MILOB) in Rwanda 
before and during the 1994 genocide. One of nine children, he 
studied at the University of Dakar before joining the 
Senegalese army. In 1993 he was assigned to the United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) covering 
the implementation of the Arusha peace settlement. He was 
stationed at the Hôtel des Mille Collines, one of Kigali’s 
luxury hotels and the scene of a major sustained rescue of 
Tutsi throughout the genocide.10 
                                                 






Within hours of the start of the genocide on 6 April 1994, 
Diagne decided that his orders not to intervene were 
unacceptable. The morning after the assassination of 
President Juvénal Habyarimana, the next in line of succession, 
the moderate Hutu Prime Minister he Uwilingiyimana, was 
herself assassinated, with her husband, by Presidential 
Guards. Learning of Uwilingiyimana’s murder, Diagne 
decided to investigate by going to the scene of the crime. 
There he found the Prime Minister’s five children hiding in 
the adjoining housing compound of the United Nations 
Development Program. After a fruitless wait for UN 
evacuation trucks, he put the children into his own vehicle, 
hid them with blankets, and returned them to the relative 
safety of the Mille Collines. He then faced the problem of 
finding a way to evacuate them, undetected, to the airport, 
crossing the various checkpoints established by the 
Interahamwe militias, and once there, to obtain a passage for 
them out of the country. He achieved this and the children 
were removed safely on a Canadian transport that took them 
to Nairobi in Kenya. 
It was a reckless and risky move, but would be only the 
first of many occasions on which the young officer would 
ignore the standing orders from UN headquarters to remain 
neutral. As a MILOB, his job was to try to find ways to 
prevent conflict and report on what he had seen; it was 
essentially a liaison and investigation role in which he was 
under orders not to get involved in any way. That was not 
what Diagne did. In the weeks following the start of the 
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genocide, he worked hard to save the lives of hundreds of 
Rwandans, charming his way past the militias, smiling, 
joking, sharing cigarettes with the murderers, and over and 
over again talking his way through the roadblocks. His solo 
rescue missions, nearly always at great peril to himself, 
attained legendary status among the UN forces in Kigali. 
Diagne’s strength lay in his ability to persuade others of 
his friendliness and comradeship. His disposition helped him 
gain the confidence of families, groups, and leaders to all 
parties in the conflict. On occasion he would have to pass 
through up to 23 Interahamwe checkpoints to get to the people 
he was trying to save. The Interahamwe, who, depending on 
the time of day, could be drunk or drugged, had to be 
convinced on each occasion that he was not harbouring Tutsi. 
Diagne would find Tutsi who were hiding, drive them back 
through the same checkpoints, and then relocate them—often 
in the Amahoro Stadium, from where he would then ferry 
them to some other place of refuge. He was forced to 
undertake countless missions, as he could only carry three to 
four (sometimes, five, though this was extremely hazardous) 
at a time. Once, he spent an entire day operating in precisely 
this fashion after he came across a group of 25 Tutsi hiding in 
a house in Nyamirambo, Kigali. On each occasion he bluffed 
his way through roadblocks. He relied on his extensive 
contacts among the Hutu military and militias, his ability to 
defuse tense situations owing to a sharp sense of humour, 
and, from time to time, bribery in the form of cigarettes or 
money. His dynamism saw him seemingly everywhere at 
once. 
It certainly helped that in his position as a MILOB he had 
access to most of the city and was known widely by all sides 
of the conflict. But in engaging in his acts of selflessness, he 
was repeatedly forced to flout his standing operational orders. 
UNAMIR’s commander, General Roméo Dallaire, was aware 
of what Diagne was doing, but neither stopped him nor 
reprimanded him. While everyone in the UN establishment 





Dallaire would not discipline him because it was a role 
Dallaire himself would have preferred to be doing.11 
On 31 May 1994, Diagne was driving alone back to UN 
headquarters in Kigali with a message for Dallaire from the 
Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces, Augustin 
Bizimungu. At this time the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) was closing in on Kigali, and engaging in fierce fighting 
with the Rwandan army. A random mortar shell, fired by the 
RPF towards a Hutu extremist checkpoint, landed behind his 
jeep. Shrapnel entered the rear window and hit Diagne in the 
back of the head, killing him instantly. 
Mbaye Diagne was universally recognised as a real-life 
hero of the Rwandan genocide. On learning of his death, 
UNAMIR Force Headquarters held a minute of silence in his 
honour, and a small parade took place at Kigali airport on 1 
June. A devout Muslim, he was buried in Senegal with full 
military honours. Later, his wife and two small children 
accepted, on his behalf, the UMURINZI Campaign against 
Genocide Medal awarded by Rwanda.12 
Vedran Smailović 
Vedran Smailović, known throughout the world as 'The 
Cellist of Sarajevo', was an inspirational musician whose 
playing of Tomaso Albinoni’s Adagio in G Minor during a 
crucial time in the Bosnian War brought home to the West the 
horror of the siege of Sarajevo in a particularly poignant 
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manner. Born in Sarajevo on 11 November 1956, he came from 
a family of musicians. As an adult, the highly talented 
Smailović became well known for his playing with the 
Sarajevo String Quartet. He also played with the Sarajevo 
Opera, the Sarajevo Philharmonic Orchestra, the Symphony 
Orchestra RTV Sarajevo, and with the National Theatre of 
Sarajevo. 
After the outbreak of war in April 1992, Smailović was 
confident that the city’s unity and pluralistic values would 
prevail over the destruction that was taking place in other 
parts of Yugoslavia, and that it would be impossible to 
destroy such strong communal harmony. This ideal kept him 
buoyant during the siege, and enabled him to tolerate the 
cold, the food, power and water shortages, and the constant 
mortar bombings and sniper fire from the Bosnian Serbs in 
the hills surrounding the city. 
On 27 May 1992 this attitude changed. A long queue 
waited patiently on Vaso Miskin Street for bread, in front of 
one of the last functioning bakeries in the city, and at 
approximately 10:00 am a mortar shell hit the line, killing 22 
people and wounding 160 more. Others died in subsequent 
days. Enraged by what had happened and feeling powerless, 
Smailović decided he would at least try to raise the world’s 
consciousness. He would protest the senseless killing, in a 
very public way, through his music. For the next 22 days, in 
honour of each of those killed in the bombing, Smailović gave 
a performance of Albinoni’s Adagio—in ruined homes, in the 
open, in the smouldering remains of the National Library. His 
approach was simple. Dressed in formal attire as he was when 
playing for the Sarajevo Symphony, he would seat himself on 
a battered camp stool to play his music. Sometimes the 
sounds of war would drown him out, but he continued 
playing.  
His heroic antiwar statement drew world attention, 
though in the constant retelling of the story of 'The Cellist of 





conveyed that Smailović would always play at 4:00 pm, in the 
same place as where the mortar hit—notwithstanding that the 
attack took place at 10:00 am, or that Smailović varied his 
location so as not to get shot by sniper fire.) His protest didn't 
end after 22 days; indeed, he had been playing since the siege 
began until he left Sarajevo in December 1993, often playing 
for free at funerals, in graveyards and bombsites. 
As his story began to circulate, Smailović became a symbol 
for peace in Bosnia. An English composer, David Wilde, was 
so moved by Smailović’s defiant act that he wrote a 
composition for unaccompanied cello, simply called ‘The 
Cellist of Sarajevo’. One of the world’s most accomplished 
cellists, Yo-Yo Ma, then played this piece at the International 
Cello Festival in Manchester in 1994 with Smailović present. 
Several other creative artists, from rock bands to folk singers, 
have also paid tribute to Smailović.13 
Vedran Smailović managed to leave Sarajevo in December 
1993, relocating to Northern Ireland. Celebrated as a musician 
who defied the city’s snipers, Smailović showed that the 
human spirit can resist as powerfully as the physical kind. He 
would not succumb to terror, making a statement that the 
forces that would destroy his city could not destroy the spirit 
of the people.  
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Father Vjekoslav Ćurić 
Vjekoslav 'Vjeko' Ćurić was a Bosnian Croat Franciscan priest 
and humanitarian, best known for his role in helping to save 
Rwandan Tutsi threatened with annihilation during the 
genocide of 1994. Born in Lupoglava, Bosnia–Herzegovina on 
26 April 1957, he studied in Visoko, central Bosnia, and in 
Sarajevo. He entered the Franciscan order, and was ordained 
on 21 June 1982. On 18 August 1983 he began his missionary 
work in Rwanda, one of the first volunteers of the Franciscan 
Africa Project. 
It was in Rwanda, during and after the genocide of 1994, 
that Ćurić’s service was at its most intense. Reportedly one of 
only two non-African Catholic priests to remain in the 
country throughout the genocide, his actions saved hundreds 
of lives. He revealed later that he had sheltered many Tutsi 
from the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi militias, having 
secretly ferried them out of the country in the bottom of his 
truck. At the beginning of the genocide, he similarly saved the 
lives of a number of white clergy—many of them Belgian 
priests, monks and nuns—who were in danger. He allegedly 
received an order direct from the Vatican to leave the country, 
but refused to do so, claiming that while his flock was in 
danger he could not abandon them. 
By 1994, Ćurić was a long-term resident of Gitarama, 
working to help develop his parish of Kivumu. He was well-
known and liked, and when the killing got under way in 
April and May the local people looked to him for rescue. 
Ćurić remained in the country at a time when almost all 
expatriates were leaving. True to his ideals, he made a stand 
with the people of Kivumu. He threw himself into the work of 
providing assistance to all who could reach him, as well as 
helping others to escape. He continued preaching the Gospel, 
condemning the violence and calling for peace. 
After the genocide, Ćurić continued his work in Kivumu. 





lives, and set up educational projects for children. He 
remained impartial throughout, helping both Hutu and Tutsi 
rebuild their shared community, blind to the differences that 
had so divided them just weeks earlier. For this, he was 
viewed by many Hutu as a Tutsi collaborator. In 1996, he 
escaped an attempt on his life but still refused to leave, 
against the advice of many. His attitude was that he had 
stayed during the genocide and would not abandon his 
congregation now that peace had come. 
On 31 January 1998, he was shot in his car, murdered in 
the heart of downtown Kigali. The perpetrators are not 
known. The Catholic Church immediately declared that he 
had gone to a martyr’s death after devoting himself to the 
rescue of others for the glory of God and love of his 
neighbours. He was buried in Kivumu, the community he had 
served without interruption for 15 years, in a church which he 
and his congregation had built. His funeral was attended by 
Rwandan Prime Minister Pierre-Célestin Rwigema and other 
members of the government, along with a vast number of 
Catholic and other Christians, as well as representatives from 
the Jewish and Islamic communities. 
Some in Rwanda refer to Ćurić as Africa’s ‘Oskar 
Schindler’. In 2005, Ćurić’s story formed the backdrop of a 
movie about Rwanda, Shooting Dogs (directed by Michael 
Caton-Jones), released in the United States as Beyond the Gates. 
The writer of the original story, David Belton, was also the 
movie’s producer; both he and the screenwriter, David 
Wolsencroft, knew Ćurić in Rwanda in 1994, as he had saved 
them from the militias on a number of occasions. They 
employed their memories of Ćurić as the inspiration for one 
of the film’s leading characters, Father Christopher, played by 
the British actor John Hurt. 
Inela Nogić 





fame at 17 when, during the siege of Sarajevo, she won the 
1993 Miss Sarajevo beauty pageant, held in a basement to 
avoid sniper attacks from Bosnian Serb militias. Born into a 
strict Muslim family in 1976, she was a good student at 
school. With the outbreak of war in Bosnia in 1992 her 
neighbourhood became known colloquially as 'Little 
Hiroshima' because of the destruction that soon ravaged it, 
but Nogić and her friends decided to make the best of the 
situation by not succumbing. An attractive young woman in a 
city renowned for what some have termed 'Sarajevo style'—a 
combination of French chic and Italian flair—the pretty 
blonde commented to reporters during the siege that 
maintaining a good appearance through attention to hair and 
make-up was a way for young women to show those bent on 
their murder that youth, beauty and life could win out over 
the forces that would destroy them. 
In 1993, Inela Nogić became the symbol of that attitude for 
all young Bosniak women. As the siege continued, the idea of 
organising a beauty pageant, ‘Miss Sarajevo 1993’, came from 
a group of young Sarajevans committed to maintaining the 
life of the city and showing the world that the conditions 
under which they were living were intolerable even though 
their spirit would not be broken. Inela Nogić was encouraged 
to enter by her mother. European aid agencies and NATO 
administrators, taken with the idea of a beauty pageant right 
under the noses of those seeking the destruction of the city, 
ensured that the contest, which took place on 29 May 1993, 
would be transmitted across the world. While inspiring, it 
was also sad to watch. Many of the young women 
participating, clearly affected by the siege and the war, 
appeared undernourished and sickly. At the end of the 
pageant, in an especially poignant moment, Nogić and the 
other contestants held up a banner that read 'DON’T LET THEM 
KILL US!' 
An American journalist and film director, Bill Carter, had 
arrived in Sarajevo in the winter of 1993 to work with the 





1991 for delivering food to orphans affected by war. In 
Sarajevo he shot hundreds of hours of video, including 
coverage of the Miss Sarajevo pageant. In later discussions in 
Italy with Bono, the lead singer of the rock band U2, Carter 
suggested a documentary based on Sarajevo’s underground 
resistance movement. Bono reputedly jumped at the idea; not 
only to produce the film, but also to provide the necessary 
funds. The result was Miss Sarajevo. Subsequently broadcast 
across the globe, it provoked a viewer response calling for an 
end to the siege and the bloodshed. Later, Bono and U2, 
together with Brian Eno, and featuring a cameo solo by 
Luciano Pavarotti, used footage from the movie to create a 
film clip for a single of the same name. Inela Nogić was 
featured on the cover.14 
Popular imagination soon created the urban legend that 
the winner of the Miss Sarajevo pageant had been killed by 
sniper fire, but it is possible to speculate that the pageant may 
have potentially saved Inela Nogić’s life. As a result of the 
publicity, she met a Dutch journalist, and a year later the 
couple moved to the Netherlands, where they settled down 
and had two children. She then studied graphic design, and 
took up residence in Amsterdam. 
In 1997, U2 was scheduled to perform in Sarajevo, the first 
rock band able to host a concert in the city since the end of the 
war. Bono contacted Nogić, then doing modelling work in 
France. He organised for his private plane to take her from 
Nice to Sarajevo where she was met by NATO military 
authorities. They escorted her to the concert at the Koševo 
Stadium along with the band members, and Bono sang Miss 
Sarajevo in her presence as U2’s special guest. 
                                                 
14 On his quest to bring news and awareness of the plight of Sarajevo 
to the world, see Carter, Bill (2005), Fools Rush In: A true story of love, 





Nogić was to say later that the objective of the pageant was 
to show that the war was about more than just men and guns, 
but that women had a part to play in defying the aims of the 
killers. In Balkan tradition—whether it is Serb, Bosniak or 
Croatian—the noun 'inat' translates roughly into a notion of 
actions taken 'in spite of the consequences'. It embodies a 
spirit of defiance regardless of what might come next. Nogić’s 
inat was thus symbolic of a wider defiance relating to 
Sarajevo’s struggle to retain its humanity.  
Conclusion 
What can we learn from these brief descriptions? Are these 
men and women representative of how all 'good' people 
behave during genocide? To recall my student's question 
about a hierarchy of righteousness, is there not a significant 
difference between people who work to save lives—a beauty 
queen and a musician—regardless of the same environment 
of horror in which their actions were played out? 
Many scholars have attempted to answer the question of 
why people engage in altruistic acts. The literature is now 
substantial, with much of it concluding that, at base, people 
are really decent, and that outbreaks of radical evil occur only 
under the most extreme conditions. More often than not, such 
literature fits into a self-help model designed to reinforce the 
‘you can do it’ approach of that large and growing genre. 
(Few, on the other hand, have taken the other approach and 
tried to consider why people do not help. In 1970 two 
psychologists, Bibb Latané and John M Darley, wrote The 
Unresponsive Bystander: Why doesn’t he help?, based on a series 
of human laboratory experiments they had undertaken 
earlier.15) Resistance to genocidal evil takes place for many 
reasons, some of which have been sketched in this essay. Why 
do people put themselves on the line to save others—or, in 
                                                 
15 Latané, Bibb and Darley, John M (1970), The Unresponsive 





lieu of that, the culture of others? The question is as broad as 
it is difficult to answer. Some reasons will include religious 
and ethical beliefs; resistance against those occupying their 
country or perpetrating war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and other massive human rights violations against fellow 
citizens; simple, human anger at the atrocities they were 
witnessing; and a sense of compassion for those in a worse 
position than themselves, regardless of ethnic, racial, 
religious, political, social or national circumstances.16 
The accounts highlighted here—each different from the 
other, in many ways—point to one unifying fact: that people 
can make a difference, even amid dire of situations. 
'Goodness' is very much a notion dependent on the opinion of 
the beholder, making it often impossible to define it in a 
universally acceptable manner. As applied to genocide, 
perhaps we can rest with the view of United States Supreme 
Court Justice Potter Stewart to describe his threshold test for 
pornography in Jacobellis vs Ohio (378 US 184, 1964): 'I know it 
when I see it.' Hardly scientific, it is nonetheless a starting 
point for further discussions relating to the positive behaviour 
that illuminates, however faintly, the awful darkness of 
genocide. Indeed, it is that very light that ensures that the act 
of saving humans can also be one that saves humanity—a 
necessary act of grace for us all, lest the world despair at its 
own impotence in the face of the destructive side of the 
inclination of mankind to perform acts of unalloyed evil. 
                                                 
16 A recent work has appeared suggesting that others are also 
beginning to see a need to examine this issue of why. See Press, Eyal 
(2012), Beautiful Souls: Saying no, breaking ranks, and heeding the voice of 
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